A Weapon’s Range is not the Whole Story

Illustration of U.S. and threat anti-ship missile ranges from Bryan Clark's CSBA monograph "Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare" (pg 13).

The U.S. Navy is clearly at a deficit relative to its competitors regarding anti-ship missile range. This is thankfully changing regardless of whether we’re talking about LRASM, a Tomahawk-derived system, or other possible solutions.

It should be noted, though, that a weapon’s range on its own is not a sufficient measure of its utility. This is especially important when comparing our arsenal to those possessed by potential adversaries. A weapon cannot be evaluated outside the context of the surveillance and reconnaissance apparatus that supports its employment and the overall size of its inventory.

Here’s an example I set up in the endnotes of my article on maritime deception and concealment regarding effective first strike/salvo range at the opening of a conflict:

Optimal first-strike range is not necessarily the same as the maximum physical reach of the longest-ranged weapon system effective against a given target type (i.e., the combined range of the firing platform and the weapon it carries). Rather, it is defined by trade-offs in surveillance and reconnaissance effectiveness and in the number of weapons employable in a short time as the target’s distance from the firing platform’s starting position increases. This means that a potential adversary with a weapon system that can reach distance D from the homeland’s border but can achieve timely and high-confidence peacetime cueing or targeting only within a radius of 0.75D has an optimal first-strike range of 0.75D. It follows that if, for technical, operational, or logistical reasons, the adversary can fire only a few D-range weapons within a defined short period of time, and if his doctrine therefore calls for using D-range weapons in coordination with far more plentiful weapons of range 0.5D, the optimal first-strike range decreases to 0.5D. This does not reduce the dangers faced by the defender at distance D but does offer more flexibility in using force-level doctrine, posture, plans, and capabilities to manage risks.(Pg. 113-114)

The same logic applies following the first strike/salvo, except that the victim of that attack will enjoy much more relaxed rules of engagement for countering the opponent’s surveillance and reconnaissance efforts. In this case, let’s say that Blue possesses a long-range weapon with maximum physical reach of R. Let’s also say that both sides’ anti-scouting efforts inside a given area have neutralized or destroyed surveillance and reconnaissance sensors, not to mention disrupted or degraded sensor-to-network connectivity. Let’s stipulate that Blue’s fraction of R that is covered by high confidence surveillance and reconnaissance is x, and Red’s equivalent fraction of D is y. All other factors being equal, the basic advantage consequently goes to which multiple is greater: Blue’s xR or Red’s yD. Note that if either side's confident surveillance/reconnaissance coverage exceeds their weapons' maximum physical ranges, then that full range can be realized (x or y = 1.0).

The qualities and quantities of sensors, and the architecture and counter-detectability of the (electromagnetic through the air and space, acoustic under the water) data pathways they use to relay their measurements to ‘consumers’ matter just as much as weapon range. Under intense anti-scouting opposition, they arguably matter even more. Remember Wayne Hughes’s maxim: attack effectively first.

Now throw in the inventory-size and salvo-rate considerations on top of the sensing competition. Assuming inventory survivability against attacks is held equal for both sides, if one belligerent has many times more of its long-range weapon than the other belligerent has of its long-range weapon, the former may gain considerable campaign-level advantages over the latter such as greater operational flexibility or greater tolerance for taking operational risks. If one belligerent can salvo off more of its long-range weapon within a short period of time than the other can, then obvious tactical advantages can accrue there as well.

The bottom line is that the question of striking clout is far more complicated than a comparison of range alone. Surveillance/reconnaissance quality and weapons inventory quantity are just as important. The full picture must always be considered.

--Updated 2/26/15 10:32PM based on comments--

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.