Command and Control for Distributed Lethality

LCDR Jimmy Drennan wrote an interesting post at CIMSEC NextWar earlier this month about how the Surface Navy should implement Command and Control (C²) of Surface Action Groups (SAG) within the nascent distributed lethality concept. LCDR Drennan correctly points out that the Composite Warfare Commander organizational structure was designed for carrier battleforces and is inappropriate for (if not unexecutable by) SAGs. He also correctly observes that because voice and data communications between a SAG and a distant higher echelon tactical commander (whether embarked in a carrier or elsewhere) cannot be assured under conditions of cyber-electromagnetic opposition, the SAG must be tactically commanded by an officer embarked in one of its constituent warships. He then suggests that the position of SAG commander should be established as a Major Command billet (e.g., a command tour assigned only after an officer has completed a tour commanding a single warship).  

This assumes a SAG would be a standing distinct group of surface combatants in peacetime—something akin to a ship squadron. If that is the case, then a U.S. Navy SAG that includes DDGs would theoretically be organized around a Destroyer Squadron and its Commodore, and a U.S. Navy SAG that is entirely comprised of LCSs or the future LCS-derived frigate would be organized around a LCS Squadron and its Commodore.

But I’d argue it is highly unlikely that the only U.S. Navy SAGs in a war would—or could—be standing peacetime squadrons of combatants. It boils down to the intersection between desired operational tempo and surface combatant availability.

Sometimes there will be missions in which a full squadron is excessive. At other times the nature of a mission and the breadth of the operating area may require dividing a squadron into several smaller groupings, each with separate tasking, that are then dispersed. There will probably often be missions in which only a handful of surface combatants can be spared to form a SAG because of other pressing demands in theater. In situations like these today during peacetime, the SAG commander defaults to the senior-most ship Commanding Officer in a task group. I would expect this to continue to be the case in wartime.

The implication is that all prospective first-tour Commanding Officers will have to be taught not only how to command their own ship, but also how to command SAGs. The Executive Officers and Department Heads that serve under them will likewise have to be taught how to serve as something akin to a “group staff” for their Commanding Officer when they are the SAG flagship.

There’s an added wrinkle in that the composition of any given SAG in a major war will likely be ad hoc. This will be especially likely the longer a war lasts. Ships will be damaged, whether from battle or wear-and-tear. Some will be lost in battle. Reinforcement ships will arrive from elsewhere in theater, other theaters, or U.S. homeports. Operational tempo will be unremitting. As we learned in the Solomons Campaign of 1942-1943, ship assignments to squadrons or groups will only be permanent in the sense that the demands of the next day—and the number of ships available that can get to sea and fight—will result in frequent short-notice reassignments. Common SAG tactics, techniques, and procedures will be needed Navy-wide so that any given ship will be able to integrate relatively easily into a new grouping.

Even so, this will not be able to fully overcome the challenges of a Commanding Officer and his or her crew having to learn the unique tactical behaviors of the other Commanding Officers and crews in their newly-assigned SAG—not to mention those of the SAG’s commander. Just about every account of the Solomons Campaign I’ve ever read contained the observation that the lack of operational familiarity between group/squadron commanders and their subordinate ship commanders, as well as the lack of operational familiarity between the watchteams of the ships in the group/squadron, was a major impediment to the groups and squadrons achieving their full tactical potential. Nelson had several months in the lead-up Trafalgar to instruct his Captains on his combat thinking, obtain their inputs, and drill them and their crews on how they should fight in accordance with his expressed intentions. Modern war won’t provide SAG commanders and their subordinate Captains that degree of pre-battle training luxury. LCDR Drennan is absolutely correct, then, that ship Commanding Officers in a SAG will need to be granted considerable independent tactical decision-making authority in accordance with the SAG commander’s last promulgated intentions. This will require a great deal of trust between SAG commanders and their subordinate ship Commanding Officers, as well as amongst the Commanding Officers of the SAG’s warships. The same will also be true between the SAG commander and his or her higher-echelon commander.

One final point concerns the facilities a warship must possess to serve as a SAG flagship. If a SAG is to be commanded by the senior-most ship Commanding Officer in the group, then the ship’s communications equipment and its spaces available for operational planning ought to be adequate. If a squadron Commodore is to be embarked to command the SAG, then his or her flagship will need space for the Commodore’s staff. And if several small independent SAGs will be operating under the operational control of a Commodore embarked in one of the ships in one of the SAGs, then that ship may need considerable communications bandwidth.

DDGs can host a Commodore and a small staff, but the fit is extremely tight. Instead of bringing staff officers aboard, it might be worth exploring whether an embarked Commodore might tap a few of the flagship’s Department Heads and Division Officers to serve as his or her planning cell and watchstanding teams. Warfare Tactics Instructor-designated Division Officers might then “fleet up” to temporarily run their departments and stand Tactical Action Officer watches while this is going on. Chief Petty Officers might likewise stand in for the Division Officers serving in other roles. If the Commodore was also a Destroyer or LCS Squadron commander, then his or her dedicated staff might serve elsewhere as a cell planning this or another SAG’s follow-on operations.

It also may be worth exploring whether the space available aboard a LCS or LCS-FF might allow it to host some sort of “C² Mission Module” that contains staff space, a SAG command center, additional communications equipment, and additional topside communications apertures. I’ve touched on some of the communications capabilities that will be needed for SAG operations under cyber-electromagnetic opposition in the past, and I’ll be returning to the topic in a few weeks.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.