Eight Responses to the Eight Ways in Which the Army is Strategically Unique

Loren Thompson's latest piece for Forbes entitled "Eight Ways In Which the Army is Strategically Unique" is a solid piece of advocacy from one of Washington's most skilled hands.  I urge you to read it in full, as its even-handed tone and seemingly straightforward logic will seem unobjectionable to many.  A closer reading however, raises some issues.  I will start with his introductory paragraphs and then take each of the eight points of strategic uniqueness in turn.

At first blush, I don't think anyone would quibble with Thompson's statement that the Army is strategically unique, and to be fair, he does not state that the other services lack this quality.  At the cost of $121B in FY15, the American public has a right to expect that its Army provides capabilities not duplicated elsewhere. His effort is aimed at bringing Army uniqueness into sharper relief--but his method of doing so demands that we dismiss virtually all other uses of military force that do not require large occupying forces as somehow unimportant.

Let's move onto his argument:

"Army efforts to articulate a compelling vision of its future are hampered by two obstacles.  First, many politicians and policymakers don’t want to know the truth about what the future may hold for the joint force.  Just as Washington avoids talking about the inevitability of nuclear deterrence one day failing, so it doesn’t want to discuss the possibility that tomorrow’s worst nightmares might find sanctuary in the back alleys of Cairo or Karachi — where we will have to go and root them out.  Second, the Army has an inferiority complex about talking to policy elites hailing from Harvard, so it tries to dress up military imperatives in pretentious jargon that undercuts their urgency."

While there may be politicians and policymakers who "don't want to know the truth" about the future, I am unwilling to surrender to Thompson's view of it.  The thought of THIS ARMY "root"ing out nightmares in teeming megacities like Cairo or Karachi strains credulity.  Why would we do this?  If we were going to do this, not only is the current Army insufficiently sized to do so, one twice its size would be hard pressed.  As a force sizing contributor, I find this assertion without merit.  As to the Army's "inferiority complex" about talking to Harvard foreign policy elites, I am not sure what Army he is talking about.  Foreign policy elites have been lionizing Army leaders for nearly two decades now, with David Petraeus achieving Bilderberg invitation status and H.R. McMaster appearing in Time's 100 Most Influential People list.

"Thus the Army message is a bit muddled, and as a result it is taking disproportionate cuts in Washington’s budget wars just as it took disproportionate casualties in overseas contingencies." 

I honor the Herculean effort of the U.S. Army in overseas contingencies, but I fail to see how the number of casualties suffered in the past is related to budget projections for the future.  This is not strategy, this is emotion.

Now the Eight Ways:

1. The ability to seize and secure extensive areas for indefinite periods.  Indeed, as long as those areas are on land.  And as long as someone else gets the Army there.  Unless those areas are in Canada or Mexico, the ability to dominate the seas and skies remains the table stakes for the Army to provide this, its most unique capability, and more importantly, to sustain it.  It is utterly dependent on the Navy and the Air Force to perform this role.  Doesn't make it unimportant or lacking in uniqueness, just makes it a dependency relationship.  That said, there are whole swathes of military operations that do not in any way, shape or form require this ability.  As long as we continue to value to capacity to invade and occupy large areas of land with hostile forces arrayed against us, this will continue to be a necessary capability of the U.S. Army and its primary strategic discriminator.  The questions of whether to do so, why we should do so, and to what extent should the ability to do so crowd out other investments in the defense budget, remains relevant.

2. The ability to sustain the rest of the joint force through continuous ground presence. Again, as long as the objective of the joint force requires #1.  And as long as #1 happens to involve land objectives, primarily.  And as long as the Army is able to be SUSTAINED by the rest of the joint force.

3. The ability to conduct protracted counter-insurgency operations. No argument here; I think the Army has rightly increased its proficiency in this arena and it should do everything it can institutionally not to lose it.  But there are relevant questions about the degree to which this capability should color force structure arguments, and whether the force necessary to do so (or #1,  #2, and #4) needs to reside primarily in the Active Army.

4. The ability to root out adversaries entrenched in large urban centers.  Returning to the nightmarish scenario posed in the introduction, Thompson raises the specter of street by street fighting in Karachi (Pakistan), a city of 13 million people.  Thompson states: 'The Marine Corps acquitted itself well in the two battles of Fallujah, but that city’s population was barely 200,000 — a city like Karachi, with 13 million inhabitants, is simply beyond the capacity of any service other than the Army to occupy and control." Doing so in Karachi is beyond the Army's capability also, so the matter of scale applies equally.  Were we to wish to engage in the combat Thompson describes, both the Army and the Marine Corps would need to be involved, in addition to the troops of many other nations or a dramatically increased size of both U.S. services.  This is simply not a useful argument for sizing the Army--and certainly not the Active Duty Army.

5. The ability to train foreign security forces in all facets of land warfare.  Another tautology.  The Armed Service that we organize, train and equip to perform all facets of land warfare ought to be able to train others to do so. I understand that the purpose of Thompson's piece is to raise these discriminators, but it comes off sounding a lot like "hey, the Army is unique because it does the things we pay it to do".

 6. The ability to support civil authorities in coping with disruptions. Indeed, another no argument point.  In fact, it is an argument for placing more force structure in the Guard and less in the Active Duty Army.

7. The ability to limit escalation by providing proportional military options.  From Fort Hood?  From Fort Benning?  Cherry-picking the Korea example works to Thompson's advantage here, but the worldwide appetite for provisioning U.S. troops on sovereign soil for decades at a time does not appear to be increasing.  Additionally, all of the mobility questions apply equally here as they do in #1, #2 (and #3).  This is the weakest of his points, and it is where the Army's contribution is least unique.

8. The ability to deter through forward presence that conveys resolve.  Again, Thompson hand-waves at the appetite for other nations to take on the presence of U.S. Army forces.  When a cooperative foreign government requests or accommodates our request to forward station landpower, Thompson is correct, significant resolve is shown.  But these instances are the exception, not the rule, requiring a level of domestic political support here in the U.S. that the use of naval forces simply does not raise.

What is interesting to me is the degree to which Thompson's piece focuses attention on those things the Army does which are -- relatively speaking -- the easiest to expand and contract.  #1-#4 are all a function primarily of how many people are in the Army and the National Guard.  Although not exclusively, these are mainly the tasks of infantry and those in support of the infantry.  Shaping the Army for its post-war downturn should not disproportionately retain those elements of the Army that are the easiest to reconstitute.  Thompson seems to be saying that the cuts to the Army are unwise because we need a massive amount of people to do things that require a massive amount of people.  There is no mention here of the capital intensive capabilities that the Army provides that are far more difficult to reconstitute and which would be far more useful in many of the scenarios currently dominating defense planning.  By this I mean Air Defense Artillery and Aviation--both of which resemble Seapower and Air Power in the time and expense required to build up--as opposed to infantry which is relatively simpler to build over shorter periods of time.

Thompson's attempt to carve our strategic uniqueness for the Army strikes me as a method of arguing against budget cuts, and that is an honorable position.  He has however, selected arguments which strike me as far less a case for the strategic uniqueness of the Army, and far more of an argument for the strategic uniqueness of the National Guard.  

Bryan McGrath

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"Searching for a 21st Century Navy," by Kirk Lippold (Real Clear Defense, 05/19/14)

"Grounded: What the UCLASS RFP Fight Really Means," by Andrew Metrick (War on the Rocks, 05/19/14)

"Conventional Frigates Are Dead Ships Sailing," by Craig Hooper (Next Navy, 05/19/14)

"Not Every Flattop is an Aircraft Carrier," by Bryan McGrath (Real Clear Defense, 05/20/14)

"Fleet Forces' Top Ship Slated for Lay Up," by David Larter (Navy Times, 05/20/14)

"Navy Braces for Backlash After PLA Indictments," by Sydney Freedberg (Breaking Defense, 05/21/14)

"Navy Considers Its Beyond-the-Horizon Future," by Kris Osborn (DoD Buzz, 05/22/14)

"Ideas Pour In To U.S. Navy's Small Ship Task Force," by Chris Cavas (Defense News, 05/23/14)

Bryan McGrath

Foreign Entanglements: Pacifying the Pacific

On this week's episode of Foreign Entanglements, I spoke with Sam Roggeveen of the Lowy Institute about happenings around the Pacific Rim:
 

U.S. Military Power: Three Great Panels at The Heritage Foundation June 4th

Information here on three panels (and lunch!) at The Heritage Foundation on June 4th, including an all-star Naval Warfare Panel.

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"Tomorrow's Stealthy Subs Could Sink America's Navy," by Bill Sweetman (The Daily Beast, 05/12/14)

"Sailors Drive Potent New Riverine Boat in Persian Gulf," by Chris Cavas (Navy Times, 05/12/14)

"Is There a Frigate in Your Future?" by Robert Natter (USNI News, 05/12/14)

"China's Cruise Missiles: Flying Fast Under the Public's Radar," by Dennis Gormley, Andrew Erickson and Jingdong Yuan (The National Interest, 05/12/14)

"Taking China's Carrier Operations Seriously," by Dean Cheng (War on the Rocks, 05/14/14)

"Can China's New Destroyer Find U.S. Stealth Fighters?" by Dave Majumdar (USNI News, 05/14/14)

"SSBNs and Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age," by Jim Holmes (The Diplomat, 05/15/14)

"Is Air-Sea Battle Useless?" by Zachary Keck (The National Interest, 05/16/14)

Bryan McGrath

RealClearDefense U.S. Navy for the 21st Century

Here is the video from the May 9th Panel.  About an hour.

U.S. Navy for the 21st Century

Mediocre Carriers Are Sometimes Enough

Australia giving some thought to the F-35B:

Defence Minister David Johnston told The Weekend West _the Government was considering buying the "B" model of the F-35 - a specialised variant of the stealth jet being built to operate from aircraft carriers. Last month, Australia committed to buying 72 of the conventional model F-35s from US aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin at a cost of almost $20 billion. But the Government has left the door open to buying more F-35s and the minister says the F-35B will be considered. "Now that aircraft is more expensive, does not have the range but it's an option that has been considered from day one," Senator Johnston said.

Here's a piece I wrote a couple weeks ago on the suitability of the Canberra class as F-35B platform:

To be clear, effectively operating the high-tech JSF takes more than just a flat deck. The Canberras are amphibious warships first. They can support helicopters just fine, but they lack the munitions and aviation fuel storage to support intensive fixed-wing flight operations. Training, deck organization and personnel for helicopters differ significantly compared to those for fighters. Moreover, flying JSFs from the Canberras would impair the vessels’ ability to carry out their primary mission by taking up deck space and storage and splitting training time... The Canberras wouldn’t make great carriers or even good carriers. But in the right circumstances, Australia might only need a mediocre carrier.

The Gift of American Power

Only occasionally does someone write something that causes me to smile broadly and do a little fist-pump.  Robert Kaplan's piece yesterday in Real Clear World was just such an occasion.  Coming as it did on the same day as Usha Sahay's piece at War on the Rocks entitled "No, America is Not in Retreat" made for two interesting and somewhat orthogonal views.  Kaplan stakes his claim here:  

"But what about all those new global and regional institutions and organizations, to say nothing about the growth and opportunity that has come from financial markets? Aren't they the other, more positive half of reality? They are. But then the question arises: Why have they been able to come into being in the first place? What ultimately undergirds them? The answer is one that many members of the global political and financial aristocracy do not want to hear: raw American power."

And then speaks clearly to the nature of that power here:

"It is the various U.S. Navy fleets and numbered air forces that are the ultimate guarantor of stability in the key theaters of the globe...The U.S. Navy calls itself a global force for good. That claim would pass the most stringent editorial fact-checking process. Without that very naked American ambition, which allows the Navy and the Air Force to patrol the global commons, the world is reduced to the sum of its parts: a Japan and China, and a China and India, dangerously at odds and on the brink of war; a Middle East in far wider war and chaos; a Europe neutralized and emasculated by Russian Revanchism; and an Africa in even greater disarray."

Contrast this with Sahay's piece:

"It’s certainly true that America is changing its role on the world stage. But that’s not the same as retreating from that stage altogether. In fact, the opposite is true: by many measures, the Obama administration has increased American engagement with the world. What has changed is not the amount of engagement, but its nature. Obama has sought to re-orient our foreign policy away from a military-first approach, and toward a more comprehensive approach that leans more on diplomatic and economic tools."

And:

"Critics who believe that Obama has pulled back from the world stage are confusing quantitative changes in the nature of U.S. engagement with a qualitative decline in that engagement."

Read both articles.  For Kaplan, it is hard power that ultimately backs up diplomatic engagement.  For Sahay-who not once, but twice, refers to pre-Obama foreign policy is terms of "militarism", engagement is self-perpetuating.  

Bryan McGrath

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (USMC) Weekly Read Board

By popular demand!

1. Marine Corps and U.S. Army: Rivalry Between Both Pushes Them to be Better

2. Marine Corps to Review Raid on Pendleton Law Offices

3. K-Max Steps Up Sangin District Retrograde Mission

4. King Stallion: Newest Marine Helo Gets Royal Rollout

5. There are Fewer Than 300 Marines Left in Afghanistan’s Once Most Violent District

6. Congressman Pressures CMC to Account for Whistle-Blower Fallout

7. Corps Doubles the Number of MRAPS It Will Keep

8. Pacific Pathways: Army Prepares New Tack for Deploying Forces in Pacific

9. Citing progress, Marine advisers leave Helmand province

10. How women are scaling barriers to combat 

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"Congress's Chance to Fix Aircraft Carrier Drones," by Shawn Brimley (Defense One, 05/04/14)

"LCS Will Miss World's Largest Naval Exercise," Chris Cavas (Defense News, 05/05/14)

"China's Underwater A2/AD Strategy," by Harry Kazianis (The Diplomat, 05/06/14)

"The Next Act for Aegis," by Sam LaGrone (USNI News, 05/07/14)

"HASC Endorses Two Super Hornets Per Month," by John Bennett (Defense News, 05/07/14)

"Surface Navy: Survivability is Not One of the CNO's Three Tenets," by Craig Hooper (Next Navy, 05/07/14)

"Inside the Ring: China's Missile Cruiser a Major Step to Naval Warfare Buildup," by Bill Gertz (Washington Times, 05/07/14)

"Following in the Wake of the Frigate; Remarkable Continuity in the Postwar U.S. Surface Combatant Force," by Lazarus (Information Dissemination, 05/08/14)

"HASC Puts Down Payment on 12th LPD," by Sydney Freedberg (Breaking Defense, 05/09/14)

Following in the Wake of the Frigate; Remarkable Continuity in the Postwar US Surface Combatant Force

The truncation of the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) to 32 units, and subsequent search for a more “lethal” and “survivable” combatant has triggered a useful discussion on the shape of the future U.S. surface combatant fleet. Captain Arthur H. Barber’s “Rethinking the Future Fleet” in this month’s Naval Institute Proceedings is especially insightful on this topic. Senior civilian and military leaders should however first look back on the last 60+ years before discussing issues of lethality and survivability for future warships. U.S. surface warships of all sizes from the 15,000 ton Zumwalt class destroyer to the 3000 ton Littoral Combatant ship are all descendents of the frigates (DLG) built just after the end of the Second World War. A combination of a new operational concept, new threats at sea, and rapidly advancing technology combined to create a persistent design in U.S. surface combatants that endures to the present day. The postwar surface combatant has been primarily assigned as a defensive platform based on the experience of World War 2 and those that followed in Vietnam. Its design features the primacy of sensory, communication and weapons control equipment over stout construction and armor. It was specifically designed to support defensive rather than offensive missions. These features have been a constant in a parade of ships that have entered the fleet from 1947 to 2014. If senior national security decision makers desire greater lethality and enhanced survivability in future surface combatants, the characteristics so prevalent in U.S. warship design since the late 1940’s must be re-evaluated.

USS Savannah hit by German glide bomb (Navsource.org)

 The Experience of War

    

      The experience of World War 2 fundamentally changed the characteristics of postwar construction surface combatants. Aircraft; early guided weapons like the German Fritz X glide bomb and the Japanese kamikaze; and underwater threats were recognized as more significant threats to the fleet than surface gunfire. The Combat Information Center (CIC) that had originated during the war was improved and expanded to support a higher volume of more accurate fire in defense of the new capital ship-designate aircraft carrier. Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) historian CAPT. David Boslaugh quotes Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Earnest King’s 1945 statement that explains this problem. The CNO was troubled about the inability to rapidly process data and said, “The display of information was slow, complicated, and incomplete, rendering it difficult for the human mind to grasp the situation.” The solution in King’s mind was to optimize the CIC for automated reception and dissemination of actionable fire control data to own ship weapons and other members of a formation. From 1945 onward surface warships would be designed around this defensive role in protecting carriers and other high value units from both air and underwater attack.

The 1945 Bikini Atoll "Abel" Test, Wikipedia

     The advent of nuclear weapons further changed warship design as they made all but the largest and best protected ship vulnerable to immediate destruction. The Bikini atoll nuclear weapon tests (ABEL and BAKER) of 1945 indicated that armor might protect the ship from sinking, but was relatively useless in protecting the lives of the crew. A goat tethered inside a 14 inch gun turret of the former battleship USS Nevada survived the blast, as did the ship, but died two weeks later of radiation sickness. Warship designers envisioned a nuclear attack rapidly turning a fleet of heavily armored units into ghost ships with dead crews. The countermeasure wash down system developed in the wake of these tests might protect against fallout accumulation, but armor was useless in the face of massive doses of gamma radiation.

The Rise of the Missile Frigate (DLG)

USS Norfolk (DL 1), Navsource.org

     The first postwar U.S. surface combatant reflected the combination of new threats. The USS Norfolk (DL-1), designed as a “hunter killer” with dual anti-air and anti-submarine warfare missions was the predecessor to dozens of similar warships that followed. This dual mission focus combined a light cruiser sized hull and destroyer weapons and machinery. The usual light cruiser five inch armor belt was eschewed and lightweight aluminum superstructure construction was embraced in order to support larger and more complex radar and communications equipment. While the Norfolk proved too expensive to mass produce in 1947, increased defense spending in the 1950’s at the outset of the Cold War fueled the construction of her missile-armed descendents. Similar ships such as the conventionally-powered Farragut, Leahy and Belknap classes followed, as did nuclear-powered variants Bainbridge, Truxtun, and the California and Virginia classes. The DLG concept was validated in the service of these ships as Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone (PIRAZ) ship during the Vietnam War. The DLG’s Sterett and Biddle armed with Terrier missiles proved as capable as the much larger guided missile cruisers like the converted gun cruiser Chicago and the purpose-built Long Beach in combating North Vietnamese aircraft.

USS Biddle (DLG 34) Navsource.org

A Homogeneous Defensive Fleet

     The DLG’s role as the principle postwar surface combatant model was further strengthened by the retirement of the World War 2 construction guided missile cruisers. The perceived “cruiser gap” between the respective numbers of U.S. and Soviet warships bearing the “cruiser” title caused the reclassification of four out of five DLG groups as guided missile cruisers (CG). The DLG’s were similar in size and capability to Soviet cruisers, making the change a reasonable choice. This relabeling of the DLG was significant in that it assumed the title, but not the perceived survivability embodied in the cruiser term.

     Other classes of surface combatant built in the postwar era followed the precedent set by the DLG and grew in size to support their part of the defensive mission. Destroyers, from the Forrest Sherman class of 1953 through the Spruance class that served until the last decade were optimized to support larger and more capable CIC’s and their associated communication and weapons direction equipment. Smaller destroyer escorts from the first postwar Dealey class through the now retiring Oliver Hazard Perry’s saw an expansion of their electronics capacity for antisubmarine warfare.

The original DDG 47 seen here with never-built Virginia
class AEGIS variant (an actual cruiser design)

     The entry of AEGIS-equipped warships and subsequent combatants to the fleet continued the postwar trend in surface warship construction. The AEGIS-equipped nuclear strike cruiser (CSGN), the successor platform to the retired World War 2-cruisers, was cancelled in the late 1970’s by the Carter administration due to excessive costs. Its low end, conventionally powered variant, the DDG-47 however survived as the rerated CG-47 Ticonderoga class cruiser due to its command and control capabilities, heavy surface to air missile (SAM) armament and ability to host a flag staff. The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class was rated as a destroyer vice a cruiser for its lack of similar capabilities as compared to the Ticonderoga’s. The Zumwalt class (DDG 1000) is as large as a late World War 2 cruiser, but it too appears to be essentially a large destroyer-type vessel. At 1/5 the Zumwalt’s displacement, the LCS might not appear at first to fit the model. Like its larger sisters however, it has a small crew, relies on stealth and self defense weapons rather than armor, and has a lightweight construction similar to other postwar U.S. surface combatants.

USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) maneuvers with USS
Freedom (LCS 1), US Navy photo

 Classification as a Measure of “Survivability”

     All current combatants (cruisers, destroyers, frigates and LCS) are similar descendents of Norfolk and the DLG “frigate” classes that followed. Like Norfolk, current surface combatants are fundamentally defensive in mission and principally equipped to protect high value units from air, missile, and underwater attack. LCS may eventually have a more “offensive” mission, but remains defensive for the present. All four classes of combatant are dependent on defensive systems rather than actual armor or structural components for survivability. The U.S. Navy separates the LCS and the FFG from the CG and DDG in its current survivability rating system. The history of the last six decades however would seem to warn that classification should be used with great care as an indicator of “survivability”. The Ticonderoga class cruiser, the Freedom and Independence LCS sea frames and even the large Zumwalt class DDG 1000 are differing examples of the same design ethos that has dominated U.S. surface combatant design since 1945. Any discussion of surface combatant “survivability” must take into account this basic similarity among U.S. surface warships. The days of significant “physical” differences between surface combatant types have been over for a very long time.    

AEI/Heritage Project for the Common Defense (Navy) Weekly Read Board

"Asia Pivot Requires Better Maritime Defenses," by Emil Maine (Real Clear Defense, 04/28/14)

"Upcoming Budget Crunch Could Unravel New Deployment Plan," by David Larter (Navy Times, 04/28/14)

"House Committee Seeks to Stall UCLASS Program Pending New Pentagon Un-manned Aviation Study," by Sam LaGrone and Dave Majumdar (USNI News, 04/29/14)

"What to do with those Eleven Cruisers," by Lazarus (Information Dissemination, 04/29/14)

"Save the Carrier, Sink the LCS," by Everett Pyatt (Real Clear Defense, 04/30/14)

"Obama's Pivot to Asia Will Lack Firepower," by Kristina Wong (The Hill, 04/30/14)

"Navy Asks Industry for Input on Follow-on for Littoral Combat Ship," by Sam LaGrone (USNI News, 05/01/14)

"Attrition, Maneuver and Air-Sea Battle," by Adam Humayun (CIMSEC, 05/01/14)

"LCS Will Miss World's Largest Naval Exercise," by Chris Cavas (Defense News, 05/04/14)

Bryan McGrath

VADM Francis R. "Frank" Donovan, USN (Ret.), Requiescat in Pace

VADM Francis R. Donovan, USN

Late in the Fall of 1991, VADM Frank Donovan, Commander of the Military Sealift Command, had a decision to make about hiring a new Flag Lieutenant.  Miltary Sealift Command had "made its bones" in the Gulf War earlier that year, ensuring that the half a million strong Desert Shield and Desert Storm forces were closed, supplied and sustained.  Donovan was at the top of his game, and as was the custom then, rated a LCDR as his aide, which is what he was replacing.  For some odd reason, the Surface Warfare shop sent my name in for consideration, even though at the time, I was a frocked Lieutenant (the horror).  So I drove up to the Navy Yard one day, figuring I'd get some interview experience for the day they send me into a bite sized one-or-two star where I'd be a better fit.

I can still remember how nervous I was, especially when I met the outgoing aide.  He was about six three, ramrod straight, the very picture of a perfect flag lieutenant.  As soon as I saw him, I knew there was no chance.  So I went into the interview with the Admiral thinking I had little to lose.

On the coffee table was a schematic, a print not unlike architectural plans.  Although I was looking at it upside down, with a short glance I could tell that it was the design for a large, marine boiler.  Admiral Donovan welcomed me and then said almost immediately, "what's that?" as he pointed at the schematic.  I suppose I hesitated a second, because he quickly interjected "nah, just kiding".  And then I answered--"it is a marine boiler, sir."  I had started the Navy as a boilers officer, and the components were readily discernible.  When he asked how I knew that, I told him about my first job--which incidentally, had been an early job of his.

"It doesn't get any better than this, Kid."

The interview did not last long, we shook hands and I left the office for the drive back to Norfolk, with little sense that I would get the job, but an incredibly positive assessment of one of the most senior men I had met in the Navy to that time.

You can guess the story.  I got the job, and it was a wonderful experience.  I never met a kinder, gentler man in the Navy, a man for whom the Sailor and the Marine were the highest reason for service.

The Admiral had eight kids, but he and Martha made me feel like one of their own.  I never knew how they all fit in that little house in Vienna, but they made it work and they made it work well.

One day, the Admiral walked into my office, adorned as was his custom in his "Navy Boxing" windbreaker. He said, "Sport (he generally called me Sport, Champ, or Kid), my picture fell off the CNO's piano."  I didn't immediately understand, so he spelled it out for me.  "The CNO just called, and I have to retire.  So that's what we'll be working on for the next couple of months."  It was a sad day for me, and I am sure it was for him too.  I know he would loved to have had another job.

Frank Donovan loved the Navy, the Naval Academy, the Marine Corps, Sailors, Marines, Mariners, and Gators.  I think he may have loved Gators best.  It was a sight to behold when he was among them, and the pride they had in each other's friendship and professionalism was strong.

I would see the Admiral yearly at Surface Navy Association symposiums.  He was always deeply engaged, always working on something important.  It was one of my favorite things about SNA shows.

I will miss him.

Bryan McGrath

052D's role in Chinese Navy

In my last blog entry, I looked over the future of PLAN surface combatant fleet. Part of the reason I did that is the emergency of the new Type 055 cruiser. For any future PLAN carrier group or expeditionary strike group, Type 052D will be expected as important escorts even with Type 055 in the fold. What roles can Type 052D and how will it be utilized by PLAN?

If we look at Type 052D’s ancestors Type 052C, we have a surface combatant that is clearly designed to provide area air defense. It is the first modern Chinese AAW ship that has advanced multi-functional radar system with Active guided long range SAM along with relative modern combat system. It is also expected by many to have an advanced AEGIS like combat system allowing engagements using inputs from sensors on different ships and aircraft. While it is also equipped with the advanced YJ-62 (also replaceable with LACM) and advanced sonar system (looks to be same Towed Array Sonar as on Type 054A), there is no question that the emphasis of the ship is for area air defense. Type 052C’s ancestor Type 052B can be looked at as a stepping stone from Type 052 to 052C. Its production stopped at 2, because Type 054A is cheaper and provides almost all of the capabilities of 052B (including much stronger ASW). A large PLAN flotilla prior to 052D would surely need both Type 052C and 054A to provide required air defense and anti-submarine defense.

Type 052D provides PLAN with a lot more flexibility. That’s why more Type 052D is expected to be produced than Type 052C. It is equipped with a newer generation of multi-functional radar, new variable depth sonar along with other new sensors. More importantly, it’s the first surface combatant with the universal VLS. Type 052D could also maintain a more balanced profile with 32 cells for long range SAM, 8 cells for quad-packed medium range SAM, 8 cells for anti-ship missiles, 8 cells for LACMs and 8 cells for ASROC like missile. That would provide comparable air defense to 052C while having increased firepower in ASuW and ASW. If 052D is given the task of area air defense, it can utilize all of its VLS for the purpose of air defense. They can use 48 cells for long range SAM and remaining 16 cells for quad-packed medium range SAM or even 56 cells for long range SAM and remaining 8 cells for quad-packed medium range SAM. Both of which would provide solid protection for the ship itself and surrounding fleet once we factor in the 24-cell HQ-10 SAM and 7-barrelled PJ-12 CIWS for point defense. Another possible usage is in BMD, although I'm not sure if the technical characteristics of 052D's radar allows it to do tracking and target discrimination of ballistic missile threats. This role might be left for Type 055 cruisers. In theory, you could put the reported HQ-26 missile (or some other SM-3 like missile) on 052D along with other air defense missiles in the BMD role.

With the addition of PJ-38 artillery gun and VLS launched LACMs, 052D could be PLAN's first ship to have major land attack capabilities. PJ-38 would provide 052D with the ability to support amphibious landings like Sov destroyers. Long range LACMs would finally give PLAN the ability to attack land target from far away. This is a capability that PLAN really never needed when they were a brown or green water navy. Even though YJ-62 launchers were removed, 052D could also be fitted with 16+ anti-ship missiles in an ASuW profile. All of the SAMs should also have secondary anti-ship mode. If they develop PJ-38 into being able to launch over the horizon anti-ship projectiles, 052D could be quite powerful in ASuW missions. Finally, Type 052D can also be PLAN's most effective surface ship in ASW missions. Its universal VLS can hold longer ranged ASROC missiles than Type 054A's VLS. Type 054A is almost limited to the short legged Z-9C helicopter while 052D could also use Ka-28 helicopters (and Z-15/20 in the future). With a more powerful sonar suite than Type 054A, it would be better suited for ASW missions in blue waters.

At the moment, 052D is China's primary surface combatant and expected to provide the most important roles in escorting a fleet. It is likely to be useful in China's navy for a long time because it is using China's first universal VLS and an artillery gun that can launch different type of projectiles. Its close in defense systems could easily be upgraded. New missiles and projectiles could probably be supported on 052D in the future with software updates or relatively small hardware upgrades. PLAN currently has the problem where it often does not replace outdated weapon system because of cost and supply concerns. That's why the recent Type 052 upgrades only changed the CIWS. Type 052D is first ship in PLAN to really benefit from a more plug and play approach that USN has enjoyed for years. Even when Type 055 joins service, Type 052D could still be very useful in land attack or ASuW or ASW roles.

CNAS EVP, Former Obama NSC Official, Shawn Brimley on UCLASS

Here's a piece on the Defense One site by Shawn Brimley, who used to work at the Obama White House and now helps run the Center for a New American Security.  In it, Brimley takes the same position I've been advocating here for months, that the Navy was moving in the wrong direction on UCLASS.  In his words:

"The Navy made a mistake by issuing requirements that guarantee the fleet will receive a lesser drone than it could be getting. The Navy is asking for a carrier-version of non-stealthy surveillance drones that operate in uncontested (friendly) airspace. That costly decision will prevent the development of a true, surveillance-strike drone that can operate where they truly will be needed, in enemy airspace."  

So, it seems that I share the same position as a Democratic national security thought leader who used to be in the Obama White House.  And that opinion is shared with the Republican Chairman of the HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA).  And a good bit of the intellectual energy behind all three of our opinions comes from the thinking of recently installed Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Work, while at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

That's what we call "consensus".

Bryan McGrath