Burn the Power Point Before Picking Up the Pen

Well this isn't very original... read all three of these.

U.S. Navy protecting our nation's interests every day by Rear Admiral Asbjornsen
Rear Admiral Asbjornsen is Deputy Commander, Navy Region Northwest.

Call them America’s ‘Away Team’ by Rear Admiral Pybus
Rear Admiral Pybus is Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command.

How the Navy protects America by Rear Admiral Klein
Rear Admiral Margaret DeLuca "Peg" Klein is Chief of Staff, U. S. Cyber Command.

I wonder if there is a "Rear Admiral's Memo" out there somewhere that instructs towards public engagement or if this is just a wild coincidence? Wait, no I don't, because we all know the answer...

These are not the same editorial, although you have to look very closely to realize that, and all three editorials clearly used the same set of talking points. A big part of me likes the active engagement by leadership aspect of these editorials, but another part of me wonders why everyone in the lower Flag ranks - who are otherwise interesting and intelligent - must resort to boiler plate templates to write about the US Navy.

I'm pretty sure the average member of Sailor Bob can execute 8 original paragraphs in support of the US Navy even if tasked after a 16 hour shift on the bridge wing during a hurricane, so why is it the average Flag Officer cannot manage 8 original paragraphs from their desk in an air conditioned office? I believe the reason is because one must practice to be good at anything, and these folks are out of practice. This isn't leadership, indeed these three articles collectively represent a good example of what not to do.

Rear Admiral Pybus comes from the SEAL community while both Rear Admiral Asbjornsen and Rear Admiral Klein are aviators. Rear Admiral Asbjornsen has a ton of experience in academics and education, and Rear Admiral Klein is Chief of Staff at US Cyber Command. These are otherwise remarkably interesting, well educated, smart Navy leaders - who are collectively - apparently - only capable of writing from the same set of talking points?

Strategic Communication by the Navy to domestic audiences can and must do much better than this, because the only reason I am even noting any of these articles is because they are all collectively the same boring article written in a different way... and I might be the only person who actually notes any of the three articles by the end of the week. This looks like assembly line communication - because it almost certainly is! Want to write Rear Admiral? Then tell your story, not only will the taxpayers appreciate that story 10x more, but those under your command will as well.

And now I will point out the obvious. Strategic Communications was absent in the NOC. It shows. I remember having a conversation with (then Captain now Rear Admiral) Mark Montgomery about STRATCOM being absent in the NOC after the NOC was released, and he acknowledged and very much regretted the absence of Strategic Communication in the NOC. He knew it was important, he fought for it, and he lost that internal fight. Sir, you were right, and even though you have moved on - your replacement now has very visible data points to make the argument for next time.

Templates are useful for newbies. 25+ years of Navy service combined with advanced education degrees should be enough to qualify every Rear Admiral to be original and unique when writing about the Navy they have given an entire career and life to. If for any reason that isn't enough of a qualification, then it should be stated outright those folks were not prepared during their career path to execute their role as a Flag officer in the modern US Navy, because Strategic Communications today is a critical, undeveloped and under appreciated aspect of leadership in the modern US Navy today - whether the audience is foreign or domestic.

Naval Diplomacy, Strategic Communication, and the NOC

Naval Operations Concept 2010 (NOC 10) describes when, where and how U.S. naval forces will contribute to enhancing security, preventing conflict and prevailing in war in order to guide Maritime Strategy implementation in a manner consistent with national strategy. NOC 10 describes the ways with which the sea services will achieve the ends articulated in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21).

Above is the stated purpose of the new Naval Operations Concept 2010.

I have a lot to say about the NOC, but instead of a broad look I have decided to discuss one small point at a time. Generally speaking, I beleive the NOC achieves its stated purpose with clarity. The NOC can be quoted easily but does not come off as Cliche - and that isn't easy to do. This represents the first in what will be several discussions inspired by the NOC.

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I'm a big Lindy Kyzer fan, because as communication specialists go in the armed services - she is one of the best. I'm a bigger LT Jennifer Cragg fan - but that's more of a Navy > Army thing. Lindy has a post up on the Official Army blog worth noting, because it discusses a topic I've been thinking about as I read through the NOC for the third time. It is very nice that the official Army blog is dynamic enough that one can find someone who isn't a flag officer giving a strong opinion. Perhaps if the official Navy blog was similar I'd think it was worth a link...

Lindy has a strong opinion on the term strategic communication, indeed on the larger concept related to the DoD.

The term strategic communication has been around for awhile, and gained traction around 2002. And it’s almost always been tied to the military and State Department in our roles of communicating issues related to national defense and public diplomacy. Then National Security Advisor Condelezza Rice even established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Commitee in 2002 (word is they’re still out there somewhere, debating the definition of the term strategic communication).

As a social media maven, I feel the pain of the strategic communication community. A well intentioned military community too easily latches on terms or initiatives as easy fixes for more complex problems. Both terms are means to an end, rather than the end themselves.

I think in the social media community, we definitely need to stop and take the time to learn from the past to set the stage for evolved, developed social media implementation and engagement. When the social media train first knocked us in the military and government community off of our feet several years ago, most folks were simply scrambling for a presence - everyone felt a burning need to be on Facebook, Twitter and You Tube - simply because everyone else was. Hopefully our social media efforts have evolved and we’re stepping back to really think through the value of all of our online engagements and interactions. And taking the time to see how social media can truly fit into our larger organizational goals (perhaps a meeting with our strategic communication team is in order).

This post fits nicely with a recent article in the March 2010 issue of Proceedings by Lieutenant Robert McFarlin, USN. The article is found in the Professional Notes section (members only) and has some observations regarding strategic communication he experienced while serving as operations officer on the USS Farragut (DDG-99) during a recent Partnership of the Americas (POA) deployment.

The term strategic communication designates much more than only press briefings and talking points. Its official DOD definition is "focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs and actions synchronized with other elements of national power." Note the word actions. Indeed, senior Defense Department officials have said that SC is "80 percent action and 20 percent words."

Admiral James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, characterizes it as providing audiences with "truthful and timely information that will influence them to support the objectives of the communicator." He identifies strategic and tactical SC levels. Planners operate at the former; at the tactical level the mission is accomplished. "Public affairs and all of the associated efforts are linked together and the execution . . . occurs."

The strategic level sets the course, but the tactical is most significant to ships on deployment because ultimately, SC is not about words or PR. It's about real people on real ships conducting real-world operations with our partner nations. Only through action can we foster and sustain relationships with our partners.

Both Lindy Kyzer and LT Robert McFarlin are discussing tactical viewpoints of strategic communication - Lindy from her perspective as the social media expert in the US Army and LT McFarlin as an officer aboard a US Navy ship making port in foreign countries. They both represent soldiers on the same information battlefield that competes to shape perceptions and influence.

Both observations are important to think about in the context of the NOC, because they highlight the absence of clarity and definition still present in the military services at the strategic intersection of organizational goals and the synchronization of activities. I think the combination of both opinions also suggest that at the tactical level - proficiency isn't the issue - suggesting the problems are top down, not bottom up.

The NOC discusses communications within the context of an information system, and does not discuss communications in the context of influence. The NOC never uses the phrase "strategic communications," for better or worse. Indeed, in the NOC, influence is only discussed in the context of a shaping operation or in the context of deterrence. The NOC spends a great deal of time and effort distinguishing the unique character of the 'Naval Service' as a maritime centric collection of services, and goes on to describe the unique nature of the maritime domain. Throughout the NOC I note a theme of distinction - or uniqueness - that is expressed to the reader as the document touts what can be described as an expected set of combat and non-combat capabilities provided by the Naval Service.

What is missing is perhaps what could make the NOC transformational, or at minimum relevant in the context of a Clausewitz view that suggests war is an extension of politics. The NOC does not integrate the Navy as part of a larger system of political influence, or the Navy as an influence enterprise. According to the NOC, the Navy is an instrument of political influence by shaping a permissive environment, or by acting as a deterrent with credible combat power. If the NOC is intended to guide the 'Naval Service' on how to implement Maritime Strategy, shouldn't there be even a nod in the direction of strategic communications?

The presence of a US Navy ship anywhere on the globe is a form of communication.

For example, we are currently conducting an ASW exercise with South Korea because of political objectives desired between Seoul and Washington, DC. It is one step in the escalation control taking place on the Korean peninsula - and that politically specific escalation control is leveraging the use of naval forces. The actions send clear signals to the DRPK; a communication element the US Navy can uniquely provide at this junction in the political posturing currently taking place. Yes, there are clearly unique and distinguishing aspects of the 'Naval Service' at work here, but more critically to the National Defense Strategy of the United States - the US Navy is an important piece of the whole of government approach that integrates unique options to an influence enterprise being directed towards North Korea - indeed the US Navy is an influence enterprise in and of itself.

The absence of describing the Navy as an influence enterprise in the NOC or even nodding in the direction of naval forces as an integrated part of influencing political objectives outside the context of permissive shaping operations or combat power deterrence bothers me, because the absence of Strategic Communications generally in the NOC highlights the absence of the entire concept of the Navy as an influence enterprise in CS-21.

Where is the chapter on Naval Diplomacy? Even though naval diplomacy is practiced ten thousand different ways by the US Navy every day, the broad range of capabilities it represents barely gets a nod in the NOC. Chapter 6 should have been titled Naval Diplomacy instead of HA/DR, because the story of Navy HA/DR in history suggests HA/DR is one of several categories of Naval Diplomacy.

And had the NOC also put Strategic Communications as one of the categories of Naval Diplomacy, the Navy might find a good starting place for discussing and integrating their influence enterprise.

The NOC is Out

The long awaited Naval Operations Concept 2010 was released today.

I've quickly read it through, and I have two immediate thoughts:

1. The NOC is--as it was intended to be--a document that lays out the "ways" the Naval Service will attain the "ends" laid out in CS21. To that end, I would say that it succeeds. It is a well-written companion volume to CS21--and it does an excellent job of answering many of the "how" questions that were asked in response to CS21's release. It is well-organized, and it succeeds in adding operational context to the strategic imperatives laid out in CS21. It defines its overarching concept as "The Sea as Maneuver Space", and it ably lays out this concept.

2. The document does not contain a recommended force structure to support CS21, though it does have a section devoted to the "Future Force Structure"--primarily a discussion of the mix of vessels the fleet will field. CS21 was planned from the beginning NOT to contain a force structure--the NOC (begun in early 2008) was generally thought to be planned to include one. Whether it was the desire not to be seen as "tying a new administration's hands", the looming threat of the QDR, both, or some other reason I haven't considered, momentum built over time to delay release of the NOC until today, and to do so with no force structure. At this point, an argument can indeed be made that the QDR has rendered its judgment on Naval force levels and so inclusion of such a force structure would be either redundant (if it parroted the QDR line) or disloyal (if it stated a requirement different than that cited elsewhere). I remain of the opinion that it would have been useful for the Navy to publicly define the CS21 requirement--even if it were unaffordable--in order that policy makers and those on the Hill would have an idea what it was they weren't buying with the resources provided.

That said--I wouldn't let the lack of a force structure be the takeaway from reading this document. One should judge it by the standard of whether or not it operationalizes its parent strategy--and I suggest it does that quiet well.

Bryan McGrath