Deception and the Backfire Bomber, the Finale

For previous installments, see Parts I, II, III, and IV

Final Thoughts

It should be hoped that Tokarev’s article will be the first of many revelations in the coming years illustrating how the Soviet and U.S. navies actually used EW and tactical deception against each other to gain edges in their struggle for maritime scouting superiority. Enough time has passed such that many of the less-sensitive aspects of this late Cold War competition ought to be safely disclosable without harming existing tactics or capabilities. A deeper understanding of this competition’s rich history will be crucial to the U.S. Navy’s doctrinal and tactical development as new oceanic surveillance-reconnaissance-strike threats emerge in the coming years. We have thankfully not fought a great power-level war since 1945, and if we are to keep that track record going our current and future force must develop and then maintain the deception and counter-deception competencies central to modern maritime warfare—not to mention conventional deterrence.