It's Time to Consider Raiding, Again

Jon Solomon's note: When we think of expeditionary operations, we tend to picture the insertion of a ground force to seize and hold some territory for a relatively long period of time. My SPA colleague Jonathan Altman points out below, though, that short-duration raids can be just as strategically useful under the right circumstances. In this piece he examines the potential use of small-scale raids as a means of signalling and compellence outside of major war. I've asked him to write a follow-up piece as his time permits examining larger-scale raids in major war, as I believe that such operations in some scenarios might be highly useful for disrupting or rolling back an adversary's localized maritime denial capabilities. 

The term “raiding” seems like an anachronism upon first reflection. For the average person, it's as likely to conjure up images of Vikings as anything else, and even serious students of military history are challenged to come up with a more recent example than WWII of an effective raid (discounting small scale Special Forces actions in the Middle East). Nonetheless, in the current security environment, where large scale maritime and land forces can be held at risk by A2/AD systems, and inter-state disputes seem to be increasingly playing out on the lower rungs of the escalation ladder, raiding operations hold terrific promise. Compared to a ‘permanent’ insertion of ground forces in some area, brief hit-and-run raids offer increased flexibility and decreased resource needs—as well as options under certain circumstances for plausible deniability. These inherently interconnected qualities and their attendant impact on conflict management suggest a future in which the practice of raiding is likely to once again become an indispensable tool for planners and policymakers alike.

A quick note on definitions is needed. For the purposes of this discussion, a “raid” is defined as a military operation by amphibious and/or airborne forces to temporarily seize enemy territory for some operational purpose. Raids in this article should be considered to be solely directed against territory-holding actors (normally recognized nation-states but a limited set of sub-state actors would also fit such as ISIS or FARC in Columbia) on a scale from a platoon to battalion size effort. Most counter-terrorist operations are accordingly outside the focus of this paper. Larger scale raids that could enable or buttress full scale military campaigns will be covered in a follow on post as these are qualitatively different operations from the smaller-scale raids described in this one.

Because they are by definition intended to be temporary actions and need not incorporate many personnel, smaller-scale raids can often be plausibly deniable. While certainly some media may correctly identify the raid as such before it is complete (especially if the raid lasts longer than a few hours), at least broadly speaking, with respect to the public and third party nations many raids should be generally deniable. This confers tremendous advantages in conflict management.

First, deniability allows the raiding nation to avoid criticism from third parties while sending a desired message of resolve and/or punitive punishment to the state or substate actor being raided. It is likely that the nation being raided will at least have an idea of who is conducting the raid and why based on the target selected, which should be enough for them to understand what brought on the attack. In this sense raiding is an excellent medium to encourage compellence, where an adversary is given a face-saving method to deescalate a conflict without being forced to publicly admit they've been compelled. Consider a scenario where the United States wished to compel a rogue nation not to continue on a path of supporting terrorism. A raid could be used against a target of military significance or symbolic value to the rogue nation's support of terrorism, whereby its seizure and/or destruction by “unknown” forces would directly retard their efforts and convey a level of seriousness that sanctions or diplomatic censure simply cannot. The willingness to spill blood through a plausibly deniable attack against a symbol of an adversary's offending behavior cannot be overstated as a demonstration of earnestness.

On a related note, the deniability of a raid also assists in ending conflicts at the lowest possible levels of escalation because it allows an adversary to potentially save face. Without a smoking gun linking the raid to a nation, the targeted nation will have a better chance of tamping down internal pressure to respond to the raid, providing an off ramp to additional escalation. Again, even if an adversary was aware of who conducted the raid with a reasonable degree of certainty, so long as they do not want war and can keep that information from firing up a domestic base then de-escalation is feasible. In any case, the nature of a raid’s target (against which actor, what sort of specific target, etc.) can be calibrated to minimize the chance of starting of a tit for tat raiding exchange. While not a certainty, de-escalation is a much more likely outcome from a deniable action than one that is not.

The other key quality associated with raids is their flexibility. While the size of a raid will vary inversely with its deniability; this too can be used to a nation’s advantage. Want to offer an adversary an escalation off-ramp? A smaller-scale raid makes sense. Want to send a message of resolve not just to the targeted adversary but also a deterrence message to other potential adversaries? Then a larger-scale raid probably is a better fit. Raids are also flexible in their duration and objectives. A longer raid may send a different message than a shorter one, and the choice of objective can be a message unto itself. For example, deliberately limited objectives may be used to showcase capabilities that could be used in a much more destructive fashion should offending actions continue, while more ambitious efforts may be used to show a commitment to not only threaten that which the adversary holds dear but also demonstrate that the raider is already prepared to (publicly) risk as many lives as it takes to stop the targeted nation. While the difference in messages is subtle, the ability to calibrate them so carefully gives raiding enormous messaging utility.

Operationally speaking, raids are a more useful tool than others because they require only a limited logistics tail and lend themselves to the element of surprise. Since raids by definition do not intend to hold territory permanently and last at most a matter of days, the supplies and supporting forces needed to execute them are comparatively minimal. One only needs a method of raiding force insertion, some small amount of supplies to support the operation, and perhaps some combined arms supporting fires if the circumstances dictate. Since the scale of resources is relatively small (for short operations raiders may simply carry on their bodies all that they need), it is likely that the preparations for a raid can be kept secret, and a range of platforms not available to larger operations can be used. For example, “white shipping” (unmarked, non-military flagged ships) or relying exclusively on airborne insertion and exfiltration can be effective in facilitating successful raids. Beyond supply needs, because a raid by definition is a relatively small operation, the number of people and computer networks needed to plan and execute the raid can also be small, making the potential for adversary discovery of the raid before the fact much less likely. Thus because the preparations for a raid can be done in a highly secure manner, raids are much more likely to maintain the element of surprise than other military operations with similar objectives; thereby lowering the risk to the raiders themselves and amplifying the chance of mission success.

Looking out to a future where inter-state conflict continues to take place at lower levels of the escalation ladder, and where obfuscating one's own military actions will be important to achieving national objectives, raiding would seem to be an essential part of a military planner's toolkit. Raids convey national level resolve at a minimum risk of friendly loss of life, and provide an adversary with either escalation off-ramps and/or clear direction that a behavior will not be allowed to continue. It's time to think about raiding less from an historical lens and instead consider how it can best be used for strategic effect in the modern world.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver and an undergraduate degree from Wake Forest University. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict

On October 8, Hudson Institute's Center for American Seapower will release its report on the future of the aircraft carrier entitled Sharpening the Spear:  The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict.  House Armed Services Committee, Seapower and Projection Forces Sub-Committee Chairman Randy Forbes (R-VA) will headline a lunch-time briefing and panel event.  Register online at the Hudson Institute's registration page.  

Here is a summary of the event:

Event Details
The aircraft carrier has served as the lynchpin of American naval power for eight decades. However, given their cost and mounting Anti-Access/Area Denial threats, many observers have questioned whether it is worthwhile to continue to build large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In a new report, Hudson Institute’s Center for American Seapower provides a comprehensive analysis of the future of the aircraft carrier. Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict examines the role of Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) in high-end conflict, identifying capabilities and vulnerabilities, and offering innovative recommendations for policymakers and military strategists in terms of concepts, capabilities, and capacities. The report concludes that while many criticisms of the platform have merit, the unmatched flexibility and adaptability of the aircraft carrier will continue to make it a critical Navy contribution to joint U.S. warfighting capabilities.

On October 8th, Hudson will release the report at an event in the Rayburn House Office Building. Congressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA) will give keynote remarks on the role of the carrier in future warfighting. Bryan McGrath, deputy director of the Center for American Seapower, will give an overview of the report’s key insights, and Seth Cropsey, director of the Center for American Seapower, will moderate a panel on the importance of the carrier in American military strategy. The panel will feature Ronald O’Rourke, specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service; Robert Martinage, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; and Timothy A. Walton, co-author of the report and principal at Alios Consulting Group.

Kindly RSVP by Friday, October 2nd. Advance registration is required and a light lunch will be served.


SPEAKERS

Congressman J. Randy Forbes (R-VA)
Congressman J. Randy Forbes is Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. He has represented Virginia’s 4th District in the U.S. House of Representatives since 2001.

Seth Cropsey
Seth Cropsey is Director of the Center for American Seapower at Hudson Institute. He is a co-author of Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict.

Bryan McGrath
Bryan McGrath is Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower at Hudson Institute. He is a co-author of Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict.

Timothy A. Walton
Timothy A. Walton is Principal at Alios Consulting Group and a co-author of Sharpening the Spear: The Carrier, the Joint Force, and High-End Conflict.

Ronald O’Rourke
Ronald O’Rourke is Specialist in National Defense at the Congressional Research Service.

Robert Martinage
Robert Martinage is Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

PROGRAM

Registration and Lunch
11:30 am — 12:00 pm
Introduction by Seth Cropsey
12:00 pm — 12:10 pm
Remarks by Congressman Randy Forbes
12:10 pm — 12:25 pm
Study Brief by Bryan McGrath
12:25 pm — 12:40 pm
Panel Discussion
12:40 pm — 1:30 pm
Audience Q & A
1:30 pm — 2:00 pm

This event will be recorded and posted
on hudson.org after it concludes.

How Many Carriers Does America Need?

Seth Cropsey, Tim Walton, and I tackle this and many other questions in a forthcoming report from the Hudson Center for American Seapower.  More information to follow, but we'll do a release event on the Hill 8 October midday.

Here's a little taste of what you'll hear from The Hill.

What Walter Pincus Gets Wrong

Carly Fiorina has surged to near the top of the GOP Leaderboard on the strength of two positive debate performances.  In last week's offering, she used about a minute of the time she was allocated to lay out some of the high points of her thinking about national defense.  In response, the Washington Post's Walter Pincus had a piece out yesterday that methodically takes her to task.  Let me now return the favor.

I will take quotes from Mr. Pincus' piece and expound upon them.

"Having proposed major steps to make the U.S. military “the strongest military on the face of the planet” — which it already is — she never said how the government would pay for her proposals."

While I agree with Mr, Pincus that the U.S. military is the world's premier force, this position does not necessarily mean that it is well-formed or postured for the future.  Ms. Fiorina and most of the other GOP candidates believe there are steps that should be taken to improve and enlarge the force--with which Mr. Pincus apparently disagrees.  That he takes her to task for how she would pay for her proposals is a fair charge--to a point--but surely he must have noticed the number of people on the stage and the degree to which Ringmaster Tapper was cutting people off.


Focus instead on her next point: “What I would do, immediately, is begin rebuilding the 6th Fleet.”As Stars and Stripes, the Pentagon’s newspaper, diplomatically put it the day after Fiorina spoke: “Her meaning wasn’t immediately clear — the U.S. 6th Fleet is less a collection of ships than a command structure for operating American warships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Moreover, the fleet is one of the few growing military commands in Europe.”Fiorina could have noticed that, beginning in March, the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and its strike group of five ships, consisting of about 6,000 sailors and Marines, began a planned tour of the 6th Fleet area and that four destroyers were being based at a U.S. Navy facility in Rota, Spain.

Lots to unpack here.  First, Mr. Pincus is on thin ice pointing to the TR's -- or any other carrier for that matter -- passage through the Med on the way to the CENTCOM AOR.  Indeed, EUCOM derives some value from these transits, but that is exactly what they are--transits.  The propensity of insecurity to break out on the rim of the Med between these transits continues to be inconvenient to the relevance of his thinking.  As for Stars and Stripes pedantry (approvingly cited by Mr. Pincus), while the Sixth Fleet is indeed a command structure, the forces under its command are dramatically fewer than they once were, and pointing to it as "growing" is interesting only from the standpoint of it having really nowhere else to go but up.

Another Fiorina proposal was to “conduct regular, aggressive military exercises in the Baltic states.” Has she ever inquired about “Baltops,” an annual military exercise in the Baltic Sea and surrounding land areas run by the U.S. military since the 1970s? The 43rd one was held with much publicity in June, with 17 countries and 5,600 ground, naval and air force personnel taking part. Activities took place throughout the Baltic Sea and in Poland, Sweden and Germany.

Pincus is correct in citing BALTOPS as an example of such an exercise, but he is assuredly cherry-picking from the most recent example--which was indeed impressive and representative of the kind of exercise that SHOULD be routinely conducted, as Fiorina states.  What Pincus does not provide is any sense of the degree to which BALTOPS had dramatically declined in size and scope over the years.

In Pincus' defense, what Ms. Fiorina is suggesting in terms of force buildup would indeed cost more than we are currently spending on defense.  Logically, she or any other candidate will have to provide voters with some sense of where the money to do so will come from.  But his insistence that doing so should have been part of a sixty second soundbite in the midst of a food-fight of a debate is off the mark.

Some Observations about Network-Enabled Over-the-Horizon Attacks

Norman Friedman’s 2009 book Network Centric Warfare is one of the principal influences upon my thinking about 21^st Century maritime combat. It is a seminal recounting of the evolution of modern maritime warfare systems, the ‘systems of systems’ they fit in to, and the doctrines developed for employing them. It also serves as a core reference for researchers seeking to discover the fine (declassified) technical and operational details of the Cold War competition between U.S. and Soviet maritime ‘battle networks.’

One of Friedman’s most interesting observations in the book pertains to network-enabled attacks, especially from ‘over-the-horizon.’ A ship targeted using remote surveillance sensors, for example, might not realize it had been targeted until it detected inbound weapons. Friedman notes that the multi-source Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS) couldn’t enable true surprise attacks because Soviet anti-ship missile doctrine was predicated on the use of ‘pathfinder’ and ‘tattletale’ scouts for visual confirmation and classification of targets. Detection of these scouts by U.S. Navy or NATO battleforces (or theater/national surveillance systems) would provide the defenders warning that Soviet anti-ship missile platforms were nearby or that a raid was inbound. (Pg. 217-239)

In contrast, the U.S. Navy of the late 1970s and early 1980s sought to use its Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) network of signals intelligence sensors and fusion centers to provide targeting cues to Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TASM)-armed submarines via an effort dubbed Outlaw Shark. Since its advent a decade earlier, OSIS had been used to detect, classify, and develop “track histories” for Soviet ships in support of Navy operational-level planning. The experimental Outlaw Shark targeting capability stemmed from using OSIS’s track histories to dead-reckon Soviet ships’ geolocations at future times, then transmitting those cues to patrolling submarines. Unlike SOSS, though, OSIS did not use active surveillance or reconnaissance sensors to supplement its passive ones. As a result, Outlaw Shark targeting would have been unavailable if Soviet ships maintained disciplined Emissions Control (EMCON). (Pg. 206-209)

In the event of exploitable Soviet EMCON indiscipline, however, Friedman observes that Outlaw Shark targeting would in theory have denied a Soviet surface force any warning of an impending U.S. anti-ship attack. This is because the OSIS-TASM tandem’s lack of a scout meant that there would have been no discernable U.S. Navy ‘behavior’ to tip Soviet ships off that they had been targeted. Friedman concludes with the thought that even if a TASM attack had landed no blows, it nevertheless might have disrupted a Soviet surface force’s plans or driven it to take rash actions that could have been exploited offensively or defensively by other U.S. or NATO forces. (Pg. 210)

The obvious limitations of relying almost entirely upon non-real-time signals intelligence for over-the-horizon targeting contributed greatly to the Navy shelving its TASM ambitions during the early 1980s. The Navy’s own mid-to-late Cold War countertargeting doctrine and tactics made great use of EMCON and deceptive emissions against SOSS, so there was no fundamental reason why the Soviets could not have returned the favor against OSIS. Moreover, TASM employment depended upon a Soviet ship maintaining roughly the same course and speed it was on at time of an OSIS-generated targeting cue. If the targeted Soviet ship maneuvered such that it would not be within the TASM’s preset ‘search basket’ at the anticipated time, then the TASM would miss. Nor could Navy shooters have been sure that the TASM would have locked on to a valid and desirable Soviet ship vice a lesser Soviet ship, a Soviet decoy ship, or even a non-combatant third-party’s ship.

Friedman’s point remains, though: a network-enabled attack that results in a physical miss could nevertheless theoretically produce significant tactically-exploitable psychological effects. This concept has long been used to forestall attacks by newly-detected nearby hostile submarines, even when the submarine’s precise position is not known. An anti-submarine weapon launched towards the submarine’s vicinity at minimum complicates the latter’s tactical situation and potentially forces it into a reactive and defensive posture. This can buy time for more effective anti-submarine measures including better-aimed attacks.

It therefore might be reasonable to use some longer-ranged weapons to “shock” an opponent’s forces along the lines Friedman outlines, even if the weapons’ hit probabilities are not high, if it is deemed likely that the targeted forces will react in ways that friendly forces armed with more plentiful and producible weapons could exploit. For example, an opponent’s force might light off its air defense radars upon detecting the attacker’s weapons’ own homing radars. Or perhaps the opponent’s units might distinguish themselves from non-combatant vehicles/aircraft/ships in the battlespace by virtue of their maneuvers once they detect inbound weapons. Either reaction might provide the attacker with definitive localization and classification of the opponent’s platforms, which in turn could be used to provide more accurate targeting support for follow-on attacks. Depending on the circumstances, expenditure of a few advanced weapons to ‘flush’ an opponent’s forces in these ways might be well worth it even if none hit.

But would doing so really be the best use of such weapons in most cases? We must bear in mind the advanced ordnance inventory management dilemma: higher-capability (and especially longer-range) guided weapons expended during a conflict likely will not be replaced in the attacker’s arsenal in a timely manner unless they are readily and affordably wartime-producible. Nor will weapons launched from surface ships’ or submarines’ launchers be quickly reloadable, as these platforms will have to retire from the contested zone and expend several days of transit time cycling through a rearward base for rearmament. The force-level operational tempo effects of this cycle time will not be insignificant. A compelling argument can be made that advanced weapons should be husbanded for attacks in which higher-confidence targeting is available…unless of course the responsible commander assesses that the situation at hand justifies firing based on lower-confidence targeting.

There is another option, however. Instead of expending irreplaceable advanced weapons, a network-enabled attacker might instead use decoy weapons that simulate actual weapons’ trajectories, behaviors, and emissions in order to psychologically jar an opponent’s forces or otherwise entice them to react in exploitable ways. This would be especially useful when the attacker‘s confidence in his targeting picture is fairly low. SCATHE MEAN comes to mind in this respect. This is probably more practical for aircraft and their deep munitions inventories in aircraft carriers or at land bases. Still, it might be worth exploring how a small number of decoy weapons sprinkled within a Surface Action Group or amongst some submarines might trade operationally and tactically against using those launcher spots for actual weapons.

As for the defender, there are four principal ways to immunize against (but not decisively counter) the use of actual or decoy weapons for network-enabled ‘shock or disrupt’ attacks:

• Distribute multi-phenomenology sensors within a defense’s outer layers in order to detect and discriminate decoy platforms or weapons at the earliest opportunity. The sensors must be able to communicate with their operators using means that are highly resistant to detection and exploitation by the attacker.

• Institute routine, realistic, and robust training regimes that condition crews psychologically and tactically for sudden shocks such as inbound weapons “out of nowhere” or deception. This might also lead to development of tactics or operating concepts in which some or all of the defender’s units gain the ability to maintain restrictive emissions, maneuvering, and firing discipline even when an adversary’s inbound weapons are detected unless certain criteria are met.

• Field deep (and properly positioned) defensive ordnance inventories. Note that this ordnance does not just include guns and missiles, but also electronic warfare systems and techniques.

• Embrace tactical flexibility and seize the tactical initiative, or in other words take actions that make it far harder for an adversary to attack first. A force’s possession of preplanned branching actions that cover scenarios in which it is prematurely localized or detected by an adversary can help greatly in this regard.

Friedman’s observations regarding the psychological angles of network-enabled targeting are subtle as they require thinking about how the technological aspects of a tactical scenario might interplay with its human aspects. We tend to fixate on the former and overlook the latter. That’s an intellectual habit we’re going to need to break if we’re going to restore the capacity and conditioning we possessed just a quarter century ago for fighting a great power adversary’s networked forces.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

An Apology to RADM Jeff Harley

Jerry Hendrix and I wrote a piece yesterday in Defense One in which we raised objections to reports of remarks RADM Harley made in London earlier this week. Admiral Harley has defended himself in the comments section of the piece, and in a meeting he held earlier today with Jerry.

Jerry and I were inappropriate in our wording, specifically "Let us be clear: military officers, especially flag and general officers, are not political appointees. Their oath and duty is to the Constitution and the people whose sovereignty it embodies. The rising unwillingness to provide realistic assessments and strategies to protect American national interests is truly disturbing." We have no reason to believe that RADM Harley has been anything but faithful to his Oath of Office, and the implication that he has is regrettable and unfortunate.  I apologize for this.  Jerry has similarly apologized to the Admiral in the comment section of the original piece.

As for apologizing with a blog post on a Friday afternoon, I weighed the benefits of speed to market against audience and came down on the side of trying to right the wrong more quickly rather than less.

That there have been mixed messages from the Navy--from the very top of the Navy--on China remains for me, troubling.  A consistent approach derived of a truly strategic framework vetted at the highest levels of the government is not too much to ask when it comes to great power relations.

But this is very different than treating a good man ungenerously, and in doing so, I was wrong.

Bryan McGrath

Five Tests for Alternatives to the Large Deck Aircraft Carrier

What could an allegorical fence in the English countryside possibly have to do with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier? If you’ll indulge me, I’ll explain.

I’ve written before that while there’s no one right way to think through and argue the complex questions in a policy debate, there is at least one wrong way. A famed parable written by early 20^th Century English theologian G.K. Chesterton makes the same case, only far more eloquently:

“In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox.  There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road.  The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, "I don't see the use of this; let us clear it away." To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: "If you don't see the use of it, I certainly won't let you clear it away. Go away and think.  Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it."

This paradox rests on the most elementary common sense. The gate or fence did not grow there.  It was not set up by somnambulists who built it in their sleep.  It is highly improbable that it was put there by escaped lunatics who were for some reason loose in the street. Some person had some reason for thinking it would be a good thing for somebody.  And until we know what the reason was, we really cannot judge whether the reason was reasonable.

It is extremely probable that we have overlooked some whole aspect of the question, if something set up by human beings like ourselves seems to be entirely meaningless and mysterious. There are reformers who get over this difficulty by assuming that all their fathers were fools; but if that be so, we can only say that folly appears to be a hereditary disease. But the truth is that nobody has any business to destroy a social institution until he has really seen it as an historical institution. If he knows how it arose, and what purposes it was supposed to serve, he may really be able to say that they were bad purposes, or that they have since become bad purposes, or that they are purposes which are no longer served.  But if he simply stares at the thing as a senseless monstrosity that has somehow sprung up in his path, it is he and not the traditionalist who is suffering from an illusion.

Like Chesterton’s fence, the large-deck carrier did not just spontaneously materialize. It is the product of a century of human efforts that incrementally evolved and were evolved by the field of naval warfare. Every change in carrier design, air wing configuration, maritime aviation doctrine and operating concepts, and so on can be traced to one or more strategic, operational, tactical, organizational, or political purposes. Not all of these purposes were wise or enduring, but that’s where the methodology Chesterton proposed in his parable fits in.

If one seeks to reduce or remove the large-deck carrier from Navy force structure, one must articulate the purposes the carrier was designed to serve, judge whether any of those purposes remain relevant, and lastly propose some alternative (be it a new platform or a family of platforms) that fulfills the purposes judged to remain relevant—or otherwise acknowledge the consequent decline in the Joint force’s capacity and capabilities. I summarized the first two steps in my series on the large-deck carrier last fall. As for the third, I would suggest that any alternative to the large-deck nuclear-powered carrier must at minimum pass each of the following five tests:

1. Can the alternative perform both power projection and sea control tasks? Carriers are commonly thought of as platforms for hurling land-attack strikes at an adversary. This overlooks the fact that in major war they more typically have served to enable maritime forces to seize and sustain temporary localized sea control for specific operational purposes, one of which can be land-attack strike.
2. Does the alternative enable the timely and persistent employment of large tactical aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, over maritime areas far from friendly defensible airbases on land? An aircraft carrier’s ability to operate in relative proximity to objective maritime areas promotes faster responses and longer on-station persistence than may be possible from in-theater airbases. This is especially the case if the airbases nearest to such areas lie well within the adversary's offensive striking reach. Furthermore, a tactical aircraft must be relatively large if is to carry heavy payloads and fly long distances at a medium to high subsonic speed or otherwise remain aloft for long periods of time. Only a large-deck carrier can launch and recover these kinds of aircraft at sea. Particularly important are Airborne Early Warning aircraft with large-aperture radars, which I have previously noted serve as the keystone of sea control. Long-range/long-endurance fighters are similarly valuable to sea control, as they can enable interdiction of “archers” well before the latter can launch their “arrows” at defended aircraft and ships. A large-deck carrier can enable sizable proactive or responsive screening support to surface forces, and a dispersed multi-carrier battleforce can enable persistent screening support in mass of such forces.
3. Can the alternative achieve a high sustained strategic speed as well as protracted operational endurance? The nuclear-powered large-deck carrier can move between (or within) theaters faster than any other surface platform—and never requires refueling to do so. Only the air wing’s fuel and ammunition, plus the crew’s food and stores, require replenishment. And the carrier’s vast storage space allows it to operate for long periods of time between replenishments.
4. How extensible is the alternative to incorporating new aircraft and shipboard systems? The large-deck carrier’s size and facilities have proven highly capable over the decades of operating each successive generation of aircraft. Similarly, the carrier’s size—and the availability of vast electrical power from its nuclear reactors—have allowed it to take on each successive generation of shipboard warfare systems.
5. Would the alternative be able to take on an increasing share of the joint force’s strike tasks in a major modern protracted conflict as long-range missile inventories are depleted? History tells us that guided munitions will be expended in war at a rate well in excess of what peacetime planners expect. Long-range missiles are central to modern warfare, but their inventories will eventually be outstripped by demand in a protracted fight. This simple fact would not change if the budgetary resources used for large-deck carriers were instead reallocated towards long-range missile procurement; in a protracted war, these missiles would eventually run out. This phenomenon is not unique to naval forces or U.S. forces for that matter; adversaries will face the same constraints. A naval force will need a platform capable of delivering numerous and relatively wartime-producible weapons over long distances at opportune moments during a protracted maritime conflict. A large-deck carrier with a smartly configured and armed air wing can fulfill that role. If anything, longer-range missiles and other joint combined arms will be best used to open up temporary localized holes in an adversary’s defenses that can be exploited by reusable aircraft carrying more plentiful and readily wartime-producible shorter-range weapons. And let’s not forget that carrier aircraft can be reloaded each time they return to their ship, whereas shipboard launchers can only be reloaded upon retirement from the immediate combat area.

It is insufficient to simply declare the large-deck carrier is undesirable because it is expensive, or that it is obsolete because it can be threatened. Neither the carrier’s relative expense nor its exposure to dangerous wartime threats is particularly new in any event. If one is to advocate replacement of the large-deck carrier with something else, that something else must be able to assume the still-relevant purposes served by the large-deck carrier using ways that are superior to those of the large-deck carrier. The parable of Chesterton’s fence applies. 

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.