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| U.S. Surface Warships in Singapore, 2013 |
The rise of the Soviet surface fleet in
the early 1970’s, in both size and global reach, caused a revolution in U.S.
Navy strategy, operational planning and tactics. Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) Admiral Elmo Zumwalt responded with a capstone document at the outset of
his tenure that encapsulated his planned response to this change. Project
Sixty, signed in November 1970 sought to “re-optimize the USN to counter the
Soviet threat.”[3] Zumwalt, like today’s
service leaders, faced a depressing budget climate that offered little hope of
reaching the number of ships and capabilities he desired. Zumwalt proposed his
now famous “high/low” mix of ships, as part of an overall presentation of 4
capability categories and 3 alternative surface force structures.[4]
There was plenty of opposition to Zumwalt’s overall tenure as CNO. The only
“low” capability ship adopted for full production was the patrol frigate (later
the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate.)
That said, Zumwalt created a dynamic environment where traditional
political/military analysts who worked in the CNO staff OP 60 office (now
N3/N5), capabilities-based analysts in the relatively new Director of System
Analysis (OP 96) office (once directed by Zumwalt and now N81), and a new,
small dedicated CNO staff element (OP 00K) worked together to produce both strategy,
and associated force structure analysis for a whole new generation of U.S.
surface ships from nuclear powered cruisers to hydrofoil missile patrol craft.
Zumwalt’s successors as CNO in the 1970’s
carried forward this climate of change and cooperative effort between the
strategic and analytical sides of the Navy to create new strategy and
associated force structure to meet the rising Soviet threat. Admiral Holloway
adjusted a good deal of Zumwalt’s terminology on the missions of the navy in his
own capstone document “The Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy”. He also
created a new operational organization for the fleet around the Carrier Battle
Group (CVBG), as opposed to organizing the fleet around ship types.[5]
Planning analysis conducted during Holloway’s CNO tenure reinforced
identification of 600 ships (first identified by Zumwalt as an ideal fleet
strength rounded up from 583) as the ideal number of U.S. ships to meet global
requirements for a variety of missions from peactime presence to nuclear
conflict with the Soviet Union. Planning and analysis from both Republican and
Democratic led administrations contributed to this effort. The Ford
administration’s January 1977 Naval Shipbuilding Program, and the 1978 Carter
administration’s Sea Plan 2000 document (drafted by the Navy at the behest of
Navy Secretary Grahm Claytor and Under Secretary James Woolsey) both largely
agreed on the number of ships at around 600. Future Navy Secretary John Lehman
helped to draft both documents as an independent CNO consultant. The analysis
effort was further aided by advanced intelligence products and by the CNO’s
Strategic Studies Group (SSG), created at the Naval War College in 1981 and
staffed by a rotational group of exceptional Commanders and Captains.
Products like this created both the Maritime
Strategy of the 1980’s and several generations of dedicated political/military
and operations analysts directly responsible for its evolution. The new CNO,
Admiral Richardson, could also perhaps produce a capstone document designed to
provoke strategic and operational analysis to counter a new generation of
threats. Such a document should specify what capabilities the Navy wishes to
field now, and in the next 10, 20 and 30 years. It must be financially
responsible and not suggest unaffordable platforms and payloads in support of
these capabilities. The advent and evolution of the distributed lethality
concept within the surface force is a positive step in building such a
force-wide operational doctrine.
This analysis must, however, not project
false illusions of a world with significantly well equipped enemies lurking
within every archipelago and anchorage in the global common spaces. The threat
to U.S. forces around the globe has significantly increased since 2004 in some
places, and many capable anti access/area denial (A2/AD) systems are now more
widely available than in the past. This trend will likely continue, but only in
a few areas will these capabilities be significant and well coordinated. The
most common threat remains general maritime lawlessness such as that which has
occurred in conjunction with failed states like Somalia, Libya, and Syria in
recent years. Larger operations have been and will likely be required to reduce
the overall threats posed by such collapse, but the day to day maintenance of
global trade through troubled regions is a more probable near-term naval
mission. Many of the tenets of the 2007 Cooperative Maritime Strategy remain,
notably in cooperative efforts with partner nations in securing the free
passage of trade throughout the world. This is where the Littoral Combat Ship
(LCS) and its frigate variant have a vital role to play.
Cooperative operations with small,
friendly nations, counter-piracy, and choke point security operations do not necessarily
demand all of the capabilities provided by an Arleigh Burke class destroyer. Many nations and non state actors
now possess, or will likely acquire capable mines that can cut key trade routes
with a mere announcement. Piracy often follows in the wake of political
disorder and many nations facing disorder continue to benefit from the visit of a U.S. warship,
especially in remote locations. These are all missions worthy of an LCS with
minimal mission module outfitting. Recent estimates from contracts awarded in
April of this year price the LCS sea frame from $345.5 to $362 million dollars.[6]
Few if any other ships capable of being produced in U.S. yards have such a
range of capabilities (medium caliber gun, extensive flight deck and hanger
facilities, point defense missile system and open architecture) at such a low
price. The Navy further estimates that the frigate variant of the LCS, with
additional warfare capabilities and less vulnerability to attack will cost no
more than 20% more than the current basic LCS sea frame and remain below the
current Congressional Cost Cap of $479 million dollars a unit.[7]
The Navy has significantly under-estimated such costs in the past, but they
should still remain well below the very conservative cost of reproducing a
larger, multi mission frigate like the Perry
class that cost $194 million a unit in 1979, which adjusted for inflation
alone rises to $673 million in 2015 dollars.[8]
Many critics continue to suggest that the
LCS is vulnerable to missile attack, but its primary point defense system is
well regarded in the rest of the operational fleet. The LCS’ Rolling Airframe
Missile (RAM and SeaRAM mounts) is an excellent capability against attacks like
those that crippled the USS Stark in
1987 and the INS Hanit in 2006. In
both of these cases failure to prepare for potential attacks, rather than lack
of capability on the part of the defending ships, significantly contributed to
attacker success. The four U.S. DDG 51 class ships currently assigned to the
Mediterranean and home ported in Rota, Spain have been fitted with this weapon
system as their point defense capability.[9]
The addition of a surface to surface missile for the LCS that could include it
in the surface navy’s distributed lethality concept hints at a fairly
formidable and capable platform not nearly as vulnerable as critics contend.[10]
Its fine to conduct a capabilities-based
assessment in support of current and future requirements, but do not limit that
analytical effort to the frigate variant of the LCS. It should equally not
be an endeavor where physics PhD’s lecture the Navy on the specific shortcoming of
individual systems on one platform. An analysis of the entire naval force structure
is required in support of a significant change in the state of global maritime
security. Threats to U.S. interests in the Western Pacific, the Mediterranean
Sea, the Persian Gulf and other locations by rising and revanchist powers
demand analysis on par with that which eventually produced the Maritime
Strategy of the 1980’s. An analysis of the surface fleet’s current and future
expected capabilities is a good place to start. Continued development of
distributed lethality represents a commitment to re-examining surface force
capabilities. Current budget conditions will likely restrain significant fleet
growth for the time, and low-cost solutions to present and emerging threats are
required. Few of these will rise to a full on A2/AD threat, and would not
require an expensive multi mission warship to fulfill. Do a CBA for the surface
fleet. It will likely be of some benefit, but don’t be surprised in LCS and its
frigate variant emerged unscathed.
[2]
http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/what-critics-of-the-navys-strategy-get-wrong/
[3]
Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone
Strategies and Concepts, 1970-1980, Strategy, Policy, Concept and Vision
Documents, Alexandria, VA, CAN Corporation, MiscD0026414A1/Final. Decmeber
2011, p. 5.
[4]
Ibid.
[5]
John Hattendorf, editor, U.S. Naval
Strategy in the 1970’s, Selected Documents, Newport, RI, The Naval War
College Press, The Newport Papers, September, 2007, p. 53.
[6]
http://news.usni.org/2015/04/01/navy-awards-2-lcss-to-austal-1-and-advance-procurement-funding-to-lockheed-martin
[9]
http://news.usni.org/2015/09/15/navy-integrating-searam-on-rota-based-ddgs-first-installation-complete-in-november
[10]
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/10/25/lcs-littoral-combat-ship-fanta-mission-module-surface-warfare-missile-harpoon-naval-strike-missile-kongsberg-norwegian-fort-worth-freedom-coronado-independence-navy/74477482/
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