In preparation,
though, I think it’s important to review the nuances of classical sea control
theory. Towards the end of Part II Chapter I of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,
Julian Corbett explained that:
If the object of the command of the sea is to control
communications, it is obvious it may exist in various degrees. We may be able
to control the whole of the common communications as the result either of great
initial preponderance or of decisive victory. If we are not sufficiently strong
to do this, we may still be able to control some of the communications; that
is, our control may be general or local. Obvious as the point is, it needs
emphasizing, because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is
all one." Like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a trail
of error in its wake. The truth it contains seems to be simply this, that as a
rule local control can only avail us temporarily, for so long as the enemy has
a sufficient fleet anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to overthrow our
control of any special sea area.(Pg. 103)
Per Corbett,
then, “general” sea control by a navy is only possible when it possesses an
exceptionally vast margin of superiority over its opponent(s) throughout “the
whole of the common communications.” Yet, if even an enfeebled opponent
typically retains some capacity for contesting the protagonist’s sea control in
“any special sea area,” then “general” sea control becomes more an illustrative
theoretical construct than something practically attainable. The obvious
implication is that sea control is normally obtainable and exercisable only
locally and temporarily, with the expanse of control determined by the
protagonist’s margin of superiority within the area in question over some
period. This means the act of obtaining and then exercising temporary localized
sea control must have a discrete mission-centric purpose. After all, it would
be illogical to expend such effort just to seek bounded sea control for its own
sake.
Another
question follows close behind: how much maritime power (e.g. aerospace forces,
surface combatants, and submarines as well as the surveillance/reconnaissance
apparatus that supports each of them) must be concentrated to achieve the
necessary margin of temporary local superiority to perform some task? Against a
relatively weak adversary, the answer is often ‘not much.’ As we witnessed
during the twelve years of maritime interdiction operations within the Arabian
Gulf following the first Gulf War, individual surface combatants (or sometimes
small groupings of them) can be completely adequate for gaining and then
exercising sea control under such conditions. The more maritime power that an
adversary can concentrate against the protagonist in some sea area over some
period, though, the more maritime power the protagonist must apply to sustain
sea control. At some point, it becomes no longer feasible for the protagonist
to ‘charge into the lion’s den’ or otherwise operate deep within a contested
zone for an extended amount of time. There simply may not be enough weapons in
a naval battleforce of any practical (let alone available) size to perform the
requisite anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and
anti-sensor/communications tasks of sea control during a particular period in a
particular area.
The
interactions between location, time, purpose, and attainable margin of
superiority compel the protagonist theater-level commander to be judicious,
then, in applying maritime power. In major war, the theater-level commander
does this via sequential
or cumulative campaigns consisting of individual operations that are designed
to incrementally achieve some set of strategic objectives. If strategic
objectives dictate that certain naval tasks be accomplished in some area, but
the protagonist’s naval forces do not by default possess the requisite margin
of superiority to do so at an acceptable degree of risk, then the protagonist
must conduct one or more preliminary or parallel operations that create the
conditions for achieving the main operation’s margin of superiority in space
and time. This also says nothing of the fact that some strategic objectives are
(or should be viewed as) more crucial to achieve earlier in a campaign than
others. For instance, in the case of the United States, no application of
military power in an overseas region to reinforce and defend an ally—or deter
or compel an adversary—can succeed in the absence of secure sea and air lines
of communication for conveying that power across the ocean and then
distributing it within theater.
With all this
in mind, let’s look at how the Navy’s apparent informal definition of sea
control has evolved over the past five years. In Naval Operations Concept
2010, sea control was described as:
The employment of naval forces, supported by land and
air forces as appropriate, in order to achieve military objectives in vital sea
areas. Such operations include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression
of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of
local military superiority in areas of naval operations. (Pg. 52)
This is
preceded in the text by the following key details:
Sea control is the essence of seapower—it allows naval
forces to close within striking distance of land to neutralize land-based
threats to maritime access, which in turn enhances freedom of action at sea and
the resulting ability to project power ashore…The vastness of the world’s
oceans makes it impossible for the Naval Service to achieve global sea control.
The combatant commanders’ operational objectives, the strategic maritime
geography, and the capabilities of potential adversaries drive the scale of
forward naval presence and surge capability necessary to conduct effective
local and regional sea control operations. (Pg. 51)
The 2010
definition thus addressed the fact that sea control is localized,
purpose-based, and affected by the attainable margin of superiority. It did
not, though, address sea control’s temporal aspect. As a result, the 2010
definition could not provide context for bounding any particular operation’s
practical duration given the intensity of opposition in a particular local area.
Nor could it provide context for informing when any particular operation should
be conducted within a campaign’s operational sequence.
Contrast the
2010 definition with the implicit definition in this month’s Proceedings article by the surface
Navy’s leadership; I have underlined portions for emphasis:
A new emphasis on sea control derives from the simple
truth that navies cannot persistently project power from water space they do
not control. Nor can navies guarantee the free movement of goods in the face of
a power-seeking adversary whose objective is to limit the freedom of the
maritime commons within their sphere of influence. Sea control is the necessary
precondition for virtually everything else the Navy does, and its provision can
no longer be assumed. Threats ranging from low-end piracy to the navies of
high-end nation-states pose challenges that we must be prepared to counter—and
ultimately defeat.
Sea control does not mean command of all the seas, all
the time. Rather, it is the capability and capacity to impose localized
sea control when and where it is required to enable other objectives to be met,
holding it as long as is necessary to accomplish those objectives. We must
begin to treat expanses of ocean the way we viewed islands during World War
II—as areas to be seized for conducting follow-on power-projection operations.
Additionally, we should recognize that the enemy gets a vote, and that all of
the elements of the Navy’s Fleet architecture are unlikely to be available when
the shooting starts. The day-to-day persistence of the surface force means that
it must be prepared to immediately go on the offensive in order to create
conditions for the success of follow-on forces. (Pg. 20)
This is
simply excellent. Not only is the temporal aspect is captured here
alongside localization and purpose, but the logic of increasing the attainable
margins of sea control via sequential operations within a campaign’s context is
made more explicit. What’s more, the implications for designing operating
concepts, contingency campaign plans, and even force architecture are profound.
I’ll be exploring some of these things in my next two posts.
---
Beginning
with this post, I am going to start applying the views disclaimer below.
Although no one in my company’s leadership has asked me to do this, I believe
it is important to make clear that the opinions I voice in my posts are mine
alone. This disclaimer should be interpreted as also applying to all my
previous posts; none of the topics I covered directly related to the work I do.
In the event that I choose to write about a topic that is directly related to
my work, I will disclose as much.
The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his
personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems
Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the
policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed
service, or any other U.S. Government agency.
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