Observing the Omissions, Additions, and Denials of Future Force Structure

So by now you might be starting to see what I'm talking about in regards to the questionable figures and statistics listed in the Navy's new 300 ship plan. If the hint on Monday wasn't enough, perhaps the visual aids from Tuesday were more effective in making the point.

You see, the issue here is specific to counting rules and how one creates a 300 ship fleet so as to not be the administration that let the Navy fade away quietly into the night. If you have been paying attention to the details of the new shipbuilding plan, you would note that the Secretary of the Navy himself is the one who brought the subject up regarding what ships count and what ships don't count in the plan. From the February 16, 2024 House Hearing on the Navy's FY13 Budget, written statement by Secretary Ray Mabus, page 11.

Future Force Structure Assessment and Re-designation of Primary Mission Platforms

Given the broad refocus of the DoD program objectives reflected in the new defense strategy, the Navy has undertaken analysis of the existing Force Structure Requirements and, in conjunction with ongoing internal DoD studies and planning efforts, is reworking an updated FSA against which future requirements will be measured. The new FSA will consider the types of ships included in the final ship count based on changes in mission, requirements, deployment status, or capabilities. For example, classes of ships previously not part of the Battle Force such as AFSBs developed to support SOF/non-traditional missions, Patrol Combatant craft forward deployed to areas requiring that capability, and COMFORT Class Hospital Ships deployed to provide humanitarian assistance, an expanded core Navy mission, may be counted as primary mission platforms. Any changes in ship counting rules will be reported and publicized. Any comments on total ship numbers in this statement are based on current counting rules.

I have a question. How exactly did the Navy's ~300 ship shipbuilding plan expect to ever get the fleet total to 300 ships as stated in this February testimony under "current counting rules" when the final plan released on March 28, 2024 before the Senate changed the counting rules - except they changed the counting rules without reporting or publicizing to the Senate those changes despite the SECNAV suggesting he would. The Navy quietly added the PCs and T-AHs into the final shipbuilding plan submitted to Congress to reach 300, then conveniently forgot to report and publicize that change. Oops.

The shipbuilding plan was released for the Senate hearing on March 28, 2012. Why didn't the Navy "report and publicize" the changes to counting rules at the hearing like the SECNAV said he would? Lets see, "Any comments on total ship numbers in this statement are based on current counting rules" was clearly an inaccurate statement, because without the changing the counting rules the plan would never be 300 ships. Saying "any changes in ship counting rules will be reported and publicized" also appears to have an accuracy problem, because the only person reporting and publicizing this counting rules change is me.

I don't know if these are SECNAV lies of omission or lies of commission, but the truth is hiding in the vast distance somewhere between CNO hope and SECNAV change.

I would like to hope Wednesday's 3:00pm House hearing on Navy Shipbuilding puts an end to the shell game the Navy is playing with shipbuilding - and has been playing for years. It is past time someone in the Navy just states outright the ugly truth about how the fleet numbers under tbe counting rules of the 313-ship plan are not going up under this new plan, and any cost growth in shipbuilding from this point going forward - like the future DDG-51 Flight III and it's AMDR gallium nitride (GaN) hail mary - means the fleet is likely to shrink even further. The new shipbuilding plan makes assumptions that carry a very high risk of failure, and the credibility of Navy leadership is on the line.

It's time to shake the "stay the course" addiction because that really is a rocky shoal ahead - the CNO can admit this but apparently does not want to admit what it really means for the future of the Navy. The new shipbuilding plan is as much a house of cards as the old plan, and the solution demands innovation in force structure sooner rather than later. The first step is admitting there is a legitimate force structure problem is to acknowledge that the evolution of existing warship platforms has become too expensive to meet operational requirements while sustaining pace on competitors, and the revolution in aircraft platforms has become an unaffordable money sink that draws resources from the innovations necessary to make NAVAIR relevant to the threats of the 21st century. No, even a perfect Joint Strike Fighter cannot make up for the loss of capabilities it's price tag prohibits from the modern carrier air wing, and JSF is destroying the value of big deck aircraft carriers to the total battle force with every extra dollar dumped into the program. If the Navy cannot admit these things, the Navy will never find suitable answers to the question the Navy has failed to answer since the cold war - what is the link between resources and strategy for the US Navy?

An entirely new force model is needed under current reduced resource investments, and both the SECNAV and OPNAV folks ignore this plainly obvious truth. Until the unaffordability reality can be admitted by the various communities inside the Navy, the shell game will continue with fewer platforms, fewer systems, and less capacity to meet the political and COCOM demand signal. The Navy doesn't have a plan, and the reason is simple:

The solution is big deck CVNs, constantly bigger surface combatants, and constantly big nuclear submarines - as many of all of them as possible - now Mr. President, what was your problem?

There is no such thing as a plan that links resources to strategy when the resources are predetermined regardless of resources available or political objectives stated in policy. The current Navy strategy is designed to inform towards a predetermined resource conclusion - the Navy will do everything, but only with these specific platforms.

The inflection point the CNO has discussed is here, now. The Navy raced past the Tipping Point months ago. It's time for folks to stop the political shell games with the future of the Navy and demonstrate some leadership. Will a leader step up to the enormous challenges of the moment?

Doubtful. Perpetuating a state of denial is easier.

Visual Aid

This is USS Firebolt (PC 10).

This is the USNS Mercy (T-AH 19)

What do these two ships have in common? These ships are in classes of ship that are now battle force ships according to the Navy's new approximately 300 ship plan. These ship types were never considered battle force ships under the 313-ship plan.

Why are they now battle force ships? Because there were 283 battle force ships when the Obama administration took office. There are 282 ships today. When you subtract 13 PCs and 2 hospital ships from the Navy's new plan, the new Obama administrations plan came out to only a 285 ship fleet, and anything short of 300 was politically unacceptable. In other words, they made shit up. Welcome to the shell game.

The Obama administration has moved BMD to the Navy, but added no ships with that policy change. Now the Obama administration is claiming a pivot to Asia with a maritime focus, and yet the Navy is losing ships and has to fudge finger add in 200 ton PCs and call them battle force ships to hit the political goal of 300 ships. I've said it before, I'll say it again...

The worst kept secret in the DoD: there is no plan.

P.S. If you want to know where the split is between SECNAV and OPNAV, you are looking at it. If the Navy is ready to start counting PCs as battle force ships, does that mean the Navy is ready to build an influence squadron? Yeah right.

I Am Definitely Fallible. But I’m Not Wrong on This One.

As part of a continuing discussion on a recent news article covering the US Navy in the New York Times, the Honorable Robert (Bob) Work sends in the following contribution.

I totally agree with one thing that Bryan (and later Seth) said: I am not infallible. Believe me, I need no one to remind me of the fact. However, I am sublimely confident I am on the right side of this particular argument.

I have never said that numbers are irrelevant. What I have long said is that numbers alone no longer give an adequate measure of the true combat capability of today’s networked battle fleets, and that comparing the size of today’s fleet with the fleet of 1917 (or 1945 or pick a date) is irrelevant. When you compare one US fleet with a past US fleet, you must compare all things—numbers of ships, overall capabilities, and relative naval standings. If you follow Bryan’s argument to its logical conclusion, one would have to conclude that he would rather have the fleet of 774 ships in commission at the end of World War I, or the fleet of 6768 ships in commission at the end of World War II because, for him, fleet size seems to be the metric of merit that matters most. Well, here’s a news flash, and one that Bryan knows well: past U.S. fleets would stand little chance against today’s “small” fleet of 282 ships. Indeed, the only problem today’s fleet would have is keeping its magazines stocked as it put every one of those proud old ships on the bottom.

The fact is that we don’t build a battle force to fight past US fleets, and comparing our current fleet numbers to those of past US fleets is a complete waste of time. We build a fleet to accomplish contemporary national goals, and to prevail against contemporary potential adversaries.

So, the real questions are: how does our 282-ship fleet stack up against other world navies, and is it big enough to do what is asked of it? When comparing relative naval strengths among navies, I generally use four simple metrics:

• Aggregate fleet full load displacement, and average full load displacement by ship type. These are the best proxies for a fleet’s overall combat capability and capacity, as well as capabilities of major combatants.
• Aggregate fleet battle force missile capacity. This is the best proxy for potential fleet firepower.
• Total number of nuclear-powered attack submarines, the capital ship in contemporary navy-on-navy engagements.
• Total number of fleet aviation platforms, and the maximum number of fixed and rotary wing aircraft carried, a good measure of overall power projection capability.

Using these four metrics, and comparing our 282-ship battle force not against past US fleets, but against contemporary rest of world navies, there is no question that our Navy is the most powerful naval force on the planet, by a wide margin. In fact, today’s 282- ship battle force enjoys a degree of naval supremacy much higher than that enjoyed by the 450+ ship British Royal Navy in 1914 (this number includes just battleships, cruisers, and destroyers), on the eve of World War I, when the US was battling it out with the Imperial German Navy to be number two among world naval powers. That’s why the US Navy no longer worries about fighting a decisive engagement with an opposing battle fleet—because there are none (at least at this point in time).

But that still begs the question: is our battle force big enough to do what is asked of it? Bryan would say no; he clearly thinks we need more ships today. So let’s play his thinking out. Today’s battle force must provide a secure nuclear deterrent; operate forward to preserve the peace; project American power; and prevail in any potential combat scenario. A formal Force Structure Assessment determines the size of the battle force inventory necessary to accomplish these four basic tasks. The driving factor behind these assessments is the force-sizing construct dictated by OSD. Since the end of the Cold War, our battle force has been sized to provide forward deployed combat credible forces in multiple theaters, and to surge when required as part of a unified Joint Force to defeat two adversaries in different theaters. As verified in numerous Force Structure Assessments conducted under the direction of both Republican and Democratic administrations, this requires an average battle force of about 310 ships (the assessments have ranged from 305-323 ships).

Our new force-sizing construct requires the Navy’s battle force to help decisively defeat one adversary in one theater, and to prevent an opportunistic aggressor from accomplishing his goals in another (“defeat-deny”). Although we are still working through the analysis, we anticipate this new guidance will require a battle force of about 300 ships. We have 282 ships today. That is 94% of our desired inventory target (91% of the 2-war requirement). We will get to 300 ships in FY2019, and we have a plan in place to maintain this level over the next 20 years—although truth in lending compels me to say it will be expensive to do so.

Now Bryan may think—and I believe he does—that the battle force should be even larger than 300 ships. If so, then what Bryan is really saying is either that our Force Structure Assessment process is faulty, or that he thinks the Navy should be given more missions than those now assigned, which would require more ships. Which one is it?

Until he makes that clear, comparing today’s fleet with the 1917 US battle force is irrelevant.

Keepers

And this is why the Navy picked the cruisers for decommissioning.

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Buck McKeon wants the Navy to keep seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers the service planned to retire to meet congressionally mandated budget cuts.

McKeon, R-Calif., said in a March 14 speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Calif., that the ships are needed to secure U.S. interests in the Pacific, the focal point of the Obama administration’s new national security strategy. His plan would call for funding needed upgrades to keep the ships — all of which were commissioned in the 1990s — for their full 35-year service lives.

“Though the administration says we’re shifting to Asia, they’re actually reducing the number of ships and planes we have available to respond to contingencies anywhere,” McKeon said. “We will try to hold back cuts to the Navy’s cruiser force, finding the money for our cruisers to undergo proper upgrades, instead of mothballing vital ships needed to sustain the shift to Asia.”

The question I have been asking myself since the beginning is how many cruisers the Navy expects Congress to save. 100%? 75%? 50%? Both the House and the Senate has several members that would prefer to keep these vessels. It isn't just the capabilities of the ships, it is the workload for the yards and industrial base support that needs these ships to stay around.

The thing is though, I don't think the Navy will keep all 7. The USS Port Royal (CG 73) is a perfect example, ever since hitting the reef off Hawaii to become the first AEGIS ashore asset for the United States, that ship has reportedly not been right. Cracks in the hull are just the beginning, the bottom line is the SPY radar is built into the superstructure of these ships - a little damage from grounding can go a long way towards causing serious combat related problems.

So my guess is Congress will find a way to keep at least 2 and as many as 6 of the cruisers. It really isn't as much money as you think, and if modernization is fully funded for each of these cruisers, most of them should be able to serve 40 years with expectations of being viable and competitive naval assets.

ALT POM Early Decommission Plans

Here come the cuts. Details from AOL Defense reporter Carlo Munoz.

Washington: Just as the Navy is planning to take on a larger strategic role in regional hot spots around the world, the service is considering massive fleet reductions -- including a two-year delay on its new aircraft carrier -- as part of its upcoming budget plan.

The Navy may cut nine cruisers and three amphibious ships as part of its soon-to-be released budget blueprint covering the next five fiscal years, sources say.

The Navy plans to deactivate four cruisers from the fleet in fiscal year 2013, with another five cruisers coming out of the fleet the next year, according to a preliminary version of the spending plan. The three amphibious landing ships will be deactivated along with the five cruisers.

He goes on to note the potential early retirement of USS George Washington (CVN 73) and shifting of aircraft construction to 7 years instead of 5 years. Very smart folks I have spoken to have noted that a shift to 7 year construction cycles for big deck aircraft carriers will result in either paying up to 25% more for aircraft carriers than we would under 5 year cycles, or loss of that capacity in industry. When you extend the time out on any construction project, you raise costs. Clearly this an accountants idea spawned from an accountant, not one from an engineer.

Getting back to the cruisers and amphibious ships, I thought I'd offer some additional details.

The FY13 ships are:

USS Normandy (CG-60)
USS Anzio (CG-68)
USS Vicksburg (CG-69)
USS Cape St. George (CG-71)

The FY14 ships are:

USS Princeton (CG-59)
USS Cowpens (CG-63)
USS Gettysburg (CG-64)
USS Chosin (CG-65)
USS Hué City (CG-66)

USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41)
USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43)
USS Tortuga (LSD-46)

You might look at this news and think - well, these are just plans, so it's nothing to concern us right now. Wrong. These are part of alternative plans now, and that has maintenance ramifications.

Title 10: 2244a. Equipment scheduled for retirement or disposal: limitation on expenditures for modifications

(a) Prohibition.— Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Secretary of a military department may not carry out a modification of an aircraft, weapon, vessel, or other item of equipment that the Secretary plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within five years after the date on which the modification, if carried out, would be completed.

(b) Exceptions.—

(1) Exception for below-threshold modifications.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a modification for which the cost is less than $100,000.

(2) Exception for transfer of reusable items of value.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a modification in a case in which—

(A) the reusable items of value, as determined by the Secretary, installed on the item of equipment as part of such modification will, upon the retirement or disposal of the item to be modified, be removed from such item of equipment, refurbished, and installed on another item of equipment; and

(B) the cost of such modification (including the cost of the removal and refurbishment of reusable items of value under subparagraph (A)) is less than $1,000,000.

(3) Exception for safety modifications.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a safety modification.

(c) Waiver Authority.— The Secretary concerned may waive the prohibition in subsection (a) in the case of any modification otherwise subject to that subsection if the Secretary determines that carrying out the modification is in the national security interest of the United States. Whenever the Secretary issues such a waiver, the Secretary shall notify the congressional defense committees in writing.

USS George Washington (CVN 73) will likely get a waiver. Somehow I doubt these other ships will, which means several COs will not be getting that maintenance for a few months, or may be retiring their ships early. The Navy will retire oldest first to keep new construction, which is how the US Navy has handled every force reduction in their history.

One more thought. I look at this list and notice a few things. First, BMD capable and ships capable of BMD upgrades are on this cruiser list. The list basically cuts the one non-BMD cruiser at Pearl; cuts half the number of cruisers everywhere but San Diego; and only cuts two at San Diego. Randomly. The first cruisers to get modernization are not on the list, but they are also not BMD capable (the Block 2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, CG-52 through CG-58).

Just think it is interesting that of the 22 Cruisers, the Navy will keep the eight that cannot get BMD upgrades and only 5 Cruisers that can or already are BMD compatible. I don't see how this approach squares with the BMD requirement that is currently driving surface vessel construction plans.

Congress Gives Roughead an Opportunity

A handful of House lawmakers are playing hardball with the Pentagon regarding the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. No question about it, this is a political trap for the Navy. It is also an opportunity.

From Phillip Ewing at Navy Times.

Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Va., and seven other Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee have filed a “resolution of inquiry” directing Defense Secretary Robert Gates to file a shipbuilding plan.

Forbes’ “resolution of inquiry” is unusual because the Armed Services Committee has only 14 legislative days to consider it before it goes to the floor of the full House — as opposed to a standard resolution, which might sit in committee for months. The full House can reject the measure, but its quick timetable is a way to bring the issue to Congress’ immediate attention.

If it was me, I would submit the same 313-ship plan as last year only reflecting the announced changes Gates has made to date. The result will be another hit for credibility in shipbuilding in the press cycle (hopefully more than one), which is the desired effect. Nothing has been more discredited than the 313-shipbuilding plan, so unless the Navy is going to try to achieve something within the next 2 weeks with this political game, just reset back to yesterday and keep looking towards tomorrow.

If I was advising ADM Roughead, I would find something related to the 313-shipbuilding plan that was signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Admiral Mullen and submit it to Congress with the FY2010 plan. I would do this for specific reasons though.

First, it is time for ADM Gary Roughead to send a clear message who has the helm. If ADM Roughead is going to be man the helm, he needs to put the 313-ship plan in context, which means associate that plan with Rumsfeld and ADM Mullen. I do not care about the sensitivities involved with ADM Mullen being CJCS. The 313-ship plan was his plan, that is just a fact, let him defend it, or even shit on it like everyone else already does. The 313-ship plan was his vision, not ADM Rougheads. ADM Roughead is taking the Navy a new direction and everyone, including these Congressman, know it. If they want to know where we are, do so by first reminding them where we are.

Second, the 313-shipbuilding plan is poison, so to submit it sets expectations of poison, which is a good thing right now. I have a great deal of faith in the men and women engaged in the QDR process. Just in case you haven't heard, or for you industry folks looking for a tip, change is coming and it isn't minor polish on the edges, it is the real deal. I have made it clear that you better read Bob Work (PDF), Frank Hoffman, Robert Rubel (PDF), and CDR Henry J Hendrix. If you haven't been listening, then it is time to do your homework.

Finally, this development gives the Navy leadership a chance to turn a problem into an opportunity. Shipbuilding is the albatross of the Navy discussion right now. The Chief of Naval Operations could barely give an interview before April when Secretary Gates announced his decision regarding the DDG-1000/DDG-51 way ahead, which is revealing in that it highlights just how the single issue of shipbuilding has all but shut down the leadership of the Navy in terms of public credibility and communication. If the QDR process is going to produce significant changes to the Navy's shipbuilding plan while also aligning itself to the maritime strategy, then the Navy can submit an old plan while positioning itself for strategic surprise with a new one.

If done right, that may be just the thing for the CNO to position himself to ask Congress for bit more money for shipbuilding, which everyone in the entire world knows is a necessity if the US Navy is going to remain strong and the US Shipbuilding industry is going to remain afloat.

Sun Sets on 313-Ship Plan, Downward Spiral For Shipbuilding Begins in FY09

Gene Taylor may be talking up 10 ships per year for the next 5 years, but the Navy and the Bush administration have a different plan, and we have been hearing all day the 313-ship plan is officially dead.

The new FY09 - FY13 five year shipbuilding plan makes a number of changes in the next 5 years for shipbuilding, which shouldn't surprise anyone considering all but 6 of the 7 years of the Bush administration have been marked by changes in the next years shipbuilding plan. Below are the details that will be presented in the presidents FY09 budget. It is ugly and complicated, so we list it out by platform then by FY in an attempt to make it easy to read.

Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) - 1 - FY10 1 - FY12 1- FY13

Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) - 1 - FY12

LHA(R) for Sea Base - 1- FY10

LHA(R), LPD-17, and High Speed Sealift ships are not included in FY09 - FY13 five year plan.

LCS plan remains same as previously covered. 2 - FY09, 3 - FY10, 3 - Fy11, 4 - FY12, 6 - FY13 (18 total)

Virginia class (SSN) - 1 FY09, 1 FY10, 2 - FY11, 2 - FY12, 2 - FY13

Joint High Speed Vessel program - one annually from FY-09 to FY-13. The Pentagon also plans to buy additional JHSVs in the coming years for the Army.

T-ATF tug in FY-13 - canceled

Lewis-and-Clark-class (T-AKE) - 2 - FY09

CVN78 - 1 - FY12

CG(X) - 1 - FY11, 1 - FY-13

DDG-1000 - 1 FY09, 1 FY10, 1 - FY11, 1 - FY12, 1 - FY13

JCC(X) command ship - 1 - FY12

This is the breakdown of the 5 year plan FY09 - FY13 included in the upcoming FY09 budget:

FY09 - 7 ships

2 LCS
1 Virginia class (SSN)
1 Joint High Speed Vessel
2 Lewis-and-Clark-class (T-AKE)
1 DDG-1000

FY10 - 8 ships

1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)
1 LHA(R) for Sea Base
3 LCS
1 Virginia class (SSN)
1 Joint High Speed Vessel
1 DDG-1000

FY11 - 8 ships

3 LCS
2 Virginia class (SSN)
1 Joint High Speed Vessel
1 CG(X)
1 DDG-1000

FY12 - 12 ships

1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)
1 Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR)
4 LCS
2 Virginia class (SSN)
1 Joint High Speed Vessel
1 DDG-1000
1 CVN78
1 JCC(X)

FY13 - 12 ships

1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP)
6 LCS
2 Virginia class (SSN)
1 Joint High Speed Vessel
1 DDG-1000
1 CG(X)


Thoughts. No way the ships in FY12 and FY13 get built as described, but if we assume all of this happens (a bad bet), it comes to 25 surface combatants, 18 of which are LCS. Also included is just 1 CVN and 1 LHA(R), no other aviation carrying platforms unless you count the 2 T-AKEs and 1 command ship.

Other ships include 4 MFP(F) ships and 5 JHSVs. Finally, 8 Virginia class submarines.

In total we count 47 ships and submarines, 33 combatants + 1 CVN + 1 LHA(R) for Sea Base, and 12 MSC ships. If your not happy, just remember, according to the CBO math, the 5 DDG-1000s costs more in total than not only the 18 LCS listed in this plan (assuming 400 million per), but you could buy an additional 18 more. According to the Navy's math, which is the math used by the Navy outlined in this plan, the 7th DDG-1000 built will cost the same as DDG-112.

At the same time, the Navy’s 2008 budget submission to the Congress estimates the cost of building the seventh DDG-1000 in 2013 at about $2.1 billion (in 2013 dollars). Deflated to 2008 dollars (using the inflation index for shipbuilding that the Navy provided to CBO), that estimate equals about $1.6 billion—or the same as for an additional DDG-51, which would have the benefit of substantial efficiencies and lessons learned from the 62 models built previously. The lightship displacement of the DDG-1000 is about 5,000 tons greater than that of the DDG-51s under construction today. In effect, the Navy’s estimates imply that those 5,000 extra tons, as well as the 10 new technologies to be incorporated into the DDG-1000 class, will be free.

We are also hearing the Navy will cut funding for F/A-18s, including the number of squadrons, and also the MH-60S, MV-22, and CH-53 among other items. What a mess the 8 years of Bush have been, and that includes the mess he will leave the next administration. The title implies the spiral begins, my screw up, more like continues.

This thread officially retires our 313-ship plan tag.

Northrop Grumman Pitches National Security Frigate

It didn't take long, we mentioned last week to expect this. I guess the good folks over the Northrop Grumman wanted to get their idea out there before Congress gets back to work. Defense News has a very well detailed article on the pitch for the National Security Frigate (NSF) proposal, which is built on the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter (NSC). The article details the proposal, including the problems facing it.

The U.S. Navy is stumbling to build the ship it wants — the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) — so shipbuilder Northrop Grumman is urging the service to turn to a ship it can get sooner and cheaper: a patrol frigate version of the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter (NSC).

“We have listened to what the Navy has said — to be more efficient, be innovative and produce affordable and capable ships,” said Phil Teel, president of Northrop’s Ship Systems sector. “The patrol frigate is a response to that, and to the Navy’s new National Maritime Strategy.”

Northrop’s analysts have studied remarks and themes oft repeated by senior Navy leaders and concluded a de facto requirement exists for a frigate-size ship capable of handling a range of low- and mid-intensity missions. Those missions, said Eric Womble, head of Ship Systems’ Advanced Capabilities Group, are detailed in the Navy’s new Maritime Strategy and include forward presence, deterrence, sea control, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

So what does the Navy think about the idea?

The official response from the Navy to Northrop’s proposal so far is unenthusiastic.

“There is currently no requirement for such a combatant,” said Lt. Clay Doss, a Navy spokesman at the Pentagon. The Navy’s other surface ship programs, he said, “address specific requirements.”

Doss did note that “the Navy and Coast Guard have considered a common platform for the LCS and the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter. However, due to the unique mission requirements of each service, a common hull is not a likely course of action.”

Northrop likely is facing an uphill battle with its patrol frigate, as the Navy culturally prefers to dictate requirements based on its own analysis.

In our opinion the requirements, developed before the Maritime Strategy, is where the review needs to take place. The Navy is using motherships for irregular challenges at sea today, but I bet if you took a close look at the same list of requirements that rejects the NSC you would notice the absence of that requirement.

The article highlights problems with the NSF idea, including that it doesn't conform to the NVR spec. It may be that the NSF isn't the right platform, but the only way to truly verify that is to take a serious look at the requirements the Navy currently works from and insure they are in line with the new Maritime Strategy, a process we understand is happening already.

To us, as long as the DDG-1000 program goes beyond the first two ships, or that the LCS program as outlined today is the only low mix combatant in the inventory for dealing with irregular challenges, we believe those requirements represents the single largest problem not only facing shipbuilding strategy, but facing the Navy as it attempts to align itself to their new Maritime Strategy.

Navy Searching For New Metrics in the Force

CDR Salamander links to a defense news article on the latest series of force changes that details some of the specifics of all three proposals. As we examine the details more closely, they tell an interesting story regarding what the Navy leadership is thinking. We will observe the details one at a time.

Major combat operations. A force of 263 ships, smaller than the 313-ship fleet that Roughead has said he wants, tailored for battle against a peer competitor. This fleet would be composed of 12 aircraft carriers, 13 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 26 amphibious ships, 81 cruisers and destroyers, 54 corvettes, 21 auxiliaries and 56 submarines including attack, ballistic and cruise missiles boats.

If you compare this to the 313-ship plan, it is basically the same fleet with 1 more aircraft carrier, with 54 LCS instead of 55, and with 5 amphibious ships beyond the current 10 LPD-17s and 12 LSDs programmed (we assume 4 HSVs and one new LHA/LHD). The big loss here is the 7 DDG-1000s, 10 submarines, and 9 auxiliaries. When you think about it, with so little deviation from the current 313-ship plan, it basically describes the current 313-ship plan as a plan to build a fleet for Major Combat Operations.

Shaping force. A fleet of 534 ships, mostly corvettes and patrol boats better suited to littoral, maritime security and partnership operations. This force would be composed of six aircraft carriers, 24 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 48 amphibious ships, 48 cruisers and destroyers, 161 corvettes, 200 patrol craft, 30 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries, and 32 submarines of all classes.

The first thing that sticks out about this plan is it represents what it would take to insert an entire Marine Division in forcible entry operations, even though it is supposed to be about MSO and Partnership. Despite the obvious flaws of only 32 submarines, which if you do the math after say 12 SSBNs is only 20 SSNs, is that with so few submarines and aircraft carriers it eliminates deterrence against China. My favorite comment about this plan so far is that "it looks like something Thomas Jefferson would advocate for to stop the British in 1810." In other words, the idea that the US Navy can emphasize partnership operations is not realistic, but as we have indicated in the past, the Navy does need a subsection of the fleet dedicated to partnership operations. This clearly would represent overkill to those ends.

Balanced force. A fleet of 474 ships able to conduct operations from high-end battle to low-end counterterrorism and maritime security. This force would be composed of nine aircraft carriers, 23 big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers, 46 amphibious ships, 57 cruisers and destroyers, 132 corvettes, 160 patrol craft, 20 riverine squadrons, 15 auxiliaries and 32 submarines of all classes.

This plan is interesting. Several have indicated that of the three, this is the one they liked the most. The first thing we like about this plan is the willingness to reduce the CVN fleet to 9. We actually like the number 10 better, but that the Navy is signaling 9 is OK is not a small thing. Another thing that stands out to us is this plan leaves 19 Cruisers and 38 Destroyers. That is a future reduction of 24 AEGIS warships. At the expense of submarines and logistics, the Navy changes the current force by adding 11 LHA/LHDs and 24 Amphibious Ships to create a "balanced force" even before producing 132 corvettes and 160 patrol craft.

While all of these plans are well and good, we wonder how serious the Navy truly is in making a force structure adjustment. If you think about it, the "Major Combat Operations" plan is simply the 313-ship plan with acceptance of a few cuts along the way, mostly to submarines and logistics. In fact, the focus of cuts to submarines and logistics, and the desire for more Amphibious Ships, specifically LHAs and LHDs raises a lot of questions regarding future existing plans, in particular the Sea Base. It leaves us curious, are these major increases in amphibious numbers in the "Shaping Force" and "Balanced Force" really nothing but MPF(F) squadrons and JHSVs?

With the emphasis on Amphibious Warfare, which can be fairly questioned considering the major competitors at this time are China, Iran, and North Korea (3 places unlikely to to be invaded by Marines), we note the desire for more amphibious ship capabilities. This tends to imply the regional deployments over the last 20 or so months by the Saipan, Ashland, Carter Hall, Whidbey Island, Peral Harbor, Fort McHenry, Peleliu, and Wasp have all been very successful. By that we note an apparent desire for more of these capabilities.

The emphasis of amphibious ships, absent any credible need for forcible entry operations, tends to imply a desire for specific metrics that are currently specific to amphibious ships, which is why we immediately jumped yesterday to discuss the concept of a mothership. One of the common themes, and the source for such a call must be forward commanders for it to make its way into each proposal, is for increased aviation capability for aviation capabilities other than fixed wing, as reflected by each plan increasing the number of LHAs and LHDs.

If this is indeed the case, it bring us back to the entire set of arguments between the big carrier vs small carrier crowds who had a major debate over CVN-21. We sided with the Navy that big deck carriers offer more to the Navy than small deck carriers, but in doing so we would side with critics who should now call upon the Navy to prove it.

The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) is returning home from its deployment, and should make it home on or around December 23rd. The Enterprise is completing the second of 2 major deployments back to back, the first being from May 2006 until November 2006, then again from July 2007 to December 2007. That is basically 14 months of deployment over a 20 month period, and between November 2006 and July 2007 the Enterprise conducted several training cruises off the east coast. The Enterprise will enter the yard next year and basically be out of action for all of 2008, and won't make another deployment until mid to late 2009.

When she returns, the Enterprise will have about 5 years of life left in her at the current rate of deployment, which clearly (and particularly when you factor in she was in the Pacific for exercises in 2006) these deployments beat on an old ship like the Enterprise.

The Navy is sending the signal that a reduction of aircraft carriers below the current 11 threshold is possible, but if doing so the desire to increase Marine Aviation capabilities is necessary. When you also account for the confusion and frustration regarding the aviation aspect of the Sea Base concept, we would encourage the Navy to evaluate how to proceed with the USS Enterprise with its upcoming yard work.

Instead of returning her to sea as the 11th CVN, we encourage the Navy to spend some money and convert her into as much of the aviation solution as possible for the Sea Base concept, specifically converting her to support as many of the 192 required CH-46 equivalents required for the ACE element of a MEB. By removing the two catapults on the angled deck, but retaining the two up front, the Navy would then be in a better position to evaluate virtually every scenario discussed regarding Sea Basing, forward deployed aviation capabilities, and establish a true set of requirements for aviation at sea in the 21st century beyond the big deck fixed wing carriers.

The Enterprise life can be extended by removing it from the forward deployment cycle and utilizing the ship as a technology demonstrator for Sea Basing, including important discussed but often discarded possibilities like support for lighter than air aviation, BUT also supporting C-130 operations at sea and the evaluation of requirements to deploy air assault elements of the 101st Airborne.

This is a proposal for evolution, as opposed to revolution in the fleet force structure changes, and evaluation of requirements and metrics required to meet emerging expectations. The Navy has already expressed desire to meet the new Maritime Strategy with an improved force structure better suited to the requirements of the 21st century, Joint requirements btw which not only includes the Coast Guard and Marines, but Army and Air Force as well. This reduction of a single aircraft carrier not only illustrates the flexibility of the large deck aircraft carrier, but reinforces the Navy's desire to all services to be a Joint Force for supporting the national interest. During a period where funding is a competitive sport in Congress, demonstrating joint force multiplying capabilities and sacrificing major platforms like an aircraft carrier for the purpose of testing and evaluation of concepts to be funded reinforces the Navies case for more funding, an aspect of this proposal not to be undersold when the time comes.

If we have learned anything from the new proposals, it would appear the Navy is in search for a new set of metrics in a future fleet. While aviation is still desired, the type of aviation is different than in the past. We are not seeing an emphasis of long range missile ships, rather a desire for well decks. We are not seeing a desire for more AEGIS, rather more smaller, faster vessels. Although with all proposals demonstrating a remarkable lack of logistics and submarines, maybe its fair to question the Navy proposals completely and disregard them all, accepting the possibility we really haven't learned anything at all regarding the thinking in the Navy.

Maybe, but we think speculating on the future fleet is more interesting.

The Navy Discusses Force Structure Changes

When I read this article over breakfast, I nearly spit my coffee on my monitor. Fresh off the development of the new Maritime Strategy, Vice Adm. John Morgan is reportedly floating ideas on future fleet structure. While his first few ideas didn't appear to get any traction, this is a great development in my opinion.

The Navy’s top strategist has floated to the chief of naval operations three alternatives to the service’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan that if adopted would radically reshape American naval power.

The three options are contained in a 26-page briefing titled “Three Futures, One Navy, A Portfolio Analysis” by Vice Adm. John Morgan, the service’s strategy chief, which was e-mailed to Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations, just before the Thanksgiving holiday.

OK so it is basically an informal process at this point, but at least there is some process in development.

Each of the notional fleets increases amphibious ships but cuts submarines, while one increases the number of aircraft carriers. Two of the options would dramatically increase the number of small corvettes, patrol craft and riverine forces.

The briefing assumes the Navy’s ship construction budgets will remain constant at about $12.5 billion annually over the coming three decades for a total of $377 billion. But that $12.5 billion figure, sources said, is below the roughly $15 billion annual shipbuilding budget that the service has previously said it would achieve over the coming years, which is critical to the execution of the current 30-year plan.

Each of the options assume the following unit costs: nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at $5 billion, big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers of either LHA or LHD classes at $2.5 billion, amphibious ships of LSD or LPD classes at $1 billion, cruisers and destroyers at $1 billion, corvettes of the LCS class at $500 million, patrol craft at $100 million, riverine squadrons at $100 million, submarines at $2.5 billion, and auxiliaries at $500 million.

The devil is in the details here, note some important characteristics of these early discussions. First, it needs to be noted that the Navy is run by surface warfare and aviation officers, so it should not too surprising they would look to cut submarines first, or even look to increase the number of aircraft carriers. Submarines are expensive, and it is an easy place to grab money quickly over an extended period of time.

I'm not too impressed with the costing here, lets face it, the figures are not realistic, but the Navy doesn't have a reputation of realism with their budgets anyway, so we'll let that slide a bit as well. Otherwise, there is great stuff here.

Increase Amphibious Ships

First note that the emphasis is to increase amphibious ships. While the LPD-17 certainly got off to the wrong start, the hull is widely recognized as a terrific platform, and can be reused in a number of ways. The Mesa Verde (LPD 19), commissioned this past weekend, reminds us that after you get through early problems a class of ships can be built to meet price targets and with excellent quality.

I have argued for more Amphibious ships even before the new Maritime Strategy, but with the new Strategy it is almost a foregone conclusion the need exists. The problem of coarse is how do you pay for them, and should the Navy stick with standard configurations beyond the first 10 LPD-17s built. I would argue, emphatically even, the answer is no.

One of the great things about the LPD-17 design is that it is so big, it can be adjusted to give more or less of certain capabilities. I would propose the way forward is to dust off the "50 ft plug" version of the LPD-17, increasing the size of the well deck to support 3 LCACs or 2 LCAC(X), and increase the aviation facilities to support 2 MV-22s, thus building 4 larger LPD-17s specific to the task of "Forward Operating Bases," otherwise known as motherships. Additionally, instead of filling the ship solely with Marines, the Navy should build and deploy surface craft the size of the original LCAC built specifically as small independent FACs, deployable from the improved LPD design.

They should be armed, fast, and able to be logistically supplied by helicopter for extended operations if necessary. These small deployable fast attack patrol craft would replace the $100 million patrol craft described above. By making these patrol craft deployable by well decks, the Navy solves several of the problems associated with deployments and logistics in operating theaters. They should be treated as commissioned warships.

The mothership would be nuclear powered, to give it greater range and faster speed for quick response to regional developments. With a focus on Command and Control and Logistics, they should also be armed for limited strike operations as well, but treated as High Value Units specific to addressing irregular warfare challenges. Roles not only include the capability to be utilized as an Amphibious Ship, but additionally as a rapid response vessel to humanitarian crisis in forward deployed theaters. Consideration should be given to providing the facilities necessary to perform the roles of Partnership Stations, which means first class medical facilities and a machine shop capable of small repairs coast guard vessels of partner nations. Instead of cargo loads of Marine vehicles, detachment vehicles able to be airlifted is all that would be required, instead allowing the Navy to forward stage unmanned systems of all kinds for distribution to other naval assets operating in theater.

Corvettes of the LCS Class

Following the construction of the original pair of Littoral Combat Ships, I hope the Navy considers a mix of "naval trucks" and "LCS Corvettes." There is certainly some value for the "naval truck" concept, but without a tender to exchange mission modules at sea, these ships will ultimately fall short of expectation. The OHPs need a replacement just as badly as the now retired Osprey class, mixing the build to include various types of LCS class ships gives the Navy flexibility in developing its concepts for small, fast, low cost warships.

This approach also allows the Navy to test the above LPD-17 "50 ft plug" proposed above as a forward deployed mission module tender for the LCS class. With all that cargo space on the LPD-17 hull, the ship should be able to deploy numerous mission modules, and support the maintenance facilities that are also lacking forward deployed in supporting unmanned systems. We already know the LCS isn't large enough to carry all the toys the Navy wants to move forward, so why not carry the tools forward on a forward operating "Sea Base" and allow them to be swapped in and out as required. This reduces the need to continue requirement creep into future LCS designs, as repairs of UUVs can be conducted by a forward unit, but additionally if a certain unmanned system is needed in greater numbers than the programmed modules intend, that will be available as well. The Navy would end up with a high end naval truck for unmanned systems fully supported by a forward operating "Sea Base," but additionally the same "Sea Base" can support unmanned systems from the smaller "LCS Corvette," other surface vessels in theater, and additionally in smaller numbers from the deployable patrol craft.

How do you pay for these ideas? Well, if the Navy canceled the DDG-1000, they would find $15 billion to buy all of what is being discussed above, and I find it hard to believe, even with nuclear power, what is being discussed would cost that amount of money. This is the first of several ideas on how to free money to expand the fleet.

The above proposal would eliminate 5 DDG-1000s but would add 12-16 additional ships, 4 motherships and between 8 and 12 fast patrol craft, a net gain of 7-11, and additionally move money to allow for a larger variety of options based on the LCS hull designs. Because this proposal removes the need to increase the size of the LCS to overcome shortcomings in the current design, there is a good argument you can also find additional LCS hulls in this proposal.

Is it a cost saver in the operational budget? Over time, nuclear power would probably be cheaper and built in logistics models can certainly save money for small craft and for LCS logistics, but in absolute terms it is difficult to give a definitive answer. It will certainly save money in the shipbuilding budget though.

Canceled LCS Opens Doors for a Better Navy

I only have time for a quick update, busy day.
LCS-4 was canceled yesterday, coverage here and here.

This may mean great things for the Navy, and I can prove it. If you think otherwise, you have the weekend to collect your facts, because I've got plenty to support my reasoning.

Congress will meet in committee soon to decide the rest of the outstanding Navy issues I listed here.

If the committee decides to cut the 3 LCS from the shipbuilding budget, add the 10th LPD-17, add the T-AKEs, and begin funding for building 2 Virginia class submarines Congress has an opportunity to pass the best shipbuilding budget so far during this administration, and insuring the quality of the Navy while establishing the priority for a better Navy in the 21st century.

One could only hope.

Big Decisions for Big Programs in FY08 Budget

On October 22nd, InsidetheNavy (subscription) ran an article called "Taylor Urging Senators to Agree to Nuclear Power, Larger Fleet" in which he had a few choice comments for the Navy and the industry.

“I think it’s time for Congress to step in and say this is what the Navy needs to do.”

The congressman commended Navy Secretary Donald Winter for accepting responsibility for the design of ships and the oversight of shipbuilding, but noted that “he’s one man -- he going to need some help.” Winter needs an acquisition executive that will help him convince the major shipyards that their major responsibility is to the fleet, Taylor said.

“He’s going to need some very capable help and quite frankly he’s going to need a head-knocker because the major shipbuilders -- they think their major responsibility is to their shareholders,” Taylor said. “I think their responsibility is to the fleet.”

These comments come among the backdrop of two very different spending bills for the Navy included in the FY08 Defense Budget. The House and Senate bills do a lot of things differently, and there are going to be some tough decisions hammered out in committee when they get together over the next few days. Below is a summery of the issues facing Congress.

Virginia Class Submarine

The House and the Senate both added additional funding to the FY08 budget for advanced procurement of a new Virginia class submarine. The House added $588 million which includes around $400 million to begin construction of the reactor, the item requiring the longest lead time in a new submarine. The Senate approved $470 million. Starting advance procurement in FY08 will allow an additional submarine to be added to the FY09 budget next year, perhaps starting a construction run of 2 Virginia class submarines per year 2 years earlier than intended in the 313-ship plan.

Lewis and Clark Class Dry Cargo Ships

Both the Senate and the House added 1 T-AKE to this years budget and authorized one more T-AKE for next year. The House went further though, adding an additional $1.4 billion to the National Sealift Defense Fund to buy two more T-AKE dry cargo ships on top of the 2 already mentioned above.

San Antonio Class Amphibious Ship

The House added around $1.7 billion for a 10th San Antonio class amphibious ship. The Senate did not include any provision for the 10th LPD-17. The Marines are eager for the ship and are lobbying for its inclusion.

UH-1Y/AH-1Z Marine Corps Helicopter Program

Both the House and the Senate recommended reductions to the program The House dropped $104 million from the $518 million request while the Senate killed dropped $78 million and eight aircraft. Since both bills were passed, the Navy has informed Bell Helicopter Textron to plan for the program to increase to acquiring around 123 UH-1Y utility helicopters and 226 AH-1Z attack helicopters as part of an initiative to grow the Marine Corps to 202,000 Marines. This is up from the original request of 100 UH-1Ys and 180 AH-1Zs. Currently, the average UH-1Y costs around $18 million, and the average AH-1Z costs around $21 million. It will be interesting to see if the Navy is able to influence either the Senate or the House regarding the program reductions given the program is expected to get larger to reflect other Congressional changes in the FY08 Defense Budget.

Littoral Combat Ship

The biggest debate is the LCS, and the entire program could hang in the balance of the decisions made in committee. All four versions of the appropriations and authorization bills are different in their recommendations regarding cuts to the LCS program. The LCS request is complicated by the Navy's April decision to drop one of the three ships it asked for in its original February budget submission to Congress, but it is further complicated by the ongoing contract negotiations with General Dynamics regarding the 2nd General Dynamics ship funded in FY07. The Navy hopes to have the GD contract negotiations concluded before the Senate and House bang out the final LCS program for FY08 in committee.

The House has recommended reducing the Navy's request for two ships to one, authorizing $339.5 million to buy one new LCS hull. The Senate has recommended no new ships and pulls funding for the GD LCS currently under contract negotiation, and moving up the timetable to pick one of two competing designs by the end of 2008 instead of 2010.

Of the original $910 million request in the Presidents original budget, the House cut $571 million and two ships, while the Senate dropped the entire $910 million request.

The Navy doesn't really like any of the options in either the House or the Senate, and is lobbying hard for $460 million to fund a single LCS in FY08 while hoping to keep funding for the 2nd General Dynamics LCS funded in FY07. According to those in Panama last week, Rear Adm. Charles Goddard said that if 1 LCS is funded in FY08, the Navy would hold a competition for the ship between General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin.

The contract renegotiation with GD over LCS3 is only part of the story though, unless the contract impresses the Senate, those negotiations may end up being a lot of effort for not. In asking around, I can't find anyone, and I mean nobody in the Navy, Industry, Congress... willing to predict what will happen with the LCS. That in itself says a lot.

2 more items of note. First, both the Senate and the House cut LCS mission module funding as well, citing LCS ship cuts as the primary reason. Second, the FY08 Budget has language in it that changes the name "Department of the Navy" to "The Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps." I'm thinking CDR needs to hold a new logo design contest.

"Lack in Strategic Direction" for DoD R&D; Funding

The November edition of National Security Magazine is out, and it has a number of excellent articles. One of the more interesting, and timely IMO, article is the aptly named "Defense Department Should Refocus Technology Spending, Experts Warn" by Sandra I. Erwin.

The Pentagon’s research and development budget has never been bigger. Despite such largesse, investments in technology tend to miss the mark and do little to enhance the United States’ competitive standing as a high-tech powerhouse, said Pentagon advisors and outside analysts.

Defense research and development budgets will exceed $80 billion in fiscal year 2008, of which about $12 billion will be allocated to long-term science and technology projects. Most of the funds pay for so-called “applied research” for near-term needs — including modifications of existing weapon systems and war-related projects such as technologies to help troops detect and disarm roadside bombs.

But despite a steady rise in R&D spending, the Defense Department has not been able to replicate the technological success witnessed during the Cold War, when the Pentagon delivered a string of breakthrough technologies that, to this day, continue to provide military forces major advantages, such as unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, stealth and Global Positioning System satellites.

The problem today appears to be a “lack of strategic direction,” said an April 2007 report by the Defense Science Board, a senior-level advisory panel.

“The Defense Department science and technology programs are not well positioned to meet the nation’s strategic challenges,” the panel wrote. Further, the Pentagon “needs to understand the technological possibilities available to the United States and the options available to adversaries.”

A lack of strategic direction? The new Maritime Strategy, intended to provide vision for the strategic direction of the Navy doesn't help, as it directs the Navy to do everything.

Eighty billion dollars driven by no strategic direction at a time when all services are struggling to fund platforms that are either aging or in disrepair due to the war. To reinforce the point, the article goes on to cite Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter in a recent speech at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s technology symposium.

But Winter also cautioned that a techno-centric view of the world is not helpful in the context of current wars.

“America’s technological superiority has thus far not proven decisive in this war,” Winter said. “Because of the stark differences in literacy rates, in economic development, and in technological advances between those seen in the West and the rest, we have a tendency to underestimate the ability of the enemy — whether a country or a non-state actor — to use technology.”

The 9/11 attacks and the roadside bombs that target U.S. troops in Iraq, for example, were not technology surprises, he said. “Rather, they were unanticipated tactics and uses of technology, not unlike the use of kamikaze pilots in World War II.”

In the near term, Winter said, “We need to defeat this enemy’s ability to make tactical use of technology to strategic effect.”

The U.S. military also must consider that future adversaries will have access to militarily useful technology as readily as Americans do, he added. The harsh reality, said Winter, “is that the most technologically advanced country in the world is finding that its technological edge is not always a decisive advantage.”

This speaks directly to what I was talking about on Friday with the new Maritime Strategy. I see the MS as designed to treat the symptoms in the maritime strategic environment. It addresses everything from dealing with and preventing major power war to irregular challenges that can disrupt global economics in the maritime environment, but it does not focus on the core problems that create the symptoms, in fact it glosses over them and implies them without tackling them directly. America faces four challenges to our maritime superiority; the emergence of competition and/or cooperation with China, the diminishing domestic maritime industrial capacity, the irregular challenges to the global commons related to the rise of Islamic Extremists, and other non-state actors, and our increasing reliance on foreign sources of energy.

I believe that the Navy should have designed a strategy to specifically address the core problems facing the Navy, specifically building upon the traditional strengths of our nation and focusing them on the problems.

To address the rise of China the US needs to leap ahead of current capabilities, so when China arrives to the point we are today, we will be yet another generation --- or two ahead. This is done through R&D and innovation into the future of naval warfare: Unmanned air systems, underwater superiority strategies, and dedicated focus for space superiority. If a Navy has control over the sea and under the sea, a Navy has control of the entire sea. The purpose is to support a fleet to address major war situations.

To address the diminishing domestic maritime industrial capacity, the Navy can refocus its R&D budget to address new technologies, and build a combination of prototypes low cost vessels. The Navy built 8 single class nuclear submarines during the cold war, and built a number of other single class vessels, some of which still serve to this day (USS Enterprise (CVN 65)). The way I see it, the Navy is building prototypes today: LCS-1, LCS-2, DDG-1000, and DDG-1001 represent four different hulls and a variety of brand new technology. Not a single one of those ships currently has a long production run on order, nor will they for at least another year or two.
A shipbuilding strategy that builds single vessel classes insures maturity of design when production starts. It forces competing innovations that ultimately reduce cost. RAND has said as much in several studies of shipbuilding, specifically pointing out that the next submarine design needs to start in 2009 even though the SSBN(X) doesn't need to be fielded until 2024. Noteworthy, RAND pointed out that extra time in design always saves money. See the British recent trouble fielding their new nuclear subs for further evidence, which explains why the UK MoD is committed to keeping R&S funded as a top priority, even if the nation has to give up some of its industrial capacity due to costs. R&D is critical to keeping shipbuilding costs down, which is critical to keeping the domestic maritime industrial capacity healthy.

To address the irregular challenges to the global commons related to the rise of Islamic extremists, the Navy can build many lower cost platforms designed for the soft power mission that accept reduced capability at lower costs. This has been done before, the last time the Navy needed to fill a specialized gap was during the cold war, when the Navy built a reduced capability frigate for convoy escort. The Navy was able to mass produce the ship because of its intentional reduced capabilities, and the vessel is widely considered successful. The purpose is to support a fleet to address irregular warfare situations, and the healthy side effect is plenty of work for the domestic maritime industrial capacity.

Finally, R&D is critical to reducing our nations increasing reliance on foreign sources of energy, and the Navy has a role here. The USS Nautilus (SSN 571), the USS Enterprise (CVN 65), the USS Long Beach (CGN 9), and the USS Bainbridge (CGN 25) all represented a break from traditional power sources for naval vessels in the late 50s and early 60s. All 4 were single class vessels. Where is a similar strategy today? Nuclear technology isn't the only option, Hydrogen power technologies are coming online but suffering from a lack of research funding in fuel cells.

But proactive in new forms of energy isn't the only approach one can take with R&D, nuclear disposal is an alternative. Congress and the nation would be more open to nuclear technology if there was innovative techniques that reduced the cost of dealing with nuclear waste. Funding for that is minimal, but it is a concern soon to directly effect the Navy with the retirements of so many nuclear submarines. Where is the Navy on addressing our nations energy concerns? Out defending oil rigs...

In case you were wondering, other than the JSF, the majority of Navy R&D is dedicated to the development of the surface fleet, including faster, lighter, and stealthy among other things. Tango Bravo, UCAS-N development, and alternative energy funding by the Navy is less than a billion dollars total even if you combine all three.

R&D in the DoD is chaotic suffering from a lack of direction according to the Defense Science Board. Their complaints aren't in a vacuum though, it represents the yearning for a larger strategy based in American innovation for solutions to the problems creating the crisis's that ultimately require the bulk of our military attention in foreign policy. It has been said there is no evidence to support a larger DoD focus to leverage R&D as a strategy, and no pressure on the Navy. From what I can tell, there is plenty of evidence to say that yearning for a grand strategy indeed exists, in fact everyone is looking for one of the services to step up in the role of leadership, but it appears no one is listening, and no one is willing to articulate the vision required for such a strategy.

Kaplan on US Navy Decline

If you haven't read America’s Elegant Decline by Robert D. Kaplan, the piece is long but worth it.

Those who are not subscribers to the Atlantic can read it in full at the US Navy Office of Information News Clips, in the Thursday October 4th edition.

Kaplan adds to a number of recent essays on what can be described as either the end of a naval era, or the beginning of a new era. The problem with either statement is the assumption that the US is actually engaged in such change. I fail to see evidence, and unless the upcoming Navy Maritime Strategy can find a way to penetrate the interests of public policy there is little evidence that the defense bureaucracy is interested in change.

The Next 12 Years Matter

In 1815, the Royal Navy found itself in a unique position. Britain had just completed an unpopular war with the Americans, while also recently emerging victorious over a revolutionary France. The Royal Navy found itself in a unique position, the sole remaining superpower with a large fleet to rule the waves and police the world heading into a new century.

The Royal Navy in 1815 faced a very uncertain future. The potential of a rebirth in the French Navy was possible, there was the potential of Russia pushing its Navy into the Atlantic, and America was a rising nation with incredible industrial potential that also raised concern. The admiralty had to make difficult decisions, and they did, and those decisions led to Royal Navy dominance at sea for well into the 20th century.

By 1817, with no naval competitor, the Royal Navy had reduced its ships of the line from 99 to 13 with several ships laid up in reserve. If the Royal Navy was going to maintain its naval superiority, it needed a plan that worked its inherent advantages. At the time Britain had the largest shipbuilding industry in the world, had the largest economy in the world, had the largest merchant fleet in the world, and had an efficient basing system that gave reach to operations virtually all over the world. This allowed Britain to make several critical decisions regarding shipbuilding, alliances, and how to handle innovation to maintain its naval superiority.

First though the Royal Navy had to define its role, which it did by taking on the war they were involved in, specifically the war against slavery, while also preparing for meeting the challenge of any emerging future rival.

For the war against slavery, the Royal Navy built a large fleet of smaller frigates, sloops, and brakes, which represented the low end of naval warships of the era. These smaller, faster ships would allow flexibility for the Royal Navy in eliminating the slave trade. In preparation for the next war, the Royal Navy adopted a strategy that Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Studies terms "the strategy of the second move." Because the Royal Navy had an existing fleet that was unmatched on the seas, the Royal Navy made a difficult decision to accept a 'good enough' fleet. Utilizing its economy and shipbuilding industry, instead of investing in new large ships, investment went into innovation for naval warfare and small ships to fight the current war.

This strategy entailed the Royal Navy developing technologies for naval warfare, but not incorporating them into the fleet until another nation did, or as a 'second move.' So for example, when the French started experimenting with explosive shells in the mid 1820s, the Royal Navy adopted explosive shells on all battleships by 1838. By 1840, the British merchant marine had over 700 steam powered ships, but the Royal Navy had none. However, as the French and Americans began looking into steam power for their naval vessels, the Royal Navy commissioned its first steam powered ship in 1845, and its first steam powered battleship, the HMS Agamemnon, in 1849 with the innovation of screw propellers.

When the Crimean War began in 1854, the Royal Navy had almost completely converted its main ships of the line to steam. When iron armor had revealed its potential in that war, the Royal Navy immediately adopted it with the commissioning of the HMS Warrior in 1861, which immediately made virtually every warship in the world Navies obsolete (and actually repeated a similar strategy of making the rest of the worlds Navies obsolete in 1906 with the commissioning of the HMS Dreadnaught).

By 1860, the most compelling part of this strategy wasn't its application of small, fast, flexible warships to address the war against slavery, nor the innovation and shipbuilding capacity that allowed the Royal Navy to rapidly adapt to new technologies, it was that the Royal Navy had sustained over 4 decades of naval superiority on a very mild budget. By maintaining a 'good enough' fleet, and by adopting a spiral development shipbuilding strategy that consisted of a large number of classes that consisted of few ships per class, constantly driven by the funding of innovations, the Royal Navy had been able to maintain superiority on a mild budget with gradual gains instead of spending a large budget on ships with generational leaps in technology.

History has repeated itself in the 21st century, and the US Navy finds itself in a similar position following the conclusion of the cold war. In 1989 the United States had become the worlds only remaining superpower with a very large fleet and no competitor on the horizon. By 2007, the fleet has been reduced to 278 ships, yet still finds itself without a naval competitor. Today the Navy is facing an uncertain future, a rapidly growing China and India, not to mention the potential rebirth of Russia. The US Navy finds itself engaged in a war today, with the possibility of one looming in the future. The US Navy also faces increasing budget pressure, meaning that any strategy adopted to meet these challenges needs to be able to work within a confined budget.

These similarities put the US Navy in 2007 in a similar position the Royal Navy found itself in 1817, but the plans forward appear to have nothing in common.

The Royal Navy in 1817 invested heavily in innovation but used modernization techniques to existing platforms to maintain its superiority, only building new platforms with existing, proven technologies. By comparison, the US Navy in 2007 has flat lined innovation, particularly for submarines, has downgraded the modernization of the existing fleets most important platform (DDG-51s), and is building new platforms that are almost completely based on new technologies.

The Royal Navy in 1817 committed to the long war it was in, and almost single handedly ended the slave trade worldwide by itself. The US Navy in 2007 is now engaged in a long war of its own, but has mildly accepted this role by throwing a modular solution that may, depending upon configuration, help in meeting the challenges posed by the war it is in. While a number of concepts have been adopted to fight the long war, specifically the Global Fleet Station concept, and the 1000 ship Navy concept, only the LCS is being built to actually effect these concepts, and even then it is questionable whether the LCS is actually a good fit in either concept.

So far in the 21st century, the Navy plan of action has committed enormous budgetary resources to building the transformational concept championed by Rumsfeld. This plan of action calls for rushing the Navy into a generational leap in naval power, despite the reality the US Navy is already at least a generation ahead of the closest potential competitor, in preparation for the war of tomorrow while almost completely ignoring the war of today. Is this really the way ahead? The existing fleet of CGs and DDGs, which represents more on board firepower at sea than the next 17 Navies in the world combined, is younger on average than the aircraft in the US Navy, and not a single one of these ships requires a replacement until 2020 at the earliest.

Why then is the Navy committing over 55% of its total shipbuilding budget between 2007 and 2020 to more cruisers and destroyers, while reducing innovation in submarines, while reducing total expeditionary capacity at sea, while reducing logistical capability for the fleet, while spending aviation funding to build it, and while building a token warship (LCS) for the war the nation is currently engaged in? The Navy is completely ignoring the potential, much less the evaluation, of new naval concepts that ForceNET technology has pointed to as revolutionary in simulation, like streetfighter, arsenal ship, underwater superiority systems, or mother ship technologies. These technologies, due to the lack of focus on innovation in today's Navy, will remain unknown in potential while the Navy races to deploy more cruisers and destroyers during the only time period until 2020 when an existing cruiser or destroyer doesn't need to be replaced.

Roughead and Gates need to get the priorities of the Navy inline with the priorities of the Nation, because as things stand, it is impossible to see how the Rumsfeld naval strategy addresses either the war we are in today, or will be affordable enough to have the Navy ready for the war tomorrow. The key for the US Navy to maintain its naval superiority in the 21st century is to utilize the next 12 years to innovate and prove which technologies will be decisive, so in 2020 when the fleet of tomorrow replaces the fleet of today, the Navy can execute an affordable plan efficiently based on proven technologies that make the generational leap transformation calls for. Continuing the rush into that generational leap today wastes the advantage the US has guaranteed itself with the existing fleet until 2020.

The next 12 years matter.

14,500 Tons of Littoral Cruising, Invisible, Survivable, Multi-Mission Capable, NSFS, Sea Striking, Deep Reach Firepower

....or something like that.

Another month, another issue of Proceedings that says nothing about the current Sea Base plan. For those counting, that is 26 straight months the Nations Premier Independent Forum on Defense publishes without a single article that addresses the $14+ billion dollar industry proposed Sea Base plan first leaked in June of 2005, including 2 issues devoted exclusively to issues of the Marine Corp btw. Bob told me the articles are coming, so maybe next month...

Don't get me wrong, I am a Proceedings subscriber and will be for life. In fact I need to get on the lifetime membership list sooner rather than later so I can quit learning about the contents of the new issues from lifetime subscribers like Gary and Rick (the theory is, lifetime subscribers get their issue shipped first).

This months issue, the annual Coast Guard issue, is still outstanding. Most notable for me was the article "The Navy and Its DDG-1000—Heading Wrong" by Captain Robert H. Smith, U.S. Navy (Retired). If you are reading this blog and you cannot read it online, you need to register because the article is free in the online content section. While your at it you should consider subscribing, for no other reason than to donate money to the great causes supported by the US Naval Institute.

Captain Smith's article takes on the Navy SWO communities expectation to build the DDG-1000 to be as stealthy as a submarine and with the strike capability of an aircraft.

The DDG-1000-class makes plain the lineaments of our Navy’s skewed vision: Remnants of sentiment clinging to a bypassed romantic ideal of the destroyer; and faith of those in its thrall that technology can overcome the impermeability of sea water and assure surface ships’ survival in the environment of the missile and the submarine. There is as well a late-blooming infatuation with that over-hyped locale known as “the littoral,” and the Navy’s straining for larger roles that the immediate conflict denies. And, as always, addiction to the kinds of advocacy that sweeps aside damning truths, with our Navy foremost among the deceived.

A recent phenomenon is an exhortation to “think outside the box.” Meaning what, I haven’t the foggiest. But I suspect that the time is nigh to pop back inside it.

Inside the box, the sea air clears the head, and answers stand out sharp as hulls on a knife edge horizon. Vision refreshed, the Navy’s altered goals should be the creation of classes of affordable warships scaled back to capabilities realistically attainable. Conveying the nature of such ships, it is easier to begin with what it will not be, what it cannot do.

Read it all.

I am a fairly well researched person on Navy public statements, and I am unaware of any instance where the DDG-1000 includes statements regarding what it will not be, what it cannot do. I have, on the other hand, read too many transcripts where the Navy goes on and on about the DDG-1000 within the context of the networked 313-ship fleet being ideal for addressing the GWOT, meeting challenges from future competitors, providing NSFS for Marines, and in general meeting all threats over the next few decades.

The glaring issue here is the Navy's dedication to meet all threats has been folded into a single platform, actually seven platforms, at the traditional cost of around 17 of the previous generations ship designed to meet that role. The CBO said last month the first two DDG-1000s are to cost 4.8 billion each, with the other 5 costing an average of 3.5 billion each. That is 27.1 billion dollars for 7 ships in FY08 dollars. By comparison a new DDG-51 would cost 1.6 billion in FY08 dollars, meaning for the cost of the DDG-1000 class, the Navy could buy 17 more DDG-51 Flight IIAs.

The DDG-51 Flight IIAs are admittedly expensive to operate, but that doesn't mean the money couldn't be for already existing proposals that would meet the same requirements at a higher quantity than the DDG-1000. The DDG-1000 was originally billed as the much needed NSFS platform. Well, why not think out of the box on NSFS? I might be guessing here, but I bet a 40 ton NSFS ship off shore is harder to see than a 14,500 ton ship, in both night and day, and I'd bet one can get more guns, more rounds down range, and more survivability in NSFS with a system like that at a lower cost too.

Additionally, there is the Lockheed Martin LCS AEGIS design, the General Dynamics LCS AEGIS design, and the Gibbs and Cox AAW AEGIS design. I'd bet the reduced costs would get the Navy more than 17 ships even if you bought all 3 classes. These designs can be molded to meet every single realistic requirement for a US Navy surface combatant, whether AAW, ASW, ASuW, or MIW and including missions other than war.

Can someone honestly state emphatically the 7 DDG-1000s will enhance the future Navy's capability further than 17 DDG-51 Flight IIA equivalents? The Navy is not a philosophical organization, there is an expectation that somewhere hard science supports the wild claims behind the DDG-1000s "transformational" capability. Where is the modern science or even the modern history that a large surface combatant is able to achieve the characteristics of a submarines stealth on the battlefield? Why then do the Navy brass continue to sell the DDG-1000 survivability in similar terms?

SECNAV said back in April:

One problem for the Navy is that over the years it has lost its "domain knowledge and understanding" and has attempted, in many cases, to pull more of that capability from industry than it has in the past, Winter said.

"[We're] asking industry to come up with solutions, as opposed to going in and saying 'we want a ship of this type and this design with these features and capabilities,'" he explained. "We've had a tendency to depend upon industry to optimize those configurations."

The Navy has to define what it wants for the future, Winter asserted.

"It's the Navy's fleet, it's not a contractor's fleet, and ships, for the most part, don't operate by themselves. Ships operate with other ships whether it is a CSG (Carrier Strike Group) or ESG (Expeditionary Strike Group) or any operations, and it's just not other ships, it's aircraft and other systems that support them," Winter said. "I think we have to go back and reassert the Navy's role in terms of defining what it is we are, we also have to develop ... re-develop, the ability to manage the contractors."

There has been a theme in the Pentagon, for many years, that says the services just have to outsource...let the contractors do it...competitive pressures will take care of everything, Winter said.

Shipbuilding is directly tied to the Navy plan. Industry is running the show on Sea Basing, and industry is tapping into the Navy's natural desire for requirement creep with the DD-21/DD(X)/DDG-1000. As long as the Navy sticks with the 313-ship plan weighed heavily towards fewer, unreasonable expectations regarding "transformational" capabilities on fewer platforms, the shipbuilding industry can continue to expect fewer orders with unreasonable expectations attached to the industries sustainment.

The irony, for the Sea Base, the industry and the Navy gravitated to a more affordable design that utilized as much existing technology as possible. It is possible that if the industry and Navy put the same theory into practice with the surface fleet, 313-ships would be the low end of the numbers the US Navy would have to operate, as opposed to what it is now, an unreachable figure.