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| The Lexington Minuteman Statue (Author's Photo) |
19 April was the 240th anniversary of the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War. On that day in 1775, a British composite force of roughly 700 regulars and marines was dispatched from their Boston garrison to raid the Massachusetts colonial militia’s stockpiled arms and materiel in Concord. The resultant clashes that morning at Lexington Green and North Bridge were but minor skirmishes compared to the series of engagements that occurred during the raiding force’s afternoon withdrawal to Boston. The British raiders would have been annihilated had it not been for their timely reinforcement with a brigade of regulars on the return trip; the latter alone suffered an astounding 20% casualty rate during its several hours in the field. Whereas only 77 militiamen had met the British at sunrise, nearly 4,000 militiamen and elite minutemen from Boston’s environs had either clashed with or were maneuvering against the Crown’s troops by sunset. Just 24 hours later, Boston was surrounded by nearly 20,000 militiamen.[1] Many of these men would go on to form the nucleus of the initial Continental Army raised by the Second Continental Congress and commanded by George Washington.
While
militarily insignificant in comparison to the afternoon’s running battle, the Lexington
salvo and its sequel at North Bridge could not have been more politically and
morally decisive. In both cases, British professional soldiers fired first at
Massachusetts citizen-soldiers even though the latter’s organized ranks had not
aimed weapons at the former’s. The British thereby set the war-opening
escalation precedents, with concomitant effects on public opinion in the
colonies as well as in Britain (albeit aided by the American Whigs’ vastly
superior strategic communications efforts).[2] The
American Whigs’ passions for and commitment to their cause were galvanized
accordingly; the same cannot be said of British popular (or Parliamentary)
sentiments.
It’s
a given that an armed conflict of some scale between the Massachusetts Whigs
and the Crown’s troops was nearly unavoidable. The political objectives of the
British government and the Whig-dominated Massachusetts Provincial Congress
were fundamentally at odds, and the latter’s de facto political control over the Massachusetts countryside
represented a direct threat to British sovereignty over the colony. Nor could
the British tolerate the Whigs’ organization of the colony’s militia units into
a well-armed, highly trained, and quickly-mobilizable army controlled by and
accountable to the Provincial Congress.
But
as we will see, it is not a given that the events of 19 April would unfold as
they did. Had the opening volley occurred under different tactical
circumstances that day, who’s to say that the Whigs would have captured the
political and moral high ground at all? In fact, it is theoretically possible
that a different set of British tactical decisions on Lexington Green could
have avoided a clash there altogether. Or perhaps with greater British
restraint upon entering the town’s center, the way the encounter unfolded might
not have been as favorable to the Whig cause.
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| General Thomas Gage |
It’s
important to note that General Thomas Gage, governor of the Massachusetts
colony and commander of the British forces based in the city, fully accepted
the possibility of a violent encounter. Gage had received orders from London on
14 April to preemptively decapitate the growing rebellion. The general no doubt
reasoned that the most effective means of accomplishing this task was to eliminate
the militia’s depot in Concord, as the other major depot in Worcester was out
of range for a quick strike. Since every British expedition outside the Boston the
previous fall and winter had been met by militia units from the surrounding
towns, Gage had every reason to expect the same would occur during the Concord
operation. His thinking was almost certainly colored by the failed British
attempt to seize cannon in Salem two months earlier; that ‘surprise’ raid had
only narrowly escaped coming to blows with the local militia.
It
is not shocking, then, that Gage’s first draft of orders for the Concord
operation specified that “if any body [‘of men’ inserted above the line] dares
[‘attack’ written, then crossed out] oppose you with arms, you will warn them
to disperse [‘and’ written, then crossed out] or attack them.”[3]
The actual written orders issued to the raid commander, Colonel Francis Smith,
did not contain any explicit direction as to what should be done under such
circumstances. I agree with historian John Galvin that Gage’s guidance to Smith
regarding rules of engagement was likely verbal as to avoid creating a paper
trail for an operation Gage had every reason to believe would result in
bloodshed.
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| Colonel Francis Smith |
Gage
likely assumed that Smith’s force’s size and training would allow it to
dominate the handfuls of militia units that he believed would be able to respond
in the worst case. His plan was further predicated on operational surprise
reducing the speed and mass of the militia’s reaction. Gage simply did not
appreciate how the militia’s century-old networks for communicating warning
across the colony, doctrine and posture supporting rapid mobilization, and
practice in conducting decentralized operations in accordance with a higher-echelon
commander’s intent completely undermined his raid plan.[4]
As
we well know, superior Whig intelligence collection efforts enabled Paul Revere’s
and William Dawes’s triggering of the militia’s warning network on the night of
18-19 April. Between that warning and the delays Smith suffered while ferrying
his force across the Charles River to Cambridge, the Lexington militia company
under Captain John Parker was fully ready on the town’s Green as Smith
approached along the road to Concord that morning. Parker had not received
rules of engagement from his regimental commander specific to this particular
British expedition, and there’s no evidence that Parker’s orders to his men
departed from the Massachusetts militia’s de
facto practice of authorizing the use of force only in self-defense or to
counter direct attacks against their towns. When his scouts reported the
British were minutes away, Parker lined his company up on the Green perpendicular
to the road from Boston roughly 100 yards from where the road forked at the
triangular Green’s apex. This standoff distance was at the fringe of effective
musket range against an opposing formation. He did not place his men in a
battle-ready formation. All evidence points to Parker seeking to demonstrate
his company’s resolve to the British and thereby deter aggression against the
town.[5]
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| Major John Pitcairn |
Smith’s
leading elements of regulars under his deputy commander, Royal Marine Major
John Pitcairn, approached Lexington Green with muskets loaded and primed. Several
factors led to this weapons posture. For one thing, Smith’s force had not
progressed very far from its landing area in Cambridge before it became
apparent that militia throughout the region were mobilizing and that any chance
at operational surprise had been lost. Smith’s scouts, including a party that
had briefly captured Paul Revere earlier that morning, had also collected ‘rumor
intelligence’ of up to 600 militiamen waiting for the British in Lexington.
Just outside the town, Pitcairn’s own scouts reported a lone figure had
attempted to fire at them but failed when his musket misfired.[6] Pitcairn
and Smith consequently had every reason to believe that they might be entering
a hostile situation. Their decision to move to a high weapons posture, then,
was logical from a self-defense standpoint.
But
inherent self-defense was not their only possible motivation. Gage’s first
draft of his operation order suggests that he defined ‘opposition’ by an armed
militia unit to mean such a unit’s presence within immediate tactical reach of
Smith’s force, that this presence alone would satisfy demonstration of hostile
intent (from our modern rules of engagement standpoint), and that Smith was
therefore authorized to decide for himself whether or not to warn a militia
unit prior to employing lethal force. Given that the entire strategic purpose
of the operation was to decisively ‘break’ the rebellion, it is logical to
assume Gage verbally empowered Smith (and Pitcairn by extension) to order a
precedent-setting first volley for purposes other than the column’s inherent self-defense.
It seems to have never occurred to them that the particular circumstances in
play on the occasion of setting such a precedent might matter far more than the
demonstration of power and resolve they might mean to convey.
Even
so, a deliberate move to set a conflict-opening precedent would require that
Smith and Pitcairn possess tight tactical control over their force’s firing
discipline. Pitcairn claimed in his post-battle deposition that his final order
to the British infantry companies on Lexington Green in the moments before the
fateful first shot was the equivalent of what today we would call “Weapons
Tight.”[7]
But Pitcairn did not have tight control over those companies thanks to the
actions of a single subordinate, Royal Marine Lieutenant Jesse Adair. London loaded
the muzzle and primed the pan, so to speak. Gage aimed the weapon; Smith and
Pitcairn were merely the executors. Adair is the man who placed his finger on
the hair-trigger.
Adair
was reportedly a ‘forward-leaning’ (but at 36 years of age, hardly young)
junior officer.[8] He did not hold any
command or staff responsibilities in Smith’s force; he was an ‘at-large’
officer in the expedition. Earlier in the morning he had served alongside a few
of his peers as Pitcairn’s scouts; this was the group that reported the firing
attempt by the ‘lone gunman’ outside Lexington. He and five other ‘at-large’
junior officers accompanied the expedition’s leading companies as they entered
Lexington center and found Parker’s Lexington militia company positioned on the
Green.
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| Situation on Lexington Green, roughly 0520 on 19 April 2024 (from Fischer, 192) |
In
their post-battle depositions, Adair’s compatriots claimed that several hundred
militiamen were arrayed before them.[9]
Their estimates were likely skewed by the fact that the Lexington Meetinghouse
at the Green’s apex obscured full view of the field, not to mention the
‘intelligence’ regarding the Lexington militia’s strength they had collected
earlier. Adair almost certainly interpreted Parker’s parade-ground formation as
a threat to the British column, even as far back from the road as Parker had
positioned his men.
If
we assume Adair had authority to order the tactical employment of units not
under his formal command (a disturbing proposition to say the least), then what
were his options? He or one of his colleagues could have ordered the column to
halt and then he or a colleague could have personally scouted the Green to
assess the situation and perhaps even speak with Parker. He could ordered the
column down the left fork in the road towards Concord and then detached several
companies into flanking positions along the Green perpendicular to Parker’s
formation so that the latter could not pivot and fire into the main column as
it marched by. These two options exemplified restraint in a precipice-of-war
situation. They would have allowed time and space for more measured
decision-making.
Instead,
Adair chose to dispatch several companies down the right fork in the road and into
the Green to directly parallel the Lexington company at close range. The quick
march he ordered past the Meetinghouse’s north side reportedly became a charge;
the two companies of light infantry halted 70 yards from Parker’s men. At the
same time, the horse-mounted Pitcairn rode around the Meetinghouse’s south side
and onto the Green while the rest of the column turned left at the fork and
then halted on the Concord road. By all accounts, combination of British
regulars’ “huzzah” cries and the bellowed orders from Adair, the other
‘at-large’ junior officers on the Green, and Pitcairn made any British attempt
to exercise tight tactical control impossible. At least some British officers,
probably from Adair’s group on the battle line, yelled at Parker’s company to
disperse. Measuring the situation, Parker ordered his men to do exactly that.
Seeing the militiamen begin to withdraw, Pitcairn ordered the regulars on the
battle line to “surround and disarm” them—an action that can only be explained
by his not appreciating Parker’s attempt at deescalation.[10]
The confusion and sense of imminent danger on both sides must have been profound.
Little wonder, then, that shots rang out.
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| Looking east from the left side of the Lexington Militia Company's lines towards the Green's apex. British battle formation was roughly 70 yards forward from this position. (Author's Photo) |
The
British were convinced the first shot came from one or more militiamen
withdrawing through the area behind Buckman Tavern across from the north side
of the Green, or perhaps from a rogue sniper in or behind the tavern itself.
The militiamen were convinced one or more British officers fired first with
pistols.[11] I
agree with historian David Hackett Fischer’s conclusion that both sides’
accounts are probably true, and that if there was a singular ‘first shot’ by
someone on one side (whether accidental or deliberate) it occurred almost
simultaneously with a singular first shot by someone on the other side.
The
post-battle depositions on both sides, though, are consistent in asserting that
Parker’s men on the Green did not fire first. And yet they were exactly who
came under fire from the British companies on the battle line. The only
legitimate targets, if any, were not on the Green. By indiscriminately engaging
Parker’s men on the Green, the British undercut any claim to inherent self-defense.
In doing so, and as pointed out earlier, they also undercut their political and
moral position. The fact that Smith’s expedition failed to achieve any of its
operational objectives in Concord and was nearly destroyed on the return trip,
while very significant at the campaign-level, is strategically secondary.
 |
| Amos Doolittle's late 1775 engraving of the Lexington clash |
The
stupidity of Adair’s decision is magnified if we take the liberty of indulging
in some counterfactuals. For instance, if there were in fact one or more
Whig-aligned rogue gunmen not under Parker’s command in the vicinity of Buckman
Tavern, then he (or they) would have found it harder to take the British
under fire had Adair not deployed the two companies into the Green opposite
Parker. Perhaps the rogue(s) could have maneuvered into a different position to
engage the column on the Concord Road, but that would have only made it more clear that the fire had not come from Parker’s men. Granted, the subsequent
chain of events would likely have been chaotic and might still have led to a direct
exchange between Parker’s company and the British. Nevertheless, the facts on
the ground would have been different—and the Whigs' assertions of the moral superiority of their cause might
have been undercut.
It’s
also entirely possible that the first shot would have occurred at North Bridge
in Concord if it hadn’t in Lexington. Or perhaps the confrontation at North
Bridge would not have resulted in an exchange of fire at all had all involved there
not been aware of the hostilities a few hours earlier. All the same, it’s quite likely given
Gage’s orders and the overall circumstances that some clash would have occurred
either later that day or on a subsequent occasion. Such a clash would not necessarily
have resulted from a strategically-impactful failure of British tactical
decision-making.
It
should be clear from this story that former U.S. Marine Corps Commandant
Charles Krulak was quite correct with his concept of a “strategic corporal” two
decades ago, except in the Lexington case it was a “strategic lieutenant” who
ultimately directed the path of history. Any contemporary junior officer and
his or her field grade commander could easily find themselves in a similar
brink-of-war situation someday. Unlike the British government in April 1775,
though, these modern officers’ political masters might actually want to avoid
hostilities.
It
follows that much should be learned from the many British operational and tactical
mistakes that led to the clash on Lexington Green (of which I have only listed
a few). In my opinion, the most important of these mistakes was Gage’s and his
subordinates’ failure to appreciate that just because their government was
willing to start a war to achieve its objectives didn’t mean the way the war
started at the operational and tactical levels wasn’t of critical strategic
importance. Neither Gage, nor Smith, nor Pitcairn made any discernable effort
to think through exactly what ought to be sought or avoided in a first clash with
the Whigs. Neither Smith nor Pitcairn made any discernable attempt to issue
clear intentions to their subordinates regarding what to do in a confrontation,
let alone to maintain tight tactical control over their force when actually in
contact. As a result, they essentially tossed a lit matchbox in the form of
Adair amidst several leaking barrels of gasoline. We should thank them for
that, as while the results were disastrous to the Crown’s interests, they led
directly to the birth of our democratic republic and its enshrinement of natural rights in law.
The views expressed herein are
solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do
not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the
author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department
of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.
[1]
John R. Galvin. The Minute Men — The
First Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution. (Dulles, VA:
Potomac Books, 2006): 99, 230, 236.
[2]
David Hackett Fischer. Paul Revere’s
Ride. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994): 275-276.
[3]
Galvin, 100-101.
[4]
Ibid, 6-33, 59-61.
[5]
Ibid, 64, 122-124.
[6]
Ibid, 119.
[7]
Derek W. Beck. “Who Shot First? The Americans!” Journal of the American Revolution, 16 April 2014, accessed
4/23/15, http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/04/who-shot-first-the-americans/
[8]
See 1. Ibid, 116; and 2. “Jesse ADAIR B. ABT 1739 D. BEF DEC 1818.”
Ancestry.com, undated, accessed 4/23/15, http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~nickblackhurst/pbl19276.html
[9] Beck,
http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/04/who-shot-first-the-americans/
[10]
See 1. Galvin, 124-125; 2. Fischer, 190-191, 3. Beck, http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/04/who-shot-first-the-americans/
[11]
See 1. Fischer, 193-194; 2. Beck, http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/04/who-shot-first-the-americans/
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