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First Aegis cruiser Ticonderoga slumbers in mothballs. Many of her younger sisters will soon join her |
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Spruances and Ticonderogas share a common hull |
The
plan for the modernization of the 11 selected ships appears to be arranged so
that for each modernized cruiser returned to the fleet, one older, previously
upgraded vessel would be retired. This is an even more draconian
cut than the previous Navy plan to retire 7 cruisers outright from the order of
battle. While perhaps surprising to some, the Navy’s reasoning has some sound
basis in fact. The CG-47 class has been “rode hard” over the last twenty five
years. Shortfalls in training and maintenance in the decade of the 2000’s as
highlighted in the Balisle report further indicate the class has been
proverbially “put away wet” without necessary attention as well. The Spruance class destroyers, on
whose hull and basic machinery the Ticonderoga class is built, had a
programmed life of 35 years. Of these ships, only the first ship of the class, USS
Spruance
(DD 963), reached 30 years of commissioned service. The newest ship in the
class, USS Hayler
(DD 997), had only 20 years of active employment. Although hull life is but one
indicator of many, it would suggest that the common hull shared by both classes
may not have a 35 year life span without significant attention. Deterioration
of that hull is accelerated by multiple long transits to and from overseas
assignments. Cracks in cruiser superstructures, fuel oil service tanks, and
aluminum decks are clear indications that the clock is ticking on the class’
service life.
Although they are deteriorating as they age, it may be
useful for the Navy to keep more than 11 CG’s in a modified condition of
readiness until they can be replaced. This can be done by moving all 11
cruisers into non-deploying reserve fleet status in place of the retiring Oliver
Hazard Perry class frigates. Operating costs of the CG’s could be
further diminished by placing much of their combat systems equipment in layup
maintenance and providing them with skeleton “nucleus crews” as Great Britain’s
Royal Navy did with aging battleships and cruisers in the decade before World
War 1. Ships in this classification had their crew complements reduced by 1/3
or 2/3 given their re-mobilization status and went to sea for limited training
opportunities not to exceed 15 days per quarter. While not as cost effective as
complete inactivation, nucleus crew status keeps the ships “on the books” as
commissioned members of the fleet and capable of more rapid reactivation in
case of national emergency. The RN nucleus crew ships were reactivated in 1914
for World War 1 and gave sterling, useful service as patrol and shore
bombardment ships, thus freeing more modern combatants for battle force
service.
A
Ticonderoga
class cruiser shorn of most of its combat systems, operations, and supply
departments would qualify for nucleus crew status. A U.S. nucleus crew might
spend a week to 10 days per quarter underway with these opportunities spread
out rather than concentrated in one at sea event. Underway periods need be no
greater than 24 hours in duration in order to provide elements of basic crew
training. Crews could eat pre-prepared meals for short underway periods, and a
shore-based centralized supply office could support individual ship’s logistics
and maintenance support needs. All CG’s selected for such a program would be
assigned to geographic areas relatively free from foul weather sortie
requirements. The program would need to be flexible in order to be resilient
through periods of fluctuating budget support.
A nucleus crew option for the
cruisers that preserves some of their capabilities might allay Congressional
fears of a sharp drop in the most capable air warfare class of U.S. surface
combatant. The end of costly ground conflicts in Southwest Asia should free
defense spending for naval, vice ground warfare concerns. If aggressive
behavior from China continues, Congress might yet be convinced to fund a logical
replacement to the CG-47 class cruiser if funds are available. The Navy will
save some significant funds in cutting the cruiser rolls to 11. Congress
however may not be interested in purchasing a capable successor to the CG 47
class if they linger on into the 2040’s.
The Ticonderoga class cruisers
are rapidly aging and it is perhaps unwise to assume the Navy will get much
more than 30 years service out of the hulls of this class. Taking 11 out of
service as long-term replacement assets for those that remain active is a good
solution. A better solution would be to reduce all 11 to nucleus crew status
while they wait for their modernization window. Although substantially reduced
in capability, nucleus crew Tico’s would remain functioning
assets that could be reactivated for service much faster than an essentially
“mothballed” counterpart. The budget outlook remains grim for defense projects
in the immediate future. The continued rise or renaissance however of potential
maritime opponents might yet guarantee the Navy a modern force of air warfare
combatants more capable than the Arleigh Burke Block
III. Holding on to more of the CG 47’s for a little longer rather than
stringing them out far beyond the lifespan of their hulls and machinery may be
the right choice.
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