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LCS-Inspired Frigate/Corvette Variants (Lockheed Martin) |
Much of the recent discussion of the
current Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) program and the proposed new frigate
FF(G)X involves the “survivability” of both classes. Numerous senior civilian
and uniformed officials have called for the FF(G)X to be “more survivable” than
the current LCS. Casual observers may not know how much information goes into determining this feature of a
warship design. Before the Second World War and for some time after,
“survivability” was primarily concerned with how many “hits” of a certain size
projectile a warship could sustain and still be mission capable. In the postwar
era, the concept of survivability changed based on a new ethos in surface
combatant design, the advent of nuclear weapons, and advances in detection, communication,
weapons, and countermeasure technologies. In fact, a warship’s active and
passive defenses against attack from aircraft, cruise missiles and underwater
weapons have effectively replaced armor and other elements of physical
resistance to damage, making a warship’s “survivability” more akin to a combat
aircraft than past combatants.
The
current Navy "survivability" instruction promulgated in 2012 is relatively effective in
measuring this new concept of “survivability”, but other so-called X factors
can play significant roles. The geography of a theater of combat and the
weather there can change the perception of a warship’s relative “survivability.
Today’s reasonably “survivable” surface combatant can equally be tomorrow’s
“iron coffin” if it sustains damage in a remote location or in a worsening sea state. Before moving forward with
a design for a “survivable” successor to LCS, senior civilian and uniformed
officers should specifically determine exactly what that concept means both for
present classes of surface combatant, the projected FF(G)X and those designs
that follow. The November 2012 instruction is a step in the right direction,
but more must be done to accurately measure the survivability of current combatants. A
first step would be upgrading the current Ship Self Defense Test Ship (currently
the ex USS Paul F. Foster) to one of
the current or former CG-47 class cruisers and conducting realistic weapon
testing against its active and passive defensive systems. They are the heart of
real warship survivability and ought to be rigorously evaluated against actual
weapons.
The present (November 2012) Navy
instruction on warship survivability makes a significant change from its
predecessor in that:
“The previous version of this instruction, dated 23 September
1988, established the policy that “Survivability shall be considered a
fundamental design requirement of no less significance than other inherent ship
characteristics.” This basic premise has not changed although survivability is
now considered in terms of capabilities
vice characteristics.”
Survival “capabilities” are divided into the
categories of susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability. While the
physical structure of ships is still part of the survivability “triangle”, the
ship’s capability to resist attack occupies a much larger part of its overall
combat rating. This revision is a welcome change. Over the course of the Cold
War and especially the last 20 years, weapons have grown more accurate and potentially lethal. A surface combatant’s survivability now rests more on active and passive systems to avoid or resist attack than physical structure
or armor. This demand is reflected in
the susceptibility component. The vulnerability and recoverability components
still emphasize the ability of a ship to survive initial effects of attack, but
the trend toward more powerful antiship weapons and more electronic rather than
armor-laden warships makes avoiding attack the primary method of survival and
continued mission accomplishment in a wartime setting.
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HMS Sheffield |
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USS Stark |
Other factors that affect
survivability are often omitted by experts. The geography and weather
conditions of a naval battle can significantly impact
survivability. The Oliver Hazard Perry
class frigates are often cited by LCS opponents as more “survivable” as
evidenced by recoverability of the USS
Stark and USS Samuel B. Roberts
after they sustained missile and mine damage. Both crews performed heroically
in saving their respective ships, but the relatively calm waters of the Persian Gulf, and proximity
to friendly bases significantly aided in the retrieval of both ships. Compare
this with the experience of the British destroyer HMS Sheffield lost during the 1982 Falklands War. The ship’s
firemain system was wrecked beyond immediate repair at sea as a result of
battle damage, but remained upright and stable for 5 days until the weather
deteriorated. The ship took on a severe list while under tow to South Georgia and
sank soon after the weather worsened. Sheffield
might have survived had she sustained the same damage in the Persian Gulf
rather than the South Atlantic.
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Ex-Japanese battleship Tosa |
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Ex USS Washington |
Tests conducted on incomplete modern
battleships such as the ex-USS Washington
(BB 45) and the ex-IJN Tosa in the
1920’s gave U.S. and Japanese naval leaders a good idea of the survivability of
their capital ships. It is no longer useful however to merely fire weapons into
dead hulks as a method of determining a warship’s ability to survive attack. That
procedure was effective when a warship’s ability to resist attack was only
resident in its physical construction and armor (if any). New methods must be used to assess a warship's active and passive defense capabilities. One
example would involve replacing the present Ship Self Defense Test Ship (SSDTD)
ex-USS Paul F. Foster with one of the
retiring/refitting Ticonderoga class
cruisers. The Defense Department Office of Test and Evaluation
recommended the Navy build a new unmanned test ship in late 2013, but a retiring Ticonderoga would be a more accurate test platform. AEGIS cruisers were designed to defeat saturation cruise
missile attacks on carrier battle groups. Put an unmanned, fully armed AEGIS
cruiser to the test. Take it to a deserted stretch of ocean and fire increasing
numbers of antiship cruise missiles at the target until its defenses are
saturated and overcome. Up to now this
question has been one of dueling mathematical formulas. Salvo equations and
estimates of single shot probability of kill (SSPK) go only so far in
determining “survivability”. An accurate measurement of combat endurance
would either build confidence in current U.S. warship performance or force
significant change depending on what results were obtained in the test. This hypothetical test would be extremely
expensive, dangerous, and violate a number of U.S. environmental statutes, but what is the
price in determining the real “survivability” of a modern warship? The overall goal remains deterring conflict if
possible rather than actually going to war. As several British admirals and American
politicians have said over the course of the 20th century, “battleships
are less expensive than battles.”
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Ex-USS Paul F. Foster (SSDTS) |
Survivability is a loaded term with many
possible definitions given the large numbers of potential variables used to
determine this vital warship capability. Those seeking to use survivability as
term of discussion should be careful in its employment. Furthermore, the U.S.
Navy should be given the funds and legal latitude necessary to conduct the live
fire testing needed to adequately measure this feature. While expensive and
time-consuming, such testing is necessary in measuring the survival of equally
expensive modern surface combatants.
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