A Positive LCS Review Effort

USS Milwaukee (LCS 5) enters Mayport, Feb. 2016

     A 29 February memorandum from Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition Sean Stackley and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (N9) Mr. Brian Persons and Commander, Naval Surface Forces Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden orders the establishment of an Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) review designed to examine LCS manning, training, maintenance, and operational and warfighting capabilities. This is a good idea, and similar to reviews of the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigate class early in that program's production run. This review, however, may not have access to all required data, and could endanger a core LCS capability essential to future U.S. Navy force structure and deployment planning. The LCS program is controversial, has been plagued by material casualties in recent months, and has been the target of significant opposition in Congress. This review and its recommendations could play a role in restoring the confidence of the legislative branch in the LCS program.
     The proposed review requests a 60 day evaluation of the LCS maintenance construct to include condition verses periodic, preventative maintenance; contractor verses organic ship, crew-based maintenance; and continental (CONUS)-based maintenance verses expeditionary maintenance efforts in the field. These components of the LCS program  are good review targets, but a significant portion of the potential data set is not yet available for such a short review period. To date, only the LCS-1 (USS Freedom)-based variant has deployed to an overseas location. The LCS-2 variant USS Independence deployed to the 2014 Hawaii-based, Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, but has yet to be deployed further afield. LCS 1 variants Freedom and Fort Worth, in contrast, have both deployed to Singapore for extended periods. Two LCS-2 variants; Independence and Coronado are scheduled to deploy to Singapore, but not until later this year. Coronado is also scheduled to participate in the 2016 RIMPAC exercise and conduct a test firing of an anti-ship cruise missile, a critical new LCS capability. The proposed review should wait until these events are complete and adequate data can be collected from both LCS variants while deployed to overseas locations and major exercises. The Navy has also been instructed to down select to one LCS variant in 2019. What happens if the data from the study covers only one variant in a deployed status and not the type ultimately accepted? A 60 day review will not be nearly adequate to collect all of this information.
   As with the need to obtain data from both LCS seaframe variants, the proposed LCS Review should obtain data from multiple forward deployment locations. As it stands, the review will only have deployment data from the Western Pacific. LCS was also planned to deploy to the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea. How will the LCS Review team assess maintenance costs in these areas without data from actual LCS deployments?
    The one danger in this review is its requirement to examine the LCS manning construct, and consider a one hull, one crew concept in place of the current 3 crews, 2 ships, with 1 ship forward deployed system. The post-1948 U.S. Navy concept for maintaining presence and providing rapid reaction naval forces is based primarily on rotational deployments of ships from continental U.S. (CONUS) bases. On average it has taken 3-4 ships in the overall Navy order of battle to provide one forward deployed warship. This ratio has gotten worse since 1998 as the U.S. Navy has decreased in size from 321 to 270 ships, while maintaining approximately 100 ships consistently deployed over the same period. These ships always have the same crew that trains for deployment, moves geographically across the Atlantic and Mediterranean or the Pacific, and is transferred to the command authority of one of the forward deployed combatant commanders (COCOMs). The ship returns from deployment at the end of a set period for an extended repair and maintenance interval and then repeats the cycle. This system is hard on ships as transoceanic voyages exact a toll of the life expectancy of the ship's hull and equipment. It also requires a large number of ships to ensure there are enough forward deployed units for presence, contingency and warfare roles. Ships forward deployed to bases such as Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan do not often face transoceanic voyages other than further deployment to the Persian Gulf. These units do, however, incur additional costs in overseas vice CONUS-based major maintenance. They also require support to the dependents of their crews as they are permanently stationed in overseas bases.
     The LCS uses rotational crews that move from training locations and LCS units in the United States directly to their ship in overseas waters. The crews have a short turnover and the old crew returns to the U.S. for training. Three LCS crews rotate among two LCS sea frames (ships) where one of the two is always forward deployed. Under this system the U.S. Navy can potentially keep 20 out of the total planned 40 LCS units forward deployed. The old, unitary crew system can at  best provide 5-13 units, and still exacts wear and tear on the ships in transoceanic voyages.

USS Jackson (LCS 6) departs for Builder trials, June 2015

   The rotational crew system is essential to getting the most out of the LCS deployment scheme. Given that current budget conditions do not support a substantially larger fleet without increasing the national budget deficit, the applicability of the LCS multi-crew manning concept seems clear. There is unfortunately resistance to this concept with the surface navy. Most warships other than small units like the mine countermeasure ships (MCM's) and Patrol Coastal's (PC's) have always had unitary crews that remain with the ship throughout the cycle. There are challenges to implementing this system on larger ships like the DDG-51 class destroyer as the configuration of individual ships widely varies. These differences between ships of the same class can be challenging for a new crew coming aboard to take charge of a forward deployed counterpart. The Navy experimented with "crew swaps" between destroyer-sized ships in the 2000's. The service declared these endeavors a success but never attempted a wider application.
     A 3-2-1 crew system for other ship classes such as the DDG-51 could help to increase and better regulate the numbers of U.S. ships attached to forward-deployed commanders. The Navy will need to have precise configuration management of any class of ship so manned in order to smooth the crew transition process. The service and the national security decision makers may also have to accept that some warships in CONUS ports will be manned at smaller and less capable levels of trained personnel in order to provide a constant rotation of crews for forward-based units. A naval reserve component attached to CONUS-based ships not expected to deploy except as an emergency surge force might offset the loss of capability in warships in home waters. These reserve units would receive valuable training and promote the overall professionalism of the Naval Reserve. Congressional Budget office naval analyst Dr. Eric Labs has completed detailed analysis on the positive and negative aspects of multiple crews. It is excellent reading and a good starting point for further analysis.
     The CNO and Secretary Stackley's review of the LCS program has the potential to provide significant improvements to the Littoral Combat Ship program. It should, however, continue in some way past its initial 60 days in order to collect valuable deployment data on both sea frames and multiple forward deployment locations. It should also think very carefully in recommending change to the LCS 3-2-1 crew concept. One crew attached to one ship may simplify some aspects of tradition, deployment and regular maintenance, but significantly reduces the number of ships that can be deployed at any one time. The transoceanic voyages the unitary crew demands also reduce the ship's overall life expectancy and will generate greater costs in earlier than expected replacement of class units. It is hoped that the 60 day review and any extensions will generate useful recommendations in moving the LCS program forward, but should equally take care to not undercut the significant operational and maintenance benefits of the current, multi-crew system.