Naval Presence Shifts Towards 2020

These slides from OPNAV were passed around several months ago as an example of the pivot to Asia. Some have identified these slides as representative of the slides presented at a recent CNO press conference. The first slide begins with the expected Naval Presence of 2013.

This is basically today. Note the gold ships are the sustained, forward deployed ships and the blue ships are the rotational CONUS forces. Noteworthy how the SSGNs are counted as steady state, forward deployed operational assets.

It continues with a slide of Naval Presence of 2017.

This is where the map starts getting interesting.

South America
Note that the Navy intends to move 10 PCs, many of which are currently in the Middle East, to the South American theater in support of SOUTHCOM by 2017. I am interested to see how that works with 1 amphibious ship and no combat logistics. In my opinion there looks to be a real opportunity for Navy/Coast Guard cooperation in that theater that is not getting a close enough look, for example, why wouldn't an AFSB for MSO and logistics not be very effective in that region? Everything has short legs, and having a place to move spare parts around at sea isn't a bad thing. It also doesn't hurt to have a UAV pad in the middle of the water. Just saying... that environment isn't likely to get better anytime soon, and has a real potential to get much worse - particularly if we start seeing more legit submarines instead of semi-submersables. It is worth noting the CG/DDG/FFGs in SOUTHCOM are replaced by 10 PCs and 2 JHSVs, not Littoral Combat Ships.

Europe/Africa
Rota is now a BMD base, and sailors will be lining up for duty on those ships. It is still very much unclear what ships the US Navy intends to station there. If it is me, I send 4 DDG Flight Is with BMD so I don't have to send and pay for RW (sorry guys!). Worth noting the full time amphibious ship is now augmented by 2 JHSVs assigned to Africa, which have replaced two large surface combatants. These ships almost certainly represent engagement work the Marine Corps is working on today towards tailored Enhanced Rifle Companies and other tailored Blue/Green assets for Partnership Station type of activity. What I find noteworthy, and useful, is that these platforms are retaining their RW capabilities, and all three ships are well suited for SOF activities if tasking is necessary. These are very flexible forces, but it means UAVs will be the only assured option to provide direct fires in contingency. That's OK, but I still think putting VLS in the San Antonio class amphibious ships for long range cruise missile capability remains an important omission in the modern force, and something the Navy needs to reconsider as an important capability as the large surface combatants move away from theaters that are traditional hotspots for SOF operations.

Middle East
Worth noting the 12 PC/MCMs has become 4 LCS, 4 MCM, and 2 JHSV. Note that the SSGN and 2 CG/DDGs that had been operating down in Africa in 2013 are moved up to the Persian Gulf region by 2017, basically suggesting an assumption that all naval activities off Africa today can be replaced in whole by two JHSVs. That is a remarkable assumption that I have a hard time believing has any merit whatsoever.

Pacific
Look closely and note that by 2017 the great pivot to Asia strategy being touted by Secretary Panetta will be the massive increase in naval forces of - four Littoral Combat Ships and two Joint High Speed Vessels. It is one thing to try not to provoke China into an arms race, but when this is the massive maritime shift towards the Pacific touted at the political level as national defense strategy, one has to wonder what our allies are truly thinking about our empty words policy. I'll also make a brief point - the reason I keep jabbing the Army with a stick and pointing to the Pacific is because it is plainly obvious the Navy is talking a big game but isn't doing anything significant there, and the force is not growing in the future, so the US Army needs to expect as an opening assumption that they will be left completely ineffective as a fighting force in the Pacific if they are dependent upon the US Navy, because the US Army will never get where they need to be unless the Army can figure out a way to make the islands of the Pacific a network of forward operating bases by which the Navy has no responsibility for their limited forces to defend, because every ship defending an island is one less ship to move the Army into the combat zone by force.

General Notes
The requirement appears to be around 1200 VLS in the Middle East in 2017, and 1500 VLS in the Pacific in 2020. Also, in my opinion, with the exception of SOUTHCOM this map looks to me what a "strategy of holding the line" looks like. You know what else bothers me about this map? It is a reminder that in 2017 US forces are basically organized in traditional heavy task forces like CSGs and ARGs, and with the exception of SSGNs and the 10 PCs in SOUTHCOM, nothing about this map sticks out as having a capability that is inherently disruptive for a bad actor in any specific area. LCS and JHSVs will be useful for their limited purposes, which is ISR and engagement respectively, but the US Navy has a shortage of assets that stand out as disruptive - punching politically and diplomatically above their weight.

It conclude with a slide of Naval Presence in 2020.

Pacific
The pivot to the Pacific has completed, and this major pivot ends up being 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 2 Joint High Speed Vessels. I am very unclear how the politics of the pivot to Asia somehow became a public diplomacy centered around the maritime domain with the US Navy doesn't even move a single major surface combatant or submarine to the Pacific as part of this touted pivot.


Europe/Africa/South America
Note that in all three places the major change the primary feature is the addition of a pair of Littoral Combat Ships. What I find very interesting is that for both Africa and South America the pair of Littoral Combat Ships is replacing the presence previously filled by an amphibious ship. This is the first document I have seen from OPNAV (that I can publish anyway) that supports the arguments I have made on this blog regarding how the LCS is more of an amphibious ship capability than a surface combatant capability it is usually generally referred to as. While that is an interesting side note, I'm not convinced it means anything other than how the numbers fit together in PPT.

General Notes
Note that the suggested plan according to this PPT is for 8 LCS in the Persian Gulf before more than 4 are in the Pacific, indeed 18 Littoral Combat Ships are specifically accounted for on this graphic, but only 4 in the Pacific. Obviously this is a moment in time look at what the Navy is thinking, but they are interesting moments and time, and interesting thoughts about future force dispersion.

About Those Fixed Wing Aircraft on Bonnie Dick

Wow. Scoopdeck had part of the story when they spotted the photos, but when I asked what was going on the other day I was told to wait for the rest of the story.

I am not disappointed.

The amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), en route to participate in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2010, is carrying unique cargo for training evolutions during the international maritime exercise. Bonhomme Richard left San Diego June 14 with two Czechoslovakian-built 1964 and 1965 Aero-Vodochody airplanes, modified with U.S. standard small turbojet J60 engines. These planes will simulate air to surface missile attacks for training purposes, during RIMPAC.

Traveling aboard with the embarked aircraft is retired U.S. Navy Cmdr. Gerry Gallop, who is Chief Operating Officer for Tactical Air Support Inc. The company, that owns and operates the aircraft, provides consulting services, tactics development and test and evaluation services to U.S. THIRD Fleet.

“Our company’s main goal is to increase readiness through quality training with affordable platforms,” Gallop explained. “It adds realism and training value, because we can do a pretty-good job simulating a profile a missile would fly.”

Gallop said that he and three other retired military pilots will fly the Aero Vodochody airplanes during the RIMPAC exercise.

“We all happened to retire from the military, but we weren’t done contributing,” reflected Gallop. ”So we came together and found a way to continue doing what we are passionate about and continue to contribute to training and readiness of the U.S. military.”

Gallop said the modified Aero-Vodochody airplanes reach top speeds of approximately 420 knots or approximately 500 miles per hour. Tomahawk cruise missiles move at speeds of approximately 550 miles per hour. The ability to use the contracted aircraft in training simulations provides a more realistic and time-sensitive approach to the detection and countermeasures used to combat an inbound threat.

“They (Aero-Vodochody) are a particularly reliable, simpler airplane, which we have modified extensively to give us more power and performance,” explained Gallop. “We’re not as fast as an actual missile, but we’re pretty close.”

Big time well done to Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Katherine Barkley for the article, and indeed, the PAOs who are putting out information on RIMPAC 2010 appear to be doing a great job.

I guess I only have one question. Will they be offloaded by crane and flown from Pearl during the exercises, or will they take off and land on the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)? I know, I know... Just saying, it can't be too hard to trap a L-29, and I don't think launching would be the issue.

What I'm really trying to say is it will be a very good day when we get some fixed wing aircraft back on our big deck amphibious ships - and I'm not talking about Harriers and Joint Strike Fighters either. I might be a big fan of big carriers, but I am not oblivious to the advantages and utility smaller carriers and the benefits these type of simplistic fixed wing aircraft can provide the fleet. We don't always need a fighter jet and there are still significant advantages to having people in the loop as a compliment to unmanned systems.

I certainly believe expanding the options of available aircraft types that could fly from the big deck amphibious ships would reduce overall Naval operational costs in specific conditions and circumstances (HE/DR, IW at sea, etc), because we get the option of having more aviation globally postured forward without necessarily having to send a big deck.

Seriously, something similar to the L-29 would be very useful in today's Navy for a number of things - potentially including fixed wing ASW support btw. I wonder if you could fold the wings in a way it could be deployed forward via C-17...

3rd Fleet Focus: RIMPAC 2008 Order of Battle

United States Navy

USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63)
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)
USS Comstock (LSD 45)
USS Port Royal (CG 73)
USS Lake Erie (CG 70)
USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93)
USS Pinckney (DDG 91)
USS O'Kane (DDG 77)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60)
USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60)
USS Reuben James (FFG 57)
USS Santa Fe (SSN 763)
USS Key West (SSN 722)
USS Los Angeles (SSN 688)
USNS Guadalupe (T-AO 200)
USNS Yukon (T-AO 202)
USNS Navajo (T-ATF 169)
USNS Sioux (T-ATF 171)
USNS Sumner (T-AGS 61)
USNS Salvor (T-ARS 52)
MV Cape Gibson (T-AK 5051)

United States Coast Guard

USCGC Kiska (WPB1336)
USCGC Rush (WHEC 723)

Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force

JDS Makinami (DD 112)
JDS Haruna (DDH 141)
JDS Setogiri (DD 156)
JDS Kirishima (DD 174)
JDS Narushio (SS 595)

Royal Australian Navy

HMAS Tobruk (LSH 50)
HMAS Anzac (FFH 150)
HMAS Success (AOR 304)
HMAS Waller (SSG 75)

Canada

HMCS Regina (FFH 334)
HMCS Ottawa (FFH 341)

Chile

CNS Almirante Riveros (FF 18)

Republic of Korea

ROKS Yang Manchun (DDH 973)
ROKS Moonmu Daewang (DDH 976)
ROKS Lee Sunsin (SS 068)

Singapore

RSS Steadfast (FF 70)

Also Check out SteelJaw Scribe's entries here and here for 2 other ships that will participate in RIMPAC 2008, as SINKEX targets during the exercise.

Observing the Massive Naval Preparations in the Pacific

There are some major military movements taking place in Asia right now, and it should come to no surprise to anyone that the US Navy is about to have more ships at sea in the Pacific than any other time in recent memory, including all 4 available Carrier Strike Groups. In our observations of the Tibet blogger feeds, or even more interesting the hackers in Tibet feeding information out in some very tech savvy clever ways through the Chinese firewalls, there are a lot of reports that a major Chinese Army is moving down G318, the main road into Tibet from Sichuan province.

This comes the week before the much anticipated major vote in Taiwan on Saturday, and while it is unclear if we should expect major fireworks from that election, the combination of Taiwan and anything politics has never really been anything short of combustible. What is clear however is the US Navy will be on call.

Two U.S. aircraft carriers, including the USS Kitty Hawk, have been sent to the Taiwan region for training exercises during this weekend's Taiwanese election, a U.S. defense official said on Wednesday.

The two warships were "responsibly positioned" in the Pacific Ocean somewhere east of Taiwan and would remain in place through Saturday's presidential election and referendum on U.N. membership, said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Basically every major naval platform you would want at sea in the 7th Fleet theater is at sea right now, and there are reserves on the way, and if you come across the Pacific back to the west coast, there will be even more major reserve forces at sea, and I'm not even going to count the Peleliu ESG. The Navy has intentionally not identified by name forward deployed naval forces at sea, so we will list them as 1 CV, 1 LHD, 1 LPD, 1 LSD, 2 CGs, and at least 5 DDGs currently operating at sea. We have also counted at least 5 submarines, including the USS Ohio (SSGN 726) currently on deployment in the Pacific. Additionally the following organized strike groups are at sea.

Nimitz Carrier Strike Group

USS Nimitz (CVN 68)
USS Princeton (CG 59)
USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53)
USS Higgins (DDG 76)
USS Chafee (DDG 90)

Recently deployed near Pearl Harbor:

Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group

USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
USS Mobile Bay (CG 53)
USS Russell (DDG 59)
USS Shoup (DDG 86)
USS Momsen (DDG 92)
USS Curts (FFG 38)

Additionally the Reagan CSG is at sea and will be conducting Composite Unit Training Exercise (COMPTUEX) and a Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) off the coast of Southern California March 18 to April 7 and April 11-18.

Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group

USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)
USS Chancellorsville (CG 62)
USS Decatur (DDG 73)
USS Howard (DDG 83)
USS Gridley (DDG 101)
USS Thach (FFG 43)

We are aware of other ships that are or will be at sea during this time period, but such operations are commonplace and not quite as organized as what we are seeing from the 4 CSGs in the Pacific.

We have no expectations of a war breaking out over the weekend or any such drama, and China certainly has its hands full trying to put on a public smile with the Olympic Games approaching. However, it is during this public happy time that those who feel oppressed by China are speaking out. While Tibet is clearly a mess, and if you follow that blogger feed you will come across some of the most gruesome stories and pictures China doesn't want you to hear about, one question is will anyone in the world actually stand up to China for Tibet?

Unlikely, in the world we live in money talks even if people die, and that is just how it is. The big question that has our interest though isn't what happens in Tibet, we expect the crackdown to come and the result to be a demonstration of raw, brutal power and blatant murder, a reminder to those who too easily forget what Communists really are. No, the big question is what does Taiwan do this weekend. The conditions, particularly with the latest outbreak of violence in Tibet and news the CHICOM Army is moving south in a massive column is bringing the conditions into play for a perfect storm.

The last time there was a storm in the Pacific with this many US Navy ships at sea, Adm Keating had to explain why the families of the Kitty Hawk CSG got snubbed for Thanksgiving. As events unfold, lets hope things stay in that realm of manageable incidents, because if things go badly and the CHICOMs panic, which they have had a tendency to do lately over the little things, a port snub could be a best case scenario.

3rd Fleet Focus: Interview With Vice Admiral Samuel Locklear

I really don't know as much as I should about Hugh Hewitt. I know he is a conservative talk show host, I know he worked in the Reagan administration, and I know I have never heard his talk show or knowingly read anything he has written. Clearly I'm out of touch...

Recently he had Vice Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander US 3rd Fleet, on his radio program to discuss the sonar issues the Navy often finds itself in court over. Of all the discussions I have read on the issue, this one sounds like it would have been the easiest for the average American to understand. Adm. Locklear does an excellent job summarizing a number of important anti-submarine issues into an easy to understand message for a general audience. If Hugh Hewitt does more interviews like this, he is likely to win over me as a listener, even if there isn't a radio station anywhere close to where I live carrying his show.

You can read the entire transcript here, and I think it is an excellent interview worth a full read, but I have quoted a key part of the Q&A.

HH: I appreciate the time, Admiral. I think this is riveting, actually. So we’ve got about 280 ships, 58% of which have sonar capacity, about half of which are at sea at any time, it’s about 85 ships then. And they’re only using their active sonar about 1% of the time they’re at sea. So let’s pick up there, that’s where we left off. And so is that a rising number or a falling number, in terms of use of active sonar?

SL: Well, over historical numbers of our Navy, it’s fallen. I mean, in the Reagan era, you know, we were building to a 600 ship Navy, which active sonar was a preeminent weapon system in that force. Today, we’re a Navy of about 280 ships, highly capable, but still a smaller Navy. So I guess historically, you’d say it’s fallen.

HH: And how much time does it take to train a sailor in the use of sonar?

SL: It could take upwards of twenty years…

HH: Wow.

SL: …to produce, I would say, an effective artisan. I mean, there’s really an art to this. We start them out early through a very aggressive classroom training, where they go off to schools, where they’re learning the classification of contacts, because remember, they’re learning both the passive and the active side. But it can take up to twenty years to produce someone that I would say was proficient in being able to understand the art, where you could take a ship or a group of ships into littorals, and you could be effective at finding and being able to manage extremely quiet diesel submarines.

This is a serious issue nobody is talking about, and credit Hugh Huwitt for opening up his radio program, an excellent medium to discuss and highlight the topic. Anti-Submarine warfare is hard. Mine warfare is hard. If you think you can sit some 19 year old into a chair with a pair of headphones, turn on the active sonar to full power, and have him identify something underwater you are woefully mistaken. I don't know what the cost of a good sonar operator, but after 20 years American citizens need to understand that sailor is worth a fair amount of national treasure.

The big issue here is that there aren't enough people who highlight the lawfare on the Navy's use of sonars in training as a method of attack against the United States, because it really is. For example, a recent case of lawfare to prohibit the Navy from using low frequency sonar was issued by a non profit organization called the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). The problem is, just about anyone can donate to these action groups, and based on who their business partners are one can raise some legitimate questions whether they are being exploited for strategical gain by the nations competitors.

NRDC works at the national level in China with key agencies and organizations, and also works with their local counterparts in several regions and cities, including Beijing, Chongqing, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Shanxi and Shenzhen.

How many of these environmental groups are funded by nations that are peer competitors. More than you think, it is why none of them, READ NONE OF THEM, are critical of China on the environment. Never shit on the hand that feeds you.

I don't think anyone at the NRDC has motives alternative to helping their environmental cause, well, other than the motive of making money for all those attorneys (I am married to a lawyer, and know too many not to be jaded. Sorry Eagle1, your occupation attracts strange folk). However, I also don't think anyone at the NRDC is going to turn down a donation from someone if the sole intention is to stop the US Navy from using sonars, under any condition. Most environmental organizations believe the worst of military intentions, which is ironic in my opinion, because these same folks will defend intentions of government otherwise.

The rest of the transcript is a must read for environmental advocates, or interested Naval observers who want to get a deeper understanding of the mid-frequency sonar issue. Your opinion will likely be shaped based on whether you think the Navy is out to kill animals on purpose or not, because it appears pretty clear the Navy is trying to find a middle ground. If you believe otherwise, please don't land your black helicopter in the comments, while I welcome environmentalists who genuinely care, I have no time for conspiracy theorists who cannot understand the importance of mid-frequency sonar to the Navy.

As a fisherman who is concerned about the ecology of the oceans around the US, I think the middle ground is important. As a Naval analyst, I think sonar is critical to our national defense, and the 9th Circuit Court, particularly in how it overrules way too many popular votes in states, is the best example of an insurgent operating within the US government at the federal level, a much more blatant example than the political charges both sides of the political isle have leveled at the spy agencies the last several years.

3rd Fleet Focus: Cocaine Confiscated on High Seas

UPI has an interesting story to go along with this image from Navy NewsStand.

Four suspected drug runners and 11 bails of cocaine were plucked from the Pacific Ocean off the Mexico-Guatamala coast, the U.S. Coast Guard said Wednesday.

Coast Guard officials in Alameda, Calif., said a 50-foot semi-submersible craft was spotted Monday by a U.S. Customs and Border Protection surveillance aircraft about 300 miles southwest of the Mexico-Guatemala border. The vessel was abandoned by its crew and sank a short time later, the Coast Guard said. The cocaine bundles bobbed to the surface as a boarding team from the USS DeWert approached to rescue the crew.

"This case shows the challenges our counter-drug patrol forces face, and the lengths to which the drug smuggling organization will go to get their deadly product to the U.S.," said Rear Adm. Craig Bone, tactical commander of U.S. counter drug operations in the Eastern Pacific. "This low-profile semi-submersible craft was very difficult to detect."

The exactly how much cocaine was seized had not been determined and no additional information was provided about the suspects.

More than 90 tons of cocaine has been seized in the Eastern Pacific this fiscal year, which ends Oct. 1.

Eagle1 saw this too, and has background on the use of semi-submersible's for drug smuggling.

I'm impressed, $352 million in cocaine! This is a really nice job of inter-agency cooperation, multiple assets from DHS and the Navy resulting in some good work.