Monday, April 20, 2024

Time for a Standing Indo-Pacific Maritime Group (IPSMG)



         
STANAVFORLANT in 1982
U.S. Strategists, senior military officers and diplomats continue to struggle with China’s apparent “salami slicing” strategy in the East and South China Seas. The Chinese have utilized a unique combination of military and quasi-military methods to extend their influence and control in these bodies of water contiguous with the Chinese mainland, but not under direct Chinese control since the end of the Ming Dynasty in the 1640's. The U.S. and its allies have yet to find an appropriate response to Chinese activities which include coast guard deployments to these waters, the building of airfields in the disputed Spratly islands, uncoordinated dredging operations in these waters, and the potential declaration of another air defense zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea as the Chinese did in the East China Sea in November 2013.[1] A unilateral U.S. military response, however, is perhaps just what Chinese authorities want. The direct deployment of U.S. military forces to either body of water would represent a significant military escalation and allow the Chinese to label the U.S. as an outsider attempting to influence Asian affairs where it has no historic claim. The U.S. and its close friends and allies in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean can, however, counter unilateral Chinese incursions into these areas with a maritime tool pioneered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the height of the Cold War. The U.S. should invite the nations of the region, including the People’s Republic of China and Russia, to join a Standing Maritime Group similar to the NATO Standing Maritime Groups that have been a fixture in Northern European waters and the Mediterranean for nearly 50 years.
          The Standing NATO Maritime Groups, conceived in the late 1960’s as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), were an attempt to create a regular deployment of the Alliance’s warships to promote common operational standards. The brainchild of Rear Admiral Richard Colbert, USN, STANAVFORLANT was intended to prevent future maritime disputes that might explode into major wars. Colbert believed that the 1967/1968 Arab Israeli War might have been averted or better contained by such a force. He wrote,” “If a few of the maritime nations had formed a squadron of destroyers and contested the closure of the Gulf of Aquaba—perhaps by escorting an Israeli ship through—in support of the principle of freedom of the seas and Innocent Passage, the situation there might have been pacified and the Arab-Israeli war, such as it was, averted for a time or altogether.”[2] For Colbert, European and Mediterranean waters were just the beginning. He envisioned global U.S. participation in a network of similar partnerships. He wrote, “With this as a prototype conceivably we can follow suit with similar forces in time in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and very importantly Latin America. As the Soviet Union continues to expand its sea power worldwide, I can think of no more pragmatic and meaningful counter to their activities than the United States participating as partners with friendly countries in their various areas.”[3]
          Colbert’s model is well suited to the present situation in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean where general cooperation might have deterrent value. A multinational maritime security force, with a rotational command and staff system based on that of the present NATO Standing Maritime Groups, would be an excellent tool for promoting common maritime operating procedures in the region and reducing tensions amongst the participating nations. Such a force might begin with a U.S. initiative toward its friends and allies in the region and expand to include all nations who wish to participate, including the People’s Republic of China and Russia. The Russian Navy, for example, participated in NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour in September 2006 when the Russian frigate Pitliviy joined the mission. While the NATO Standing Maritime Groups are divided into combatant and mine warfare-specific units, an Indo-Pacific Standing Maritime Group would welcome a variety of vessel types depending on what nations are participating and the mission to be undertaken. These efforts could include counter-piracy patrols in international waters, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, as well as good will visits to promote peace and understanding in the region. The solution to the present strained maritime security environment in these waters should not be a unilateral U.S. military or even diplomatic effort, but rather a multinational maritime undertaking. In such a situation, those that refuse to join would be more likely seen by the international community as troublemakers and not as active participants in reducing tensions.
          Just as “only Nixon could go the China”, the United States is the nation best positioned by its 160 plus years of direct involvement in East Asian maritime affairs to initiate a multinational standing naval force in the Indo-Pacific basin. An Indo-Pacific Standing Maritime Group is the first step to promoting greater understanding amongst the nations that border its littoral. It can welcome those who desire greater cooperation, and just as effectively isolate those who refuse to join in the international solution it presents to tensions in the East and South China Seas. It is a better first step than a direct, increased U.S. military presence.


[1] Bonnie Glaser, “Conflict in the South China Sea”, Washington D.C., Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), April 2015.
[2] John Hattendorf, “Admiral Richard G. Colbert: Pioneer in Building Global Maritime Partnerships,” Newport, RI, The Naval War College Review, Summer 2008, p. 121.
[3] Ibid.

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