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| Recent retirement of frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts |
Critics of the Littoral Combatant Ship
(LCS) often claim the U.S. Navy needs a follow-on medium capability
combatant similar to the retiring Oliver
Hazard Perry class frigates in place of the smaller and modular LCS. In fact, the medium-capability warship is
rapidly disappearing from many world navies with similar deployment patterns as
the U.S. Navy. Medium combatants are fairly expensive while providing little more than half the combat capability of ships only 25% larger in size. The strategy and operational construct for war at sea has significantly
changed since the Perry’s entered
service. The weapons are much faster, smarter and more powerful in destructive potential. The Perry
class ships depart a far different navy then they entered at the end of
the 1970’s. The fact that a type of ship has been in service for decades does
not automatically mean it should continue to be built. Medium capability ships
like the Perry’s have served the
nation well through the end of the Cold War and beyond, but there is no reason
to build a similar, repeat class. The present high/low mix of remaining Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers combined
with the LCS and its frigate sub group represents the best mix for the U.S.
Navy surface combatant force in the first half of the 21st century.
The medium-sized surface combatant is
a vanishing species in navies whose operational areas are at a significant
distance from home waters. European navies in particular, have undergone a
metamorphosis since the end of the Cold War. While once composed largely of
medium sized destroyers like Great Britain’s Type 42 and Italy’s Audace class and frigates like the
British Type 22 Leander and the
French Georges Leygues, European
navies have adopted their own high/low mix of warships that reflects new
operating environments and shrinking naval budgets. The end of the Cold War
brought peace to the bulk of Europe, and European navies moved from larger
numbers of medium and smaller ships designed to fight in the North Atlantic sea
lines of communication and the Baltic and Mediterranean littorals against the
Soviet Union to balanced naval forces capable of security deployments to the
developing world. European “frigates”; once 3000-4500 ton ships, have grown to
7000 ton and larger ships with the operational ranges and capabilities of
larger destroyers or cruisers. These larger combatants such as the
Franco-Italian FREMM (European Multipurpose Frigate), the larger German and
Dutch multipurpose frigates, and the British Type 45 Daring class destroyer are
the equivalent of the U.S. Arleigh Burke’s.
They are their respective navy’s largest and most capable surface combatant. European fleets have also added smaller
corvette/offshore patrol ships like the German Braunschweig, Dutch Holland,
and British River class. These ships
are small and inexpensive enough to add numerical strength to shrinking
European navies and have the potential for foreign military sales. Shrinking
European defense budgets in response to social spending requirements have
caused the overall size of European navies to decrease since the end of the
Cold War. This new “high/low” mix of surface combatants is rapidly becoming the
norm for European navies whose ships deploy to locations outside home waters
for the bulk of their operational employment.
Those navies whose ships do not
deploy far afield have continued to deploy a mix of surface combatants designed
to protect increasing defense zones beyond their littoral waters. The Japanese
Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), the South Korean Navy, the Russian Navy
and the People’s Republic of China’s Navy (PLAN) have followed this model since
the end of the Cold War. Japan and South Korea rely on oceanic commerce as
their principal means of trade. Their surface combatants have grown in response
to requirements to protect those sea lines of communication at greater ranges.
The addition of the AEGIS weapon system to Japanese and South Korean warships
has also forced size growth in their high-end combatants. The Russian Navy has
been subject to severe financial constraint since the collapse of the Soviet
Union and has sought to preserve the most modern Soviet era combatants for prestige
and the hope of an eventual naval renaissance that has yet to occur. The
Russian Navy has built no ship larger than the present large European frigate
since 1991 and has only constructed two such ships (1 Udaloy II and one smaller Neustrashimyy class frigate). The rest of its
construction has been smaller combatants suitable to littoral operations.
The PLAN began much like the Soviet
Navy of the 1950’s with an emphasis on coastal combat and diesel submarines. As
China’s maritime ambitions have grown, its fleet has increased in both size and
capability. While it has maintained construction of a balanced series of
surface combatants to the present, it may be forced to choose between a robust
littoral fleet and a more capable “High Seas” fleet much as the German Empire
did over a century ago when it embarked on direct competition with the British
Royal Navy. Although it seems to have global aspirations, much of the PLAN’s
surface force seems dedicated to protecting the expanding ring of island chains
articulated in its defense plans over the last two decades.
Concepts for war at sea have
significantly changed since the Perry’s
went to sea. While weapons such as the ship and air-launched cruise missile,
the torpedo and the mine remain familiar features of the naval combat
landscape, they are much smarter and more deadly than their Cold War
predecessors. The increased threat posed by these weapons makes survivability a challenge for less capable ships. Current
choices open to fleet planners seem to suggest greater “fortification” of
existing ships by increasing their defensive capabilities, creation of a large
fleet of single mission but expendable smaller ships, or a combination of the
two. Evidence suggests that the United States Navy has made a compromise
choice. It continues to build the large Arleigh
Burke’s with significant defensive capabilities. It has also embraced the
concept of greater lethality for the surface fleet in the form of larger
numbers of offensive weapons and a more limited zone of missile defense for its
larger combatants as articulated by naval analyst Bryan Clark in his proposal
for increasing surface fleet lethality[1]. A
significant number of vertical launch tubes (as part of the MK 41 VLS) is
required in order to support large numbers of offensive and defensive missiles
required for Clark’s concept. A U.S. follow-on to the FFG 7, as proposed by
several sources, would likely support less than 60 VLS cells per ship.[2]
The CG 47 class, by contrast, has 122 cells and the DDG 51 90-96 cells.[3] The
U.S. Navy has also continued purchase of the much smaller and less capable LCS
for both low threat missions and as a potential offensive partner for the Burke’s in the distributive lethality
concept. In such a force structure there is little room for a medium sized combatant
that is too expensive for the limited capability it delivers in comparison with
the Burke.
The advent of a different force
structure for the post-Cold War world and changes to the threat level for
surface ships means the Perry class
frigates are departing a much different U.S. Navy then they joined at the end
of the 1970’s. When the FFG-7 class entered service in 1977, the U.S. surface
force was a “mixed bag” of ships with widely varying equipment and
capabilities. The destroyer ranks, for example, included ships as diverse as
the updated World War 2 vintage Gearing
class, the Cold War Forrest Sherman and Farragut classes and the (then)
brand new DD 963 Spruance class.
Nuclear powered ships served alongside ships designed before nuclear power was even
thought possible. In this disparate mix the Perry’s
were a very capable addition to the surface fleet. They carried as many surface
to air missiles as most Cold War-era guided missile destroyers (DDG’s); their MK
92 fire control system was state of the art technology; and they could support
two antisubmarine (ASW) helicopters. These capabilities and others made the Perry’s welcome additions to the late
Cold War fleet.
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| AEGIS cruiser and destroyers at sea 2014 |
Fast forward nearly 30 years and the
surface fleet is much changed in composition and capability. A relatively
homogenous group of AEGIS warships (the remaining Ticonderoga class cruisers and the Arleigh Burke class destroyers) form nearly the entire surface
combatant force. A medium sized combatant, presumably as a successor to the Perry’s would be less capable for high
end combat missions like air and missile defense, yet too large and expensive
for lower order endeavors such as counter-piracy and military cooperation
exercises. Foreign classes often recommended as potential platforms for a new
U.S. medium combatant sometimes approach the cost of the Burke’s whilst delivering 1/3 to 2/3 the combat capability. The
Spanish Navantia-Izar F-100 series frigate/destroyer (unitary cost $905
million), and its Australian Hobart
(currently $9 billion for three ships), and Fridtjof Nansen ($704 million)
subclasses are representative of the increasing cost of medium capability
combatants. The Danish Iver Huitfeldt
($330 million without weapons and in need of significant upgrades) costs much less, but is still too large for the low-end missions the U.S. Navy must meet with a ship other
than the Burkes. All of the European
ships listed are also those nations’ equivalent of the DDG 51 and do not
represent a medium capability that they would in U.S. service.
The LCS, however, is a less expensive
alternative for the lower-end missions envisioned for a U.S. small/medium
combatant. The baseline 0 LCS (without an installed mission module), but
equipped with a helicopter detachment, costs $470 million dollars and is
capable of most of these less taxing duties. While LCS can free the nation’s
destroyer fleet from low threat missions, the new combatants can also play a
significant role in the emerging distributive lethality doctrine. Armed with
six or more antiship cruise missiles, organized in distributive flotillas, and capable of bursts of high speed, the LCS force could deliver a substantive strike against surface targets.
Possession of an organic rotary wing capability also allows the ship to see and
engage targets at greater ranges in the event of network jamming or loss. As
Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work has suggested, LCS was conceived ““as an integral part of a new battle force architecture that continues to evolve.”[4] That architecture has become a new high/low for the first half of the 21st century and will likely continue to evolve in response to changing threats. It contains a high end multi-mission combatant (the DDG 51) and a low-end, reconfigurable platform (the LCS) to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. Given the growing threats, and rising cost of warships (largely attributable to increasing electronics), this combination is becoming the standard for nations that globally deploy their warships.
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| The new High/Low mix: DDG 51 and LCS |
The
U.S. Navy has made a good choice in the new high/low mix of AEGIS and LCS. The
new mix of large and small combatants represent the best choice for maximizing
both offensive operations in the form of greater numbers of antiship cruise
missiles at sea while preserving a significant defensive capability for high
value units such as aircraft carriers and large amphibious warships. Criticism
of the LCS has been loud and vigorous for more than 10 years, but when it came
time to select a new “frigate” in response to these concerns, the collective
leadership of the U.S. Navy proposed a modified LCS as the best, most cost
effective solution.[5] The
debate is settled and it is clear that the U.S. Navy has chosen a high/low mix
that does not include a medium capability successor to the Perry class frigate. Such a combatant has no place in the present
force composition of the U.S. surface fleet.
[1]
Bryan Clark, “Commanding the Seas; A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface
Warfare”, Washington D.C., Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, 2014.
[2]
Sam Lagrone, editor, “What’s Next After LCS?”, Annapolis, Md, United States
Naval Institute (USNI) Online News, 25 February 2014, http://news.usni.org/2014/02/25/whats-next-lcs
[3]
Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide
to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, Annapolis, Md, U.S. Naval
Institute Press, 2005, pp. 145-147.
[4]
http://awin.aviationweek.com/Portals/AWeek/Ares/work%20white%20paper.PDF
[5]
Megan Eckstein, “Frigate Will Leverage Littoral Combatant Ship , Focus on New
Combat Systems”, Annapolis, Md, United States Naval Institute (USNI) Online
News, 15 April, 2015, http://news.usni.org/2015/04/15/frigate-will-leverage-littoral-combat-ship-testing-focus-on-new-combat-systems
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