Q and A: The North Korean Missile Threat (Segment 7)

Q and A: What is the Impact of Sequestration on American Seapower (Segment 6)

Question of the Week January 23-27, 2017

Each week Information Dissemination will present a Question of the Week for professional consideration and discussion. The question will remain at the top of the blog from Monday at 12:00am until Friday 5:00pm. Please scroll down for new contributions. This weeks question:

Does a world of Great Power friction require a different fleet architecture than a uni-polar world?

The question asks why, not how.

What Are You So Worried About? (Segment 5)

Phillip Bilden Nominated as Secretary of the Navy

From the White House press release.

President Donald J. Trump today announced his intention to nominate Philip Bilden as the 76th Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Bilden, a highly successful business leader, former Military Intelligence officer, and Naval War College cybersecurity leader will bring strategic leadership, investment discipline, and Asia Pacific regional and cyber expertise to the Department of the Navy.

Bilden has longstanding trusted relationships with senior military leaders, particularly in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, through his years of national security engagement, including service on the Board of Directors of the United States Naval Academy Foundation and the Board of Trustees of the Naval War College Foundation. Mr. Bilden understands the strategic, operational, and readiness challenges our Navy and Marine Corps leaders confront in maintaining our naval maritime presence around the globe.

Bilden is deeply committed to military service members and their families, coming from a military family with four consecutive generations of seven Bilden Navy and Army officers, including his two sons who presently serve in the US Navy. He greatly respects the sacrifices that Navy and Marine Corps families make to serve their country.

Mr. Bilden served ten years in the U.S. Army Reserve as a Military Intelligence officer from 1986-1996. He was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant and served through the rank of Captain at Strategic Military Intelligence Detachments supporting the Defense Intelligence Agency. He resigned his commission in 1996 upon relocating to Hong Kong.

“As Secretary of the Navy, Philip Bilden will apply his terrific judgement and top-notch management skills to the task of rebuilding our unparalleled Navy,” said President Trump. “Our number of ships is at the lowest point that it has been in decades. Philip Bilden is the right choice to help us expand and modernize our fleet, including surface ships, submarines and aircraft, and ensure America’s naval supremacy for decades to come. I am proud of the men and women of our armed forces. The people who serve in our military are our American heroes, and we honor their service every day.”

“I am deeply humbled and honored to serve as Secretary of the Navy,” said Philip Bilden. “Maintaining the strength, readiness, and capabilities of our maritime force is critical to our national security. If confirmed, I will ensure that our Sailors and Marines have the resources they need to defend our interests around the globe and support our allies with commitment and capability.”

Mr. Bilden has three decades of international management, leadership, and investment experience building an investment management business across global markets with diverse international partners. After 25 years, Mr. Bilden recently retired as a co-founding member and Senior Advisor of HarbourVest Partners, LLC, a leading global private equity investment management firm with institutional assets under management currently in excess of $42 billion. He became a founding member of the firm following the management buyout of HarbourVest’s predecessor company in 1997. Mr. Bilden joined the firm in Boston in 1991 and relocated to Hong Kong in 1996 to establish the firm’s Asian presence as a pioneering investor in the region. Throughout his 25 year tenure at HarbourVest Partners, Mr. Bilden served in senior leadership roles in the firm’s global management, including the firm’s four person Executive Committee responsible for governance.

Mr. Bilden serves on numerous philanthropic boards of non-profit organizations supporting military veterans, national and regional security, and cybersecurity missions. He serves on the Board of Visitors of Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; the Asia Pacific Advisory Board and Dean’s Board of Advisors of Harvard Business School; the Board of Directors of the United States Naval Academy Foundation; and the Board of Trustees of the Naval War College Foundation, where he serves as the inaugural Chairman of the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies.

Mr. Bilden graduated as Distinguished Military Graduate, U.S. Army ROTC, from Georgetown University, earning the President’s Cup as the top graduate in the corps. He received a B.S. (magna cum laude) in Foreign Service from Georgetown University in 1986, with a concentration in International Politics and Soviet bloc studies. Mr. Bilden earned an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School in 1991.

President Trump's selection of Phillip Bilden can be described as the expected choice, as he was the only name specifically promoted by the Trump administration transition team for the position. While there was a public campaign for the selection of Randy Forbes for the position, that campaign primarily came from outside the transition team. Once General Mattis had endorsed Phillip Bilden, this was pretty much a done deal.

I think it is a good pick. There are a number of different opinions on how Presidents should pick the cabinet positions for the various military service Secretary's, and there has never been a single proven way to make such a selection. In the eyes of many who campaigned for Randy Forbes, a Randy Forbes selection would have been great for the Navy because it could build upon existing relationships in Congress and he has relevant experience as the House Seapower Subcommittee chairman that would have allowed Mr. Forbes to hit the ground running. In the end I saw that close relationship Randy Forbes has with top uniformed leadership in the Navy as the reason he wasn't selected.

I like and respect Randy Forbes a lot, but I never believed Randy Forbes was going to get the nomination. Had any other Republican President among the list of candidates who ran for President in 2016 been elected, then Randy Forbes would have almost certainly been nominated, and I believe the Undersecretary of the Navy position would have led to a nomination of someone like Bryan McGrath or Jerry Hendrix. With that said, I also don't believe any other Republican President but Trump would have selected General Mattis for Secretary of Defense, which is to note that each administration looks at these top positions in National Defense differently. With the exception of General Flynn, I believe President Trump has done a decent job filling out his National Security cabinet, but people will ultimately be judged by what they do once installed into office, not what their reputation says going in.

The selection of Philip Bilden does bring an outsider into the Navy. Phillip Bilden has been successful in his career, and to me being good at what you do professionally is very important, regardless of the profession. For me, success is also defined by what one does outside of their career, and for Philip Bilden that includes having two children choose and get accepted into the US Naval Academy. Both the choosing and the being accepted aspect of that detail says something about Philip Bilden that I respect. Another part of Mr. Bilden's success is financial, and what exactly is the relevant criticism of a private citizen who donates time and money to support the US Naval Academy, US Naval War College Foundation, and the United States Naval Institute? As a private citizen I have supported all three organizations, and would do so with more monetary resources if I had the means to do so.

For me, I like the signaling of nominating Philip Bilden as Secretary of the Navy on multiple levels. First, I believe it is good for the Navy to have an outside voice advocating for the Navy from the Secretary position. In the end Ray Mabus may have departed the Secretary of the Navy position unpopular for several of his choices, but as Secretary of the Navy his record is that of the Secretary of the Navy who got Congress to fund the second most naval vessels of any Secretary of the Navy since World War II, and unlike John Lehman who remains in first place, Mr. Mabus was able to do that during a time where the relative budget growth for the Navy was either static, or in decline. I tend to believe outsiders tend to prioritize some things better than insiders, and prioritizing shipbuilding was one of those things Ray Mabus did effectively.

Phillip Bilden has the opportunity to do the same thing, particularly with the charge by the Trump administration to grow the size of the US Navy. Until the Budget Control Act is dealt with, that's going to be very difficult to do. Mr. Bilden also has to address the consequences of choices made by his predecessor, specifically how Ray Mabus chose to build ships at the cost of maintenance and upkeep for existing ships and aircraft - particularly but not limited to less popular priorities like the helicopter squadrons. Mr. Bilden must address the broad scope of problems that are a direct result from maintenance shortages for existing ships and equipment over a period of many years, and doing that while also growing the fleet is going to be a significant challenge, and potentially impossible without additional funding from Congress.

Second, another signal I really like here is that it suggests President Trump intends to at least attempt to keep Sean Stackley on as Undersecretary of the Navy. I may be misreading this, but I certainly hope not. A major distinction between the Navy's poor return on investments during the Bush administration compared to the better rate of return on investment during the Obama administration was the presence of a strong Undersecretary of the Navy with a clear understanding of how to work inside the Department. While there was never a strong Undersecretary of the Navy during the Bush administration, there were two very capable Undersecretary's during the Obama administration - Bob Work and Dr. Janine Davidson.

Those are enormous shoes to fill, and if we remove all the names from the National Security letter against President Trump during the campaign as potential Undersecretary of the Navy choices, and we remove Jerry Hendrix because I highly doubt the President will seek another exemption from Congress for a recently retired military officer,*** the only logical choice I see representing someone who can fill the shoes of the last two Undersecretary's of the Navy with a clear understanding of the challenges that lie ahead for the Trump Administration's Navy growth policy is Sean Stackley. In my mind selecting Sean Stackley for the Undersecretary of the Navy is probably the smartest way for the Trump administration to put themselves in a position for success with Phillip Bilden as Secretary and with the stated National Security Policy intent to grow the US Navy.

With that said, I have no idea if Sean Stackley would take the job, I just think it's important that he does take the job given the position and direction of the Navy right now going forward.

Finally, the other signal being sent by the selection of Phillip Bilden is that the Trump administration doesn't appear to have a high degree of confidence in the US Navy to execute the administrations priorities successfully. I think this is related to events as they unfolded immediately following the election of Donald Trump as President. There were two things that became unquestionably obvious, at least from a public perspective, and fueled the gossip coming from the Navy immediately following the election results.

Navy uniformed leadership was shocked Donald Trump won the election. To be honest, so was I and whether you admit it or not - many of you were too. Being shocked by the 2016 Presidential election outcome is hardly something unique.

But, Navy uniformed leadership was also completely unprepared for the possibility of Donald Trump winning the election, and that was the narrative that kept going well into December following the election results, and that is a narrative that isn't easily forgotten. When there are only two possible known outcomes of an election, uniformed leadership of any military service is not allowed to be unprepared for either known outcome, ever. There is one truth about military officers in the United States; the only skill every single military officer over the grade of O-5 can always put on their resume is 'contingency planning expertise.' Contingency planning is what the US military does, all day, every day, whether awake or asleep. US military officers are judged by that standard, and often the standard of quality for a military officer is based on how many contingencies for unknown outcomes they have prepared for. Known contingencies? That's the bare minimum, and yet, somehow, the Navy made the impression publicly, and more importantly - to the Trump administration transition team, virtually every reporter that covers the Navy, and every think tank that follows naval affairs in Washington DC that the Navy was completely unprepared for Donald Trump winning the election with no budget work of value planned for that possibility.

Now, while that was a serious problem, I have no doubt that the CNO and Sean Stackley will leave no evidence that this was ever an issue by the time the budget season arrives, but the seed of doubt was planted. As soon as it became obvious the US Navy had done virtually no FY18 budget planning of consequence in preparation for the possibility of Trump winning the election, I was fairly certain President Trump was going to select someone from outside the known Navy community to be Secretary of the Navy. Randy Forbes was the chairman of the House Seapower Subcommittee, so please don't try to suggest he is an outsider. Under the circumstances as they unfolded after the election, one would expect any smart executive to look for a fresh voice capable of taking an independent, objective view, so that person could get in there and figure out what the administration is dealing with before the administration can effectively move forward.

This isn't a knock against Randy Forbes, but because of his existing relationships with the uniformed Navy leaders at the top, I wouldn't have picked Randy Forbes to get in there and be objective about the situation either. When Flag officers appear completely unprepared for a known contingency - it is so unexpected that it is very hard to ignore. While I see the lack of preparation by the Navy for Trump being elected as a mistake that can be corrected, in my mind one of the top priorities for Phillip Bilden once confirmed is to find out if the mistake is a reflection of a bigger problem, or if the mistake was the wake-up call Navy leaders needed to do some self reflection and get to work.

Answering that question determines where the Navy is today, and what is actually possible for the Trump administration going forward with the people in place.

*** This article originally discussed retired Captain Jerry Hendrix as needing a waiver from Congress if retired for less than five years in order to accept an appointment. This is inaccurate, only retired Flag officers and General officers require Congressional waivers.

Reforming the Department of the Navy

This post originally appeared one year ago today, and it was posted then in no small measure to be timed to the arrival in office of the new Under Secretary of the Navy, Dr. Janine Davidson.  Janine is someone I admire quite a bit, and she and I discussed these reforms in detail as she prepared to take office. A new Secretary of the Navy nominee was announced yesterday, and Mr. Bilden and his team will have a significant opportunity to move forward on necessary reforms. This is reposted to provide that team with a few things to consider. 

Introduction
This post is a summary of ideas that have been germinating in my mind for a while. I have been arguing for a powerful vision of American Seapower for some time now, and closer Navy/Marine Corps integration has consistently been at the heart of it. I have come to conclude that the benefits of what I argue are worth pursuing, but that achieving them is unlikely as long as the two Services are not invested in a common understanding of American Seapower and led by an organization dedicated to discerning one.

In the Navy, I enjoyed four tours in Washington. Admittedly, none of them were on the Navy Secretariat, and so I do not write from a position of great authority on its inner workings. My observations are those of an interested observer who has worked around and in the vicinity of this staff. I welcome factual refutations of my opinions and observations.

Theory of the Case:
• America plays a critical and leading role in the world
• It is in America’s interest to continue to execute this role.
• America has interests that are thousands of miles from its own territory.
• America’s sovereign territory is relatively safe from military threat.
• The rise of China and a resurgent and belligerent Russia present a new era of Great Power competition.
• America is likely to encounter China and Russia as an adversary in areas contiguous to the world’s oceans, as this is where the majority of the world’s population lives.
• The Department of the Navy has within it two Armed Services that specialize in operating from the sea.
• These Armed Services provide the world’s most powerful naval force, the world’s most feared middleweight land force, and the world’s most mobile and lethal air force.
• These forces—if properly resourced—are capable of servicing the majority of U.S. presence, conventional deterrence, assurance, and crisis response requirements.
• In order to do so, these expeditionary capabilities must be more closely integrated into a cohesive and integral maritime fighting force, a new vision of American Seapower.
• In order to achieve a new vision of American Seapower, a closer alignment of all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping the Navy and Marine Corps must be considered. Planning, programming, and budgeting must also be included. Redundancy, overlap, and conflict must be minimized.
• The Department of the Navy Secretariat, under the Secretary of the Navy, is the organization that must bring about this closer integration and alignment.
• Process and administrative changes in the Secretariat and throughout the two Services will be required.

Explanation
America’s role in the world and its favorable geography create the conditions under which Seapower can and should play a central and distinct role in its security and prosperity. By combining the capabilities of the world’s most powerful Navy, the world’s most feared middleweight land force, and the world’s most mobile and lethal air force, the Department of the Navy plays a leading role in all of the missions of the Department of Defense:
• Counter terrorism and irregular warfare
• Deter and defeat aggression
• Project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges
• Counter weapons of mass destruction
• Operate effectively in cyberspace and space
• Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
• Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities
• Provide a stabilizing presence
• Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
• Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

This is not to say that the Department of the Navy performs ALL of all of these missions. Its role varies from mission to mission. What should not be disputed however, is the fact that the primary operational formations derived of the forces organized, trained, and equipped within the Department perform these missions as a matter of routine on a global basis. The very nature of American Seapower offers the nation the ability to field and operate forces that can protect and sustain American interests thousands of miles from its own shores, at the point of impact where the overwhelming majority of the world population lives. And while the Seapower resident in the Department of the Navy cannot perform all of the missions above in their totality all of the time, it can perform them to a greater degree than any other aspect of American military power most of the time in most places most efficiently.

In not recognizing the unique and foundational contributions of American Seapower to the nation’s defense, duplication, and waste are promoted as precious resources are inefficiently allocated, rendering the nation somewhat less capable of defending its interests for a given investment.
It is therefore essential that the an integral and coherent vision of American Seapower be formulated and espoused, one that presents the case that the nation can and should lean more heavily on the Department of the Navy for its peacetime crisis response and security requirements, while the forces of the other military departments prioritize preparation for the conduct and winning of largescale conflict.

Such a vision is however, insufficient, as the current organization of the Department of the Navy and its subordinate Armed Services (the Navy and the Marine Corps) does not adequately support the integration of capabilities that would be required in order to bring it about. Simply put, a coherent vision of American Seapower at the operational level demands a greater degree of integration at the very top, in efforts including planning, programming, budgeting, organizing, training, and equipping. By thinking more expansively about the utility of American Seapower and how it can best serve the needs of the Republic, pressures arise on the Navy and Marine Corps to work more closely together bureaucratically and organizationally in order to bring about the operational results desired.
Such integration is unlikely to occur from the bottom up. Service cultures and comfortable roles and missions create a situation in which the promise of American Seapower is unlikely to be achieved if the Navy and Marine Corps are left to themselves to bring it about. A forcing function is required.

Therefore, a reorganization of the Department of the Navy, undertaken with support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and appropriate Congressional Committees is necessary to take positive steps designed to ensure that within the Department of the Navy, a greater level of Service integration is achieved, while also working to obtain the resources necessary to field the capabilities and capacities necessary to more effectively service the nation’s peacetime security and presence needs. It is not enough to say that we need a larger Navy and or Marine Corps. We must ensure that the American people understand what will be done with such an increase, why it is in the nation’s interest to do so, and how doing so will make a given level of defense spending go further.

Pathologies

Strategic Thinking
There is no organization within the Department of the Navy dedicated to thinking about integrated American Seapower.
Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps maintain three star directorates with “strategy” within their mandate, in addition to small, highly influential strategic cells that report directly to the Service Chief. In none of these organizations is there a meaningful representation of officers from the other Service.
The Department of the Navy Secretariat has no such organization.
The lack of such an organization has not however, resulted in no strategic thinking in the Department. Quite the contrary, two maritime strategies have been produced in the past ten years (2007, 2015). These were however, ad hoc efforts that do not appear to have influenced fleet operations or force structure, and in at least the 2007 instance, was undertaken around and without the inclusion of the Service Secretary.

Strategic Communications
Under the Secretary of the Navy, there is a Chief of Information (CHINFO) and a Chief of Legislative Affairs (OLA). These officers report directly to the Secretary, with dotted line reporting responsibility to the Chief of Naval Operations. Neither organization is responsible for Marine Corps affairs, as the Commandant of the Marine Corps has his own legislative assistant and his own public affairs assistant.
In essence, the organizations charged with Department of the Navy strategic communications represent only one Service (the Navy), and to the extent that the other Service—the Marine Corps—requires these functions, they are creatures of the office of the Commandant, not the Secretary of the Navy.
In essence, any strategic communications efforts are derived of three disjointed and unaligned efforts—Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps.
Additionally, no one person in the Department of the Navy is charged with the creation and implementation of a coherent strategic communications plan including legislative affairs, public affairs, and international messaging. Put another way, even if there were a coherent strategic narrative promoting the benefits of American Seapower, there is no process, organization, task force, or group responsible for carrying it out.

Planning and Programming
The Navy and Marine Corps do not receive adequate planning and programming guidance from the Secretary of the Navy at the beginning of the annual budget cycle, guidance designed to achieve a coherent vision of American Seapower. Secretary priority items are included in current guidance, but the degree to which the Services respond to a coherent and integrated vision of Seapower is minimal at best. There is little evidence that the Services are instructed what to devalue or cut.
The Navy and Marine Corps maintain separate planning and programming functions designed to create inputs (known as a “program objective memorandum” or POM) to the annual defense budget. There is little or no coordination between the Services during the development of Service POM’s, and there is limited interaction between the Services and the Navy Secretariat.
The Navy Secretariat does not have an organization staffed to issue such guidance, monitor its implementation, and remedy shortfalls. To the extent that any changes are made to the Service POM’s, they come late in the process and are generally made within individual Service POMs.

Acquisition
Meaningful reform to the acquisition system is essential to achieving alignment within the Department of the Navy, as a vision of American Seapower would create derived requirements and the opportunity for capability trades between and among USN and USMC acquisition efforts.
This currently happens to some degree within the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. This work is however, undermined by the disjointed strategic communications efforts described above.
Captain Mark Vandroff, USN and I laid out a proposal for reforming Department of the Navy acquisition elsewhere, and rather than repeat it here, readers are urged to review it. Though not mentioned in that article, the need for an integrated strategic communications/legislative relations effort is essential to achieving some of the benefits of the recommended reforms.

Recommendations
• Revive the Office of Program Appraisal (OPA) on the Navy Secretariat at the two-star level. A staff made up of USN/USMC and civilian experts in strategic thinking and budgeting. Headed by a two-star with a one-star deputy who fleets up. Alternates between Navy and USMC. Billets would come from USN (N3/N5, N8) and USMC (P,P,&O/P&R). This organization would have the dual mission of aligning the American Seapower strategic narrative and providing oversight of Service POM development in order to achieve it.
• Empower the Under Secretary of the Navy to manage Navy Department Strategic Communications.  VCNO, ACMC, CHINFO, OLA, N3/N5, and PP@O would all serve on a DON strategic communications Board of Directors. Public, legislative, and international messaging would be aligned within this BOD.
o Both CHINFO and OLA would become truly Departmental organizations. The Commandant would lose the Assistant for Legislative Matters and the Assistant for Public Affairs. The two-star heads of these organizations would have a one-star deputy who fleets up. The heads of these organizations would be filled by officers from the two services, with no more than 90 days at a time in which officers from one of the Services are in both positions.
• Empower the Secretary of the Navy as the single responsible party for Departmental capability definition and its acquisition, subject to overrule only by the President or the Secretary of Defense (within the Executive Department). This is described more fully in the previously linked to USNI News piece.

Conclusion

The promise of powerful, integrated American Seapower tending to the nation’s peacetime presence and crisis response missions while it creates the conditions for garrison forces to fall in on for warfighting, will not occur organically. There are powerful interests aligned against it, and as this article may reveal, potentially good arguments against it.

I look forward to those arguments being made, and to those arguments in agreement with the central proposition of this proposal but with doubts about the offered solutions.

In the end, this nation’s geography, interests, and role in the world demand more of its naval services.  Seapower advocates must not shy away from the benefits conferred to this nation by a powerful naval force, even if it means relative comparisons with other elements of military power.

Why Does the Navy Have to Be So Big? (Segment 4)

What Does America Need Its Navy To Do? (Segment 3)

Freedom of the Seas is the Purpose of American Seapower (Segment 2)

Some Thoughts on the McCain White Paper

Bryan Clark of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and I (Bryan McGrath) put together a few thoughts on the recent White Paper from Senator John McCain (R-AZ) entitled "Restoring American Power".

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The Trump Administration began work this week on its promise of an across-the-board enlargement of the U.S. military. The President-elect has thus far described his plan only in the broadest of terms, but those terms portend a sustained period of higher defense spending—something Congress has been unwilling to approve since it passed the Budget Control Act (BCA) in 2011. Chief among those who will shape the future of the American military is Senator John McCain (R-AZ), the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who waded into the debate last week with a strong, coherent outline that not only aims to restore the capacity of a significantly hollowed-out force, but also provides direction for how the force should evolve as it grows. There is a lot in this report, but we will restrict our comments to the larger context of the plan and its impact on American Seapower.

Hope versus strategy

Senator McCain’s report begins by rightly highlighting the fundamental disconnect in today’s U.S. defense planning between resources and objectives. Hoping revanchist regimes in Russia and China would not be able to act effectively on their objectives for more than a decade, Congress and President Obama passed the BCA in 2011, reducing military budgets by about 10 percent for the subsequent decade. The BCA, in turn, contained the a ticking time-bomb known as Sequestration, which implemented another 10 percent cut starting in fiscal year (FY) 2013 if the Department was not able to meet BCA targets for spending. Because FY 2013 was already halfway over, services had to immediately cut their spending, creating maintenance depot backlogs, personnel shortfalls, and training shutdowns from which DoD is still recovering.

As the impact of the BCA’s cuts became clear, DoD and Congress experienced buyer’s remorse, turning to various budget gimmicks and abuse of the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to pay for expanding U.S. involvement in regional conflicts, growing compensation costs, and to allow for modest modernization of the force. McCain excoriates both Congress and the Executive Branch for these measures. Issuing a clear call to action, his report states “This law (BCA) must be repealed outright so we can budget for the true costs of our national defense.”

The most significant problem with the BCA’s reductions, McCain argues, is they do not allow modernization to address the rapidly improving capability of great powers such as Russia and China and regional powers such as Iran and North Korea. The BCA also does not provide the resources for U.S. forces to sustain the operational tempo to conduct daily strikes and raids on terrorists in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere. Notably, despite the hopes that underpinned the BCA, Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and China’s aggression in the South China Sea show, in McCain’s words, “A better defense strategy must acknowledge the reality that we have entered a new era of great power competitions. China and Russia aspire to diminish U.S. influence and revise the world order in ways that are contrary to U.S. national interests.”

McCain’s focus on great power competition is important in two ways. First, it draws a distinction between the Obama Administration’s approach and McCain’s more forward-leaning view of great power dynamics. Second, it sends a signal to the incoming administration of McCain’s wariness of Russia in clear and unambiguous terms. This could ultimately prove to be a contentious issue between Congress and the Trump Administration, which has indicated it may view Russia as a partner rather than a competitor or adversary.

Strategy and Fleet Architecture

McCain argues for a new set of defense strategies to address great powers, regional powers, and transnational terrorists, rather than a single U.S. security strategy. In CSBA’s upcoming study of alternative Navy fleet architectures, we argue the most important of these is a strategy to deter great power aggression, which could potentially have the most catastrophic consequences of these security challenges. With the realignment of American bases since the Cold War, U.S. ground and air forces overseas are less numerous and more easily suppressed than when they last faced a great power adversary a quarter century ago. Thus, naval forces will assume a more prominent role in conventional deterrence.

Recognizing both the Trump goal of a 350 ship Navy and the Navy’s own recently released 355-ship Force Structure Assessment (FSA), McCain lays out a plan that over the next five years that: 1) increases the size of the fleet over the final plan of the Obama Administration by building 59 ships as opposed to the Obama Administration’s 41,  2) truncates the current Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and accelerates the Navy’s move to an open-ocean frigate replacement, 3) funds design work on a new class of aircraft carrier, 4) increases Navy end-strength, 5) invests significantly in unmanned technologies of all varieties, and 6) provides additional, immediate funding to address fleet readiness and maintenance, and installations and infrastructure.

McCain’s plan aligns in large part with our proposed fleet architecture, and would improve the Navy’s ability to deter aggression by great powers, counter attacks by regional powers, and help keep terrorists on the run. Unlike the current fleet, McCain’s proposal would not focus on efficiently providing presence at the expense of the capability and capacity for combat against a capable adversary.

Three aspects of McCain’s force structure plan are of particular interest. First is its truncation of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in 2017 with a follow-on frigate proposed for acquisition no later than 2022. It is essential that the Navy move as quickly as possible from the LCS to a proper blue-water frigate capable of anti-submarine warfare and local air defense, but it must also continue to increase the size of the fleet and ensure the frigate can be affordable and built in large numbers. McCain proposes an acquisition “bridge” for the two shipyards currently building LCS to continue between 2017 and 2022. This would expand the fleet and enable these shipbuilders to compete for the follow-on frigate, which could lower costs for the frigate and increase the number of shipyards at which it could be built.

The second initiative of note is McCain’s proposal to move to a mix of large, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and smaller, conventionally-powered carriers. As recommended in our fleet architecture study as well, conventional carriers would initially be based on current amphibious assault ships that carry short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft such as the AV-8B Harrier and F-35B Lightning II. As McCain argues, a smaller carrier would be suited to supporting many of the smaller steady-state operations that require naval air power, such as air strikes in Syria. Senator McCain is skeptical of the Navy’s new FORD-class carrier due to its high cost and poor management, but argues the fleet will continue to also need large nuclear-powered carriers to provide a mobile airfield for combat air sorties during larger conflicts in which host nation concerns or enemy actions prevent effectively using land bases.

Finally, though not mentioned in the narrative, a “patrol ship” of less than 800 tons appears in the McCain plan’s appendix for acquisition starting in 2020. The addition of this small combatant highlights the need for a larger, more distributed, and resilient force, which was also a finding of our fleet architecture study. A patrol vessel of 800 tons such as Sweden’s Visby-class would be able to defend itself against a salvo of a dozen or more anti-ship missiles and could carry 4 to 8 offensive strike or anti-ship missiles. This will make patrol vessels able to deny or delay enemy aggression while being too costly a target to be worth defeating in large numbers.

Overall, McCain’s proposal would grow the surface fleet by adding frigates and patrol vessels to the Navy’s current requirement of 104 large surface combatants and 52 small surface combatants. We agree a larger surface fleet is essential to conduct offensive strike and anti-ship attacks in a distributed manner that will make them harder to defeat in detail. But we would argue the Distributed Lethality concept and growing needs for logistics escorts suggest the surface fleet needs to both grow and be rebalanced, with more small surface combatants that can conduct widely distributed offensive operations and fewer large surface combatants that will tend to concentrate the fleet’s firepower.

A fleet for the future

A Navy is a capital investment that takes years to build and lasts for decades thereafter. Any plan for a future fleet should be based not on the world of today, but on a set of plausible futures that best represent the world of 15 to 20 years from now. Even with an aggressive shipbuilding increase such as envisioned by McCain’s plan, only ¼ of the fleet will change between now and 2030. McCain’s proposal considers the likelihood that the fleet of 2030 will need to deter revisionist great powers as its primary mission, while addressing the growing capability of regional powers and transnational terrorists. It appropriately invests not only in platforms, but across the board in the various enablers and extenders of maritime power, including ISR, networking, unmanned vehicles, cyber, and electronic warfare.

If the United States fails to make great power competition a priority in long-term force planning, rivals such as Russia and China will continue eroding American influence and alliances, with damaging economic and security impacts on the American people. McCain’s plan sets American Seapower (as well as the rest of DoD) on a solid course for an uncertain future. It remains to be seen the extent to which this thoughtful, strategic approach will be complemented by the other instruments of national power, or the degree to which the incoming administration will welcome it.

Last Week's Other Transition of Power

RADM James Shannon USN meets Commander South Sea Fleet RADM Shen Jinlong PLA-N in HMAS Perth at IMDEX Asia, Singapore. (Picture courtesy of Ivan Ingham, Commanding Officer of HMAS Perth.

Last week the largest Navy in Asia undertook a transition of power at the top for the first time in over a decade. The official announcement can be found here, but the English version was reported here.

The People's Liberation Army Navy has appointed a new commander — 60-year-old Lieutenant Admiral Shen Jinlong.

In a news release distributed by the PLA Navy on Friday, Shen spoke in a video conference with officers and sailors of the 25th Escort Fleet in the Gulf of Aden in his new capacity as PLA Navy commander.

That means he has replaced Admiral Wu Shengli, 71, to take charge of the largest navy in Asia. Although the Navy did not disclose when the transition took place, observers believe it was this week.

A point of interest that will be noted by most PLA Navy experts is that Shen Jinlong had been the Commander of the PLA Navy South Sea fleet since December 2014. As we have seen over the last many years, virtually all Commanders of the South Sea Fleet eventually rise to one of the top offices in the PLA Navy. These military moves within the PLA Navy come as China has discussed reorganizing that command into a more "joint" organization.

The South China Morning Post covered the possibility of Shen Jinlong becoming the new PLA Navy Commander last week, prior to it happening, and has additional information on the reorganization that is proposed, and may in fact already be underway.

The PLA is set to break with a long-standing tradition if a proposal to appoint a naval officer to head its strategic southern command is adopted, four independent sources said.

The proposed reshuffle at the helm of the Southern Theatre Command, which is responsible for the South China Sea and the PLA South Sea Fleet, also underscores the rising importance of the navy in the Chinese military and the decline of its army-centric doctrine under an overhaul begun by President Xi Jinping last year.

The article goes on to note other changes, but in discussing Shen Jinlong later in the article, this stood out as worth noting.

If Shen secures the top navy job, it will surprise many PLA watchers at home and abroad. Shen would have beaten a number of rivals, including Vice Admiral Qiu Yangpeng, the chief of staff for the navy, and Vice Admiral Wang Hai, the navy’s deputy commander.

Wang is tipped to be the new commander of the South Sea Fleet and deputy commander of the Southern Theatre Command, according to the sources.

Shen would be the least experienced naval boss for decades.

There are several news reports that the reorganization has taken place, the most interesting new development being that Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai has taken command of the new Southern Theater Command.

While I look forward to the analysis of these events from PLA Navy experts like Andrew Erickson, I see three important takeaways from the early news reporting.

First, Shen Jinlong is as much a scholar as he is a sailor. Shen Jinlong was President of Naval Academy of Commanding from 2011-2014, prior to taking command of the South Sea Fleet. Prior to that he was President of Dalian Naval Academy from 2010-2011. In other words Shen Jinlong spent five years as an Admiral immersed in the two academic establishments most noted for advancing the strategic and academic acumen of PLA Navy officers.

Would it be a feature or a bug if the US Navy CNO had spent five years as a Flag Officer Commanding either Annapolis and the Naval War College. What about both? Is it a feature or a bug that the new Commander of the largest Navy in Asia spent five years in Command of the equivalent of both? I can't speak to the US Navy admirals who take command at Annapolis, but in my opinion based on my own observations, US Navy Admirals who spend time in command at the Naval War College change while they are there, and almost always come out the other side with an increased strategic and academic acumen not easily rivaled by their peers.

Second, reorganizing the Southern Theater Command structure to be under the leadership of a naval officer represents a commitment towards true joint operations that China has been discussing for well over a decade. The Southern Theater Command incorporates Marine forces (sea, land, and air), the air force units in the region, and the rocket forces under the command a naval officer for virtually all military forces with domain responsibilities over the South China Sea region.

The significance of this change cannot be understated. This change ultimately discards PLA military tradition that has been in place for over seven decades where strategic rocket forces commanded by Army officers have controlled the command structure for a region. The Southern Theater Command structure represents the official beginning of a Command structure that includes naval officers, and the first instance of this inclusion takes place in China's most important strategic theater.

Finally, news that the Southern Theater Command will be led by Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai simply cannot be ignored. The world knows very well where Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai stands on South China Sea issues, because he certainly hasn't mince words and his promotion signals his previous comments on the subject almost certainly contributed to his promotion. From September of 2015:

The South China Sea, Yuan said, “is a sea for all the nations around, and a sea of peace.

“The South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China. And the sea from the Han dynasty a long time ago where the Chinese people have been working and producing from the sea.”

While I suspect we will all learn more as the Chinese experts weigh in more facts and opinions on events taking place in the PLA Navy, my initial impression from changes in the PLA Navy last week is that the force took meaningful steps towards more strategic and academic acumen at the top of the PLA Navy, took serious organizational steps towards a joint forces approach for the South China Sea theater of operations, and among all the candidates that could be chosen to lead the Chinese military forces into this new joint forces era in the South China Sea - the PLA Navy ultimately picked one of the most well known vocal hard liners in their ranks for the position.

Why Do An American Seapower Speaking Tour? (Segment 1)

Hello World. Let's Try This Again.

Raymond Pritchett  (Galrahn)

It would be both foolish and self indulging to explain in any detail why I have been away for most of the last five years. It would be challenging to discuss publicly the reasons why I closed the blog for most of last year.

To keep it short and sweet... I have a career, and occasionally I am very good at it. Sometimes there are rewards, and sometimes there are restrictions, but I accept both as consequences of successfully navigating the rough seas found in ones professional journey.

It is in this time I find myself emerging again into a stable situation where my activities on this little corner of the Internet no longer represent a point of interest to those I associate with professionally. I am excited about the opportunity to reengage the discussions and build a new community online, even if it is on this old platform that has survived nearly a decade.

As I emerge from my late 30s into my 40s, it is possible I am not the same person you remember. But some things never change. With more information comes changes in my opinions. Basically, I wouldn't assume anything.

As a reminder, I would like to reiterate the rules of Information Dissemination.

1. I will not tolerate personal attacks against other people participating in this community. Be respectful to one another.
2. This is a professoinal forum, and my expectations is that all contributors will respect the professionals who leverage this forum for information, knowledge, and idea generation.
3. Do your homework if you intend to respectfully debate another community member, because the person you are debating almost certainly will have done their homework.
4. Update your Disqus profile and use the forum to network with other professionals.
5. The authors are not always right. We are here to learn as well.
6. There are no stupid questions, but there are stupid ways to ask a question. Respect the distinction.
7. If you have a short attention span, or read nonsense on the Internet and believe it, this is probably not the right community for you. Conspiracy theories are not welcome here, but well thought out and sourced theories are.
8. Have fun.

Welcome back to those who have long been part of this community. We welcome new professionals here as well.