There
will be no ‘silver bullets,’ however. Each potential option will come with tradeoffs
regarding deterrence utility, war-waging capability, peacetime operating tempo
and readiness, political supportability (both here and in allied/partner
nations hosting our forces), and so on.
It
is therefore absolutely necessary to have precise terminology that
characterizes how a given degree of forward naval presence in a given region inherently
affects our approaches to deterrence and defense in that region. Robert has
supplied exactly that with his article.
Robert’s
taxonomy, from maximum to minimum:
·
War-winning
power forward, or rather the standing presence necessary to defeat a given
adversary quickly and decisively.
·
Assured defense,
or rather a standing presence sufficient to successfully defend an embattled
ally but not necessarily defeat the adversary.
·
Delay/Disruption,
or rather the standing presence necessary to prevent a fait accompli or otherwise ‘hold the line’ in defense of an ally
until war-winning surge forces arrive in theater.
·
Trip Wire, or
rather a standing presence designed specifically to incur a (presumably
assured) American intervention using surge forces but not to credibly achieve
defensive tasks on its own.
·
Virtual Presence,
or in other words the use of U.S. political or treaty commitments to surge
forces in the event of a conflict in lieu of any standing forward-positioned
forces to perform deterrence or defense tasks.
·
Random
Deployment, or in other words the use of unpredictable deployment locations and
durations to elevate potential adversaries’ uncertainties regarding
opportunities for aggression.
Let’s
be clear: a ‘war-winning power forward’ presence is only achievable against the
weakest of opponents. Even then, the U.S. has never possessed sufficient naval
forces to sustain this degree of presence for long periods of time without
severe disruptions in presence or rotational deployment durations in other
regions.
Assured
defense and delay/disruption are consistent with our post-Second World War
forward strategy. As the Navy’s force structure declines, however, maintaining
sufficient presence for assured defense against a reasonably strong opponent will
likely come at the expense of the presence for assured defense against
opponents in other regions. We will likely find ourselves relying more on
delay/disruption to succeed. This is a manageable problem, but it requires
sober thinking about campaign design, operating concepts, force positioning and
postures during peacetime and crises, force structure, and the like.
It
should be obvious that Robert’s taxonomy is relevant not only to naval forces,
but also to the land-based services. I sincerely hope that his article is used
as a starting point for the much-needed tradeoff analyses regarding how our
Joint forces will achieve standing presence in our many overseas regions of
interest.
The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his
personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems
Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies
or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any
other U.S. Government agency.
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