In a 19 January 2024 letter to The Times of London, the former Chief
Naval Constructor (and then member of the British Parliament), Sir Edward Reed
attempted to explain some of the reasons for the rapidly rising cost of British
capital ships. The battleship HMS
Devastation had been completed in 1871 at a cost of 361,438 pounds, but the
cost of HMS Inflexible, launched in
1876 and nearing completion at the time of Reed’s letter was to cost 812,000
pounds. Parliament was naturally concerned about these apparent, skyrocketing
costs. Reed, whose former position as Chief Naval Constructor, as position
roughly analogous to that of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition,) explained the cost
increase as this:
“Every war vessel is now a steamer, and
some of our most powerful and valuable ships have not a sail upon them, but, on
the contrary, are huge engines of war put into activity of every part by steam
and steam alone. The main propelling engines are worked by steam. A separate
steam engine starts and stops them. Steam ventilates the monster, steam weighs
the anchors, steam steers her and steam pumps her out if she leaks. Steam loads
the gun, steam trains it. Steam depresses or elevates it…The ship is a
steam being.”
Reed went on to explain that the use of
steam in so many areas of modern ship operation as a replacement for the wind
and muscle power utilized in age of fighting sail warships, along with advanced
products of the industrial revolution such as rifled, breech-loading cannons
and compound steel armor had combined to significantly increase the cost of the
modern battleship. A similar, 1877
report by the U.S. Navy’s Chief Engineer echoes Reed in that it stated, “year by
year the thickness of armor and the weight of naval artillery go on increasing
together. Mechanical appliances have more and more replaced manual labor, and
at the same time the forms of the ships have been adapted to the work they have
to do and the conditions under which they must act.” The Royal Navy was able to slow and eventually
reverse the growth in its overall budget estimates in the first decade of the
20th century, but only through the radical actions of First Sea Lord
Admiral Sir John Fisher. The cantankerous and combative senior uniformed
leader of the RN opted for quality over quantity and produced fewer, but larger
and more powerful warships as the means to reduce the budget and increase
combat capability. As a result, the RN’s budget
from 1905-1911 remained less than that of 1904.
Still,
the rising costs of the British naval armaments race with Germany exceeded Fisher’s capacity
for cost savings and British Naval estimates again increased in 1911. The Royal Navy did not regain control over
the escalating costs of its capital ships until the interwar period of the
1920’s and early 1930’s when a combination of naval arms limitation treaties
and appalling economic conditions forced such conditions.
A
similar process may be underway in the increased costs of U.S. surface warships
over the last four decades at a rate greater than inflation. A 2006 RAND
Corporation study
suggests that key indicators for modern warship cost center on a vessel’s ratio
of electrical power generating capacity to its light ship (with no fuel
ammunition, stores or other consumables aboard) weight. It appears that just as
the industrial revolution’s steam and steel products drove up warship costs in
the 19th and early 20th centuries, today’s rapidly advancing electrical and
electronic equipment now account for significant increases in 21st century
warship costs. The rapid advance of electronic equipment and its operating
software, as well as new technologies like rail guns and directed energy
weapons suggests that ship cost increases will continue for the foreseeable
future as they did during the Industrial Revolution. Given this data, today’s
warships might echo Reed’s comment and can be construed as “electronic beings”
with electrical and electronic systems and associated software just as integral
to the rising costs of 21st century warship as steam and steel
products were to its 19th century counterpart.
The
RAND study’s potential solutions for reducing these costs include keeping ship
designs less complex, more stable over time, and a consideration to physically
separate expensive capabilities in the form of modular components to the main
hull. The study also emphasized the unstable nature of U.S. naval shipbuilding,
starting: “Many shipyards have a monopsony relationship with the government—that
is, the government is their main, if not only, customer. At the same time,
fluctuating ship orders from the Navy, with initially forecast orders typically
exceeding what is ultimately purchased, discourage shipyards from making
investments that could ultimately reduce the cost of ships.” RAND noted that
unless these costs are brought under control that the U.S. would be
hard-pressed to field even 260 ships by 2035.
The
RAND study was released in 2006 and now the U.S. struggles to maintain its
current fleet of 287 ships. It is vital for the U.S. to reduce these costs
moving forward into the middle 21st century. A 2015 RAND
report on surface ship maintenance suggests that the current readiness
crisis is just the beginning of potential troubles, as deferred maintenance and
mid-life upgrades in existing warships will grow over the next twenty five
years. Unlike Admiral Fisher, the U.S. cannot now afford to reduce its overall
number of ships, and solutions to qualitatively increase fleet firepower such
as rail
guns and directed
energy weapons require significantly more, expensive development.
What
can the U.S. do to slow the growth of its own “electronic being” fleet? It
should develop a Maritime strategy that is a worthy successor of its 1980’s-era
predecessor. That strategy product was put “on the shelf” by then CNO
nominee Admiral Frank Kelso in June 1990. It was replaced by the “From theSea/Forward from the Sea” concept that assumed an extended period of
operational maneuver from the sea against rogue and in support of failed states
around the greater Eurasian littoral. That time where great power competition
was a relic of the past is gone and has been replaced by a hybrid period of
both great power competition and growing non-state actors. Concepts like “Defeat one /
Deny or Deter another”
are not strategy and represent operational art raised to strategic levels. A Maritime Strategy
with operational characteristics that can be activated from phase zero start to
a phase 4 conclusion needs to be in place. It will help shape global naval
force deployment, and fund the units needed to carry out the strategy and its
operational elements. Great Britain’s Royal Navy had a clear
strategy from the age of “fighting sail” through the end of the Second World
War. It was the shield of imperial trade and commerce and the sword that
attacked those of its enemies and enabled the operational maneuver of British
ground combat forces from the sea. The U.S. Navy does not have a similar clear
purpose that can be easily articulated to Congress, U.S. allies, and potential
opponents. Instead, the U.S. speaks of strategy in terms status quo, the 30 year shipbuilding plan
and other force structure management processes. The Navy needs a product and
not a process to shape the size, design and operation of its 21st century force
and perhaps prevent the technological creep that has contributed to the price
increases on Navy ships as documented in the RAND report.
The littoral
combat ship (LCS) class tried to affect some of the changes suggested by the
RAND. LCS was supposed to be less complicated than other combatants through the
separation of its major capabilities in surface, subsurface and mine warfare
into modular components bought and developed separately for the class. “Teething”
issues in the first four experimental LCS units and the shipyards that produce
them caused significant program delays, including an outright pause
from 2007-2009 and the cancellation of the original LCS 3 and 4. The shipyards
producing LCS have matured as have the designs and LCS has made significant
progress in terms of capability and production cost maintainability since being
placed under program executive officer (PEO) management in 2011. Despite those
successes, troubles with the first four LCS units, uncertainty over operational
costs, and a deep-seated Congressional
and naval culture that believes that a frigate must be a “light destroyer” to
be successful
have combined to make LCS the defense press’ poster program for poor
acquisition management.
Despite
widespread dislike, the LCS program still offers to solve some of the problems
that dogged both the British Navy of the 19th century and the U.S.
Navy in the present. Admiral Fisher combined the
functions of the battleship and the armored cruiser into the hybrid
battlecruiser
that had the speed and range to overhaul and destroy surface raiders, and the
firepower and advanced fire control needed to engage any opponent at long
range. LCS still offers the ability to combine multiple small ship functions of
patrol, mine warfare and the traditional combatant surface and subsurface
warfare missions as interchangeable capabilities on one hull. LCS also supports
unmanned vehicles and other off-board systems much better than the
conventional frigates proposed to replace it. One LCS frame, like that of the
World War 2 Sherman medium tank, that supported multiple variants is a better
choice than building new, separate, separate mine warfare, patrol, and small
surface combatant units, which will need to happen if the “frigate” category is
taken by a high end design.
The
RAND study touted the benefits of stability in design as a cost saving
measures. One of the reasons for the selection of an LCS hull as the basis for
the new frigate class is an attempt to improve stability through the use of the
same basic hull, much as the DD 963 hull
was used as the basis for the CG 47 class. If seen through to the
construction phase, this choice would support the shipyards that produce both
LCS and the projected frigate. The U.S. elements of the firms that produce the
LCS have a “monopsony
relationship”
with the U.S. government as described in the RAND report and have little
civilian business as compared with more traditional shipbuilders who also
construct warships. The maintenance of stability in construction might allow
these companies to avoid the layoffs that happen when the U.S. cannot make up
its mind about which design to accept. This is not “corporate welfare,” but a
vital issue in the maintenance of an effective industrial base to support the
Navy in both peace and war.
The
electronics revolution that has driven up the cost of U.S. warships over the
last half century bears a remarkable resemblance to that of the Industrial
Revolution, whose steam and steel products so substantially increased the cost
of British Navy units in the 19th and early 20th
centuries. The 2006 RAND study on warship costs suggested ways the U.S. might
slow that growth. LCS was one possible solution, but problems with early units,
and opposition from Cold War cultures of ship size, lifespan, manning, sustainability,
and intra-service parochial interests have combined to make LCS less of a
success. While visions of larger, very capable fleets for the future may dazzle
they eyes of some, the realities of rising fleet maintenance costs, the budget
deficit, and internecine political warfare on Capitol Hill effectively combine
to strangle such visions in their think tank cradles. The Navy will likely have
to make due with a smaller force for the time being, and effective strategy,
not massive firepower, could determine victory in the event of significant
naval conflict. Like the Royal Navy of the mid and late 19th
century, the U.S. must mitigate the accelerating costs of technological
revolution and develop cost effective, operational solutions in support of
defined Maritime strategy. Some of the concepts pioneered in the LCS program
can aid in that endeavor and should be given a chance to succeed. Given current
challenges, LCS and its frigate variant are likely to be the only small surface
combatants the U.S. Navy will receive for the foreseeable future.
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