Reconciling the Conventionally-Armed Inventory’s Size and Roles
A PLA inventory of 30-40 DF-21Cs is
simply not sufficient to support protracted land-attack operations against U.S.
forces in East Asia. This becomes readily apparent after calculating the raid
sizes possible with this inventory against just a short list of major Japanese
bases housing U.S. forces that lie outside the reach of the Second Artillery
Corps’ SRBMs and DF-16 MRBM.[i]
Table 3: Major U.S. Bases in Japan Beyond PLA SRBM Range
|
Name
|
Military Significance
|
Naval
Base Yokosuka, Japan
|
Headquarters
for U.S. 7th Fleet; homeport for 7th Fleet carrier and
surface combatant forces
|
Yokota
AFB,
|
Headquarters
of
|
Misawa
|
U.S.
Navy maritime patrol aircraft and U.S. Air Force fighter base; major signals
intelligence and space monitoring facility
|
Marine
Corps Air Station
|
Primary
Marine Corps air base in
|
Naval
Air Facility
|
7th
Fleet carrier air wing and antisubmarine helicopter base
|
On first glance, a 40 missile
DF-21C inventory would seem to allow the PLA to strike each of these bases with
up to 8 missiles either in a single mass raid or as divided up amongst
several smaller raids over the course of a conflict. This, however, neglects
probability’s effects. Let’s generously assume that 95% of the DF-21Cs suffer
no internal malfunction in flight and are fully functional at the time they are
either neutralized by U.S. theater Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems or
impact their targets. Let’s also generously assume that the U.S. can only
intercept or decoy 30% of the missiles fired. If all eight missiles are
employed in a single raid against each base, this would mean 5.32 missiles
would successfully impact their targets per base.[ii] Use of
submunitions-dispensing warheads to strike soft targets such as runways,
aircraft parking aprons, naval base pier areas, fuel tank farms, communications
antenna farms, and logistical staging areas would certainly allow individual
missiles to spread severe damage across wide areas.
These bases’ sheer sizes suggests
the number of high campaign-value targets at any given base may be beyond what
is coverable by a mere five submunition-dispensing warheads—and this assumes
none of the missiles are instead armed with unitary penetrating warheads for
attacking C2 posts or other ‘hard’ targets. A coordinated raid
employing both DF-21Cs and long-range cruise missiles, or perhaps the use of
the DF-21Cs to suppress area and point air defenses in support of far more
extensive follow-on bomber and cruise missile raids, might be sufficient to
ensure the full neutralization of a given base for a given period if not the devastation
of any exposed forces stationed there. This would probably be more than adequate
to perform the first strike role, but would clearly leave no reserve DF-21Cs
for strike operations over the course of a protracted campaign. Any expansion
of the list of bases to be covered in the first strike, such as to include
those that solely station Japan Self-Defense Forces, would only further
compress the number of targets that could be struck at each base.
Now, let’s generously assume that there
is only an average of three targets per base that need to be neutralized or
suppressed in order to support raids by other combat arms during a PLA first
strike. In theory, limiting the number of targets that must be hit by DF-21Cs in
the first strike would allow for more -21Cs to be available for later campaign-waging.
Probability indicates that 4.5 missiles per base would need to be launched in
that first strike.[iii]
Since one cannot launch half a missile, this means five missiles would need to
be salvoed per base in the strike. Out of an original inventory of 40 missiles,
15 would remain for follow-on raids. While this might be sufficient for ‘mop
up’ raids against high campaign-value targets inadequately damaged in the first
wave, it would leave little reserve for major raids against U.S. reinforcements
as they arrive in theater or assemble for subsequent operations. It would also
leave little margin for wasting missiles if U.S. and Japanese forces employed
concealment measures, such as the randomly-rotational use of dispersed austere
airbases, not to mention deception.[iv] Any increase in U.S. BMD
effectiveness, decrease in DF-21C in-flight reliability, or expansion of the
first strike target set to include bases solely housing Japan Self-Defense
Forces would only amplify these effects.
The problem of maintaining a
sizable missile reserve might be comparatively less for the DF-21D. Let’s
assume the -21D would only be used (or usable) against aircraft carriers, large
deck amphibious warships, underway replenishment and other combat logistics
ships, or maritime prepositioning ships. Assuming that one -21D hit would be
enough to neutralize any one of these ship types, and carrying forward the generous
probabilistic assumptions for missile in-flight reliability and U.S. BMD
effectiveness used in the DF-21C examples, 1.5 DF-21Ds would need to be
launched in theory (and two in practice) to hit a ship.[v] If there were only two of
the above large ships operating within the DF-21D’s range and under
high-confidence track by the Chinese Ocean Surveillance System (COSS) at the
time of a PLA first strike, just 4 missiles would need to be launched to
ensure they were incapacitated.[vi] Assuming an inventory of
12 DF-21Ds, this would leave a reserve of 8 missiles available for attacking
4 additional major ships over the conflict’s duration—not an unreasonable
number if the conflict was short and the inventory carefully husbanded. Again,
any increase in U.S. BMD effectiveness, decrease in the missile’s in-flight
reliability, or increase in the number of missiles that must ‘hit’ to achieve a
‘firepower kill’ would reduce this reserve considerably.[vii]
Nevertheless, it is not clear the
PLA would gain any campaign-waging benefits by being able to retain a
decently-sized DF-21D reserve. Indeed, it seems quite unlikely the PLA would be
able to wield these missiles in wartime nearly as effectively as would be the
case during peacetime’s waning moments. This is because DF-21D is a network-dependent weapon system; it cannot be assigned targets absent external
cueing by maritime wide-area surveillance systems or reconnaissance scouts. Any
tactically-exploitable disruption in PLA surveillance-reconnaissance quality or
network integrity and availability, whether due to natural phenomena (i.e.,
meteorological conditions), internal systemic phenomena (i.e., Clausewitzian
friction and its psychological impact on COSS operators and decision-makers),
or external phenomena (i.e., U.S. and allied countersurveillance and
countertargeting efforts), handicaps the entire DF-21D system-of-systems. Not
only could U.S. maritime deception and concealment efforts situationally
exploit each of these phenomena types, but U.S. rules of engagement relaxations
would also open the door to kinetic as well as non-kinetic suppression and
attrition efforts against COSS, with the scale and scope of all these actions
defined in no small way by the unique, precedent-setting circumstances of how
the war started. U.S. neutralization of COSS would likely never achieve
totality even during a protracted conflict, but it would be quite possible to
neutralize it locally and transiently in support of individual operations or
tactical actions such that the PLA would not be able to confidently aim
DF-21Ds. It might even be possible to deceive PLA decision-makers into wasting
precious missiles in raids against decoy forces. Therefore, it is not clear
there would be any advantage in retaining a sizable DF-21D reserve beyond a
war’s opening phase.[viii]
Tomorrow, some concluding thoughts
[i]
The PLA’s new DF-16 MRBM and later variants of its DF-15 (CSS-6) SRBM possess
sufficient reach to strike the major U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps bases in
Okinawa. See the 2013 NASIC “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” 13. They may
also be capable of striking the U.S. 7th Fleet’s amphibious
warships’ homeport in Sasebo, Japan; in the DF-15’s case a mild reduction in
ordnance payload might be necessary to reach that far. For the purpose of this
essay’s analysis, we will assume neither Okinawa nor Sasebo would be attacked
with DF-21Cs in order to maximize that missile’s employment against the other
major Japanese bases housing U.S. forces.
[ii]
As these variables would be independent of each other, the probability of a
missile not failing (.95) x the probability of a missile not being intercepted
(.7) x the number of missiles fired (8) would yield 5.32 hits per base.
[iii]
Carrying forward the assumptions from the previous example, the number of
missiles that must be launched equals the number of hits desired divided by the
product of the probability of a missile not failing and the probability of a
missile not being intercepted (Number of
hits =3/(.95 x .7)).
[iv]
For a more detailed discussion of this, see Solomon, “Maritime Deception and
Concealment,” 87-116.
[v]
Number of hits =1/(.95 x .7)
[vi]
COSS is examined in detail in Jonathan F. Solomon. “Defending the Fleet from
China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile: Naval Deception’s Roles in Sea-Based
Missile Defense.” (master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2011), 11-34,
accessed 8/21/14, http://gradworks.umi.com/1491548.pdf;
[vii]
The term firepower kill is defined in CAPT Wayne Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret). Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd
Edition. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 48.
[viii]
See 1. Solomon, “Defending the Fleet,” 69-78, 107-125; 2. Solomon, “Maritime
Deception and Concealment,” 87-116.
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