Sugio Takahashi of the Japan Ministry of Defense’s National Institute for Defense Studies has published an excellent short monograph at the Project 2049 Institute on his government’s conventional deterrence policy evolution with respect to China over the past few years. His explanation of the subtle deterrence policy differences between the 2010 and 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (Japan’s highest-level defense strategy document) is particularly interesting.
Takahashi notes that
the 2010 document defined the Chinese threat as being the opportunistic use of
primarily non-military tools of national power to gradually expand the maritime
zones under Beijing’s de facto
political control. This, he says, led Japan to develop a policy of “dynamic deterrence”
that focused more on countering China’s use of low-end salami
tactics as it deemed the risk of conventional aggression by
the PLA was low. Under its dynamic deterrence policy, Japan sought to use
persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) coverage of
contested waters such as those surrounding the Senkakus to cue intercepts of
Chinese “civilian” platforms by maritime law enforcement assets. Tailored
military demonstrations of capabilities and readiness also figured into the
policy. As he puts it:
“…dynamic deterrence is intended to
sensitize a challenger to the notion that they are always being watched, and
that there are no physical gaps of defense posture, or “windows of
opportunity,” for fait accompli or
probing.” (Pg. 2)
While
the 2013 Guidelines recognized the continuing problem of Chinese salami
tactics, according to Takahashi it also recognized China’s increasingly-frequent
deployment of maritime law enforcement—and sometimes PLA—assets near the
Senkakus following Tokyo’s September 2012 purchase of the islands. As such, the
2013 Guidelines identified the emergence of escalation risks inherent to
potential direct contacts between PLA and Japan Self-Defense Force assets in
the East China. Maritime ISR still figured in heavily under the new Guidelines,
but now had the task of enabling rapid responses by the Self-Defense Force to
“deliberate or accidental escalation.” Conventional military considerations
also rose in prominence, namely demonstrations of the Self-Defense Force’s
ability to quickly and decisively conduct a circumstances-tailored response to
any Chinese escalation along the spectrum of conventional conflict. This
entailed deployments of Self-Defense Force units to forward positions as deemed
situationally appropriate, plus the ability to quickly surge forces forward as
required.
Takahashi
asserts that the most immediate threat to Japanese interests remains China’s
use of coast guard and other “paramilitary forces to challenge the East Asian
maritime status quo. With respect to the South China Sea challenge, he
correctly observes that:
“…since very few Southeast Asian
countries currently have significant coast guard forces, there is a possibility
that Southeast Asian countries will mobilize military forces to counter China’s
paramilitary force. If that occurs, China can blame those countries as
“escalating the situation” and further justify their mobilization of military
forces. (Pg. 4)
This
is exactly what happened to the Philippines in the 2012 Scarsborough Shoal
incident.
Even
more interestingly, he implies a Japanese government concern that if the U.S.
were to publicly declare that China’s improvements of its nuclear second strike
capabilities had led to a state of mutual nuclear vulnerability, it might
encourage the Chinese to act more boldly in the conventional sphere. He refers
to the stability-instability paradox, or rather the idea that the nuclear equilibrium
made possible by a secure second strike capability in turn encourages adventurism
at the conventional level.
While I understand
Takahashi’s concern, it’s important
to note that Cold War deterrence theorists did not believe the paradox was
deterministic. As I noted in my SSQ article on conventional deterrence:
Glenn Snyder, an early articulator
of the paradox, points out that the interplays between context, specific
circumstances, and chance are the keys to its real-world application. In his
view, a Soviet conventional offensive against NATO or Japan would have had
vastly greater ramifications to US interests and prestige, and therefore more
risk of unleashing inadvertent escalatory processes, than one against countries
in which U.S. interests were peripheral. Robert Jervis agreed, noting that
Schelling’s ill-controlled escalatory process meant nuclear equilibrium hardly
created any margin of safety for major conventional provocations or wars.[1] Nevertheless, it is
the defender’s inability to confidently know whether the stability-instability
paradox will work for or against deterrence efforts at a given point in time
that drives the need for a conventional hedging force capable of denying the
opponent’s potential fait accompli attempts. (Pg. 154)
And
Takahashi does a spectacular job outlining the qualities of such a hedging
force. He states that:
“From the perspective of countering
the A2/AD threat, however, putting more forces on the frontline would not be
wise because these frontline forces could be neutralized or destroyed by
Chinese A2/AD capabilities. A light presence on the frontline and a heavier
stand-off strike force outside of A2/AD ranges would be better-suited for this
environment.”(Pg. 6)
His
observation on the need for two forward “echelons,” a “light” one consisting of
lower campaign-value assets to fight on the “frontline,” and a “heavy” one
consisting of higher campaign-value assets that fight from locations
“over-the-horizon,” mirrors my own thinking on this issue. So does his subsequent observation that forward
forces must be designed to be resilient against a Chinese conventional first
strike, and thereby lower any Chinese incentives to conduct one in a crisis or limited conflict, let alone pursue a major conflict.
Takahashi
raises the question of whether the best approach for structuring the
“frontline” forces within a peacetime-contested zone is to employ tactical
dispersal of lower-campaign value conventional forces in order to counter
primarily military threats, employ primarily coast guard assets in order to
counter salami tactic threats, or a mix of the two. I frankly believe a mix is the right way to go, with the non-military forces in the “area of
contact” and the military forces latently backing them from a distance
determined by the specifics of the situation. Takahashi is absolutely right
that U.S. and Japanese leaders will need to work together to sketch out the
“right capability portfolio and institutional division of labor,” not only
between non-military and military forces but also the Japanese and U.S.
contingents. His monograph provides a terrific starting point for that exact
discussion.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author
and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official
positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do
not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any
U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.
[1]
See 1. Glenn Snyder. Deterrence and
Defense. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 225-26; 2. Glenn
Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Co., 1965), 199; and 3. Robert Jervis. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1989), 21-22, 105.
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