Industry and Innovation in the QDR

2010 QDR, p.82:

Although some unique items are produced solely for the Department, these items themselves often rely on a complex and integrated supply chain of product providers that, if strained at the second, third, and even fourth tiers, would jeopardize the ability of even the seemingly pure military industrial providers to continue to support our forces.

Many of the defense industries' jobs that require the most irreplaceable skills reside within nonprime suppliers. Many of these small, highly specialized companies depend on the major suppliers and their unique requirements for their very survival. The cascading effects on them of decisions that the Department makes at the overall programmatic level must be better understood-to ensure that critical lower-tier providers have the capacity to respond to these decisions, to ensure the continued supply of critical subcomponents to our defense industrial base, to ensure that critical skills are not lost, and to protect our national security from the risk of
using compromised supply chains ….

Likewise, although innovations unique to national security often occur within the "pure-play" defense industrial base, the vast majority of innovative and revolutionary components, systems, and approaches that enable and sustain our technological advantage reside in the commercial marketplace, in small defense companies, or in America's universities.

I found this passage interesting, because it echos an argument that the Rumsfeld Pentagon made about the role of small business in defense procurement. Specifically, Rumsfeld argued that in an era of accelerating innovation, small companies that weren't traditionally part of the defense industry would play a larger role in developing new technologies and systems.

Rumsfeld also argued that small, innovative companies had trouble working with the Department of Defense. Eugene Gholz and Pete Dombrowski made this argument at greater length (and with a different focus) in Buying Military Transformation, which suggested that the familiarity of the major defense-industrial companies with DoD practice and personnel made it very difficult for alternative providers to break in to the market. Davida Isaacs and myself expanded on this by arguing that DoD interpretation of patent and trade secret law makes it very risky for small companies to engage in any kind of military-oriented innovation.

And so it's interesting that we still find an injunction to support the innovative practices of small companies in the 2010 QDR. The quoted statements, I think, would be right at home in Rumsfeld's DoD. The lack of explicit, concrete steps to support small, non-traditional defense providers, however, indicates to me that the rhetorical support may be lacking in any kind of policy force.

AFCEA/USNI West 2010

I will be at AFCEA/USNI West 2010 this week, so most of my posting will be over at the USNI Blog. I will likely be on Twitter quite a bit more than usual this week trying to capture the quotes from the various speakers. My Twitter feed is here.

If you are looking for photos, I'll be taking more than a few and posing them on my Facebook page, or the USNI Facebook page as applicable.

For those of you who are here, shoot me off an email and I'd love to meet you.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report Day

As the QDR report goes online sometime today on the DoD official QDR page, the first question worth pondering is whether the DoD webmaster will correct the spelling for Quadrennial on the pages title (for those who don't know, page titles translate to Google searches. See top line of your browser window for title). I will be out front in admitting I am the last person who should say something about spelling though, I can be horrible.

To be honest, I am much more interested in the FY2011 budget than the QDR report, because budgets matter and QDR reports do not, but if you are looking for a tip guide in reading the QDR report I thought I would offer a bit of assistance.

Legislation describes in detail 15 items that the QDR report to Congress must contain, including overall national defense strategy, national interests, threats, assumptions, and requirements:

"The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the national defense strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low-to-moderate level of risk."

"The assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that inform the national defense strategy defined in the review."

"The threats to the assumed or defined national security interests of the United States that were examined for the purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of those threats."

"The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to (A) the status of readiness of United States forces; (B) the cooperation of allies, mission sharing and additional benefits to and burdens on United States forces resulting from coalition operations; (C) warning times; (D) levels of engagement in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies and withdrawal from such operations and contingencies; and (E) the intensity, duration, and military and political end-states of conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies."

"The effect on the force structure and on readiness for high-intensity combat of preparations for and participation in operations other than war and smaller-scale contingencies."

"The manpower and sustainment policies required under the national defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting longer than 120 days."

"The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the national defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions."

"The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the tooth-to-tail ratio) under the national defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of headquarters units and Defense Agencies for that purpose."

"The strategic and tactical air-lift, sea-lift, and ground transportation capabilities required to support the national defense strategy."

"The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the national defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts."

"The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the national defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters."

"The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the national defense strategy."

"The effect on force structure of the use by the armed forces of technologies anticipated to be available for the ensuing 20 years."

"The national defense mission of the Coast Guard."

"Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate."

If you can find these topics covered sufficiently in the QDR report - then the report is good. If you cannot, the report is not good. That is basically the only benchmark that matters, because those quotes come from Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, §118 (d).

The QDR has no statutory authority, meaning it will be used when applicable to someones agenda and ignored when not applicable. That is the pattern of the past anyway.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report is intended to "delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most recent national security strategy." Recognizing that the most recently released National Defense Strategy (2008) and National Security Strategy (2006) were published by the Bush administration, we are once again doing things out of order if there is some forthcoming NSS or NDS.

'What is driving what' is a serious question, because one could conclude that the current Secretary of Defense is driving National Security Policy - not the other way around - if we are attributing the QDR to the Obama administration. Otherwise, the NDS and NSS would be available for release... one should presume.

I have seen a few people praise the QDR because it focuses on the war we are in. While I believe that is important, I think it is also important that people recognize the intent of the QDR, as Title 10 law makes clear, is to produce a report that looks out 20 years - not a report that looks at today. Being unable to look into the future has been the biggest problem troubling the DoD under Secretary Gates, and all anyone said in Congress in FY 2010 was that the QDR would answer those forward looking questions.

I guess not.

Am I the only one who looks at the QDR and is concerned how little the report looks ahead? While some initial reactions may be positive, I am unsure if that will last as the long term trend once budget season rolls around and everyone realizes how very little the QDR contributes to answering big lingering questions.

The QDR report does not answer questions. What the QDR report has done is shape which questions will be asked over the next year. The debate over the next 12 months will be interesting to watch, but it is unclear if yet another year of debate will actually produce meaningful results. The issue is this: there are about 9 COCOMs and Service Chiefs that will be retiring in mid 2011 - during the FY2012 budget battle. POM12 will be the last budget for a lot of leaders in the DoD, and if Secretary Gates is still around in mid to late 2011 he will decide who carries the QDR and POM12 agenda forward.

So the QDR just bought the DoD another year - until POM12. No answers, lots of questions, and the stars are in alignment to begin debate from a blank slate under very generic directions. It will be interesting if Congress is patient enough to give the DoD another year to make a tough decision. Do not be fooled by rhetoric, cutting defense programs has never been a tough decision; defining the future is what is tough. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report Day represents a starting point - the 1 year countdown to POM12. If Secretary Gates is successful, over the next 21 months he will execute a strategic vision that changes and molds the DoD into the 21st century force everyone has been hoping was coming. If he is unsuccessful, it will be because he was incapable of articulating and executing a strategic vision for the DoD that looks into the 21st century. The outcome is far from certain.

--

For more thoughts on the QDR Report, the FY2011 budget, and upcoming POM12 cycle check out Sunday nights Midrats. For those who prefer to download to iPhone or iPod from iTunes, click here. Topics included a heavy dose of AEGIS BMD, my thoughts on LPD-17 issues, and other random bits of knowledge that can come out when we have high powered guests like Mackenzie Eaglen - who was outstanding.

Force Structure in Order to Create Partnership

Now this is interesting (p.29):

The intention is for these units to steadily grow to the point at which their staffs can sustain specialized expertise in regions and countries of greatest importance and regularly detach experts to accompany units deploying to training missions abroad. In addition, the Air Force will field light mobility and light attack aircraft in general purpose force units in order to increase their ability to work effectively with a wider range of partner air forces.

And (p.30):

DoD will double its current capacity to provide [training for partner aviation forces]. This enhancement will include the purchase of light, fixed-wing aircraft to enable the Air Force's 6th Special Operations Squadron to engage partner nations for whose air forces such aircraft might be appropriate.

These are part of the QDR section titled Build the Security Capacity of Partner States. Now, unless I'm reading this wrong, the argument seems to be that the United States needs to purchase and operate COIN oriented aircraft in order to effectively train partner states to operate such aircraft, in both an organizational and technical sense. I find this of particular interest because I wrote my dissertation on the subject of how military organizations learn from one another; one focus was the need for transfer of tacit, practical knowledge in addition to explicit, written knowledge. This is to say that the best kind of learning is learning by doing, and learning by doing is only available from those who have already learned to do. The proposal here seems to be that the USAF ought to restructure its procurement and training (if only on a relatively small scale) in order to become a better "teaching" organization to its "learning" partners in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

My second thought is this: I have long wondered what the end state expectations are for the Iraqi Air Force. During its heyday, the Iraqi Air Force was a large, capable, technologically advanced force capable (theoretically, anyway) of long range strike against a variety of opponents. Given that the political situation in Iraq remains uncertain, it has never been clear to me that the US intended to rebuild this Iraqi Air Force; the threat is too great that advanced fighter aircraft sold to Iraq in two years might be used against the US (or Israel) in ten years. At the same time, whatever Iraqi Air Force is created needs the capacity to support Iraqi ground forces against both domestic opponents and foreign competitors such as Iran. I'm wondering whether the idea of re-orienting the USAF, even on a small scale, around operational training in COIN platforms indicates that US expectations of the Iraqi Air Force will be measured, modest, and defensive.

...to put this in a naval context, here's a somewhat similar passage (p.39):

U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies.

Note, though, that this doesn't seem to include the idea of operating particular platforms for the purpose of being able to instruct others in their use.

QDR Available

Andrew Exum has posted the 2010 QDR. I assume that everyone already knows this, and is too busy reading the document to post here.

In a related story, my daughter makes clear her position on the appropriate allocation of scarce defense resources:

By the Numbers

Not sure if you noticed, but the Small Wars Journal has a pre-decisional draft copy of the QDR up. I'm not going to analyze too deep, simply wait for the real thing next week. But...

Do the math. The QDR sizes the Navy fleet as follows.

10 - 11 aircraft carriers
84 - 90 large surface combatants, including 19 - 32 BMD-capable combatants
14 - 28 small surface combatants
29 - 33 amphibious warfare ships
51 - 55 attack submarines
4 guided missile submarines
3 maritime prepositioning squadrons
30 - 34 combat logistics force ships
17 - 24 command and support vessels (including JHSV)

If we assume 6 ships per MPS, and add the top number in each listing instead of the bottom number, the result is less than 300 ships. I highlight, but again, everything is unclear until Monday.

QDR and Budget Season Questions

With the FY2011 budget and QDR expected to be released next week, there is almost no point discussing the speculation beginning to pop up in draft versions the media has obtained. A good example is this Defense News article, which is certainly a topic worth diving into - if we weren't only a few days from seeing the real thing.

I am one of those who believes this QDR will end up prompting more questions than answers. Over the last several years, those in defense policy have continuously stressed the environment of uncertainty. It has left me with the impression the real uncertainty that exists is specific to the inability for anyone to articulate with any degree of credibility a matching of defense budget to global environment. I have serious doubts that the QDR will address this issue with enough credibility to steer budgets, once again leaving a disconnect between budget allocations and stated defense policy.

On Sunday, CDR Salamander, Eagle1, and I will be discussing the upcoming QDR release with Mackenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security at The Heritage Foundation on Midrats. Next week I'll be at AFCEA/USNI West in San Diego - which is also devoted to the QDR. With any luck, there will be some clarity in the QDR to guide debate... Luck is fleeting.

A few observations...

Aviation

It is absolutely clear the Joint Strike Fighter has lost popularity with Navy leadership over the last year. After reading the InsideDefense article from Tuesday titled CNO Downplays NAVAIR Ownership Costs Report where ADM Roughead responds to the NAVAIR JSF cost report conclusions that the F-35 costs will be 40% higher than F/A-18 fighters today with his "It will have no bearing on anything we're doing with our budget" comment; it is absolutely clear to me the F-35C will be kicked down the road a bit. When the CNO says a $100 billion cost increase of a program doesn't have any bearing on budget, something is up.

While kicking the F-35 has limited impact on the Navy at this time, it raises serious issues with the Air Force. The F-22 was basically dropped because the F-35 was going to come online sooner. Now the F-35 is having all kinds of problems that are leading to delays and higher costs. Do the math... Gates is going to end up not building F-22s in trade of not buying F-35s. For the wars, Gates has been a great source of leadership. When it comes to the long term direction of defense equipment budgeting for all of the services, I do not believe Gates will be remembered well.

The F-22 was canceled when production costs were stable for a program that is, by all definitions, a globally lobbied military-industrial complex on a scale beyond any program in history - ironically the same complex Gates pretended to stand up against with the F-22. The JSF program has become too big to fail, and the Air Force will very likely end up buying F-35s in a few years that cost as much as F-22s today.

It is unclear what his might mean for the Marines. The MV-22 makes a lot of sense when complimented with the F-35B, but without the F-35B the MV-22 is too expensive and beyond the needs of the Marine Corps. The F-35B is also a serious issue internationally, particularly to the British but one might imagine interest all over the world in the future. The stakes are high, but the cost continues to grow higher. While the F/A-18 represents a Plan B for the F-35C, there is no Plan B for the F-35B. This program needs good news, and none has come from the direction of Lockheed Martin in awhile.

Shipbuilding

Is there such a thing as a good investment in any ship built on the Gulf Coast right now? The LPD-17 problems are troubling. Everyone is to blame for the problems, and it is unclear where the solutions will come from. It is my impression that nothing short serious executive leadership will fix the shipbuilding problems of industry, and I have serious concerns if Ray Mabus is that executive. Congress does not inspire, the Navy does not inspire, and Northrop Grumman's reputation has been flushed in the shipbuilding toilet over the last decade.

It has been 2 years since the Navy had a shipbuilding plan, and every single "21st century" surface warship design has been a mess. DDG-1000, LPD-17, and two different Littoral Combat Ship designs have been less than inspiring, well over budget, or based on very questionable requirements. What will the Littoral Combat Ship do exactly? Which war is the DDG-1000 going to operate in the littorals during? Will the USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) be the first of her class to complete a full 6 month tour without requiring a few weeks in a Middle Eastern seaport for repairs?

Congress has made it law that new ships require Nuclear power. The Secretary of the Navy wants a Great Green Fleet. The President of the United States advocated nuclear energy in his first State of the Union Address. The Navy is the only government department to field nuclear energy in several decades, and has spent the last year discussing a reduction of the two types of naval vessels that use nuclear power: aircraft carriers and submarines.

China

We are in a defacto cyberwar with China today, and China is conducting cyber espionage on virtually every major US business every day. I look forward to seeing the QDR address this, or not.

Nobody wants to discuss it, because nobody in the open source really knows what is happening, but there is work at every major Chinese shipyard right now and it is not clear what most of those shipyards are building. We do know a few things. We know orders for commercial ships have not been there over the last 12 months, and the shipyards are building something. We know that just as the Chinese have big plans to build aircraft carriers, they have big plans to build all kinds of escorts. We know the 988 is soon to be deploying to the Gulf of Aden, the first expeditionary ship to undertake a long deployment from China.

We know China is building lots of submarines. We know the Maritime Strategy never mentioned China. Will the QDR? In what context? Should we be calculating our force structure based on what China is doing? If we do, what does that say about us?

At what point does the economic relationship between China and the US rise to a QDR level national security strategy concern?

Marine Corps

Building amphibious ships has become very expensive, and the quality of the product produced is in doubt. The EFV almost has all of its problems worked out, but the mission it was designed for may not be applicable in the future maritime environment. The logistics of the EFV is completely unreasonable when examined against its operational profile. The MV-22 requires long range escort beyond that of available helicopters, but the F-35B is in doubt. The UH-1Y and AH-1Z programs have been slow going and has taken on cost increases, but are beginning to show signs of very positive results. The Harriers are old. Sea Basing was nothing more than a concept in PPT, until Haiti became the textbook Sea Basing operation right from the PPT presentation. The Marines are expanding manpower but losing expeditionary platforms to move Marines forward, and at the same time the Navy is reducing manpower on ships even as the Navy takes on more manpower intensive operations during peacetime. How will the Marines use the MRAP after Afghanistan when it is clearly too heavy for the ARG? Will the next Marine Corps vehicle be tracked or wheeled? What will the next generation heavy lift aviation platform look like?

Am I honestly supposed to believe the QDR is going to address these questions, or will it simply add more questions to the ones already being discussed? I've aimed my expectations low, and am ready to be pleasantly surprised.

My QDR Questions

Below I've outlined what I think are the pressing issues I expect the QDR to address:

How does the QDR measure force size and force structure? Under what scenario is the US expected to operate that leads to these force size and force structure measurements?

Does the QDR account for the frequency of using military power appropriately? We are fighting 2 wars in Asia, balancing power in the Pacific, standing up AFRICOM, supporting ballistic missile defense in the Pacific, Middle East, and Europe, and with excess capacity - responding to one of the largest natural disasters in my lifetime in Haiti. Other than BMD, this short list of priorities doesn't address national security concerns that might include Yemen, Somalia, North Korea, Israel, or Iran.

How is the issue above addressed from a joint perspective? How is the issue above addressed from an international cooperation perspective?

How does the QDR address modernization towards the future? Will it recommend building legacy systems in quantity, shifting towards new systems in quantity, or take an quantity R&D approach to systems instructing short builds in various trials of quality?

What does the QDR add and subtract?

How does the QDR treat ballistic missile defense? Is it a strategic priority like nuclear deterrence?

How does the QDR address acquisition reform and deal with increased costs in both manpower and equipment?

How does the QDR line up with the QDDR?

QDR Talk

Bryan and I will be getting together here for some QDR discussions. If there is any interest, we can do an Information Dissemination beer night...

QDR Review Panel Coming Together

DoD Buzz is covering the news of the Quadrennial Defense Review Review Panel, noting several new appointments. For those who have not been following this, Congress included a law requiring an eight mem­ber independent panel to review the Quadrennial Defense Review findings. The panel will be picked by con­gres­sional defense com­mit­tee lead­ers and the Secretary of Defense. The panel appears to be coming together.

According to DoD Buzz, Defense Secretary Robert Gates will ask former Defense Secretary Bill Perry to be one cochairman of the oversight panel. DoD Buzz is reporting Perry would be the Democratic co-chair, leaving Gates still to find a GOP member. Today House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton also selected his panel members; retired general Robert Scales and former Air Force historian Richard Kohn. They will join the picks made by Rep. Buck McKeon last week; former Missouri Senator Jim Talent and Eric Edelman, former undersecretary of defense for policy during the Bush administration.

Senators Carl Levin and John McCain have not named their panel mem­bers yet, and according to DoD Buzz, both appear to be having trouble finding candidates without close ties to the defense industry.

In looking at the list so far, one might immediately note that the Navy and Marine Corps are not very well represented by this independent panel. When Senator Warner declined to represent the Republican co-chair position, the Navy lost a major potential voice on the panel. Hopefully Secretary Gates finds someone capable of filling that position with Navy ties (like this guy).

I do not really have a recommendation for Secretary Gates, primarily because I can't think of a Republican of the caliber of Senator Warner that could be named, but I do have a recommendation for one of the positions that might be named by both Senator McCain and Senator Levin.

For Senator McCain, he would be very smart to name Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation. For starters, she was who pushed the idea of an independent panel anyway, so clearly she is a source of ideas Congress trusts. Beyond that though, she is the most published conservative analyst on naval affairs, but her publications and analysis are not limited to only naval affairs. As an incredibly smart conservative defense analyst, there is no question she is one of the young superstars in the Republican Party. If the Republican Party is going to be represented by anyone under the age of 50, her name has to be top of the list.

For Senator Levin, he would be very smart to name Information Dissemination's own Dr. Robert Farley. Not only is Dr. Farley widely respected in the progressive community as one of the up and coming young superstars in progressive political circles regarding analysis of foreign policy and military strategy, but he is widely and regularly published for comment on naval affairs and foreign policy. While the Center for American Progress might be offended that you chose Dr. Farley over one of their young folks, the simple answer is the only analyst at CAP producing quality strategic defense analysis is Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, and he actually makes a lot of sense as Senator Levin's other pick. Bottom line, CAP doesn't have any young superstar strategists over there, they have a bunch of young regional experts. That great and all, but it doesn't help for a QDR.

FYI, most think tanks are non-partisan, so it is important to point out this is not easy when you add the political element.

Mackenzie Eaglen is wrong about the way the independent QDR panel should be formed by the way. She sold this idea on the merit that an independent panel loaded with elder political statesman in defense policy will well represent a credible review of the QDR. Mackenzie, love ya, but an optimal panel will be loaded with plenty of top notch veteran talent combined with younger talent. While it is tempting to load down the QDR panel with nothing but big names, the result will prevent new ideas, because I got news for you... old dogs not named Mike Mullen do not learn new tricks after the age of 50-60 - and Admiral Mullen was the exception, not the rule.

The independent review panel has a serious need for a small few of younger folks on both sides of politics who will almost certainly bring a unique perspective. I don't like the idea that we would put together a QDR review panel without developing the younger generation as part of the process, because unless you haven't noticed, Gates is faced with a problem finding a credible conservative to co-chair the panel. With the future military environment at sea projected to expand much faster than in other areas (with the exception of space and cyberspace), grab two young superstar analysts with obvious political associations who are the most published in maritime strategic affairs, who btw are named Mackenzie Eaglen and Dr. Robert Farley, and add them to the independent QDR panel.

Even though I know both Mackenzie Eaglen and Dr. Robert Farley, I didn't ask for their opinion nor seek their approval before writing this post. To do so on topics like this just isn't my style.

Dropping the Carrier Requirement to 10, 9, and Potentially 8

The big Navy news over the past week was the rumor, as reported by DoDBuzz, that the Navy is evaluating a further reduction of aircraft carriers to nine. This is how DoD Buzz reported the story.

File this one under QDR rumors, although senior OSD officials thought about cutting a carrier from the very beginning of the QDR. Now, sources tell us that OSD may actually chop an additional carrier from the Navy’s battle fleet, a move that would take the force down to nine carriers from the current total of 11.

The Navy plans to retire the CVN-65, the Enterprise, in 2012. The resulting 10 carrier force would be further reduced by one if DoD’s rumored reduction is enacted. Skipping a future carrier purchase doesn’t save money now. Cutting one flattop from the existing force would.

Some additional information in the story.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates endorsed the Navy’s plan to shift procurement of the new CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford class carriers from one every four-and-a-half years to one every five years. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost to build a Ford class carrier at $11.2 billion each; the Navy plans to buy 7 by 2038.

To be sure, there are plenty of obstacles to cutting a carrier from the fleet. For one, the Navy is required by law to maintain 11 carriers. The Navy has an outstanding request for a legislative waiver from Congress so it can retire the Enterprise, which would drop the carrier force to 10 for 33 months between the retirement and the scheduled entry of the first of the Ford class into service in 2015. Lawmakers have yet to act on the request.

There is some legislative activity to back up what is being discussed here. Section 1022 of the House Armed Services Committee Report (H.R. 2647) for FY 2010 would authorize a waiver to title 10 USC 5062(b) and allow the early retirement of USS Enterprise. This would give the Navy a temporary waiver to the requirement in section 5062(b) of title 10 to maintain 10 operational aircraft carriers instead of 11.

S. 1390 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee, is a bit more specific and states:

Notwithstanding section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, during the period beginning on the date of the decommissioning of the U.S.S. Enterprise (CVN 65) and ending on the date of the commissioning into active service of the U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the number of operational aircraft carriers in the naval combat forces of the Navy may be 10.

The Senate language makes more sense, because it allows for problems with technologies like EMALS that may delay the USS Ford (CVN 78) without new legislation. Unfortunately, delays because of new technologies may occur with the USS Ford (CVN 78).

The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) was procured in FY2008 and is scheduled to enter service in 2015. As part of Secretary Gates announcement, CVN 79 would be procured in FY2013 (5 years later) and would presumably enter service in 2020 or 2021. CVN 80 would then be procured in FY2018 and would presumably enter service in 2025 or 2026.

The FY 2007 defense authorization act established a procurement cost cap for USS Ford (CVN 78) of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. It also established a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford class carriers of $8.1 billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. It is unclear what the cost impact of shifting the CVN 79 procurement date one year to FY 2013 (instead of FY 2012) and the CVN 80 procurement date by two years to FY 2018 (instead of FY2016) will be, but odds are very good this will increase, not decrease, the cost of building Ford class nuclear aircraft carriers. The Ford class is already suffering cost growth, and the full extent of what the total cost growth might be with many outstanding questions is still unknown. There does not appear to be many cost saving options available due to the US economic situation. With the Nimitz class, the Lincoln and Washington were ordered together and the Stennis and Truman were ordered together, and there were cost savings in ordering the carriers in pairs.

The inflation to shipbuilding combined with tough economic times appears to make this option unavailable to either Congress or the Navy, even though the savings would be in the billions of dollars.

One thing is absolutely clear though; any reduction in aircraft carriers below current planned levels does not appear to effect new construction of the first three Ford class. As the DoDBuzz report indicates, the Navy is evaluating other ways should a decision to reduce the aircraft carrier force to 10, or 9, be made. There is a dirty little secret though, the operational aircraft carrier number will already drop to 9, not 10, long before the Ford enters service.

With an understanding the USS Enterprise will be retire in 2012 at a healthy age of 52 years old, lets look at the 10 Nimitz class aircraft carriers.

• USS Nimitz (CVN 68) was commissioned May 3, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2025.
• USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) was commissioned October 18, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2027.
• USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) was commissioned March 13, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2032.
• USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 70) was commissioned March October 25, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2036.
• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) was commissioned November 11, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2039.
• USS George Washington (CVN 73) was commissioned July 4, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2042.
• USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) was commissioned December 9, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2045.
• USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) was commissioned July 25, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2048.
• USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) was commissioned July 12, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2052.
• USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) was commissioned January 10, 2024 and is scheduled to retire in 2058.

Each Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier requires what is known as a refueling and complex overhaul (RCOH) after ~23 years of service. RCOH is a complex and expensive 3 year maintenance that costs almost $3 billion (see interesting analysis by Tim Colton) and is mandatory for Nimitz class aircraft carriers, as the nuclear fuel requires refueling. As of last week, the Navy paid a huge chunk of the RCOH cost for the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 70). The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) would begin her RCOH in 2012 and be unavailable until 2015, the same period the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) will be retired. This is why there will actually be only 9 operational carriers.

It is important to note that with the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) unavailable from 2012-2015, the Navy will actually be down to 9 carriers already with the retirement of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). I have not seen any detailed public discussion of this operational loss of aircraft carrier availability to 9, even public discussion in Congress was fairly weak when the questions about Enterprise were asked this year. The Navy has suggested that adjustments have been made to account for the loss of the Enterprise, but it is unclear what that means for the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). After the Lincoln emerges from RCOH in 2015, USS George Washington (CVN 73), commissioned in 1992, would then begin RCOH in 2015, roughly ~23 years after commissioning per schedule and be unavailable under current plan until 2018. Presumably after that, USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) would begin RCOH in 2018, ~23 years after commissioning, and emerge back into service in 2021. With CVN 79 expected to enter service in 2020, under current plans the Navy would then have 12 aircraft carriers by ~2020 (2 Ford class and 10 Nimitz class), with the Stennis in RHOC thus unavailable, but the Navy would still be back to the current legally mandated 11 operational aircraft carrier requirement.

One of the ideas I have heard floating around is to retire the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) early instead of undertaking a RCOH, which wouldn't influence current short term plans since USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) is expected to be unavailable from 2012-2015 anyway. When the USS Ford (CVN 78) enters service in 2015, the Navy would then perform a RCOH on USS George Washington (CVN 73) from 2015-2018 and perform the planned USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) RCOH from 2018-2021. From the period when CVN 78 enters service until CVN 79 enters service, the Navy would maintain 10 aircraft carriers, but 9 would be operational available while 1 was continuously undergoing a RCOH.

In 2021, as CVN 79 enters service, the Navy would then conduct the RCOH for the USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) from 2021-2024. Upon emergence from RCOH, the USS Nimitz could be retired and the Navy would stay at 10 operational carriers. In 2025, CVN 80 will come online bringing the total to 11, but the Reagan will be due for her RCOH and be unavailable from 2026-2029, and the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) is expected to retire in 2027, so the true operational carrier number would again drop to 9 until 2030, when the number will return to 11 with the return of Reagan and CVN 81 entering service.

The USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) will get her RCOH from 2032-2035 and the retirement of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is scheduled for 2032, so that will drop the Navy back down to 9 operational carriers from 2032-2035 if a Nimitz class was retired early, but with the return of Bush and the CVN 82 entering service, the Navy would be back to 11 by 2035. In 2036, the Navy will retire Roosevelt but CVN 83 will be in service by 2040. Washington retires in 2042 and Stennis in 2045, but CVN 84 would come into service by 2045, so with the retirement of Stennis the operational number of carriers would level at 10, dropping periodically to 9 with the retirements of Truman (2048), Reagan (2052), and Bush (2058) but presumably bouncing back to 10 with CVN 84 (2050), CVN 85 (2055) and CVN 86 (2060).

I've even heard the number 8 operational carriers bounced around, under a more aggressive retirement plan (but the plan would sell it as 9 operational carriers, by always counting carriers in RCOH as operational). In addition to the early retirement of Lincoln in 2012, the Navy would retire the Truman early in 2021 when CVN 79 enters service. This would allow cost savings in the early 2020s when the Navy must build SSBN replacements at the same time they attempt to replace the cruiser force.

The dirty little secret though is that with the retirement of USS Enterprise (CVN 65) in 2012, the number of operational aircraft carriers will actually only be 9, because Lincoln is scheduled to refuel from 2012-2015, the same years Congress is making the exception for the Enterprise. Given that 9 is acceptable just 3 years from today, and will remain 9 from 2012 until CVN 79 enters service around 2020, it is not unreasonable that the QDR could make 9 the new number long term. The Navy already intends to use fuzzy math and count Lincoln as operational while in RCOH, suggesting they are meeting the legal requirement of 10, so realistically the Navy could retire both Lincoln and Truman by 2025 and still maintain a quasi legal number of 9 as DoD Buzz is reporting.

Personally, I think the whole idea of retiring aircraft carriers early is a terrible waste of resources. Beforef retiring nuclear aircraft carriers, perhaps the most flexible warship in the world, I'd like to see the Navy use the RCOH of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) and USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and turn them both into massive mobile Sea Bases, one for each coast, and replace everything from the proposed sea base aviation ships to the hospital ships in the current plans. The nuclear aircraft carrier is the most flexible warship in the world, I'd encourage Congress to capitalize on their flexibility before allowing them to be retired early. Simply using them for something other than supporting the carrier airwing will immediately save costs, and refitting them while removing fixed wing carrier aviation support will allow a lot of other crew savings. I don't know how many helicopters the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne division can put on 2 aircraft carriers, but I think it would be a useful exercise to find out.

I find it hard to believe any platform in the world could be a better Joint Sea Base enabler than a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. Instead of giving up such useful platforms, I'd like to see them used for something else before retired outright. It would be a tragedy of Congressional imagination to simply give up such useful platforms, indeed, it took Congressional action to insure the Navy used the retiring SSBNs in alternative ways in the 1990s - and I'd say that encouragement has paid off very well in the form of the SSGN. Hopefully, should budget require adjustment to the CVN force, Congress takes the same approach with any Nimitz class aircraft carriers suggested to be retired by this administration, and turns them into something imaginative and useful at a reduced cost instead of simply retiring them from service.

Demand More From the Lesser Contributors

An article by Christopher J. Castelli in Inside the Navy (subscription) from August 13th titled Pentagon's QDR Red Team Nears Final Recommendation For Gates has been on my mind over the last few weeks, but it has taken me a bit of time to realize why it has been bothering me.

Christorpher Castelli's article is outstanding, and sums up in great detail the work of the QDR Red Team led by General Mattis and Andrew Marshall, two brilliant Americans IMO. In the article, it discusses some comments shared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development David Ochmanek, and also discusses some comments by Andrew Krepinevich of CSBA, whose book 7 Deadly Scenario's has influenced Red Team to some degree.

These are the details in the article that have had me mulling thoughts in my mind the last few weeks.

At the breakfast with reporters, Ochmanek shared an anecdote from the meeting that could foreshadow the kinds of concerns in the Red Team’s final report. Describing the panel as “wise,” he recalled being pressed by the Red Team to identify new concepts for operating against high-end, anti-access adversaries eyed in the QDR. “I had to plead guilty that those concepts are as yet a work in progress,” Ochmanek told reporters.

“The QDR isn’t going to develop a brand new set of concepts for power projection in the six months it has to run, so our challenge is to identify some vectors that we want to move along for modernizing and enhancing capabilities that we’re confident are going to play important roles in that new concept as it emerges over the next few years,” he added. “That would be the way I’d characterize a lot of our thinking and analysis with regard to high-end challenges.”

But in a July 7 speech related to his book, Krepinevich noted he is on the Red Team and underscored the need to develop novel, detailed concepts of operations to address disruptive challenges, stressing revisions to Cold War approaches will not suffice. U.S. officials must focus on how to counter China’s anti-access capabilities; how to counter guided rockets, artillery and missiles when forces such as Hezbollah obtain such weapons; how to respond when developing countries get access to nuclear weapons, how to operate the day after a nuclear explosion and how to handle the threat of loose nuclear weapons, he said. Krepinevich did not propose an alternative force-sizing metric, but cautioned in some cases the steady state posture may be more demanding than the surge posture. He also cited Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey’s critique of the two-war metric earlier this year at the Center for International and Strategic Studies. Further, he noted each armed service has a different idea of what the most demanding contingencies are.

“The Air Force and Navy might well say it’s China and defending the global commons,” he said. “The Army might say it’s the wars we’re engaged in and it’s keeping a lid on everything else and it’s hedging against a conventional attack, points unknown.” Those are two very different problem sets, he said.

I think Andrew Krepinevich is a brilliant strategist and entrepreneur, but I think he has this backwards. The "China" scenario, as well as the "defending global commons" scenario isn't the most demanding contingency for the Air Force and Navy, it is the most demanding contingency for the Army. I also believe "the wars we're engaged in" is the most demanding contingency for the Navy and Air Force, and I think the data proves it. I believe Dr. Krepinevich and I suggesting the same thing, but I think it is important to say it correctly in order to insure the point is delivered accurately.

By subscribing to the way Dr. Krepinevich is outlining what is important to the services, what is missed is how this effects the services and the gaps exposed. It is natural for the US Navy and US Air Force point to the scenarios where their assets will be in highest demand and claim these are the most demanding scenarios they face, but is that actually true? The China scenario may demand more US Navy and US Air Force assets, but the challenge of the China scenario is highest on the Army, for the purposes of being relevant. Think about it, if the US Army isn't relevant in the China scenario, then the question can be asked regarding the necessity for investment for a larger Army. If a military service is unable to justify reasoned arguments for resources for a major military scenario facing the nation, isn't that the most demanding contingency facing that military service?

I think it should be, because I look at Afghanistan and ask myself, is the US Navy and the US Air Force able to justify itself fighting in "the wars we're engaged in?" When one looks at the shortage of Army helicopters, or the inability of the US Navy to conduct major effective interdiction operations against the drug trade from Afghanistan, I think legitimate questions should be asked. The inability of naval forces, with the exception of aircraft carriers and sealift to be relevant in the war in Afghanistan is, in my opinion, the most demanding contingency facing the US Navy today because it goes to the heart of relevance.

I believe the biggest challenge facing the individual military services isn't where they are needed most, rather where they provide the least traditional contribution to the contingency the DoD is facing. In other words, I believe (and hope) a Red Cell for the QDR should be focused on how the US Army can contribute to the China scenario, and where the US Navy and US Air Force can increase their contribution to the "the wars we're engaged in." Without that, there is no such thing as what Gate's calls balance.

QDR Gossip and Guesswork, or a Foregone Conclusion

Colin Clark recently discussed the QDR with some unnamed source who stated the QDR major decision process is already over, that the decisions made on April 6th ends up accounting for all the major changes. That is not exactly true.

The major attention of the media regarding the QDR is procurement, so the program aspect of the QDR is getting virtually all the attention. If there are no major program shifts, changes, cancellations, or beginnings the attention span of the average American gets lost quickly. Too many people have come to believe that technology is the primary factor in defense, and the DoD revolves around money primarily due to technology. These are urban myths.

A few things here. First, the reason the DoD budget is so high and not likely to go down over the Obama administration is because the administration would be hard pressed to cancel enough programs to make a significant dent in the DoD budget. This was one of the April 6th decisions, specifically to continue increasing the size of the Army and Marines, and to stop the decline in personnel of the Navy and Air Force. People, not stuff, is by far and away the largest expense of the DoD budget and the Obama administration is promising more benefits for the people, thus increasing the cost of the largest cost factor of the DoD budget.

When someone complains about the DoD budget being too big, if they are complaining about equipment, they are an ignorant fool. The equipment problem is different, the real challenge facing the DoD is how to responsibly spend the money allocated for technology to produce enough equipment for a balanced force. In the end, with the size of the force increasing, the procurement decisions and arguments are about insuring the money is spent to meet the demand for quantity, instead of the procurement trend that has focused on quality. The costs are essentially the same, which is why watching people celebrate cancellation of a defense program as a cost savings move is laugh worthy.

Another thing, and this is key for naval discussions. Since April 6th, if not long before, my take on the Navy QDR study is that the Navy will find a way to validate exactly what they are already doing with procurement, but will then attempt to make the argument that they can take what they have and use the equipment differently. This is where the QDR comes in, the QDR is going to discuss how more than with what, and that can end up being much more important in shaping the future force (and can also end up being irrelevant).

I also believe we will see a major battle develop between the "<> 300 ship" crowd. It will be easy to tell who is part of what crowd. Anyone who advocates for 55 LCS as a starting position and more than 2-3 total new destroyers after FY11 is in the less than 300 ship crowd, and anyone who advocates for a major change to surface combatant procurement specifically for smaller warships is in the greater than 300 ship crowd.

It is hardly surprising, as Colin Clark also reports, that the amphibious study is going nowhere. If the Navy attempts to disrupt the Marine Corps amphibious force, the Marines will come right back and disrupt the Navy surface combatant force. What has likely surfaced in QDR study is that the two forces - the surface navy and the amphibious force - are linked, because the surface combatant force must provide access to the requirement for amphibious capability.

If the Navy changes the amphibious force, the surface force must also make significant changes in order to meet the requirements of the adjusted amphibious force (greater demand on the surface fleet for assured access to green water). I would guess that the Marines finally realized that the Navy refuses to change the way they buy surface forces, so changes to amphibious forces were never going to happen as long as the link between surface forces and amphibious forces was locked into the discussion. The Navy was never going to give up a precious handful of destroyers to support assured access requirements for a less protected amphibious force that must tractor from greater distances of sea in anything short of assured access environments. Come on.. the amphibious study was dead on arrival primarily because the surface fleet force structure was already decided before the QDR study even began.

In the end, the QDR programmatic result for the Navy and Marines was largely decided long before the QDR process began. The Navy will validate what they are already doing, and attempt to explain how they will use the platforms produced from existing force plans in new and dynamic ways to meet 21st century challenges. What amazes me is that so many very smart people thought the QDR process was something different this time.

Well That IS Interesting...

Did you check out the line up in July Proceedings yet? Did you read the article published by Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley yet?

Is Tom Ricks right or wrong with this comment?

Pretty near the top they quote Alfred T. Mahan, which seasoned Pentagoners know is a sign that the Navy is getting teed up to get hit long. (This is like when Gorby would quote Lenin, or Marc Antony would praise Julius Caesar.)

Tom Ricks is a CNAS fellow, and those CNAS folks seem to be popping up everywhere these days. For example:

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates today announced the following new members to the Defense Policy Board: Gen. (Ret) Larry Welch, former Air Force chief of staff ; Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Danzig, former secretary of the Navy; Robert Gallucci, former assistant secretary of state; Chuck Hagel, former senator from Nebraska; Robert D. Kaplan, Center for a New American Security; Andrew Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Rudy deLeon, former deputy secretary of defense; John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Sarah Sewall, Harvard University; Wendy Sherman, former special advisor to the President.

These members join the following returning members: John Hamre, chairman; Harold Brown; Adm. (Ret) Vern Clark; J.D. Crouch; Fred Ikle; Gen. (Ret) Jack Keane; Henry Kissinger; Dave McCurdy; Frank Miller; William Perry; James Schlesinger; Marin Strmecki; Vin Weber; Gen. (Ret) Pete Pace.

The Defense Policy Board provides the secretary, deputy secretary and under secretary for policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning matters of defense policy.

That quote about who gets the last laugh applies to Nagl. It also applies to Gates though, and I really appreciate what he is trying to do. A lot of folks believe Gates is trying to fundamentally change the Pentagon to fit a specific mold. That would not be correct, Gates has proven time and time again he is smarter than that, and it would be accurate to say that is exactly what Rumsfeld was trying to do, and couldn't.

Gates is simply trying to break the mold, because he knows once he gets people off the old road and on to the road, then the thinking will start and good things will happen. Once people realize that resisting change is counter productive, they stop fighting change and begin working within the new framework. In big organizations, particularly government, that process forces some of the most experienced and intelligent folks, who had been conformed to yes men, to now become idea men that the organization capitalizes on due primarily to their experience that has largely been suppressed in the ideas shaping the organization up until that point.

It is the Aristotle approach... If you want happiness, go for virtue. If you want change in the DoD, go for shift in direction, any direction will work as a starting point.

Gate's 10% Naval Force For Mullen's 1000 Ship Navy

On June 10th, I wrote a post called Theories and Considerations that I will be referring back to on occasion. The post was a generic outline for what I call the Go Big, Go Small Strategy as the Navy looks at the QDR. While I will not presume this is the right strategy for the Navy, it is an outline that fits a model for a number of strategic concepts that I have been developing as part of the collaboration effort this blog represents for the emerging strategic naval ideas of our time. I will not take credit for the ideas, as many are produced by the great strategic minds in the Navy discussion today, and I'm simply accumulating them and organizing them into one potential vision of their manifestation.

On the United States Naval Institute Blog yesterday, I wrote an article outlining the challenge the Navy faces over the next decade in regards to force constitution. The intent of that article was to highlight how the Navy really has very few options unless a shift in thinking is made, a shift that no one inside the Navy is talking about publicly. That shift in thinking is specific to surface warfare. I'd like to offer some ideas to the debate recently called for by the CNO in regards to what a 21st century evolution in surface warfare might look like. I base these ideas on the following assumptions.

• The US Navy will remain the dominate maritime power until at least 2025.
• The US Navy will remain the only maritime power globally postured and capable of global action until at least 2025.
• The United States will maintain sufficient capabilities and capacity to compete against any belligerent power until at least 2025.

The year 2025 is a specific target, as that is the year the current cruiser force begins retirement.

The strategy proposed is called Go Big, Go Small because I believe the Navy must do both over the next decade. I believe that going big and going small must be well defined; articulated in a way that the American people can easily understand the vision, understand how it aligns to maritime strategy, and understand how it aligns to national policy.

On going big, as outlined in Theories and Considerations post, I believe the Navy should build 20 nuclear submarines and 30 major surface vessels as part of the go big strategy over the next decade. Those 30 vessels are 2 DDG-51s, 1 DDG-1000, 2 CGN(X), 1 LHA(R), 2 LH(X), 1 LPD-17, 5 LSD(X), 6 T-AKE, 4 LCS Tenders, 4 MLP, and 2 JCC(X). 19 of the nuclear submarines are Virginia class, while 1 of the nuclear submarines would be a SSBN(X) purchased in FY 2020. I will go into detail on the Go Big portion of the strategy in another post, primarily because I want to see if a ballistic missile defense debate actually takes place as events unfold over the next few weeks, but I will note the three critical aspects of the Go Big portion of the approach is ballistic missile defense, moving up the LSD replacement, and building significantly more logistical capability with 6 T-AKEs and 4 Littoral tenders. As a rule, I believe 21st century fleet structure will include larger ships with smaller crews, and smaller ships with larger crews. The optimization of manpower requirements on ships can never be understated as an operational consideration, but it must also factor costs if the Navy is to develop a larger fleet.

Go Small

I believe the US Navy needs 100 littoral capable combat vessels. I look at the 100 littoral capable combat vessel force as Gate's 10% force of Mullen's 1000 Ship Navy. This force is an enabling capability for meeting operational requirements when facing low intensity, high intensity, and hybrid warfare challenges that naval forces will face in the 21st century. When taking the strategic view of the maritime domain in the 21st century, there are several challenges that must be addressed when applying the Navy's own maritime strategy.

When I talk about 100 littoral capable combat vessels, I am specifically talking about 32 Littoral Combat Ships and 64 PC/Corvettes. I don't have a specific design in mind when discussing the PC/Corvettes, rather a set of requirements.

• 1 57mm
• 1 RAM
• 23 man payload (20 + 3 officers)
  
• 2 module stations for supporting 2 offboard systems up to 12 meters
  
• 1 ScanEagle Launcher w/ 2 ScanEagles
• $100 million cost cap
  

The concept would be to match 1 LCS and 4 PC/Corvettes into a squadron, and build 16 Squadrons. 4 PC/Corvettes produces a capability that can carry up to 60 people supported by the LCS as a C2 node for the squadron. 4 squadrons would then be organized into a Littoral Strike Group. The Navy would operate and deploy 4 total Littoral Strike Groups, with all of the squadrons based forward and all of the larger ships based in the continental US. Conceptually a Littoral Strike Group would be made up of the following ships:

1 DDG-1000 (2 MH-60R/UAVs)
1 DDG-51 (2 MH-60R)
1 LPD-17 (ACE Det)
1 T-AKE (2 MH-60S)
1 Littoral Tender (2 MH-60S)
4 Littoral Combat Ships (Helicopter module, FireScout module)
16 PC/Corvettes (16 ScanEagles)
4 JHSVs (8 MH-60S)
1-2 Rifle Company Marines w/ Equipment

The Littoral Strike Group is a tailored, modular force that can perform across the hybrid spectrum intended to enable maritime awareness, dominance, influence, and engagement as called upon by the Combatant Commander.

The DDG-1000 is likely the platform people will have the biggest problem with in this model, but I do believe the Navy will have to build a 4th DDG-1000 at Bath to sustain that shipyard until the CG(X) design is ready. Well, 4 DDG-1000s fits right into the rest of the force structure I describe here. The DDG-1000 is built for the littorals, and just fits into an operational construct of several smaller, but not missile armed surface platforms. I don't know if the Navy is ever going to get that gun to work as promoted, but I will say this... If that gun can support fires at 400nms as some PPT advertisements suggest, that offensive capability can provide serious fire support to small vessels operating distributed over a broad area. The DDG-1000 is very well designed to act as a command node for a distributed naval network, particularly in the littorals and specifically when the long arm of violence towards land is required.

The DDG-51 for additional firepower and AAW capabilities.

The LPD-17 would act as the mothership for regional engagement and supports the staff of the Marine Corps or Coast Guard attachment elements. The ship doesn't have to be only for that role though, because LPD-17 has enormous space and flexibility that can be loaded up with any number of NECC capabilities, and can support a variety of aircraft including the CV-22/MV-22 for special operations. A Littoral Strike Group should always include at least 1 Rifle Company of Marines, but preferably 2 Marine Rifle Companies at a time, and the LPD-17 would act in the C2 role for those Marine units.

When operating up to 30 ships in one group, which is what is being suggested as possible here, the necessity to maintain logistics at sea is critical. The T-AKE and Littoral Tender would fill the on station supply and support roles, and would themselves be supplied via delivery from other ships in the MSC. These ships would be specifically for maintaining logistics and support for the 4 Littoral Combat Ships and 16 PC/Corvettes, although capable of supporting the other major vessels in the force. Small ships do not have legs, so logistics will have to be built in.

This is why I also include 4 JHSVs in this type of force. 2 of the JHSVs would act as shuttles for supply and support to the squadrons when they are distributed at distance from the logistics force. A JHSV is a unique capability that can quickly deliver supply, support, and fuel as a payload to a squadron hundreds of miles away. The JHSV as a logistics shuttle enables persistent, distributed presence.

Squadrons

What can a single squadron with 1 LCS and 4 PC/Corvettes do? Well, alot. I am holding onto a post that expand a concept in detail, but let me briefly discuss an idea that really needs some attention. The Navy needs to seriously think about RHIB operations, and do so while looking at Riverine operations. The small unit riverine craft (SURC) and the RHIB used by surface combatants needs to become the same platform. The technology exists to make this happen, and by doing so Riverine becomes a potential capability organic on major surface combatants.

The PC/Corvette has a payload of up to 23 people, and that would assume 3 are officers and 2 are medical. Options would include support for up to 2 SEAL Platoons, a squad of Marines, a Riverine Boat Team, or a detachment of operators for other modular technologies, including EOD. 4 PC/Corvettes with an LCS could then support an entire SEAL Team, a full platoon of Marines, or a Riverine Boat Division.

The payload is intentionally human, modular, and it scales to the skill sets of the maritime services while allowing for unit integrity to be retained. Equipment and detachment support can be provided from either the LCS, a JHSV, or the LPD-17. The LPD-17 matched with PC/Corvette squadrons could potentially field CB-90s to support a Riverine squadron that can land a company of Marines several miles up a river completely saturated with unmanned ISR and supported by multiple MH-60Rs as fire support. If one Company of Marines was operating on 4 PC/Corvettes squadrons, with another Company of Marines on the LPD-17, a LHA(R) could be added to the mix supported by a JHSV to deliver a MAGTF SC or a reinforcing MEU to an engagement, and could even conduct a battalion sized light infantry strike against a specific targets in the maritime places.

Littoral capable small vessels become the capability of delivering manpower to the point of engagement in a hybrid threat environment. Forces can be tailored to meet requirements, and with JHSVs the human payloads can become interchangeable. In theory, the Littoral Strike Group could deploy with 1 Company of Marines and 1 Riverine Squadron, while one of the JHSVs carries equipment for Sea Bee, engineering support, and equipment for a 3rd expected engagement. As a command node, the LCS would act as a C4ISR platform coordinating PC/Corvette squadron operations, and act as the local air support capability with the MH-60R or FireScouts. In a MIW operation, the LCS would act as a command node for mine clearance operations, while both the LCS and PCs field necessary equipment and EOD to remove the minefield. In an amphibious assault, PCs could field USVs and support escort operations through the 25nm zone for amphibious landings, keeping those lanes clear of the local population which could present a threat.

Most 21st century operations in active hybrid threat environments to date have proven to be manpower intensive supported by unmanned systems. The Navy will face similar conditions in the 21st century maritime domain as the population at sea continues to grow. Small capabile littoral ships expand the Navy's capacity to meet with this emerging challenge.

Population of the Sea

If General McCrystal is trying to tell the American people one thing right now in regards to Afghanistan, it would be the simple phrase "Its the population stupid." The reason this is his primary talking point is because US strategy in Afghanistan consists primarily of developing partnerships with with the people who are present in the terrain that is also his battlefield. General McCrystal knows that not everyone who populates that terrain is a partner, or even a potential partner. The challenge is to make sure that those who are partners, or who represent potential partners, remain partners even as he either kills, or prevents action from those who are the enemy.

This human terrain and the challenges of the population can be directly applied to the South China Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Caribbean Sea, and every Bay, Channel, Isthmus, River, Gulf, or body of water not specifically named. Lets use the South China Sea and potential conflict with China as an example.

Every day in the South China Sea there are over 200,000 private and commercial vessels at sea. The majority of these vessels are within 50nms of land, which means almost nothing considering there are over 250 ~1-km² islands, atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars in the South China Sea, most of which have no indigenous people, many of which are naturally under water at high tide, and some of which are permanently submerged. The population of just the people on a boat in the South China Sea is estimated over 1,00,000 daily.

In a world of hybrid warfare, how will naval forces identify friend and foe in the populated seas? If the intent is to build partnerships, preferably by avoiding the destruction of the folks we are not fighting, how will the helicopter or UAV know which fishing boat to sink and which fishing boat not to sink? Ultimately operations will require manpower at the point of engagement to identify friend and foe if partnership, and not killing our allies, is a core strategic operational objective (which it is).

I envision the squadron components of the Littoral Strike Groups being forward deployed in specific places. Off the top of my head I would suggest 8 squadrons at Guantanamo Bay, 4 squadrons at Djibouti, and 4 squadrons at Bahrain. For the record I would put the other 16 Littoral Combat Ships at Guam (4) and San Diego (12). All of the larger vessels and the JHSVs that support the Littoral Strike Group would port in either Mayport or San Diego.

In the South China Sea scenario, the Littoral Combat Ships in the Pacific would move quickly to support ISR for any naval assets in the South Pacific. The Navy could also quickly move several of the Middle Eastern squadrons, supported by major naval assets in the Middle East until the rest of the Littoral Strike Group arrives, to the Straits of Malacca for sea denial operations. When one thinks about controlling major sea lanes during wartime, particularly crowded sea lanes like the Strait of Malacca and denying communications at sea to the enemy... small ships are ideal for that role. 16 PC/Corvettes with 2 RHIBs each supported by 4 Littoral Combat Ships conducting ASW can establish a pretty damn good blockade, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where Littoral Combat Ships could fill both the VBSS and ASW roles without those smaller PC/Corvettes.

Small ships are not matching capabilities, because no Navy on the planet can match the capabilities and skill sets of US Navy sailors. Small ships are enablers for that manpower to engage at the point of contact with friends and foes during both war and peace, and as our manpower is paired and enabled by emerging unmanned capabilities the US Navy can do things in large areas of ocean that right now present enormous challenges for the top heavy, shrinking fleet.

One more thing. I don't know if a PC/Corvette can be produced for $100 million and be a stealth platform. I would hope so, because if it can be truly stealthy the Navy would for the first time have a surface warfare capability for that no-go 25nm contested zone that the US Navy must be capable of taking control of. In populated seas with small stealthy PC/Corvettes, I think the Navy can exploit that space on the surface to enable capabilities for exploiting that space under the surface, even against sophisticated anti-access, area denial capabilities.

'Tis a Rare Thing To See Him Criticized

Strong public criticism of Secretary Gates is a rare thing, so when it happens I think consideration should be given to the alternative view.

The problem is, there is clear evidence that a lot of analysis is being rejected and many processes are being ignored in the acquisition planning in the Pentagon. Absent the analysis and processes, the Secretary has (probably rightfully) taken the initiative himself and made enormous decisions for the defense of the United States. The man is clearly the right guy for the job running the wars overseas, but the Secretary of Defense does not inspire me much when it comes to the direction of the services.

I don't agree with everything in this article by MacKenzie Eaglen and Rebecca Grant, but I find myself in agreement on a lot of it. This portion of the article may be written by the two ladies bold enough to speak their mind, but I have to tell you, this article is a reflection of a much broader commentary, and suggesting there is a political, ideological divide in these opinions would be a false assumption.

As Gates himself said last year, his national defense strategy flowed from George W. Bush's national security strategy. Unless President Obama is now adopting Bush administration policies, we're left with the cart before the horse. That's a problem, because by law the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is supposed to reflect the new administration's national security strategy, not retread the old one. Defense policy is supposed to be subordinate to foreign policy.

It looks fishy. The chiefs were silenced, Congress wasn't given full information on the budget out-years, and the Pentagon is now rushing through what amounts to a rubber-stamped QDR. Is this the type of transparency in government we were promised?

We believe both the process and recommendations it has produced thus far could seriously undermine national defense. We question how Gates can emphasize preparing for "the wars we are most likely to fight," while accepting greater risks that undermine our extended deterrence. We cringe when we hear the dismissive tone surrounding key decisions, such as ending the modernization program for search-and-rescue missions. And we shake our heads when the Secretary adopts a threats-based approach to Navy force structure planning, choosing to focus on the "actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries," instead of taking a long-view of the fleet that will be required for tomorrow. This kind of hubris may threaten the military's ability to stay ahead of technologically sophisticated threats and compromise what's left of our industrial base.

Media reporting this week noted a National Defense Panel was written into the House Defense bill. I may be wrong, but I think that idea was first proposed by MacKenzie Eaglen. The NDP would be an independent bi-partisan panel assigned to review the findings of QDR, what I would term a risk assessment. The authors are correct in my opinion, I continue to see evidence that analysis is being ignored and processes are being skipped, perhaps intentionally, to achieve a predetermined conclusion regarding the defense needs of the United States. That is very dangerous in my opinion. Predetermination isn't strategic; its religion.

The lack of explanation for several multi-billion dollar decisions do not inspire confidence. I probably disagree in many ways with both authors regarding the constitution of forces the services require to meet the challenges of future adversaries, but I will say this... I do not make any recommendations regarding Navy force structure without providing significant evidence and supporting information for my arguments, often with many posts and several thousand words, and I'm just a blogger. Gates provides very little supporting arguments for billion dollar decisions of enormous consequence to national security, then gets dismissive with questions, and apparently reporters are so thankful Gates is not Don Rumsfeld they ignore the absence of a public argument in the major decisions effecting the future security and defense of the country.

And in my opinion, this approach combined with clear advocacy is undermining the efforts of those like me who believe institutionalizing COIN would be a good thing for the military services. When Gates is gone, thanks to a lack of considerable intellectual support for major acquisition decisions made to date, I fear it will be back to where we came from because his approach doesn't inspire and doesn't advocate.

I was trying to avoid it, but I'm going to write about the F-22 again next week. If you are reporter, here is a tip. OSD planning reveals the Air Force needs more than 187 F-22s, and Gates is ignoring the analysis conclusions of his own people. In the meantime, we think Congress is crazy for keeping the F-22 line open for maintenance and parts. Why is Congress crazy?

Supposedly because Gates makes brilliant intellectual arguments for how to conduct wars, but people are giving him a pass when he offers no intellectual argument for major defense acquisition decisions. I don't get it, Congress is doing what they should do, making important decisions when credible information isn't offered to counter previous analysis.

I call the approach to Gates the zero sum assumption model, he is the right leader for the war, so he must be right in everything he does. Hmm... I don't think asking for an intellectual basis of important, and obviously difficult decisions is asking too much. In fact, as I understand it... it's part of his job.

Theories and Considerations

Over the past two years, I have attempted to evolve the blog discussion through news events with a narrative while detailing my own views of maritime strategy applied to the context of an emerging naval era. During these two years, I have attempted to emphasize warfighting and peacemaking as two opposing and, at the same time, complementary (completing) applications of military power. The necessity for naval to remain persistently engaged in peacetime is as important as actions that would be taken by naval forces during war, because those peacetime activities can influence the conditions of war, or even prevent it altogether.

I believe military power must take a balanced approach addressing the requirements for winning war and managing peace. If the military is to balance itself, this means there must be a commitment to counterinsurgency capabilities for Army peacemaking operations, and in the case of the Navy it means building flexible forces for leveraging the sea as a base to connect the non-integrated gaps.

I believe this narrative is in line with the Navy's maritime strategy, highlighting the phrase "preventing war is as important as winning war," I believe that balance is critical for military power to adequately address the 21st century threat conditions.

Theories and Conditions

As a general rule for force development of US Navy forces in the 21st century, I believe the closer to shore a ship is intended to operate, the more manpower will be required. Consequently, the further into blue water the ship is intended to operate, manpower reduction is a financial priority. This is a counter intuitive concept, because it means bigger ships with smaller crews, and smaller ships with more manpower. Balancing manpower requirements is critical to developing the 21st century Navy fleet constitution.

The Navy plans force structure in periods of 30 years, which is further out than even the Joint Operating Environment 2008 (PDF) document speculates. The shelf life of ships extends between 20-50 years, and all warships have an expected life of 30 years, which is why each ship represents a major investment not just in money, but more importantly, time, a commodity any professional appreciates. In order to insure proper investment in shipbuilding, the Navy must make several assumptions regarding the strategic environment of the future and plan within this context.

I believe we are currently in an expeditionary era of persistent engagement. This period, which I believe has a shelf life of at least the next 15 years, can be characterized with the following assumptions.

• The US Navy will remain the dominate maritime power until at least 2025.
• The US Navy will remain the only maritime power globally postured and capable of global action until at least 2025.
• The United States will maintain sufficient capabilities and capacity to compete against any belligerent power until at least 2025.

As of currently announced plans, by the year 2020 the US Navy will consist of something like 12 aircraft carriers, 22 AEGIS cruisers, 65 AEGIS destroyers, 3 Zumwalt class destroyers, 42 Littoral Combat Ships, 10 minesweepers, 48 attack submarines, 4 guided-missile submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 33 amphibious ships, 30 combat logistics ships, and 24 support ships. This list does not include any MPF ships and totals 307 ships. I believe that between the time frame of 2010-2025, the Navy is well positioned to execute the maritime strategy as a peacetime engagement force, and use command of the sea to build global maritime security capacity to forward the interests of the United States. Understanding and articulating clearly how to use and for what national purpose to use command of the sea is critical to executing the maritime strategy during this 15 year time frame.

Beginning in 2025, the United States Navy must be positioned to hedge all bets regarding rising great powers. By 2025 the proposed strategic plans for naval forces of those rising great powers will be clear, specifically we will know if Russia really will build 6 aircraft carriers, or if China intends to build a massive fleet, and several persistent questions regarding the naval development of other emerging great powers like India and Brazil will be better understood. More importantly, the Navy will have a better idea how these powers intend to use their naval forces.

I believe for the US Navy, this means as the existing AEGIS fleet begins to retire at a rapid rate, the US Navy must be positioned as a requirement to institute a massive naval buildup itself, and at the same time be positioned to fill the capacity for global maritime security built through executing the strategy from 2010-2025. In order to afford and meet these conditions, fleet constitution strategy should meet the obligations for filling global security capacity while also be positioned to afford replacing retiring systems at the pace of retirement.

Organizational Assumptions

I often read discussions or documents that refer to the types of fleets we need. They become organized to meet a purpose, sometimes suggesting we need one big balanced fleet centered on traditional platforms with slight numerical adjustments to insure capacity across the board, which has the effect of spreading out the risk.

Another popular fleet constitution suggests everything revolves around X, Y, and Z, which for the record, are the most important figures to be determined in the QDR. X number of aircraft carriers, Y number of surface combatants, and Z number of submarines. This fleet model focuses on these three platforms to determine the relative power of the US Navy against competitors in a naval war, and these platforms are emphasized as the metric that determines naval power. These ship types carry priority in every force constitution decision, and risk is accepted in other areas of naval power.

There are also two emerging schools of theory for fleet constitution.

The first school suggests that all surface vessels are obsolete and they simply don't know it. Proponents of this theory suggest that only submarines can survive the modern maritime battlefield, and surface vessels will not be able to approach close enough to the enemy to be effective. This theory suggests precision weapons and unmanned vehicles will be sufficient for striking power, and as I understand it, heavily relies on the Air Force for air superiority. The proponents of this theory accept the risks that come from an absence of surface capabilities, including aircraft carriers.

A second emerging theory suggests that smaller vessels with precision weapons and speed would allow naval forces to overwhelm opposing naval forces with the quality of sufficent quantity. There are several folks who promote this theory, and most of these theories I have heard about were developed from the streetfighter debate of the late 90s. Advocates of this theory I have spoken tend to make a lot of bets in favor of unmanned systems, and accept the risks associated with losing large dominant sea based aviation, not to mention naval systems capable of supporting warfare in space should that be a necessary requirement in the future.

I fully admit that may have butchered these force constitution theories, as I do not claim to fully understand some of them. I only subscribe to theories that begin by clearly stating the aircraft carrier, major surface combatant, and nuclear submarine represent the prevailing strike power capability of fleets today. With that said, I believe the aircraft carrier, major surface combatant, and nuclear submarine all require major evolutions to remain the dominant capabilities of the 21st century. I also believe a 4th platform is emerging in the 21st century as a dominant enabling capability for fleets, and that the mothership will be as important to naval power in the 21st century as the aircraft carrier was in the 20th century. I believe that nations that develop and master doctrine for mothership operations will be dominate naval powers in the 21st century. This paragraph will be expanded in much more detail in a future post.

Using Command of the Sea

I believe the global Coast Guard sucks, and I am talking specifically about the 3rd world. The lack of sufficiently trained and properly equipped maritime security forces globally contributes to insecurity and can be a major factor in generating political crisis. As markets in the third world become more competitive for rising great powers, insuring stable governance and security is in the national interest of the United States. In the facilitation of this diplomacy, there is a clear naval role: a persistent engagement towards building global maritime security capacity and building partnerships based on mutual trust and interest. The Navy already conducts these missions in the form of security cooperation, humanitarian engagement, and medical diplomacy.

What is not well defined is how training manpower and building security capacity translates into true maritime security capacity, and how our humanitarian engagement and medical diplomacy translate into partnership. Multiple agencies play key roles, often primary roles, in building off US Navy supported humanitarian engagement and medical diplomacy missions, but the US Navy and US Coast Guard share the role (thus define the objective) of developing global maritime security capacity. As we have learned in our current wars, without security there is no room for political progress, and as security capacity improves so does the economic conditions.

I see the persistent engagement towards building capacity of the global maritime security condition as the execution of the Navy's maritime strategy in peacetime towards preventing wars. I see this approach as a Clausewitz style strategic approach during periods absent direct conflict of leveraging opportunities to take the offensive towards forwarding a political objective with military power.

To me, leveraging command of the sea means not only building global capacity for the global coast guard, but then after the capacity is developed, filling that capacity sufficiently as a basis to maintain security and leverage cooperation. Said another way, I believe using command of the sea is in part providing assistance in developing coast guards in 3rd world, beginning with training and partnership, but with an end that includes materials to support the partner nations new Coast Guard capacity. I believe this is particularly important if the British are correct when they suggest a population migration to the sea will be one characteristic of the next few decades.

The First 15 Years

Over the next 15 years, from 2010 - 2025, the Navy is well positioned with the existing strike power of the XYZ fleet to meet potential peer adversaries. The most likely challenges of this period directly related to US national security interests include extremists organizations and nation states that are proliferating military and nuclear weapons by sea, or those organizations and states that use the sea to transport illegal goods that fund violent movements. We can also expect belligerent states to threaten neighbors, for example the regular threat rhetoric between Israel and Iran, or the drumbeat of rhetoric by "Dear Leader" towards South Korea. In failed states like Somalia, piracy is unlikely to go away without a solution on land, and absent any solution on land it isn't hard to imagine a scenario emerge where the US participates in a military action from the sea onto land to attempt to influence a political solution that initially involves military power.

However, one constant in examining all the scenarios that are probable to occur between now and 2025 is that the existing XYZ fleet is sufficient to meet these and other challenges. Indeed, there is one driving priority that must be considered: The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, and specifically this provision.

"to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."

I believe that the United States Navy is positioned to meet this requirement until 2025, but as I mentioned earlier the XYZ fleets must evolve to be able to meet this requirement beyond 2025. Even if the US declines to assist Taiwan should China make a move, the US Navy is under a clear obligation to "maintain the capacity" to "resist any resort to force" made by China, and capacity is a big word in that context.

A 30 Year Proposal

I have previously highlighted a shipbuilding budget of $14 billion annually for 10 years between FY2011-FY2020. The planning number for the QDR is actually around $15.4 billion annually, which is the number for the FY 2010 budget. If we use $15.4 billion annually for 10 years, take out $20 billion for CVNs and $38 billion for SSNs over the decade (I only build 1 SSN in FY2020), that leaves $96 billion to build the fleet for the next decade. I count $8 billion per decade for nuclear refuelings. With this budget, leveraging the assumptions above, I build the following fleet:

Build 29 Littoral Combat Ships ($16 billion)
Build 2 DDG-51s (FY11) ($4 billion)
Build 1 DDG-1000 ($2.8 billion)
Build 64 PC/Corvettes for $100 million each ($6.4 billion)
Build 2 CGN(X) for BMD (FY17, FY20) ($9 billion)
Build 25 JHSVs ($4 billion)
Build 2 LHA(R)s ($7 billion)
Build 1 LHD replacement (FY20)($3 billion)
Build 1 LPD-17 (11th) ($2 billion)
Build 5 LSD(X) ($10 billion)
Build 6 T-AKE ($3.3 billion)
Build 4 LCS Tenders ($4 billion)
Build 4 MLP ($4 billion)
Build the first SSBN replacement (FY19) ($5 billion)
Build 2 Command Ship replacements ($4 billion)
Build 4 Fleet Tug Replacements ($1 billion)
Build 3 Oiler Replacements ($2 billion)
Build 1 Ocean Surveillance Ship replacement ($.5 billion)
* Nuclear refuelings ($8 billion)

Total of the list above = $94 billion.

This list includes 2 CVNs, 19 SSNs, 1 SSBN(X), 29 LCS, 2 DDG-51s, 1 DDG-1000, 25 JHSVs, 2 LHA(R)s, 4 MLPs, 6 T-AKEs, 4 Tenders, 2 JCC(X), 4 T-ATF(X), 1 T-AGOS(X), 1 T-AO(X), 1 LPD-17, 5 LSD(X), 1 LH(X), 64 PC/Corvettes, and 2 CGN(X) for a total of 176 ships, or 17.6 ships annually between FY11-FY20. Below is the chart that outlines this period against previous periods.

Ship Type	Last 30 Years (1980-2009)	Reagan Buildup (1982-1989)	Last 15 Years (1994-2009)	Next 10 Years (2011-2020)
Surface Combatants	36	34	36	25
Aircraft Carriers	16	14	19	18
Submarines	30	34	27	28
Amphibious Ships	11	9	14	17
Other Ships	8	10	4	12
Total	100	100	100	100

The first thing people are going to scream at me about is the 4th DDG-1000. Look, this is an industrial decision that keeps Bath working until the CGN(X) line begins in FY17. Unpopular? Yep, but necessary. I build both of the DDG-51s in Mississippi, and then build the 64 PC/Corvettes in Mississippi to sustain the yard the rest of the decade while upgrading the yard, preparing for the Future Surface Combatant.

There are 8 ships built on the LPD-17 hull: 1 LPD-17, 5 LSD(X), and 2 JCC(X). The reason I begin replacing the LSDs early is because I would take the four LSD 49s and during their modernization, convert them to be the 4 Global Fleet Station ships the Marines suggest they need above the 11 LHX, 11 LPD, 12 LSD thirty-four ship amphibious force. As the LSD-41s are replaced, I immediately begin using them to develop mothership doctrine and operations, test platforms for emerging unmanned system capabilities, and evaluate these vessels as motherships for supporting Riverine squadron operations and other NECC capabilities. There are also 2 LHA(R)s and 1 LH(X), meaning plenty of Gulf Coast work.

During the next decade, I also build 15 ships logistics and support ships: 4 MLPs, 6 T-AKEs, 4 LCS Tenders, and I buy the first T-AO(X), presumably at NASSCO.

I build 29 more Littoral Combat Ships for a total of 36, meaning the 36 LCS and 64 PC/Corvettes becomes a 100 small ship littoral force for managing hybrid littoral threats during a period of emerging great powers. The idea behind the 64 PC/Corvettes is to use them for at least 10 years as a partnership building capability and distributed littoral force, and once the capacity on the manpower side with a partner has been sufficiently developed, simply give some PC/Corvettes away as a means of filling the developed capacity. If we get 10-20 years out of a $100 million small ship, its like leasing a small naval vessel for $5-$10 million annually. As I have explained many times, I see the payload of the PC/Corvette force to be manpower, not missiles. These are small, modular platforms intended to support ScanEagle's, RHIBS, and limited unmanned systems. I see these ships operating with the LCS in the littorals, and supported by leased vessels or inexpensive converted purchased vessels acting as logistics motherships. If we buy a commercial vessel for mothership conversion, we give it away with the PC/Corvettes to the partner, again filling capacity.

That leaves 25 JHSVs, 4 T-ATF(X), and 1 T-AGOS(X) that will be built... somewhere. Also I continue the current plan to build 20 submarines over the decade, 19 SSNs and the first SSBN(X).

The idea is to assume risk with the existing surface combatants while going both big and small, big with the CGN(X) and small with the 100 ship littoral force. There is one major issue though, the CGN(X) cannot cost more than $4.5 billion as a cap on SCN, and I see this as something the Navy will have to work out with Congress. Without the cap, the Navy needs to make it clear to Congress that they have a limited BMD capability, and cannot perform a broader role in BMD.

I am opposed to building Burkes for any reason other than sustaining industry. I do not understand why the US Navy believes that a ship built on a 1980s design and fielded in 2015 will be relevant to its role in 2040, much less in 2055 when it retires. Not a single ship in service in 1915 designed before 1890 was competitive as a naval capability in 1940, and yet with a straight face very smart people claim a ship designed before 1990 in service in 2015 will be competitive in 2040. I see building Burkes well into the next decade in the context of building wood ships to fight ironclads. The US Navy either looks forward, or prepares to fall behind.

The industry can be sustained with very few Burkes, 64 PC/Corvettes, and moving the LSD(X) replacements up while also building the CGN(X), a BMD capability that is much more realistic for long term BMD challenges than the existing AEGIS BMD system. Additionally, by focusing on the amphibious ships, logistics fleet, and building the bulk of the attack submarine force over the 10 years 2010-2020, the Navy doesn't have to build them after 2025.

FY2021-FY2030

Now we apply a $15.4 billion annual number to the next decade. Between FY2021-FY2030 the Navy will be spending every dollar on replacements, there is no room for new stuff. The $2 billion cost annually for aircraft carriers will remain, but because SSN production slows down, we count it separately. That gives us $134 to work with, and I still count the $8 billion for nuclear refueling.

Build 8 SSBN(X) ($40 billion)
Build 8 SSN ($16 billion)
Build 4 CGN(X) ($18 billion)
Build 6 Future Surface Combatants ($17 billion)
Build 2 LH(X) ($6 billion)
Build 7 LSD(X) ($14 billion)
Build 8 T-AGOS(X) ($4 billion)
Build 12 T-AO(X) ($8 billion)
Build 3 T-ARS(X) ($1.5 billion)
Build 2 AS(X) ($1.5 billion)
* Nuclear refuelings ($8 billion)

Total of the list above = $134 billion.

This list includes 2 CVNs, 8 SSBN(X), 8 SSNs, 4 CGN(X), 6 FSCs, 2 LH(X), 7 LSD(X), 8 T-AGOS(X), 12 T-AO(X), 3 T-ARS(X), and 2 AS(X) for a total of 62 ships, or an average of 6.2 ships annually. Below is the chart that outlines this period against previous periods.

Ship Type	Last 30 Years (1980-2009)	Reagan Buildup (1982-1989)	Last 15 Years (1994-2009)	Next 10 Years (2021-2030)
Surface Combatants	36	34	36	23
Aircraft Carriers	16	14	19	18
Submarines	30	34	27	36
Amphibious Ships	11	9	14	13
Other Ships	8	10	4	10
Total	100	100	100	100

I finish several priorities this decade, beginning with the Virginia class submarine. I also complete modernization of the expeditionary force, logistics fleet, and support fleets during this decade. I build 60% of the strategic national fleet in 4 CGN(X) and 8 SSBN(X) during this decade, positioning the Navy to meet the challenges of emerging great powers. I begin construction of the future surface combatant in Mississippi just as the cruisers begin retiring. The numbers of surface combatants will begin to dip around 2030 from over 90 to the mid 80s as the cruisers retire.

However, one advantage of this approach of building the submarine fleet, amphibious fleet, and modernizing the bulk of the combat logistics and support force is that as the intentions of rising great powers are being understood, the US Navy is positioned with budget resources to begin a major buildup of the next generation future surface combatant. For those who are familiar, I consider the alignment of budget resources in this way a modern version of the 19th century strategy of the second move executed by the Royal Navy.

Y2031-FY2040

Now we apply a $15.4 billion annual number to the decade between FY2031-FY2040, which again the Navy will be spending every dollar on replacements. The $2 billion cost annually for aircraft carriers will remain. That gives us $134 to work with, and I still count the $8 billion for nuclear refueling.

Build 2 CGN(X) ($9 billion)
Build 23 Future Surface Combatants ($62 billion)
Build 3 SSBN(X) ($15 billion)
Build 12 SSN(X) ($28 billion)
Build 2 LH(X) ($6 billion)
Build 15 JHSV(X) ($2.5 billion)
Build 4 T-AOE(X) ($3.5 billion)
* Nuclear refuelings ($8 billion)

Total of the list above = $134 billion.

This list includes 2 CVNs, 2 CGN(X), 23 FSC, 3 SSBN(X), 12 SSN(X), 2 LH(X), 15 JHSV(X), and 4 T-AOE(X) for a total of 63 ships or an average of 6.3 ships annually. Below is the chart that outlines this period against previous periods.

Ship Type	Last 30 Years (1980-2009)	Reagan Buildup (1982-1989)	Last 15 Years (1994-2009)	Next 10 Years (2031-2040)
Surface Combatants	36	34	36	46
Aircraft Carriers	16	14	19	18
Submarines	30	34	27	28
Amphibious Ships	11	9	14	4
Other Ships	8	10	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100

I build the last 2 CGN(X) and the last 3 SSBN(X) national strategic fleet platforms, and begin a slow build up of the SSN(X) system. I also ramp up surface major combatant construction, so if I am in an arms race around 2030 against a peer competitor, I am well positioned with the most capable shooter under construction in more than one shipyard. Only 2 amphibious ships are built this decade, both LHD replacements, and the Navy is also positioned to replace the JHSVs if necessary.

This is key. If by chance, the Navy finds itself in an arms race, the Navy is well positioned to give up platforms to allies. The PC/Corvettes and the JHSVs all built before 2020 can be used in a fungible way to build up maritime security capacity of our partners, presumably capacity previously developed with GFS and other expeditionary partnerships.

The maritime strategy states the Navy builds partnership capacity. Presumably, by 2040, the Navy will have 126 littoral ships to populate global Navy's with to fill the developed capacity, and because these are mostly low tech platforms, we are giving away security, not building up defense in an arms race.