 |
| LCS Independence and frigate Gary |
The most recent National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) language on the Littoral Combat Ship program makes requests more akin to a program in development, rather than one with 24 ships
built or under production contract. One of the most pernicious of these is a
demand for more analysis on the surviviability of the proposed frigate variant
of the LCS. The constant reporting of
this supposed LCS deficiency by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
(DOT&E) is likely one of the key underpinnings for this dictate. The most
recent edition of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on the LCS program
by Ron O’Rourke has a number of statements from the Director, Operational Test
and Evaluation (DOT&E) on the survivability (or apparent lack of such
capacity) of the modified LCS, now designated as a frigate (FF). DOT&E
reports state that proposed capabilities of the modified LCS are still
inadequate “compared to the Navy’s legacy frigates.”[1]
DOT&E also said that the minor modification of LCS as frigate variant would
have somewhat less susceptibility to attack, but “will not yield a ship
significantly more survivable than the (current) LCS.”[2]
It would be helpful if DOT&E published
a detailed report of how the agency came to these conclusions. The test and
evaluation agency seems to place great faith in the “legacy” Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate, whose
last member just exited the active fleet this month, as the ideal modern
multimission frigate. The Perry’s were
once the recipients of the same sort of criticism currently leveled at the LCS
in terms of armament and survivability. The Perry’s
are departing from the Navy, however, in a considerably less capable and
survivable condition than when they began entering the fleet in the late 1970’s.
A direct comparison of the departing Perry’s
and both current LCS variants suggests that that their survivability is roughly
similar.
DOT&E seems to believe that the Perry class represents the ideal
multimission frigate, but the class was once equally labeled as under-armed,
unsurvivable, and crewed too lightly for high endurance operations. A February
1975 GAO report on the Perry (then
called a patrol frigate), suggested the ship was too small to accept upgrades
over a 30 year lifespan and questioned if the ship could remain viable over
that period.[3] A January 1979 GAO
analysis of the FFG-7 class criticized the selection of the SQS-56 sonar for
the ship, suggested its lifespan would be too short for significant upgrades,
said the crew was too small, and was especially critical of the ship’s
survivability, suggesting the FFG was, “vulnerable to low level threats” and
would be “a cheap kill” in comparison with other ships.[4]
The Director of Naval History, Rear Admiral Sam Cox, USN (ret), suggested
recently that the LCS was being subjected to the same sort of criticism now
leveled at the LCS.[5]
 |
| USS Stark (FFG 31) after missile hits, May 1987 |
The Perry’s
have now departed from the fleet, but in a much denuded condition in terms
of armament and sensors, making direct comparisons of their former selves with
the current LCS and/or FF disingenuous at best. The Perry once boasted an armament of 40 missiles, a 76mm gun, a close
in weapon system (CIWS), and antisubmarine torpedo tubes; all supported by the
Mark 92 fire control system. By the late 1990’s, however, the FFG’s was
assessed as having, “low capability against near and midterm missile threats.”[6]
The Navy removed the FFGs’ MK13 missile launcher in the early 2000’s and with
it the ship’s surface to air (SM-1MR) and surface to surface missile (SSM)
capabilities. The ship retained its antisubmarine warfare sensors and weapons.
The Perry’s retained their CIWS; a
weapon generally assumed to be capable of no more than three engagements against
air, missile and surface platforms before requiring a reload.
The Navy defines survivability in OPNAV
9070.1A as a combination of susceptibility to attack, vulnerability to weapons
that actively target a ship and recoverability from damage sustained.[7]
What does a head to head comparison of the retiring FFG to the baseline LCS sea
frame using these criteria reveal about the survivability of both classes?
Consider the threat of cruise missile attack; the preferred weapon against
surface ships. Neither class is particularly stealthy in design. Emissions
control of electromagnetic equipment (radars, sonars, communications, etc) may
allow both ships to equally avoid missile attack. In its current condition, the
Perry has only its CIWS with perhaps
three potential engagements. The LCS has the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
launcher (or SeaRAM) with 11-21 missiles per mount, superior range to the 20mm
gun of the conventional CIWS, and a similar or better engagement capacity.[8]
 |
| Fires out aboard HMS Sheffield. She foundered later in heavy seas |
The Perry
is a physically larger ship at 453 ft length, 4200 tons full load displacement,
as compared to either LCS sea frame (Freedom
at 378 ft length at 3900 tons and Independence
at 418 ft length at 3100 tons.) Larger size and greater length represent an
advantage in survivability from the perspective of a longer floodable length
and greater reserve buoyancy. Such factors come into consideration after a ship
is hit. Missile combat since World War 2, most notably in the 1982 Falkland
Islands war and in the missile damage suffered by USS Stark (FFG 31) in the 1987 attack suggests that one
medium-sized cruise missile or large bomb can immobilize a medium-sized surface combatant
(3000-6000 tons displacement). The post-battle investigations of the Stark and the HMS Sheffield (lost in combat in the Falklands) revealed that both
ships suffered significant damage to their ability to fight fires from cruise
missile hits, residual cruise missile fuel caused significant fires, and
that smoke spread rapidly and rendered damage control efforts difficult.[9] Stark at one point sustained a 16 degree
list and could have sunk had she encountered similar weather conditions that
caused the loss of Sheffield days
after she incurred similar damage (also from an Exocet missile hit).[10]
Examination of the loss reports of HMS
Ardent and HMS Antelope, both of
384 ft. length and 3250 tons full load displacement, suggest that LCS (of
similar size) is likely to be affected to an equal or greater extent by similar
ordnance.[11] While both reports are
heavily redacted, and recommend additional equipment and training, neither
report suggests the Type 21 frigate was too small or “unsurvivable” given the
level of damage they sustained.
If all factors of “survivability” for the
FFG and the LCS, as currently defined by the Navy, are compared, the results
are roughly equal. Both ships are equally effective at avoiding attack through
emission control and operational/tactical maneuvering. The hard kill systems of
LCS will likely sustain more engagements at longer ranges against cruise
missiles than could the FFG. Finally, the FFG, by virtue of its larger size, is
more likely to recover from damage sustained than the LCS. The most important
point of survivability, however, is to “avoid a hit, and not stand still and
slug it out.”[12]
 |
| HMS Ardent after fatal bomb hits on her aft, port quarter |
DOT&E needs to publish more detailed
reports as to why it continues to so strongly object to LCS survivability. As
it stands, the Test and Evaluation agency seems to only compare LCS to its
immediate predecessor and only in the most superficial terms.This decision seems
contrary to previous DOT&E pronouncements on the importance of detailed
testing, such as its suggestion that the Navy invest in a more capable self
defense test ship that supports live fire missile testing.[13]
Both LCS sea frames are scheduled to complete full shock trials next year.[14]
In the absence of other data and in light of the historical evidence presented,
perhaps DOT&E should restrict its comments on survivability until it has
actionable data. LCS is no less survivable than the departing Perry’s and no ship under 4000 tons and
400 feet in length is terribly “survivable” against modern ordnance.
[1]
Ron O’Rourke, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate Program; Background and
Issues for Congress”, Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service, 21
September 2015, p. 26.
[2]
Ibid.
[4]
http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/108301.pdf.
pp. 4-14.
[5]
http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/ftrStory.asp?issue=3&id=91288
[6]
James F. Wiggins, “Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise Missile
Defense “, Washington D.C., General Accounting Office (GAO), GAO/NSIAD-00-149,
July, 2000, p. 43.
[8]
http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-116.html
[11]
http://www.rna-10-area.co.uk/files/boi_hms_ardent.pdf
and http://www.rna-10-area.co.uk/files/boi_hms_antelope.pdf
[12]
https://www.aei.org/publication/they-only-say-no/
[13]
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/top-tester-tells-navy-to-test-carrier-destroyer-defenses-with-real-missiles-explosions/
[14]
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=91239
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