This week in print, media, and in person, the Navy's Surface Force Leadership debuted what appears to be something of a "grand unifying theory" of Surface Warfare (my understanding, not theirs) that describes the direction that Surface Warfare will take in the decades to come--Distributed Lethality. It is notable because of the impact that a significant shift in operational mindset will have on the organize, train, and equip functions of the Service. Additionally, it appears to recognize both the changed strategic/operational environment and the ongoing fiscal morass. Fundamentally, Distributed Lethality is an argument that the surface force can play a more effective role in warfighting by creating planning and targeting problems for adversaries who would have to account for more a more threatening fleet architecture more widely arrayed, thereby holding a larger number of value targets at risk. Based on the Proceedings article above, the speeches made by VADM Tom Rowden (Commander Naval Surface Forces) and RADM Pete Fanta (OPNAV N96), I've cobbled together what I understand to be a set of principles of Distributed Lethality.
1. Warfare based. I think it would be improper to place Distributed Lethality in anything other than a war-fighting or war-deterring context. This is not a scheme for peacetime presence/Phase 0 operations. It will of course, influence fleet training approaches, and it will also create new opportunities for engagement with allies, as we seek to integrate their estimable capabilities into the Hunter-Killer Surface Action Groups (SAG).
2. Generational. VADM Rowden used this word in his speech, and my sense is that it has several meanings. First, that this is not going to be an overnight implementation, that the desired impact on fleet operations, architecture, and resourcing will take a number of years to accomplish. Questions from the audience at SNA seemed to focus mainly on a snapshot view of the affordability of what the surface leadership is suggesting, while the answers implied that the time horizons involved are multiple POM cycles long. Another meaning of "generational" is with respect to developing Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) who will be capable of fighting this new concept, in which additional operational risk is accepted, operations are carried out in distributed, autonomous formations that will likely be subject to communications network disruptions.
3. Economical. Increasing unit lethality is at the heart of Distributed Lethality, and elegant solutions will be bypassed in favor of off-the shelf weapon and sensor enhancements. Opportunistic, short turn around enhancements will be favored over long-lead time acquisitions. Re-use of hardware from decommissioning ships to fill gaps in the operational fleet will be considered.
4. Platform agnostic. The surface leaders seem to be suggesting that at the very least, deep consideration should be given to increasing the lethality of EVERY naval vessel, to include the Amphibious force and the combat logistics force.
5. Autonomy. A fully networked fleet is of course, the preferred operational condition, but the Surface Force appears to be suggesting that the Hunter-Killer SAGs must be trained and equipped for operations in a network denied environment. This clearly raises the need for organic, persistent, overhead ISR/Comms relay within the surface force
6. Calculated Risk. Capitalizing on investments in IAMD and ASW (specifically the Multi-Function Towed Array and the SQQ-89 (V) 15 processor), the Surface Force is asserting that it can operate within an acceptable margin of risk without the protective blanket of the Carrier Air Wing, at least in some operational scenarios. Clearly, solving the ongoing offensive SUW problem is the long pole in this tent. Convincing analysts within the Pentagon to consider the power of these dispersed forces must be high on the list of early objectives for concept development.
I am sure there are many more, but these are a few that occurred to me this morning.
Bryan McGrath
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