The Navy’s Combat Logistics Force and the 21st Century Threat Environment

Then-USS Arctic (AOE-8), Undated. (U.S. Navy Photo)
Note NATO Sea Sparrow launcher, forward Close-In Weapons System mount, and deckhouse-mounted SLQ-32(V)3.

Jon’s note: I’d like to introduce a new navalist voice, Chris Mclachlan. Although he’s at the start of his professional career, I’ve been thoroughly impressed by his maritime strategic insight over the several months he and I have been discussing such topics. When he suggested to me that he wanted to write about the logistical aspects of fighting a major war at sea in the Western Pacific, I lobbied hard for him to allow me to publish his work here at ID. I think you’ll see why.

On July 31, 2014, the House Armed Service Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Force Projections convened a hearing to discuss Sealift Force Assessment. One concern expressed at the hearing was by Rep. J. Randy Forbes, the committee’s chairman, regarding the ability of the Navy’s Combat Logistics Force (CLF) to conduct its mission in a contested environment. Without increasing the CLF’s current level of capabilities to survive in such environments as well as shuttle fuel, ammunition, and stores to forward naval forces, the U.S. Navy will not be able to meet emerging threats in the Asia-Pacific. Currently, there has been little internal or public discussion on the ability of the CLF to sustain the operational tempo demanded of the Navy in a major conflict, let alone do so within a combat zone.

The current logistics fleet is derived from the 1992 “. . . From the Sea” and 1994 “Forward. . . From the Sea” strategic concept documents.  These concepts were based on the premise of general U.S. command of the open oceans, which meant that the Navy could focus much of its efforts in the littorals. The Navy’s ability to obtain virtually de facto sea control in the post-Cold War era allowed it to project power from close to adversaries’ coastlines and then be resupplied from sanctuaries these adversaries simply could not touch. It follows that the Navy did not foresee a need to escort its logistics ships to and from these underway replenishment locations. Nor did it assess that the logistics ships retained the need to defend themselves against missile or torpedo attacks. The Navy’s decision to replace the Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided missile frigates with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was greatly informed by this view.

Potential adversaries’ advancing capabilities for denying access and limiting freedom of maneuver in contested maritime areas have effectively negated the underlying premises of the Navy’s post-Cold War strategic concepts. In particular, China’s inability to seriously challenge the U.S. Navy during the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis persuaded it to develop capabilities to disrupt the U.S.’s ability to intervene militarily against Beijing’s interests in East Asia. Submarines, mines, land-based fighter and bomber aircraft, land-based strike missiles, advanced air defense systems are the major elements of China’s capabilities for denying maritime access to the East Asian theater. The employment of many of these weapons are cued by networked wide-area surveillance/reconnaissance systems located on Chinese soil, in the air, at sea, and in space.

The new environment poses a significant danger to U.S. naval operations. With a considerable forward presence in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. Navy must sustain operations over what is often referred to as the “tyranny of distance.” Once in theater, if warships are unable to replenish at sea, they must then return to a friendly port. The process of transiting to a port, replenishing and then returning to a forward operating area may take days or even weeks. Forward ports and naval facilities are also becoming increasingly vulnerable to theater-range precision guided munitions. Such delays and risks would be untenable in a major conflict.

And yet, no moves have been made to arm the logistics fleet with point defense weaponry. Further threatening the CLF’s ability to operate in opposed environments is the Navy’s declining surface combatant force structure. The final retirement of all the Navy’s FFGs this year will have a major impact on the defensibility of forward- deployed ships’ logistical support chains. As previously noted, the LCS is incapable in its current and planned configurations to assume the FFGs’ Cold War-era role screening logistics ships’ movements in contested waters. The lack of  small surface combatants with medium range air defense and anti-submarine capabilities  means that vital DDGs would be utilized as CLF escorts instead of being utilized in carrier battlegroups or surface action groups. The forthcoming LCS-derived frigate will address only the anti-submarine portion of this capability gap.

In addition to the loss of the FFG escorts, the retirement of all of the Navy’s T-AOEs will further amplify the fleet’s combat logistics dilemma. T-AOEs are the most important logistic ship in the Navy’s inventory as the ship provides a “one stop shop” for combatants as it carries marine fuel, aviation fuel, dry stores, and munitions. Furthermore, it is the only replenishment ship that is fast enough to keep up with a carrier battle group and thus remain within its protective air, surface, and subsurface defenses. Due to budgetary constraints the Navy is planning on putting two T-AOEs in reduced status while keeping two in service. Without the T-AOEs the Navy is left with the less capable but more numerous T-AO and T-AKEs which supply fuel and ammunition/dry stores respectively. Both the T-AOs and T-AKEs are incapable of matching the speed of the carrier battle group and require more time to replenish combatants. Furthermore, it is not clear the Navy and the Military Sealift Command have enough of these ships to sustain a high operational tempo in a major conflict, or how severely CLF losses  would degrade this tempo. This represents a crucial area for war-gaming as well as campaign analysis.

Although the current logistics model was adequate for a post-Cold War world in which the U.S. Navy maintained essentially-uncontested command over the world’s oceans, potential adversaries’ development of advanced maritime denial capabilities demands a new approach. Fleet structure and composition is not properly aligned to support forward positioned surface combatants in a contested environment for extended periods of time. Ensuring timely and consistent logistics support to these combatants is central to the U.S. Navy ensuring American maritime supremacy. The presence of forward forces is critical to U.S. security.  Logistics ships must receive basic self-defense capabilities as well as be provided sufficient escort support for their transits through and operations within opposed areas. The Navy also ought to retain logistics ships that are capable of operating as part of battle groups: in active service if possible, and in ready reserve if necessary. Failing to do these things could cost the Navy—and the nation—dearly in the event of a future war.

Chris Mclachlan currently works as a defense contractor. He recently spent time working on defense issues at the House of Representatives. The views presented in this article are his own.