The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) arsenal’s traditional primary role is supporting theater nuclear deterrence.[i] China’s first generation DF-3 series (NATO Designation CSS-2) MRBMs were tasked with holding Indian and Russian targets, as well as major U.S. military forward deployed force concentrations within East Asia, at nuclear risk. As such, they were neither produced in great numbers nor required the terminal accuracy necessary for conventional long-range strike tasks.[ii]
Although some DF-3s remain in
service, roughly twenty years ago the PLA began replacing them with the DF-21
(NATO Designation CSS-5) missile series. Unlike its liquid-fueled predecessor, the
solid-fueled DF-21 series can be rapidly readied for launch and are therefore harder
to interdict when deployed in the field on their Transporter Erector Launchers
(TEL). More significantly, while the ‘original’
DF-21 (CSS-5 MOD 1) and its longer-range DF-21A (CSS-5 MOD 2) variant assumed
the historical theater nuclear deterrence role, the more recent DF-21C (CSS-5
MOD 3) and DF-21D (CSS-5 MOD 5) variants were designed specifically to deliver conventional
munitions against point targets on land and large ships at sea respectively.[iii]
There are two hypothesized roles
for conventionally-armed DF-21s. First, there is a general scholarly consensus
that PLA doctrine allows for if
not embraces the use of conventionally-armed theater-range ballistic missiles
in war-opening/escalating strikes aimed at decisively neutralizing a superior adversary’s
forward forces and military infrastructure. This doctrinal tenet is almost certainly independent of the military strategy, doctrine, or force structure and posture
options the U.S. might employ for defending its East Asian allies and
interests. Beijing’s paramount declared military-strategic objective—the prevention of
effective American military intervention on the behalf of an embattled ally in
a major East Asian contingency—simply cannot be accomplished with a high degree
of confidence absent a PLA first
strike. It is resultantly noteworthy (and generally overlooked) that the PLA
doctrinal works and professional journal articles advocating conventional first
strikes predated the U.S. Air-Sea Battle operational concept’s 2010 introduction.[iv]
Within this context, the conventionally-armed
DF-21C’s and -21D’s advantages in range, speed, field-deployed survivability,
and defense penetration capabilities relative to PLA
strike aircraft make them ideal for maximizing the damage that can be inflicted
upon an opponent’s in-theater Command and Control (C2) nodes, military
bases’ critical infrastructure and logistical stores, and highest campaign-value
forces while minimizing tactical warning of attack.[v] Further, these missiles’
abilities to distract, suppress, or damage the opponent’s most important theater
air and missile defense nodes could help support other elements of a PLA first
strike, as well as bash down the door for follow-on strikes by PLA assets that
would otherwise be quite vulnerable to those defenses. If it is solely
configured to perform these war-opening/escalating missions, the peacetime
conventional-capable DF-21 inventory only needs to be as large as what would be
necessary to create a high probability of successfully neutralizing the
relatively small set of high-priority targets assigned to a first strike’s
opening waves. This sizing would be possible because surviving and
lower-priority targets would likely be assigned to other combat arms for follow-on
attacks. DF-21C and 21D inventory sizing along these lines would be consistent
with the PLA’s apparent sizing of its SRBM inventories for Taiwan
contingencies.[vi]
Additional margin might be built into the inventory to provide backup rounds in
case some missiles were unavailable for maintenance reasons when a crisis
erupted, failed to launch when ordered, or failed to successfully strike the
highest priority targets. The operative force-sizing question would be whether
the inventory would be earmarked specifically for Sino-American/Japanese
contingencies, or whether Sino-Indian or Sino-Russian contingencies would also
need to be covered.
The second possible conventionally-armed
DF-21 role is performing long range strikes throughout a protracted conflict.
These could include preemptive or suppressive strikes against major force
groupings as they assemble for an operation, opportunistic strikes against
fleeting high campaign-value targets, or direct/indirect fires—including
possible feint attacks—in support of PLA Joint combined arms operations. It has been
suggested, in fact, that the DF-21D might be used in war for land-based
‘artillery support’ of PLA maritime operations.[vii] Much like shore-based heavy artillery prior to
the mid-20th Century, this kind of fire support would be
exceptionally difficult for an opposing Navy to counter directly. Whereas
coastal guns could only cover localized waters, however, the DF-21D possesses a
theater-wide coverage area that not only includes China’s immediate periphery
but also the maritime approaches to East Asia—and U.S. treaty allies’ homelands.
A conventional-capable DF-21
inventory sized for the campaign-waging role would need to be rather large
given the modern historical evidence advanced ordnance expenditure rates would be
quite high in a conflict.[viii] This would be
accentuated if Chinese leaders believed any notional conventional war would be
intense but short, and resultantly opted not to take the extremely
cost-inefficient and expensive step of structuring the DF-21C and -21D
industrial production and test infrastructures such that they could readily replenish
the PLA’s arsenal under combat conditions. Additionally, the more effective the
defender’s surviving active and passive missile defenses might be in combat—especially after
the first strike’s shock and surprise fades—the more missiles the attacker must
launch per salvo to achieve a desired probability of target neutralization. Not
only would this probabilistic effect push the PLA’s peacetime inventory size
requirements even further upward, but it would also influence PLA combined arms
campaign-level contingency planning enormously.[ix]
Tomorrow, unpacking the DF-21 inventory.
[i] In
this article, a MRBM is defined as possessing a range between 1000-3000km. This
conforms to the range niche presently filled by the DF-21 series within the
PLA’s arsenal. PLA theater ballistic missiles roles beyond 3000km are filled by
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, and those beneath 1000km are performed
by Short Range Ballistic Missiles.
[ii] “DongFeng
3 (CSS-2) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.” Sinodefense.com, 27 February
2009, accessed 8/21/14, http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df3.asp
[iii]
See 1. “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.” (National Air and Space
Intelligence Center, 2013), 14, 17; 2. Mark Stokes. “China
Of note, authoritative
publicly-released reports, Congressional testimony, and the like from the U.S.
Department of Defense as well as the U.S. Intelligence Community do not call
out a CSS-5 MOD 4 variant. This contrasts with the bulk of English-language
open source materials on the DF-21 series, which associate DF-21D with CSS-5
MOD 4. This essay will defer to the authoritative U.S. Government products in
associating DF-21D with CSS-5 MOD 5. That said, Western observers of the
Chinese ballistic missile arsenal should take note of the apparent U.S.
Government reporting jump from MOD 3 to a MOD 5 in terms of operational
deployments of DF-21 variants.
[iv]
For detailed explanations of publicly-available PLA doctrine’s apparent
advocacy of first strikes, see 1. Dean Cheng. “Chinese Views on Deterrence.” Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 60 (1st
Quarter 2011), 92-101; 2. Ron Christman. “Conventional Missions for China’s
Second Artillery Corps.” Comparative
Strategy, Vol. 30, No. 3, 198-228; 3. Roger Cliff, et al. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess
Strategies and Their Implications for the United States. (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2007), 13-15, 23, 28-43, 47-50; 4. James C. Mulvenon, et. al.
“Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the
Department of Defense.” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 46-47; and
5. Larry Wortzel. China’s Nuclear Forces:
Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning.
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007), 8-14, 36. For
a compelling description of reasons why Chinese leaders might be willing to
accept the escalatory risks inherent in unleashing conventional first strikes
against core U.S. bases in Japan and Guam, see 1. David Shlapak. “Projecting
Power in a China-Taiwan Contingency: Implications for USAF and USN
Collaboration.” in “Coping with the Dragon: Essays on PLA Transformation and
the U.S. Military.” (Washington D.C.: Center for Technology and National
Security Policy, National Defense University, December 2007), 91-92; 2. Toshi
Yoshihara. “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The
Operational View from Beijing.” Naval War
College Review 63, No. 3 (Summer
2010): 52-57.
[v]
The term “campaign-value” is defined in Jonathan F. Solomon. “Maritime
Deception and Concealment: Concepts for Defeating Wide-Area Oceanic
Surveillance-Reconnaissance-Strike Networks.” Naval War College Review 66, No. 4 (Autumn 2013): 109.
[vi] David
A. Shlapak, et al. “A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military
Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute.” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2009), 127-128.
[vii] See James R. Holmes and
Toshi Yoshihara. “Mao’s Active Defense is Turning Offensive.” U.S.
[viii]
See for example 1. “Lessons of the Falklands.” (Washington, D.C.: Office of
Program Appraisal, Department of the Navy, February 1983), 3, 11, 34, 36; 2.
Barry Watts. “The Evolution of Precision Strike.” (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), 14-17, 20-23. Note Watts’s
observation of the dramatic tradeoff between a precision-guided munition’s combat
range and procurement affordability, with obvious implications for inventory
sizes.
[ix]
Solomon, “Maritime Deception and Concealment,” 94-95.
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