Arming the Combat Logistics Force for Distributive Lethality

USNS Lewis and Clark

        The U.S. Navy surface fleet’s emerging doctrine of distributive lethality calls for arming the combat logistics force (CLF) ships with offensive and defensive weapons so that, “if it floats, it fights.” Such a change could significantly alter a potential opponent’s targeting calculus if they need to account for CLF ships as potential offensive platforms. This concept also poses some problems for the U.S. Navy. The diversion of significant numbers of sailors, weapons, and associated equipment to the CLF force in a period of general financial hardship for the whole fleet could leave some purpose-built combatants without full weapons magazines or qualified sailors to operate them. U.S. missile inventories could be rapidly depleted in large scale missile engagements, leaving purpose built combatants bereft of weapon reloads. The modular operations concept being developed in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, however, may present a solution to the problem of arming relevant units of the Combat Logistics Force while simultaneously not dispersing overall U.S. missile assets too widely over the surface fleet.

USS (now USNS) Rainier when still armed with 20mm CIWS

            CLF ships have not historically been armed with offensive weapons, although throughout the Cold War, when still under Navy jurisdiction, these ships had self defense weapons such as the twin 3 inch 50 caliber gun mount, the Basic Missile Point Defense System (BMPDS) and the 20mm Close- in Weapon system (CIWS). These weapons were removed when the remaining CLF ships in the Navy were transferred to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in the 1990’s. Ships that had previously been commissioned warships like the Supply class Fast Combat Support Ship (AOE) could have their defensive weapon systems such as CIWS or the new SeaRAM (Rolling Airframe Missile) systems restored. Space and weight are available for the installation of two CIWS mounts in the MSC Henry J. Kaiser class oilers and Lewis and Clark class Dry Cargo/Ammunition ships. A number of modern offensive missile systems such as the Norwegian-made, Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace (KDA) Naval Strike Missile could also be mounted on CLF ships if weight and stability limitations support such installation.

            Such offensive and defensive weapon systems, however, may not yet exist in sufficient quantity to fully arm the whole CLF, as well as meet the needs of the combatant Navy. A number of missile combat experts have also suggested that a rapid exchange of missile fires could rapidly deplete U.S. stocks of offensive missiles. Future battles between missile-armed combatants at sea may not be perfect, Lancaster equations of exchange, but the firing of large missile salvos by networked naval platforms could rapidly deplete theater stocks of U.S. offensive and defensive missiles.

            While CLF-based missiles may also be fired in the opening stages of a conflict, many others could be virtually marooned aboard their host platforms far from the combat zone. The U.S. surface fleet does not currently have an operational capability to reload vertical launch system (VLS) missiles at sea, and has only two tender class ships perhaps capable of such efforts outside land-based resources. Given potential large expenditures of missiles in combat, and the difficultly in reloading said weapons in forward areas, it is imperative to concentrate CLF missile firepower where offensive needs are most required.

Recent test of Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile

            One potential solution to this problem is the creation of a modular combat system(s) of both offensive and defensive components similar to the LCS mission module. Like the LCS version, these modules would contain both weapons and associated personnel required for their integration and full operation on board CLF ships. While all CLF ships may be equipped with the basic structural, electrical, and support system requirements to host an offensive weapon capability, only those in forward areas would actually host such a mission module.

 LCS squadrons (LCSRON’s) presently control LCS mission module equipment and personnel within their own structures. The Navy may, however, need to create a separate organization charged with the management all modular afloat systems. This requirement might eventually fall to the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for LCS when the three present LCS mission modules are fully operational on both LCS sea frames. This command would specifically be charged with the organization, training, and equipage of mission modules for a host of offensive, defensive, and special service missions on multiple classes of ships. CLF offensive and defensive mission modules and associated equipment and personnel could be deployed to forward bases and installed on CLF ships as needed.

            The surface force can achieve its goal of a more distributed and lethal offensive capability though the arming of CLF ships. Using a mission module to accomplish this task will ensure the best, most cost and combat effective distribution of limited weapon assets. The eventual creation of a command element to manage the growing module inventory will give the Navy an increased capability to manage these systems so that regional combatant commanders can get the right modules in the right place at the right time in support of their operational requirements.