The Ship is an "Electronic" Being

            In a 19 January 2024 letter to The Times of London, the former Chief Naval Constructor (and then member of the British Parliament), Sir Edward Reed attempted to explain some of the reasons for the rapidly rising cost of British capital ships. The battleship HMS Devastation had been completed in 1871 at a cost of 361,438 pounds, but the cost of HMS Inflexible, launched in 1876 and nearing completion at the time of Reed’s letter was to cost 812,000 pounds. Parliament was naturally concerned about these apparent, skyrocketing costs. Reed, whose former position as Chief Naval Constructor, as position roughly analogous to that of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition,) explained the cost increase as this:

“Every war vessel is now a steamer, and some of our most powerful and valuable ships have not a sail upon them, but, on the contrary, are huge engines of war put into activity of every part by steam and steam alone. The main propelling engines are worked by steam. A separate steam engine starts and stops them. Steam ventilates the monster, steam weighs the anchors, steam steers her and steam pumps her out if she leaks. Steam loads the gun, steam trains it. Steam depresses or elevates it…The ship is a steam being.”

Reed went on to explain that the use of steam in so many areas of modern ship operation as a replacement for the wind and muscle power utilized in age of fighting sail warships, along with advanced products of the industrial revolution such as rifled, breech-loading cannons and compound steel armor had combined to significantly increase the cost of the modern battleship. A similar, 1877 report by the U.S. Navy’s Chief Engineer echoes Reed in that it stated, “year by year the thickness of armor and the weight of naval artillery go on increasing together. Mechanical appliances have more and more replaced manual labor, and at the same time the forms of the ships have been adapted to the work they have to do and the conditions under which they must act.”  The Royal Navy was able to slow and eventually reverse the growth in its overall budget estimates in the first decade of the 20^th century, but only through the radical actions of First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher. The cantankerous and combative senior uniformed leader of the RN opted for quality over quantity and produced fewer, but larger and more powerful warships as the means to reduce the budget and increase combat capability. As a result, the RN’s budget from 1905-1911 remained less than that of 1904.

            Still, the rising costs of the British naval armaments race with Germany exceeded Fisher’s capacity for cost savings and British Naval estimates again increased in 1911.  The Royal Navy did not regain control over the escalating costs of its capital ships until the interwar period of the 1920’s and early 1930’s when a combination of naval arms limitation treaties and appalling economic conditions forced such conditions.

            A similar process may be underway in the increased costs of U.S. surface warships over the last four decades at a rate greater than inflation. A 2006 RAND Corporation study suggests that key indicators for modern warship cost center on a vessel’s ratio of electrical power generating capacity to its light ship (with no fuel ammunition, stores or other consumables aboard) weight. It appears that just as the industrial revolution’s steam and steel products drove up warship costs in the 19th and early 20th centuries, today’s rapidly advancing electrical and electronic equipment now account for significant increases in 21st century warship costs. The rapid advance of electronic equipment and its operating software, as well as new technologies like rail guns and directed energy weapons suggests that ship cost increases will continue for the foreseeable future as they did during the Industrial Revolution. Given this data, today’s warships might echo Reed’s comment and can be construed as “electronic beings” with electrical and electronic systems and associated software just as integral to the rising costs of 21^st century warship as steam and steel products were to its 19^th century counterpart.

            The RAND study’s potential solutions for reducing these costs include keeping ship designs less complex, more stable over time, and a consideration to physically separate expensive capabilities in the form of modular components to the main hull. The study also emphasized the unstable nature of U.S. naval shipbuilding, starting: “Many shipyards have a monopsony relationship with the government—that is, the government is their main, if not only, customer. At the same time, fluctuating ship orders from the Navy, with initially forecast orders typically exceeding what is ultimately purchased, discourage shipyards from making investments that could ultimately reduce the cost of ships.” RAND noted that unless these costs are brought under control that the U.S. would be hard-pressed to field even 260 ships by 2035.

            The RAND study was released in 2006 and now the U.S. struggles to maintain its current fleet of 287 ships. It is vital for the U.S. to reduce these costs moving forward into the middle 21^st century. A 2015 RAND report on surface ship maintenance suggests that the current readiness crisis is just the beginning of potential troubles, as deferred maintenance and mid-life upgrades in existing warships will grow over the next twenty five years. Unlike Admiral Fisher, the U.S. cannot now afford to reduce its overall number of ships, and solutions to qualitatively increase fleet firepower such as rail guns and directed energy weapons require significantly more, expensive development.

            What can the U.S. do to slow the growth of its own “electronic being” fleet? It should develop a Maritime strategy that is a worthy successor of its 1980’s-era predecessor. That strategy product was put “on the shelf” by then CNO nominee Admiral Frank Kelso in June 1990. It was replaced by the “From theSea/Forward from the Sea” concept that assumed an extended period of operational maneuver from the sea against rogue and in support of failed states around the greater Eurasian littoral. That time where great power competition was a relic of the past is gone and has been replaced by a hybrid period of both great power competition and growing non-state actors. Concepts like “Defeat one / Deny or Deter another” are not strategy and represent operational art raised to strategic levels. A Maritime Strategy with operational characteristics that can be activated from phase zero start to a phase 4 conclusion needs to be in place. It will help shape global naval force deployment, and fund the units needed to carry out the strategy and its operational elements. Great Britain’s Royal Navy had a clear strategy from the age of “fighting sail” through the end of the Second World War. It was the shield of imperial trade and commerce and the sword that attacked those of its enemies and enabled the operational maneuver of British ground combat forces from the sea. The U.S. Navy does not have a similar clear purpose that can be easily articulated to Congress, U.S. allies, and potential opponents. Instead, the U.S. speaks of strategy in terms status quo, the 30 year shipbuilding plan and other force structure management processes. The Navy needs a product and not a process to shape the size, design and operation of its 21st century force and perhaps prevent the technological creep that has contributed to the price increases on Navy ships as documented in the RAND report.

            The littoral combat ship (LCS) class tried to affect some of the changes suggested by the RAND. LCS was supposed to be less complicated than other combatants through the separation of its major capabilities in surface, subsurface and mine warfare into modular components bought and developed separately for the class. “Teething” issues in the first four experimental LCS units and the shipyards that produce them caused significant program delays, including an outright pause from 2007-2009 and the cancellation of the original LCS 3 and 4. The shipyards producing LCS have matured as have the designs and LCS has made significant progress in terms of capability and production cost maintainability since being placed under program executive officer (PEO) management in 2011. Despite those successes, troubles with the first four LCS units, uncertainty over operational costs, and a deep-seated Congressional and naval culture that believes that a frigate must be a “light destroyer” to be successful have combined to make LCS the defense press’ poster program for poor acquisition management.

                Despite widespread dislike, the LCS program still offers to solve some of the problems that dogged both the British Navy of the 19^th century and the U.S. Navy in the present. Admiral Fisher combined the functions of the battleship and the armored cruiser into the hybrid battlecruiser that had the speed and range to overhaul and destroy surface raiders, and the firepower and advanced fire control needed to engage any opponent at long range. LCS still offers the ability to combine multiple small ship functions of patrol, mine warfare and the traditional combatant surface and subsurface warfare missions as interchangeable capabilities on one hull. LCS also supports unmanned vehicles and other off-board systems much better than the conventional frigates proposed to replace it. One LCS frame, like that of the World War 2 Sherman medium tank, that supported multiple variants is a better choice than building new, separate, separate mine warfare, patrol, and small surface combatant units, which will need to happen if the “frigate” category is taken by a high end design.

            The RAND study touted the benefits of stability in design as a cost saving measures. One of the reasons for the selection of an LCS hull as the basis for the new frigate class is an attempt to improve stability through the use of the same basic hull, much as the DD 963 hull was used as the basis for the CG 47 class. If seen through to the construction phase, this choice would support the shipyards that produce both LCS and the projected frigate. The U.S. elements of the firms that produce the LCS have a “monopsony relationship” with the U.S. government as described in the RAND report and have little civilian business as compared with more traditional shipbuilders who also construct warships. The maintenance of stability in construction might allow these companies to avoid the layoffs that happen when the U.S. cannot make up its mind about which design to accept. This is not “corporate welfare,” but a vital issue in the maintenance of an effective industrial base to support the Navy in both peace and war.

            The electronics revolution that has driven up the cost of U.S. warships over the last half century bears a remarkable resemblance to that of the Industrial Revolution, whose steam and steel products so substantially increased the cost of British Navy units in the 19^th and early 20^th centuries. The 2006 RAND study on warship costs suggested ways the U.S. might slow that growth. LCS was one possible solution, but problems with early units, and opposition from Cold War cultures of ship size, lifespan, manning, sustainability, and intra-service parochial interests have combined to make LCS less of a success. While visions of larger, very capable fleets for the future may dazzle they eyes of some, the realities of rising fleet maintenance costs, the budget deficit, and internecine political warfare on Capitol Hill effectively combine to strangle such visions in their think tank cradles. The Navy will likely have to make due with a smaller force for the time being, and effective strategy, not massive firepower, could determine victory in the event of significant naval conflict. Like the Royal Navy of the mid and late 19^th century, the U.S. must mitigate the accelerating costs of technological revolution and develop cost effective, operational solutions in support of defined Maritime strategy. Some of the concepts pioneered in the LCS program can aid in that endeavor and should be given a chance to succeed. Given current challenges, LCS and its frigate variant are likely to be the only small surface combatants the U.S. Navy will receive for the foreseeable future.

Thoughts on Syrian Strike

USS Porter launching cruise missiles towards Syria.

I watched Nikki Haley's speech in the UN on social media this morning, and I quickly realized two things:

1. America was pissed off.
2. The world was now aware America was pissed off.

If you haven't seen that video yet, the stare she gives the Russian ambassador makes it must see viewing. I was impressed.

When President Obama gave Syria a red line on chemical weapons back in 2013, and Assad crossed that red line, you may remember I was quite uncomfortable with how everything had gone down. I was uncomfortable with the President giving the red line, and I was uncomfortable with the idea the US would have to attack Syria. President Obama took a lot of criticism for addressing that incident in 2013 with diplomacy, but the United States ultimately removed a considerable amount of chemical weapons from Syria via MV Cape Ray and over time I came to appreciate the decision by President Obama. Until this past week, there had been no clear evidence of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in Syria against civilians, including for the entire remainder of the Obama administration. In my mind, what President Obama did at the time was the right thing.

But when news broke about chemical weapons use in Syria this week, particularly in the context of what is happening on the Korean peninsula, in my mind President Trump had a very serious choice to make. He either attacked Syria for breaking their agreement with President Obama, or the United States retreated from the role as the leader of the global security construct the world has enjoyed since the end of the cold war.

Assad left Trump no choice, and actually gave the Trump administration exactly what they needed in many ways. The strike by the United States against Syria on Thursday checks multiple strategic boxes that needed to be checked given the checkered beginning of this Presidential administration. In one stroke, President Trump was able to:

1. Support a policy championed by President Obama with a limited use of military force thereby proving that domestic political disagreements do not represent a weakness in US foreign policy.
2. Send a clear signal of US resolve to the dictators globally like Bashar al-Assad and Kim Jong un that the US is not to be tested.
3. Reassert US influence in a region of the world dominated by Russia at this point and time.
4. Send a clear message to world powers like China, at a time Trump is meeting with Xi Jinping, that the US led by President Trump will use military force when forced to.

These are not small things. President Trump's action reinforces the security framework rule sets led by the United States that many, including myself, have been concerned that President Trump might not be willing to stand up for under his administration. I'm not really sure what actual tactical military impact 60 Tomahawk cruise missiles may or may not have had hitting some random targets in Syria, and my gut tells me the tactical impact is probably very little.

But sending 60 Tomahawks into Syria isn't about tactical effects, the way to measure this military action will be to observe strategic effects. I'm sure in the near future cable TV will find some political science mouth breather ready to do battle damage tactical assessments on use of Tomahawks as if the military action taken Thursday has something in common with trying to win some battle against Syria. Firing Tomahawks into Syria isn't about winning a battle though, it's about shaping the conduct of a war, which is a continuation of the policy set forth by President Obama specific to chemical weapons and a necessary escalation in response to Assad for challenging the agreement Syria made with the last administration.

Only time will tell if the strategic communication sent on Thursday was sufficient, or whether a new challenge to President Trump is forthcoming to test the US resolve on this issue.

As this event relates to naval strategic theory, I will be observing this event as an early test of the Trump administrations naval focused offshore balancing strategic theory. The ability to send an effective strategic communication with the execution of a tactical missile strike was a staple of both the Reagan and Clinton administrations, but both of those President's enjoyed a large US Navy capable of acting globally in massive force in response to any incident. Today's US Navy is significantly smaller than the Navy of those two Presidents, and while an Arleigh Burke class destroyer can send the initial volley of cruise missiles to send a strategic message, I am not as confident regarding how things might unfold if there was blow back from this type of military action.

On the Navy and Oversharing

Earlier this week I attended the Navy League's annual "Sea-Air-Space" Symposium, and among the thousands of attendees were a number of my friends in the Navy trade press. Quite independently, three working journalists each brought up what one of them called the "CNO's gag order"--recently released guidance by the CNO to Navy Leadership discussed yesterday by Sydney Freedberg in a piece that also features the CNO's memo. I was unfamiliar with the memo, but not with the sentiments CNO expresses in it. His dissatisfaction with the amount of information getting out has been a popular topic of recent conversation, but I wasn't in on the memo.  But now that I am, I have a few thoughts on the subject.

There is no doubt in my mind that the Navy is "oversharing". There is also no doubt in my mind that it is "undersharing". There is furthermore, no doubt in my mind that the Navy is "inefficiently-sharing". The plain truth is that the Navy is incapable of figuring this out because it is not organized to address it. So when Freedberg opines in the column above that "many of my fellow reporters here at the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space conference said they’d felt a chilling effect from the CNO’s memo", no one should be surprised at the wholly foreseeable reaction that CNO's memo caused among his flag and civilian leaders--even though he stated that "....I am not asking you to throttle back engagement with the media or with the public." In the absence of actual, specific guidance, their instinctual reaction is simply to clam up. This is how one avoids running afoul of the CNO, but this is not in the long-term interests of the Navy, American Seapower, or national strategy. Ultimately, the CNO must take responsibility for this and begin to advocate for necessary change. And that change must occur within the staff of his boss, the Secretary of the Navy, and within the OPNAV Staff.

Before I get to this weightier subject, some vignettes. In February of 2015, I had my hip replaced, and I was convalescing in an opioid-induced fog at home rolling through my Twitter feed, when I came upon this press release from the Naval Air Systems Command announcing that "Navy demonstrates synthetic guidance technology with Tomahawk missile". Had I been physically capable, I would have jumped out of my chair. In this test, what had previously been solely a long range land attack missile had demonstrated the capability to act as a long-range anti-ship missile targeted against a moving target. Having been involved in the creation of the concept of "Distributed Lethality" within the Surface Force, I found myself wondering how it was that this important component thereof found its way into the open press. Who made this decision? Why was it made? What was the process that created it?

Nearly a year to the day later, I was again at home rolling through my Twitter feed (ok, I spend too much time on Twitter) when I came across tweets from the OSD account announcing that the SM6 missile was being modified to provide a supersonic anti-ship capability. Knowing that -- or at least thinking that -- this information was classified, I began to write to some of my friends in the Pentagon wondering what was happening. Why was this capability being announced? Why now? As I watched my timeline roll on, more and more information ensued. Here is USNI's story on the subject from the very next day. 

Now, back to the problem and what to do about it.

The bottom line here is that we are re-entering a period of great power contention, but the Department of the Navy is still acting like it is 1996 and there aren't any real threats--at least at the level of how to communicate strategically.  In a post here on ID a little over a year ago (and just days before Secretary Carter spilled the SM6 beans), I advocated for a series of reforms of the Navy Secretariat, one of which was to bring some rigor to its strategic communications efforts. Clearly, if the Secretary of Defense decides he wants to declassify something, it is likely within his authority to do so. In this case though, there was no Service position from which to advise him. And this is because there is no formal or organizational method of achieving such a position.

If the Navy were serious about actual strategic communications, it would begin to think deeply about what it means to do so. The CNO's well-intentioned memo is the antithesis of effective strategic communications--in that the wholly foreseeable outcome of it is for the service to simply clam up, and in the process miss out on important opportunities to shape behavior of both potential adversaries and friends alike.

Effective strategic communications planning would necessarily involve (at a minimum) public communcations (CHINFO), legislative communications (OLA), executive communication (OSD), capabilities (SYSCOMS) and operational objectives (FLEET). This function would have a modest staff to serve as an administrative tool for teeing up subjects and tracking decisions to completion. The bottom line here is that a concerted effort to achieve message alignment requires both organization and action, and in their absence, lurches in unanticipated directions will disturb the illusion of calm created by enforced silence.

Every single program manager has a list of milestones for his or her program. Those milestones include tests and demonstrations of new or innovative capabilties. Every single one of these tests is an opportunity to communicate a message--yet we have no effetive mechanism for determining which ones should be released, which ones shouldn't, how information should be shared, what should be stressed, to what end, and how will that end be measured.

We need to get serious about this end of the business. There will be times where we want to rock our contenders back on their heels. There will be times when we wish to be coy. There will be times when we wish to remain silent. How we distinguish among these times should not be left up to chance. It is time for the Navy to get its strategic communications act in gear, and it isn't going to happen without the CNO making it so.