Many of the article’s ideas echo or expand upon those proposed by Bryan Clark in his CSBA monograph. Some of my observations will accordingly be similar to those I made in my post yesterday.
First, I want
to comment on several impressive statements made in the article.
Increasing surface-force
lethality—particularly in our offensive weapons and the concept of
operations for surface action groups (SAGs)—will provide more strike
options to joint-force commanders, provide another method to seize the
initiative, and add battlespace complexity to an adversary’s calculus.
The
objective is to cause the adversary to shift his own defenses to counter our
thrusts. He will be forced to allocate critical and limited resources across a
larger set of defended targets, thereby improving our operational advantage to
exploit adversary forces. (Pg. 19)
Well expressed. The use of SAGs in these ways can affect more than just the adversary’s defenses—however the latter are defined. It can affect the overall positioning, employment, and operational priorities of his maritime forces writ large. In other words, it can shape the adversary’s overall operational conduct in a war. It may also be able to contribute to peacetime deterrence by encouraging an opponent’s political and military leaders to perceive that a war would likely not be quick or cheap.
…the shift to the offensive responds to the development of increasingly capable A2/AD weapons and sensors designed specifically to deny U.S. naval forces the freedom of maneuver necessary to project power. (Pg.19)
Too often we fixate on the weapons of maritime warfare. I therefore appreciate the mention of sensors here (and by implication, the methods by which those sensors disseminate their data throughout a force), as without those systems the weapons cannot be effectively employed. It must be appreciated that the two sides’ scouting and anti-scouting efforts prior to a naval clash will often be a dominant factor in deciding which side emerges victorious.
…it is important to remember that as our interests lay thousands of miles from our own coastlines, sea-based power projection is both our main competitive advantage and an absolute necessity to retain influence and to exercise global leadership. Adversaries who counter this advantage diminish the deterrent value of forward-deployed forces and negatively impact the assurances we provide to friends and allies. A shift to the offensive is necessary to “spread the playing field,” providing a more complex targeting problem while creating more favorable conditions to project power where required. (Pg. 19)
Also well stated. Sea-based power projection is often interpreted to be synonymous with land-attack strike or expeditionary force insertion. Both are indeed forms of power projection, but they are not the only ones. Any means by which some form of national power is projected ashore from the sea qualifies, whether it is the mere presence of flagged combatants in nearby waters to convey national interests (and influence other countries’ leaders’ decision-making), the use of portcalls for diplomatic ends, the conduct of information operations (such as the broadcasting of messages into a territory, or interference with some of the territory’s communications systems), or the protection/interdiction of a country’s maritime commercial activities in order to affect that country’s economic health—just to name a few. All of the above are strategically useful—and sometimes crucial—tools for a maritime power.
Distributed lethality is the condition gained by increasing the offensive power of individual components of the surface force (cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships [LCSs], amphibious ships, and logistics ships) and then employing them in dispersed offensive formations known as “hunter-killer SAGs.” It is the motive force behind offensive sea control. Both parts of the definition are critical; raising the lethality of the force but operating it the same way sub-optimizes the investment. Operating hunter-killer SAGs without a resulting increase in offensive power creates unacceptable risk. (Pg. 20)
This is absolutely correct, though I’m not sure what to make of the reference to increasing the offensive power of logistics ships. As I noted yesterday, there are legal considerations that might limit the types of combat tasks that ships partially manned by civilian mariners could perform. A better means of increasing logistics ships’ offensive power would be to provide them (and the combatants they support) with capabilities supporting at-sea Vertical Launcher reload. Either way, I’d be extremely hesitant to include logistics ships in SAGs operating deep within a contested zone. Replenishment ships have high campaign-value; the loss of just one could drastically suppress SAG or carrier battleforce operations in a theater for some time. Therefore, underway replenishments should not occur in areas where the possibility of adversary attack is high enough to place logistics ships and the combatants they are servicing at undue risk.
Hunter-killer SAGs seize maritime-operations areas for subsequent activities (including power projection), perform screening operations for larger formations, and hold adversary land targets at risk. Additionally, by distributing power across a larger number of more geographically spaced units, adversary targeting is complicated and attack density is diluted. Hunter-killer SAGS are capable of defending themselves against air and missile attack, and extend that protection to expeditionary forces conducting offensive operations of their own. These hunter-killer SAGs will be networked and integrated to support complex operations even when not supported by the carrier air wing and land-based patrol aircraft. (Pg.20-21)
Excellently stated; this nicely dovetails with the topics I discussed in my commentary yesterday on Bryan’s monograph.
The article next
outlines a scenario in which a SAG is tasked with reconnoitering a small
isolated island with airfield facilities that can be used as a short-term
Forward Operating Base (FOB) for Marine Corps F-35Bs. Several enemy surface
combatants and one enemy submarine are described as operating nearby. The SAG’s
capabilities for locating and destroying these threats are then listed. All
fine and good, but it nevertheless begs the question of the SAG’s combat endurance
based on its ordnance inventories. If all the adversary can throw at the SAG
during the entirety of this operation is what’s explicitly listed in the
scenario, then the SAG probably has enough ordnance to carry through. If the
adversary can reorient other forces (including aircraft and long-range
missiles, which are not directly mentioned in the scenario) to repeatedly attack
the SAG or the FOB upon realizing what the SAG is doing within the time scale
of the operation, however, then there needs to be some thought about how to
address the SAG’s ordnance depletion. In other words, the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander overseeing the SAG’s operation would face the question of
how long the SAG could sustain local superiority above some minimum margin
fully on its own. This leads into my observations yesterday about the
possibility that a SAG might need sea control support from external forces at
one or more points during an operation within a contested zone.
The article
follows by alluding to a desire to increase the amphibious fleet’s offensive
clout:
There is a strong argument to add offensive capability
to the amphibious fleet, creating within it yet another planning nightmare for
an adversary, who would face expeditionary forces packing organic offensive
surface-to-surface missiles and land-attack capabilities. Adding offensive
firepower to the amphibious force does not relieve the surface force from its
role of protection, nor does it mean that the primary mission of those
ships—projecting Marine Corps power ashore—must be compromised. It does mean,
however, that we should think differently about these ships and consider the
power of adding additional capability to them. (Pg. 22)
I’d be very
curious to know what is meant here by surface-to-surface missiles, and whether
they are to be employed by the amphibious warships or by their embarked Marines
once ashore.
A bit later,
the article reiterates Bryan Clark’s call for a new, long-ranged anti-submarine
weapon that can disrupt attacks by adversary submarines out to at least 50
nautical miles. This is a sorely-needed capability, and I am glad to see it is
receiving serious attention.
After that, the
article discusses how SAG command and control would need to be exercised under
cyber-electromagnetic opposition:
An important aspect of distributed lethality is the
ability to confidently conduct dispersed operations apart from centralized
command-and-control networks. Local combat-information networks are essential
to achieving localized battlespace awareness. Those networks need to be more
capable than those existing today and must be persistent in a satellite-denied
or jamming-intensive environment. Whether current vertical-takeoff unmanned
aerial systems have the persistence necessary to support dispersed offensive
operations remains to be seen, but the potential for them to augment networking
and information-sharing should be examined. The ability of hunter-killer SAGs
to launch and recover fixed-wing or partially fixed-wing UAVs will be pivotal
to employing UAVs in this role…
…We anticipate the electromagnetic spectrum to be challenged as a part of
an adversary’s A2/AD tactics. Where we do not have equipment to counter and
continue networking in such an environment, we must field such as part of the
development of our next generation of ships and backfit that capability to
existing ships. (Pg. 23)
The authors appear to be
referring to operations
on interior lines of networking, with SAG-organic unmanned aircraft of
varying kinds being used as ‘middleman’ data relays between the surface
combatants. This is an excellent idea, as the use of highly-directional
line-of-sight communications paths within this kind of relay network would make
an adversary’s ability to detect, jam, or otherwise exploit those communications
extraordinarily difficult. However, the selected text seems to imply that the
primary means supporting operations under cyber-electromagnetic opposition are
technological. Improved sensors and analytical tools for monitoring the
electromagnetic environment surrounding a SAG’s operating area, not to mention
improved communications systems, are certainly central. All the same, doctrine
and training are irreplaceable means for filling in the capability gaps;
technology alone will not be sufficient. Command
by negation doctrine based upon mission-type orders will be necessary for SAGs
to operate under C2-degraded conditions. So will frequent and realistic training
to prepare crews for these types of conditions. The development and
institution of the requisite doctrine, tactics, and training does not need
to—and must not—wait until the next generation of ships enter the fleet. Much can
be done along these lines using the warships and systems we already have.
The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his
personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning
and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or
positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any
other U.S. Government agency.
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