RMMV aboard USS Independence (LCS 2) |
In the 70 years since the end of the Second World War the United States
has twice attempted to create a dedicated force of mine warfare ships to
support global naval operations. Neither effort has been fully successful. The
first such endeavor was the construction of the 53 Aggressive minesweeper, ocean class (MSO’s) in the wake of the October
1950 amphibious assault at Wonson during the Korean War. By the late 1970’s
however, this first postwar mine warfare force was poor condition. A planned
modernization program on the fleet of 65 ships was curtailed to 13 units.[1]
There was little specific training and enlisted men assigned aboard the MSO’s
usually provided training on mine warfare to incoming officers.[2] The
Commander of Naval Mine Warfare Command in 1985, Commodore Duke Cockfield, was
quoted in the Navy’s All Hands
magazine as saying, “If you go back to the 1970’s, mine warfare was in serious
trouble.”[3] Finally,
significant minesweeping operations such as the post-Vietnam War clearance of
naval mines from Haiphong Harbor as part of the agreement ending the war were
conducted by mine sweeping CH-53 helicopters rather than surface ships. Despite
this success, overall U.S. mine warfare capabilities were at a low eb.
The Reagan administration began a U.S. Navy surface ship mine warfare
renaissance with the authorization for construction of 31 new mine warfare
ships of the Avenger class mine
countermeasures ships (MCM) and the Cardinal
(later Osprey) class coastal mine
hunter ships (MHC).[4] Construction was slow due
to a general loss of mine warfare ship construction expertise in U.S.
shipyards, and the Avenger class
average cost grew to $260 million dollars a unit (in 2009 dollars) by the time
they were complete and in active service.[5] Initial
units of the MCM class were in service in time to participate in mine hunting
and clearance actions during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. While mines
claimed no Allied ship losses, significant damage was incurred by the cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59) and USS Tripoli (LPH 10) due to hitting
World War 1 design contact mines.
The continued construction of both the MCM and MHC classes through the
1990’s appeared to have renewed the U.S. surface mine warfare capability, but
this force is now aging as the MSO’s were in the 1970’s. In fact, the whole of
the U.S. mine warfare capability, including surface ships, helicopters and
explosive ordnance detachment (EOD) capabilities are, in the words of mine
warfare expert Dr. Scott Truver, “brittle” and have historically accounted for
less than 1% of the Navy’s program for funding and operations.[6]
The Osprey class MHC’s have already
been retired in the decade of the 2000’s. The last MCM is scheduled to leave
service in 2024, and the MH-53E Sea Dragon minesweeping helicopters will depart
active duty in 2025.[7]
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USS Coronado (LCS 4) and JHSV 3 USNS Millinocket |
This modular package of systems was always intended to be flexible and
able to add or remove equipment based on the current threat. If the RMS and
associated RMMV are not capable of meeting critical performance parameters,
then other systems such as unmanned surface (the Minehunting Unmanned SurfaceVehicle (MHU) and Common Unmanned Surface Vessel (C-USV) or subsurface (MK 18Mod 1 Swordfish and Mod 2 Kingfish Unmanned Underwater Vehicles) systems may
fill its position in the LCS mine warfare module (weight restrictions
permitting). It is also worth noting that nothing in Dr. Gilmore's 03 August 2024 letter to OUSD, AT&L
condemns the LCS program, or the concept of modularity for mine warfare. Specifically:
“The reliability of existing systems
is so poor that it poses a significant risk to both the up coming operational test of the
LCS Independence-variant equipped with the first increment of the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission package,
and to the Navy's plan to field and
sustain a viable LCS-based mine hunting and mine clearance capability prior to fiscal year (FY)20.”[8]
Mine warfare must continue to move past
manpower intensive, ship specific capabilities to modular, automated systems. Surface
ship mine sweeping is an intensive, very physical process that quickly saps a
crew's endurance. There is good reason behind the aphorism of “hunt when you
can and sweep when you must”. Mine sweeping operations on U.S. MCM ships
involve the whole crew; often in “port and starboard” (six hours on and six
hours off) watches that could last for up to a week. This operation also places
highly trained sailors in the midst of an active mine field in order to
accomplish their mission. Mine hunting in order to clear a swept channel
through a mine field can be accomplished entirely through unmanned units like
the RMMV, and other automated surface and subsurface platforms. Sweeping is
best left for post-conflict clearance operations like that to clear Haiphong
harbor in 1973, the Suez Canal in 1974 and the Persian Gulf in 1991 and 2003.
The LCS remains the right platform to host
the bulk of the surface ship mine warfare capability. An LCS-based capability
frees the mine warfare capability from over a century of confinement aboard
small, slow, short-legged ships often incapable of operations outside the shallow
littoral zones of the world’s oceans. Furthermore, it ends the period of mine
warfare as an arcane; little understood concept of naval warfare beyond those
few sailors assigned to dedicated mine warfare platforms. The planned large
force of LCS and FF variants has the potential to introduce the mine warfare
module to a larger joint and multinational audience. A modular mine warfare
capability can become just as common as helicopter-based antisubmarine warfare.
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AN/SLQ-48 MNV |
Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy has been a
neglected discipline for nearly two decades. The change to a modular capability
from its previous platform-centric model can liberate the mine warfare
discipline from its century-long confinement aboard small, slow ships with
little survivability. Problems with one system of the modular capability should
not distract Congress or the Navy from making the important change to surface
naval mine warfare.
[1]
Tamera Moser Melia, Damn the Torpedoes, A
Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures,Washington D.C., The
United States Navy Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1991 p. 97.
[2]
Ibid, p. 98
[4]
Melia, pp. 117, 118.
[5]
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/07-17-smallcombatants.pdf,
p. 6 (author: Dr. Eric J. Labs, supervised by Dr. J. Michael Gilmore and
Matthew Goldberg)
[6]
Truver, p. 47.
[7]
Ibid, p. 48.
[9]
Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute
Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, 5th Edition, Annapolis, Md,
U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006, p. 821
[10]
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/ms2/documents/RMS-brochure.pdf
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