Campaign value is a term I frequently use to note that an
asset’s budgetary ‘price tag’ or its tactical importance are not necessarily the
same thing as its importance to a campaign or a war effort. As I described in
the endnotes of my Maritime Deception and Concealment article:
The traditional
term “high-value unit” is shorthand for tactically important or very expensive
assets that a force must strive to protect: aircraft carriers, amphibious and
maritime prepositioned matériel-carrying ships, replenishment ships, strategic
aircraft, wide-area-surveillance aircraft, transport aircraft, and
airborne-refueling aircraft. At the spectrum’s other end, “low-value unit”
applies to relatively expendable small surface combatants and tactical
aircraft. This terminology is imprecise, however, in that it incorrectly
implies that an asset’s tactical value always carries over into campaign-level
value. Although “high-value units” generally have high campaign value, the
relationship is not automatic. For example, while an aircraft carrier’s
tactical value is difficult to dispute, in a given campaign a combatant capable
of ballistic-missile defense or a submarine carrying conventional land-attack
missiles—either of which might otherwise be considered medium-value units—may
be of greater importance and correspondingly require the support of the rest of
the force. The key to interpreting a specific asset’s campaign value is to
judge how a campaign would be impacted by its temporary incapacitation or
outright loss. Campaign value is thus a more nuanced framework for doctrinal
development and operational planning. (Pg. 109)
I failed to
note above that “high value unit” can also be used to indicate an asset is of
great operational-level importance. It is probably also more accurate to
characterize them as being ‘very capital intensive’ to field vice merely being
“very expensive.” Nevertheless, as most campaigns are comprised of multiple discrete
operations, I believe that understanding an asset’s campaign value is a prerequisite
to planning those operations.
I must
reemphasize that the types of assets we normally think of when we use the term
“high value unit” will generally also have high campaign value. My point is
that circumstances matter, and as such one should examine how a specific
asset’s capabilities and limitations can affect the holistic flow of a
particular campaign based upon the capabilities and limitations of every other asset
within the friendly force. A particular asset’s campaign value could also
conceivably change over the course of a conflict; it is not necessarily static.
Gauging an asset’s campaign value in ‘most likely’ as well as ‘most dangerous’
conflict scenarios not only can help inform when and how that asset should be
used, but also inform force structure planners as to roughly how many of that
asset should be procured or preserved.
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