Naval Presence Shifts Towards 2020

These slides from OPNAV were passed around several months ago as an example of the pivot to Asia. Some have identified these slides as representative of the slides presented at a recent CNO press conference. The first slide begins with the expected Naval Presence of 2013.

This is basically today. Note the gold ships are the sustained, forward deployed ships and the blue ships are the rotational CONUS forces. Noteworthy how the SSGNs are counted as steady state, forward deployed operational assets.

It continues with a slide of Naval Presence of 2017.

This is where the map starts getting interesting.

South America
Note that the Navy intends to move 10 PCs, many of which are currently in the Middle East, to the South American theater in support of SOUTHCOM by 2017. I am interested to see how that works with 1 amphibious ship and no combat logistics. In my opinion there looks to be a real opportunity for Navy/Coast Guard cooperation in that theater that is not getting a close enough look, for example, why wouldn't an AFSB for MSO and logistics not be very effective in that region? Everything has short legs, and having a place to move spare parts around at sea isn't a bad thing. It also doesn't hurt to have a UAV pad in the middle of the water. Just saying... that environment isn't likely to get better anytime soon, and has a real potential to get much worse - particularly if we start seeing more legit submarines instead of semi-submersables. It is worth noting the CG/DDG/FFGs in SOUTHCOM are replaced by 10 PCs and 2 JHSVs, not Littoral Combat Ships.

Europe/Africa
Rota is now a BMD base, and sailors will be lining up for duty on those ships. It is still very much unclear what ships the US Navy intends to station there. If it is me, I send 4 DDG Flight Is with BMD so I don't have to send and pay for RW (sorry guys!). Worth noting the full time amphibious ship is now augmented by 2 JHSVs assigned to Africa, which have replaced two large surface combatants. These ships almost certainly represent engagement work the Marine Corps is working on today towards tailored Enhanced Rifle Companies and other tailored Blue/Green assets for Partnership Station type of activity. What I find noteworthy, and useful, is that these platforms are retaining their RW capabilities, and all three ships are well suited for SOF activities if tasking is necessary. These are very flexible forces, but it means UAVs will be the only assured option to provide direct fires in contingency. That's OK, but I still think putting VLS in the San Antonio class amphibious ships for long range cruise missile capability remains an important omission in the modern force, and something the Navy needs to reconsider as an important capability as the large surface combatants move away from theaters that are traditional hotspots for SOF operations.

Middle East
Worth noting the 12 PC/MCMs has become 4 LCS, 4 MCM, and 2 JHSV. Note that the SSGN and 2 CG/DDGs that had been operating down in Africa in 2013 are moved up to the Persian Gulf region by 2017, basically suggesting an assumption that all naval activities off Africa today can be replaced in whole by two JHSVs. That is a remarkable assumption that I have a hard time believing has any merit whatsoever.

Pacific
Look closely and note that by 2017 the great pivot to Asia strategy being touted by Secretary Panetta will be the massive increase in naval forces of - four Littoral Combat Ships and two Joint High Speed Vessels. It is one thing to try not to provoke China into an arms race, but when this is the massive maritime shift towards the Pacific touted at the political level as national defense strategy, one has to wonder what our allies are truly thinking about our empty words policy. I'll also make a brief point - the reason I keep jabbing the Army with a stick and pointing to the Pacific is because it is plainly obvious the Navy is talking a big game but isn't doing anything significant there, and the force is not growing in the future, so the US Army needs to expect as an opening assumption that they will be left completely ineffective as a fighting force in the Pacific if they are dependent upon the US Navy, because the US Army will never get where they need to be unless the Army can figure out a way to make the islands of the Pacific a network of forward operating bases by which the Navy has no responsibility for their limited forces to defend, because every ship defending an island is one less ship to move the Army into the combat zone by force.

General Notes
The requirement appears to be around 1200 VLS in the Middle East in 2017, and 1500 VLS in the Pacific in 2020. Also, in my opinion, with the exception of SOUTHCOM this map looks to me what a "strategy of holding the line" looks like. You know what else bothers me about this map? It is a reminder that in 2017 US forces are basically organized in traditional heavy task forces like CSGs and ARGs, and with the exception of SSGNs and the 10 PCs in SOUTHCOM, nothing about this map sticks out as having a capability that is inherently disruptive for a bad actor in any specific area. LCS and JHSVs will be useful for their limited purposes, which is ISR and engagement respectively, but the US Navy has a shortage of assets that stand out as disruptive - punching politically and diplomatically above their weight.

It conclude with a slide of Naval Presence in 2020.

Pacific
The pivot to the Pacific has completed, and this major pivot ends up being 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 2 Joint High Speed Vessels. I am very unclear how the politics of the pivot to Asia somehow became a public diplomacy centered around the maritime domain with the US Navy doesn't even move a single major surface combatant or submarine to the Pacific as part of this touted pivot.


Europe/Africa/South America
Note that in all three places the major change the primary feature is the addition of a pair of Littoral Combat Ships. What I find very interesting is that for both Africa and South America the pair of Littoral Combat Ships is replacing the presence previously filled by an amphibious ship. This is the first document I have seen from OPNAV (that I can publish anyway) that supports the arguments I have made on this blog regarding how the LCS is more of an amphibious ship capability than a surface combatant capability it is usually generally referred to as. While that is an interesting side note, I'm not convinced it means anything other than how the numbers fit together in PPT.

General Notes
Note that the suggested plan according to this PPT is for 8 LCS in the Persian Gulf before more than 4 are in the Pacific, indeed 18 Littoral Combat Ships are specifically accounted for on this graphic, but only 4 in the Pacific. Obviously this is a moment in time look at what the Navy is thinking, but they are interesting moments and time, and interesting thoughts about future force dispersion.

Canary in the Coal Mine

This post at AOL Defense by Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. is worth reading in full, but I want to quote this specific section. To me, this is very well written, and right on point.

"We intercept about 33 percent of what we know is out there, and that's just a limitation on the number of assets," said Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser, chief of the U.S. Southern Command, at a breakfast with reporters this morning. And, Fraser admitted, that percentage is "going down... More is getting through."

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and, after 2014, Afghanistan may free up some aircraft and boats for drug interdiction, Fraser said. But the limitations on what some partner nations can do are more intractable - and any improvement in American capabilities is at the mercy of increasingly tight budgets and a possible sequester.

At sea, Fraser explained, the U.S. Navy is retiring the smaller ships that have traditionally been the mainstay of drug interdiction patrols, the aging and increasingly expensive to operate Perry-class frigates, while their much-delayed replacement, the Littoral Combat Ships, is just beginning to enter service. "We 'll see a gap in the numbers of those types of ships," Fraser said. "So we're working with the Navy to see what other types of vessels and capability that's coming back from Iraq might be available," particularly small craft that have been used for river patrol and offshore patrol in the Gulf. Such boats could boost the U.S. fleet's own interception capability but also, and perhaps more importantly, some could be transferred to friendly countries that are currently short on assets to intercept drug boats moving through their own territorial waters. (Fraser focused on Navy vessels and did not specifically address the Coast Guard, which does contribute some ships to Southern Command operations).

The shipbuilding budget has seen a lot of discussion, some here, but mostly elsewhere since the beginning of the year. I think so far Congress is handling this right - focus on sequestion, the rest is what it is. I think the FY13 budget is simply a reflection of the Obama administration - it avoids every difficult decision the DoD supposedly faced - including sequestion - and the budget fails to lay out any guidance for future difficult choices. That is a purely political move by the SECDEF and President, which is absolutely fine and valid, but let no one pretend the DoD FY13 budget is anything but a politically focused budget specific for an election year.

If someone wants to jump on the issue of the Navy needing more ships, I'm all for it, but I think it is important to highlight that no one in the Navy is making that case... so in many ways I'm not too swayed by others who try to make the case for more Navy ships. For example, Ray Mabus got blasted in Congress by Representative Forbes on Green Energy (YouTube). Legitimate? Politically - Yes, but the sin Secretary Ray Mabus has committed in the eyes of folks like Randy Forbes is one of omission not commission - the SECNAV has failed to focus on Navy specific issues and has instead focused on what every one rightfully sees as 'other crap.'

But the ugly truth is, 4 star Navy Admirals are not beating the table for more ships, so why are folks so upset that the SECNAV doesn't pound sand for that cause as well? The Navy uniformed leadership has publicly consented to the DoD on virtually all the big issues so that the DoD can take a haircut (or trim across the top everywhere) in an election year instead of get a new hair style (legitimate maritime focus for Pacific shift). Does that mean big changes are coming next year? Maybe, probably not, but it doesn't really matter... because without someone in political leadership setting legitimate national defense policy, the annual Navy budget has become a rock drill in contingency planning - not an exercise in short or long term planning - meaning for this CNO the budget planning process will be primarily be about hitting targets within existing margins instead drawing new lines as new margins.

With all due respect to the Obama Administration, you have not given anyone a legitimate national defense policy. This is handful of used toilet paper (PDF) that is embarrassing to label strategic in any context. How does anyone make a strategic choice from that? Where would one even begin making strategic choices with something like that? That is a very sad document, and pretty much sums up the last decade of strategic thinking from the DoD as a nice little bow tied turd.

It is the random disparity of priorities from services and COCOMs that makes comments by Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser very interesting to me. Am I wrong in suggesting that Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser has made a stronger argument than Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert for more Navy ships so far in 2012? I think the question is legitimate, even if General Fraser's argument isn't really that good.

In truth, the reporter is more accurate - Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser is basically saying he needs more Coast Guard Cutters with his argument regarding this specific problem and solution. Janet Napolitano disagrees, but there is little evidence she takes serious the drug problems taking place south of the United States, so her credibility due to simple trend lines, statistics, and facts on the issue of narcotics and drug related violence is already strained.

But again, I have watched the Coast Guard's leadership so far in FY13 and I have not seen Admiral Papp making a serious case for more Coast Guard Cutters, except perhaps the need for more ice breakers in the future. Unfortunately the Coast Guard is simply struggling to keep what they have in existing plans, instead of trying to build political momentum towards a future.

In conclusion, here is what I see. Combatant Commanders not named PACOM have needs in the maritime domain that a smaller sized Navy cannot meet, but the assets those Combatant Commanders tend to need are not aircraft carriers, ballistic missile destroyers, fighter squadrons, or attack submarines so their priorities don't matter as much to the Navy. Basically the Navy is going to have enough of the 'right kind of ships' despite hell or high water, and everything else will suffer - including priorities that are low on the Navy's internal totem poll like narcotics. As long as the Navy is going to have enough of the 'right kind of ships' then the Navy sees itself as OK, and not necessarily in need or more ships. That is what it is, maritime strategy can be tailored later to meet this objective.

According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, The Economic Impact of Illicit Drug Use
on American Society (PDF) is now around $193 billion annually. The Coast Guard doesn't even spend 1% of that total annually building Coast Guard Cutters to address the problem, and the entire annual procurement budget for the entire Coast Guard for everything ships and aircraft is about 5.5% of that figure. I believe there are several ways to read Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser's comments, but the way I read them is simply - the United States Coast Guard is neither sized nor capable of meeting the national security and homeland defense responsibilities with which it is tasked, and on the narcotics issue the US Coast Guard today is only capable of meeting 1/3 of the requirement. While not a scientifically drawn number, it is statistically sound - which is more than most political arguments for money on Capitol Hill.

So here is my concern. If the Coast Guard is so underfunded it is only able to meet about 1/3 of it's mission requirements, and we know the future Navy is going to be too small to fill in gaps for the Coast Guard, which organization is actually capable of being a reserve for the other? It makes a lot of sense to cut the Navy at the low end if the Coast Guard is being sized/shaped to potentially fill in those gaps, or it might actually make sense to cut the Coast Guard if the Navy is going to be filling in gaps in their capabilities. How does the United States reconcile a true national defense strategy when the gaps created by cuts in both the Coast Guard and the Navy directly impact specific, credible, legitimately cited and fiscally accounted threats to the homeland in any context from social to economic to security?

Air Force Gen. Douglas Fraser sounds a lot to me like a canary in the coal mine. When people who should know better hear the canary as just a narcotics problem, rather than what it represents as also a smuggling and violence problem, the sound of the canary gets ignored.

Monday Begins 4th Fleet Week in Haiti - Updated

**See updates at bottom of article.

There are many reasons to be cautiously optimistic, even if the images that will beam into your television screen over the next 48 hours are likely to leave one with a different impression. The President dispatching the Secretary of State to Haiti was an important political and strategic move in support of Haiti, because it sends exactly the right message to the rest of the world. It is unlikely that most Haitian people in Port-au-Prince were even aware of her visit.

The issue is time. The time for recovery operations will end in the very near future and transition to becoming the largest relief operation in the history of the Western Hemisphere. The purpose of Hillary Clinton's visit is many fold, but basically the Secretary of State trip was strategically important to buy time for the United States, the United Nations, and the government of Haiti. Lets briefly examine in reverse order.

The communication emphasis by the State Department is that the Haitian government is leading the effort. There is apparently some truth in that, because the Haitian government effectively led the Toussaint L'Ouverture International Airport in Port-au-Prince right into a logistical nightmare Thursday. They had to fail first to concede operations of the airport to a more capable authority, specifically the US Air Force. Within the context of the unfolding international effort, there will be times the Haitian government will attempt to lead and be allowed to fail in order for more competent authorities to take control. This process has caused delays already in many ways, which is why the US, UN, and international community has to politically buy time for Haiti so the government will get out of their own way. NGO experts who understand Haiti privately will frame this a different way, much less kind than I. We may see more examples of this over the next few days.

The United Nations also needs time. The leadership of the United Nations was decapitated by the earthquake, and as a truly international force each member has been working recovery efforts towards their own people first - as they should. As recovery shifts towards relief, the UN effort will likely become more visible but will remain concentrated to a limited number of locations. Communication challenges are significant for the United Nations, and it will restrict to a great deal what they are capable of doing out among the people until those issues are addressed sufficiently. It will take a great deal of time for the UN to pick itself back up in Haiti, the loss of hundreds of experts and leaders has significantly set back the UN in Haiti, and they need time to regroup.

The United States also needs time, and Hillary Clinton's visit today buys a few days. CCTV, Al Jazeera, BBC, and a great number of other news organizations around the world remain focused on Haiti - the whole world is watching. Barack Obama cannot afford for the world to lose confidence in US efforts to support Haiti. It is a serious political consideration because when the world thinks you are not doing a sufficient job, it can create political distractions. Barack Obama does not need political distractions right now, something leaders in the rest of the world could potentially create. I suspect that one of the next big moves by the White House will be to call for a large international meeting of world leaders to discuss the Haiti situation.

As has been discussed, there are significant strategic interests to the United States at stake. If the US is seen as not sufficiently responding to Haiti in our backyard, it opens up the US to global criticism that will create all kinds of political problems for the President. Rivals will insure our important allies notice that should we be unable to help a country only a few hundred miles from Florida, we would unlikely be able to live up to our commitments in Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. If you saw any press conferences today, particularly the Biden press conference, the administration is making emotional appeals that include patience globally by stressing the enormous scope of the disaster and complexity of the effort to respond. The effort is on throughout government at almost every level to set expectations through strategic communications.

It may not make some NGOs happy that the Secretary of State visited Haiti because her plane went instead of someone else, but the parochial issues of a very few NGOs had created other problems we'll discuss in a minute.

The United States Navy is about to do many amazing things in Haiti, and it is going to be interesting to watch it unfold on television. Before looking ahead though, lets review the last 48 hours.

On Friday the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) was only able to fly 15 sorties all day, with the helicopters reportedly sitting idle on the flight deck by late afternoon and all night Friday night. Night operations were restricted at the airport because of unlighted power lines and no lights for the control towers. Why were they idle during the day and fly so few sorties? Rear Admiral Ted Branch explains:

"We have no supplies at the airport that we have access to. There are other supplies there that are under the control of other agencies, other organizations and we haven't yet coordinated together to make those supplies available for anyone to deliver," he added...

"We need to get that kind of supply chain process energized to have an efficient route point for the supplies. Unfortunately that doesn't happen overnight," Branch said.

The commander noted that some supplies remain at the airport, and could easily be delivered by US helicopters.

"The problem is, some people are perhaps not ready to release their stuff to the most efficient transportation makers and want to deliver supplies themselves."

Some NGOs were complaining that the US Secretary of State was able to go to Haiti, and their supplies were not allowed in. Well, when a few NGOs made their own relief effort a bigger priority than the overall effort to help the people of Haiti, I imagine that didn't sit well with the Secretary of State. The priority changed, at least for some flights on Saturday, to getting relief supplies to Haiti that can be delivered by the US Navy helicopters that have more mobility in the area than the NGOs expecting flights.

Rear Admiral Ted Branch may have said "that doesn't happen overnight," but based on everything I read and saw on Saturday it looks like he did indeed straighten out whatever supply chain problems there were for his forces overnight. See the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) Facebook page for photography of Saturdays operations. The USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) is building up capability to very shortly begin providing relief to several hundred thousand Haitians a day.

Over the last 48 hours several other activities have been set in motion. The Friday night press conference by SOUTHCOM was excellent. We learned the State Department is supporting a Haitian government radio station and that there were 24 helicopters by Friday supporting relief operations in Haiti. On Saturday morning ADM Roughead told reporters at the USS Independence (LCS 2) commissioning that the Navy intends to build an airport in Haiti. The statement was unclear whether that means expanding the current airport, or start from scratch.

Rear Admiral Victor G. Guillory told the media the Navy is focused on the Port-au-Prince port facilities, and there are several vessels heading to Haiti to assist in that effort. Currently off the coast of Haiti is the USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), USS Higgins (DDG-76), and four Coast Guard cutters. 22 MEU expects to arrive on Monday on USS Bataan (LHD 5), USS Carter Hall (LSD 50), and USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), although I read a rumor that USS Carter Hall (LSD 59) may arrive Sunday, being one day ahead of the other two ships. En route is the very important Coast Guard cutter Oak, a buoy tender that can do significant good in the port. This report goes on to note:

Other ships on the way to assist in the operation are the dock landing ship USS Gunston Hall (LSD 41), the cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60), the frigate USS Underwood (FFG 36), the rescue and salvage ship USNS Grasp (ARS 51) and the oceanographic survey ship USNS Henson (T-AGS 63). Additionally, several auxiliary ships from the Military Sealift Command (MSC) are en route and will provide fuel and supplies to sustain the Navy force at sea throughout the operation.

The most noteworthy ship deployment is not mentioned in that Navy report: USNS 1st LT Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011) is scheduled to depart Jacksonville for Haiti on Sunday. Despite being the last asset listed under Navy on the SOUTHCOM Fact File, I believe this is the second most important vessel yet to arrive in Haiti, with the USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) (PDF) being the first.

It is hard to imagine how any other single asset in the world can significantly change the logistics situation in Haiti more effectively than what I expect to be coming on USNS 1ST LT Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011). I suspect she will arrive on Wednesday, which means the Navy may have a Sea Base built and ready for receiving relief by sea by next weekend, just in time for the CNO to talk about it at CNAS on the 26th.

Also not mentioned but listed by SOUTHCOM to be heading for Haiti is USNS Big Horn (T-AO 198), for obvious reasons.

The security problem to date appears to be manageable, even though there are some areas of the city relief workers are being told not to go into right now. The 22 MEU Marines can fix that problem until the UN is ready to resume management, and absent a widespread breakdown of civil order there may be enough boots on the ground to get on top of the relief effort. Based on press reports I am presuming the 24 MEU with Nassau ARG and additional forces from the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division represent the reserve force for security should that become necessary.

There is still one very significant problem ahead. Haiti can suffer from outbreaks of disease on a normal day, and the conditions in Haiti are ripe for a major outbreak. There are thousands of Haitians in need of medical treatment today that will die over the next week. Thousands. The rush to get medical supplies and mobile hospitals into Haiti is not to save those people; many of them will die. The rush is to insure the medical facilities are in place should and perhaps when the major disease outbreak occurs in Haiti. If medical support is on the ground in time, a disease breakout can be managed. Without those NGO hospitals up and supplied, this goes from the very bad it already is to a completely different form of bad we've never seen unfold on live TV before.

Over the next few days, things will continue to get worse in Haiti before they get better. There are many degrees of worse that are still possible though. Right now, only thousands more will die from infection. There is still the potential thousands can turn into tens of thousands, or more, and the resources necessary to prevent the continuing slide towards tens of thousands or more deaths will not yet be in place by late Tuesday afternoon, the one week anniversary of the earthquake.

We are starting to see what the plan is and how it will unfold over the next week. From here on out there is nothing left to do but watch it unfold, observe whether we sufficiently planned the response, and observe to see if we are adaptive to crisis situations that may still emerge. I am cautiously optimist that this is going to work, and when I see the CNO speak on January 26th, it could very well be one of the best public relations days in the Navy to date in the 21st century. I pray it is, for the sake of the people in Haiti.

Update: And update from Captain Conrad Chun, CNO Spokesman.

ADM Roughead DID NOT say "that the Navy intends to build an airport in Haiti." What the CNO said, as stated in the referenced Reuters article is that we were "literally moving in an airport," referring to the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson on station off the coast of Haiti.

Apparently I took the CNO too literally.

Sea Basing in South America

Captain Frank Ponds (PDF) can sell soft power from the sea, and he needs a date in about 6 weeks on The Daily Show (yea CHINFO I'm talking to you). I've been involved in the blogger roundtable process for at least a year now, and this morning was the most informative, most interesting discussion I've experienced to date in these conversations with the blogosphere.

Operation Continuing Promise 08 is a strategic sea basing engagement that represents the very best of the diplomatic, national, military, and humanitarian power of the United States Navy. The Navy leverages the uncontested sea for an interactive, cooperative local engagement tailored to the host nations requirements, needs, and requests supporting medical, dental, veterinarian, and engineering engagements that significantly portraits a positive perception of the United States, and does so empowered by the invitation of the host country.

While I admit to still being concerned how we quantify results, I am convinced this is an emerging pillar of peacetime strategy that must be fully supported, encouraged, and emphasized by political leadership in the 21st century towards the national strategic ends of building partnerships, supporting regional security, and preventing regional conflicts.

Below is the transcript portion of my questions to Commodore Ponds.

Galrahn: Hey, Captain Ponds. It's great talking to you. Listening to you discuss the Continuing Promise mission, it sounds to me like everything is very tailored to the locals' needs, so this question might sound a little absurd. But, I was wondering if there's a typical day: How many people do you bring on the ship? How many sites do you put people at? How many people per site? And I understand there's probably no such thing as a typical day, but I'm just trying to get a feel for a daily operation within Continuing Promise.

CAPT. PONDS: Well, let me just tell you, the Continuing Promise mission requires a continuous day. It is non-stop. There is no break in this process ever. I mean, because when the mission stops ashore, it continues with planning on the ship. So, Continuing -- Continuous (sic) Promise off the ship is continuous operations on the ship.

So, let me give you the life in the day of a sailor onboard Kearsarge: You wake up at 4:30 in the morning. You -- you know, you clean up; you brush up; you have breakfast at 5:00. You muster at 5:30 if you're going to go on a mission -- and that's where we get the accountability of who's going ashore and what they need to do.

You're either on that helicopter, that landing craft at about 06:00 or 06:30. It normally takes you about 30 to 45 minutes to go from the ship to shore, of which you get on another transport vehicle to go to the project site, and that could be anywhere from 15 minutes to an hour and a half, depending on the traffic and the way to get there.

Once you get there, we engage immediately, and work through lunch sometimes -- or to lunch. Lunch is normally 30 minutes, which it consists of a healthy MRE right there on site, which we share with our Force Protection brethren there. We stop lunch at about 13:00 and we reengage until about 17:00. At 17:30, we breakdown the equipment we're going to bring back to the ship, or we stow that equipment that's going to be secured by the host nation. And so you get back on a bus and you travel back to the point of the embarkation -- or debarkation, and then you come back to the ship either by helicopter or by surface conveyance.

You may get back on the ship about 19:00. And they had the hiccup like last night where the waves, and the tides and currents didn't allow those individuals to get back until about 22:00. And then you come back and you're tired; and you shower; and then you eat. And then you get your orders for tomorrow.
And then you link up with the plans that has been going on while you were off the ship. And so once you get your marching orders, at 21:00; and then the day begins again a 04:30 the next day. So, that's a day in the life of a typical operation on-board the ship.

Now let's talk about the project ashore. It depends. On an average day, we have about, maybe anywhere between 100 to 150 individuals that may go ashore to cover the medical sites, the dental sites, the veterinarian sites, and the engineering sites.

Galrahn: So, you're doing one site for each dental, medical, engineering --?

CAPT. PONDS: Well, I mean, like, right now we have two medical sites, two dental sites, and we have a -- we're going to set up a (rove ?) and veterinarian sites. So, these things are not running consecutively, they're running concurrently. So, we could have, like, three medical sites running at the same time; and three engineering sites running at the same time.

Let me give you a snapshot of the total number of sites we've been working within the different countries: In Nicaragua we had eight projects going on -- everything from engineering and medical projects; in the Dominican Republic we had a total of -- let me see, looks like about nine sites in the Dominican Republic; in Colombia we had -- five, six, seven -- looks like eight sites; Guyana, we're going to have 13 sites; and here in Trinidad and Tobago, we can have up to eight sites. So, again, it's a mixture of medical, dental, veterinarian and engineering sites.

Galrahn: Thank you very much, Captain.

....

Galrahn: I talk a lot on my blog about humanitarian -- proactive humanitarian missions and these medical diplomacy missions. And there's a general consensus among my readers that this is a great thing.

But the debate begins when you start talking about how -- and I don't want to get into the white hull, gray hull debate, but I am curious about the capability sets on the ship that you emphasize -- that you would emphasize. Like, you know, is it storage capacity? Is it your medical facilities? Is it your welldeck? Is it your aviation capabilities? What is the capability set that you think requires emphasis for these missions to be successful in deployments like Continuing Promise?

CAPT. PONDS: Everything that you just named. If I had to answer your question, I would just answer just the way you said. I mean, it all depends in what country we are. I mean, as you know, right now I just told you we are off the coast of the country, and not pier-side.

And when you're off the coast, and we call that "sea-based operations," the aviation lift, the heavy lift that's provided by the HMH Fourth and by the 53s -- MH-53s, it's a critical component of being able to lift these heavy, you know, CONEX boxes filled with materiel or supplies -- whether they be medical or engineering, deep into the host nation. It saves times on the logistics -- (inaudible) -, and also it reduces the footprint ashore.

And then let's talk about also the surface lift. Some of these countries have very well-developed ports, some of them -- some of them do not. So, when we can't go pier-side, we have to use the LCMs and the LCUs that are normally used for landing Marines, but now we landing humanitarian assistance and supplies. I mean, so it's critical to be able to broach the beach to get that humanitarian assistance across the beach.

Now, let's talk about the on-board capacity. This ship, as you know, is second only to the U.S.N.S. Comfort and the U.S.N.S. Mercy for being able to deliver this medical capacity. And so whether the ship is gray, white or green,
it's the function that it brings, it's the capacity and the capability that it brings. Just because it has an LHD-3 on it -- I mean, the host nation doesn't care what the number is, or the color, all he cares about is that this ship is bringing a critical capability by sea, air and shore to their citizens.

And that's all they care about. And you know what? That's all we care about. We are no threat to any host-nation down here because we are here on a humanitarian assistance mission. That is it. Period. Point-blank. So, I think the strategic communication sometimes gets lost in the media when it gets -- and when they try to portray this ship to be doing something that it is not. This is an HA mission. This happened to be a (gray hold ?) conducting an HA -- carrying out HA operations.

Galrahn: Captain, has your ship been full? I mean, when you deployed, where you've just crammed in everything you possibly could, like the Marines were deploying? I mean, I know how the Marines deploy. Their loading plans are to pack everything you possibly can. Was that the way you guys are deployed, or do you still have capacity? Is there -- is there non-governmental organization capacity that you could support?

CAPT. PONDS: Oh yeah. Yeah, when we left we were -- we were packed in -- stem to stern, port to starboard. I mean, you couldn't move anything because, between the vehicles, the boats and the supplies -- I mean, it was, it was loaded out.

But, as we moved from one country to another country, we've expended and used those supplies and that equipment, and so we created space because of that. So when we get back we hope to be empty of only -- everything that we needed to do the job. So, yes, we can accommodate. And, again, that's what makes this ship so perfect for HADR missions, because if we had to go and support another hurricane, or whatnot, we could on-load the necessary supplies and equipment and go out and do that mission.

A few notes. It was good to hear that northeastern accent of Boston Maggie whose voice always contains an uplifting spirit within. She set the tone before the call began with energy and I thought it woke everyone up. Keep her in your prayers as she beats cancer. The questions by ID friends Boston Maggie, David Axe, and Chuck Simmons were all very good, and Tom Crowes who I am unfamiliar with, but has this excellent photo album from his trip aboard Kearsarge earlier this year; also had some excellent questions regarding the NGO and medical components of Operational Continuing Promise 08.

For me, the discussion of what platform has become mute, we need ships of various types and my impression from speaking with Captain Ponds is that this deployment, particularly in Haiti but also for the planned HA aspects of the deployment, is simply not possible without any other ship than a LHD. I've heard people complain about them, and after doing my research, I think they are superbly ignorant and uninformed.

There is a retired professor of economics who is a member of my lodge, and he has a special interest in the economy of Africa. I will not identify him by name, but note there are other sources that say at least as much as this...

He believes that the lack of security alone contributes in numerous forms towards $50 billion annual loss of GDP to the Gulf of Guinea region. A LHD costs about $3.5 billion to build, and around $100 million to operate annually for 40 years, not including life cycle modernization. It would take 4 LHDs to operate year around in that region. Even if the United States invested $50 billion over a period of 40 years in the form of LHDs for the Gulf of Guinea, which comes to around $1.25 billion annually over 40 years compared to whatever our actual total annual investment in Africa is.

The return on investment for changing the security conditions of that region, if that $50 billion annual regional GDP loss could be recouped into the global economy, would be a minimum of $2 trillion dollars of regional GDP over that 40 year period. The way I see it, soft power via joint service, multi-national cooperative engagement efforts like what the Navy is doing in the case of Operational Continuing Promise 08 with the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) is the best bang for the buck going for US soft power. Think about it...

Full transcript here of the bloggers roundtable, and even if he is an alumni of the Crimson Tide you can check out Commodore Pond's blog here. Sorry, a bit of displaced Razorback frustration from a terrible football season spilling over...

4th Fleet Focus: Russians Coming to South America

Russia is deploying a small naval force to Venezuela for an exercise in November. Hardly surprising, Hugo Chavez is making a big deal out of it, but also hardly surprising, the US is shrugging shoulders saying "so what?"

The Defense Department seemed unaffected Monday by an announcement from Venezuela and Russia that Russian warships would sail to the Caribbean this winter for exercises with the Venezuelan fleet — the first-ever such move by the Russian navy.

Pentagon officials did not express particular concern over the announcement from Caracas. “We’re aware of the announcement made in Venezuela,” said Navy Cmdr. J.D. Gordon, a Pentagon spokesman, “and we’ll see how it goes.”

The exercise is reportedly part of a deal earlier this summer that Russia when it was agreed Russia will sell submarines to Venezuela, but it is also likely this will be sold in Russia as a response to the US Navy delivering humanitarian supplies to Georgia. For all the hype otherwise, the DoD official is right and this is not something that will raise concerns.

While a lot of attention is being paid to the deployment of the nuclear powered battlecruiser Pyotr Veliky (Peter the Great) , we aren't much impressed. Like Robert said, if the ship blows up then we'll be interested. The other three ships include a destroyer, an oiler, and a... you guessed it, fleet tug.

As we have noted in the past, the Admiral Chabanenko (DDG 650), a Udaloy II destroyer, was laid down in 1989, but she (or he in the Russian Masculine vernacular) was under construction when the Soviet Union collapsed. Finally launched in 1995, the Admiral Chabanenko (DDG 650) was not commissioned until 1999 and was in fact the last surface ship laid down during the cold war to be built and commissioned. If there has been a workhorse of the Russian Navy over the last several years, the Admiral Chabanenko (DDG 650) would qualify, which makes perfect sense as the destroyer is the largest surface warship built by Russian in the last 2 decades.

One of the interesting questions asked during the press conference that announced the deployment was "how would the Americans like it if we responded to hurricanes with our warships?" Well, I have not met Admiral Stavridis personally, but what I do know of him leads me to believe he would welcome the Russians in such an effort.

One prediction, Spook86 has discussed many times that it is only a matter of time before long range Russian bombers make an east coast flight down to Cuba like they did during the cold war. If I was placing a bet, I'd bet we would see that scenario sometime between October and November, and it would be very embarrassing if the USAF wasn't ready for it.

This development should be seen for what it is, a response to the Russia's objections to humanitarian response and naval activity in the Black Sea. While Russia will be sure to hype it, and Hugo Chavez will be part of the over hype, it is very much a good thing because it is one of those small steps towards Russia saving face. Sometimes this type of non-escalation - media escalation stuff is necessary to bring about the normalization of relations.

At the end of the day, the concern for the US Navy isn't the Russian naval forces, it is the purchase of submarines by Venezuela. Should the submariners ever get well trained, that would indeed be a major threat for US naval forces.

4th Fleet Focus: Reacting to the Weather

We don't really see this very often.

U.S. Southern Command has directed Commander, Fourth Fleet to divert the amphibious ship USS KEARSARGE (LHD 3) to Haiti to assist with relief efforts in areas affected by flooding due to tropical storm activity in the Caribbean.

Kearsarge will depart today from its present location in Santa Marta, Colombia to Haiti and will join other U.S. assistance operations in the vicinity of Port au Prince on 7 Sept.

Kearsarge is currently supporting phase two of Continuing Promise 2008, a humanitarian assistance mission that includes assisting partner nations impacted by natural disasters and other emergencies resulting in human suffering or danger to human lives.

I'm trying to remember, did Mercy go to the Philippines after the Cyclone as a reaction or part of the schedule? I thought the ship remained on schedule and arrived later. I don't remember Comfort returning to Peru last year when the earthquake happened. During the GFS last year, I also don't remember HSV Swift adapting to hurricane events, or Fort McHenry adapting much during its GFS in Africa.

But lets shoot straight here. Instead of deploying a ship from Norfolk, the Navy is moving a LHD from its regularly scheduled deployment to Colombia all the way to Haiti, while also deploying another LHD to prepare for response to future hurricanes.

Looking at this, it is clear we can do soft power this way and respond big, but it raises the question if the Navy's approach to soft power, HA, disaster response, etc.. is smart. The Wasp class is 6th largest class of warship in the world, and the other five are aircraft carrier classes, 4 of which are single ship classes and only 2 of which aren't US.

After reading Captain Bob throughout his deployment, I'm convinced that forward presence is critical for soft power, and that forward established presence shouldn't be a warship. Let what responds be a warship. I could be wrong, but it just seems we would want to do this without the commitment of our most important ships, even if they are the most flexible.

Global Naval Operations: Order of Battle

Blog note: This post substitutes for our usual weekend 5th Fleet Order of Battle.

With naval forces deployed in Georgia, the Persian Gulf, the Pacific, and South America, and with so much disinformation being put out on the internet regarding US Navy activities, we thought we would give a general update of global Navy operations. Forgive me if I don't cover your ship.

In South America the US Navy is currently involved in two operations. The first is PANAMAX 2008, an annual exercise that simulates the protection of the Panama canal against attack. Participating in PANAMAX 2008 is the USS Tarawa (LHA 1) , USS Farragut (DDG 99), USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98), USS Kauffman (FFG 59), USS Devastator (MCM 6), USS Chief (MCM 14), and the USCGC Harriet Lane (WMEC 903).

The second current operation in South America is Operation Continuing Promise involving the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3).

In the Pacific the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike group has departed Malaysia. If we were guessing we would say the Ronald Reagan CSG is on its way to the 5th Fleet to relieve the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group that has been operating there for the last four months. That is a guess, but the Lincoln CSG deployed in March and is rapidly approaching the end of its deployment, and will be heading back soon. With no US carrier currently deployed in the Atlantic the Reagan makes the most likely replacement in the 5th Fleet to support operations in both theaters of war. The Reagan CSG consists of the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Gridley (DDG 101), USS Decatur (DDG 73), USS Thach (FFG 43), and the USS Springfield (SSN 761).

The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group consists of USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72), USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), USS Russell (DDG 59), USS Shoup (DDG 86), USS Momsen (DDG 92), and USS Curts (FFG 38).

The USS George Washington (CVN 73) has departed San Diego and is on its way to her new home port in Japan. This deployment would allow the Reagan to redeploy to the 5th Fleet.

The Peleliu Expeditionary Strike Group is still in the 5th Fleet, but may soon be getting relieved by the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group. The Peleliu ESG deployed in early May, so they are only about half way through their deployment, but news today is that the Iwo Jima ESG will deploy next week. Given the time overlap, the Iwo Jima ESG may operate either in the Med or around Africa before relieving the Peleliu ESG, although that is purely speculation.

The Peleliu ESG consists of the USS Peleliu (LHA 5), USS Dubuque (LPD 8), USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52), USS Cape St. George (CG 71), USS Benfold (DDG 65), and USS Halsey (DDG 97).

The Iwo Jima ESG consists of the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), USS San Antonio (LPD 17), USS Carter Hall (LSD 50), USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), USS Roosevelt (DDG 80), and USS Ramage (DDG 61).

Already forward deployed in the 6th fleet, by now you are no doubt aware that the USS McFaul (DDG 74) and USCGC Dallas (WHBC 716) are in the Black Sea on a humanitarian deployment to Georgia.

Also deploying into the Black Sea is Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE consisting of the Spanish frigate SPS Juan de Borbon (F102), the Polish frigate ORP General K. Pulaski (272), the German frigate FGS Lubeck (F214), and the US frigate USS Nicholas (FFG 47). These ships will visit the ports of Constanza in Romania and Varna in Bulgaria in the west Black Sea where they will do exercises with both Navies. SNMG-1 is also scheduled to make port in İstanbul for training during its Black Sea tour. These ships are not expected to visit Georgia and these activities had been scheduled and approved with Turkey back in October of 2007.

USS Barry (DDG 52) deployed two weeks ago and will do a tour with Standing NATO Maritime Group TWO. It is worth noting that usually SNMG-1 operates in the northern Atlantic and SNMG-2 operates in the Mediterranean Sea, but with SNMG-1 in the Black Sea it is unclear where SNMG-1 will be operating.

Other naval news. INS Delhi (D61), INS Talwar (F40), INS Godavari (F20) and INS Aditya (A59) are currently deployed off east Africa and are expected to make port in Mombasa, Kenya followed by Darasalam, Nigeria and other ports including Madagascar. Some of these ships are expected to participate in Malabar 08 in October.

FGS Pegnitz (M1091) and FGS Laboe (M1097) and FGS Main (A515) have taken up UNIFIL duties off of Lebanon.

HMS Lancaster (F229) departed Portsmouth yesterday and will be replacing HMS Montrose (F236) currently operating in the Persian Gulf. HMS Portland (F79) is reportedly preparing for deployment, and is suspected of relieving HMS Kent (F78) currently on a Far East deployment.

HDMS Absalon (L16) has a port visit scheduled in Malta on August 26-28, after which she is expected to operate with Task Force 150. HMCS Iroquois (DDH 280) and HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) are operating in Task Force 150, while HMCS Ville de Quebec (FFH 332) is escorting ships for the World Food Program instead of participating with SNMG-1 in the Black Sea.

Following Operation Continuing Promise

David Axe and Chris Albon continue their reporting from the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) and have put out some outstanding stories. The depth and quality of the reporting that blogging is allowing the Navy cannot be understated, because not only are the tough questions being asked, but the right questions are being asked.

We think this is exactly the kind of public discussion the Navy wants to have, and needs to have regarding its soft power strategy.

I wanted to know whether the mission is even a good fit for the military. Sure, Damstra’s people, representing a dozen different military forces, are undoubtedly highly skilled. But they’re soldiers, sailors and airmen, for the most part trained to look after other sick and injured soldiers, sailors and airmen. These doctors wear uniforms. Some of them are even trained to carry weapons. But where we’re going, there are just sick civilians, whose only previous exposure to a military might have been in less, ahem, friendly circumstances. In light of this, can military personnel really make good humanitarians?

All over the world, many agencies have answered this question with a resounding NO. In Central Africa, civilian aid workers are often reluctant to work alongside military peacekeeping forces because they don’t want their charity associated with weapons, uniforms and potentially oppressive governments. The U.N. doesn’t allow the E.U. army in Chad to enter the very refugee camps that the troops are supposed to protect. They all fear the creeping “militarization” of what should be strictly peaceful functions. Even U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates last month warned against a similar militarization of U.S. foreign policy, which he said should remain squarely in the hands of the (unarmed) State Department.

So can military personnel make good humanitarians? [Commander David] Damstra thought about it for a moment then said, yes...

Read the whole thing, that is a brilliant blog piece analyzing important questions.

You can also find pictures at War and Health, while Tom Crowe (another blogger traveling with the Kearsarge) has a ton of pictures up with clever captions.

4th Fleet Focus: Medical Diplomacy Takes Another Step

We didn't discuss it much, and I don't have a good reason why. The USS Boxer (LHD 4) recently completed the first leg of the Continuing Promise 2008 mission. The invaluable DoDLive, specifically Lt Cragg, did a really nice job getting the information from Capt. Peter Dallman, Commander, Amphibious Squadron 5, regarding the USS Boxer (LHD 4) deployment. In reading through the transcript of the blogger roundtable (PDF) two specific things jumped out.

The first is interesting. The Navy recognizes the importance of the NGOs, but for some reason this strikes us as a token presence of the potential capacity of what the USS Boxer (LHD 4) should be able to bring forward on this kind of deployment.

So ours was somewhat -- relatively limited. And like I said, it's difficult to say with a straight face that a four-month planning timeline is a short timeline, but the effect of that is it was a little late notification for us to go to partner nations -- I'm sorry, to nongovernmental organizations and to have them pitch in a lot for this fight. But they're certainly looking forward to follow-on missions.

And I think that's going to -- ultimately, that's going to be a golden key to our success, to do these types of missions. Project Hope folks and the Public Health Service goes through this kind of thing, obviously, on an ongoing basis as opposed to an episodic basis as we are doing it here on Boxer. They have experience in this. They're trained in it. And I think, in my opinion, the Navy wants to continue to ask them to get involved in this kind of thing.

And I think it's going to be good for both Project Hope and Public Health and other NGOs to continue to push people into these missions and push them forward to do this kind of work because, you know, they're good at it and we certainly can learn from them. They added a lot of value to our processes and our overall effort.

One would think Representatives would be aware of NGOs in their district that might be interested in getting involved in these types of deployments, indeed one thing that comes to mind is this might be a good way to get college students involved to community service through University programs. For example, pair a pre-med student with a corpsman, or work with fraternities and sororities at the national level to help raise money to send students each year as part of a summer program to participate in these types of deployments. Universities often discuss the importance of getting young men and women involved in summer programs that expand their experiences in a rapidly changing and globalized world, it seems this type of deployment would be an excellent way for college students to get involved in volunteer work.

Earlier in the roundtable it was mentioned that materials come from title 10 work, well if that is the case, then all the Navy is really looking beyond the specialized help is volunteers for labor and outreach, and we think the Universities offer an excellent resource for this type of thing. In the grand picture of US diplomacy, there are several faces. Governmental, Non-governmental, and Business are only three such faces, but the average citizen volunteer, particularly youth of college age and education, is another way to export the American spirit in diplomacy. Seems like the House of Representatives would be the right place to build the bridge between the DoD and the Universities in promotion of such a program.

Despite having so few people outside the Navy, this is a very impressive statistical impact.

We had 127 total surgeries onboard Boxer, 14,000 total dental procedures, 66 repairs to biomedical equipment in the various clinics and hospitals that we worked at.

A lot of this is done by corpsmen that don't have any parts, no kit, no tool bag, no anything. So I was amazed that they could repair that many.

We saw just under 4,000 optometry patients. We distributed about 3,500 glasses to those patients. We dispensed nearly 40,000 medications. We had a veterinarian team, and they saw just under 2,900 animals total. A lot of that was vaccinations and de-worming. And primary care saw just over 14,000 patients.

So total patients for the 28 mission days was just over 24,000 patients seen. And that results -- if you add in the classes, 123 classes, and 18,000 total students for those classes, then that's a total of 65,000 encounters during the 28 mission days.

Medical diplomacy at work in its early stages. Very impressive.

Blogger roundtable participants included the always insightful John of Argghhh, Chris Albon from War and Health, and Chuck Simmons of the North Shore Journal. Well done all, we thought the roundtable was very interesting.

Global Fleet Stations Forever

When we observe the Navy discussing Global Fleet Stations, the mission objective profile is one of a mission without end. Instead the mission will transition from one phase to another, and the next phase of both the the Caribbean region Global Fleet Station and the African Partnership Station in the Gulf of Guinea region. Admiral Stevenson discussed the next 4th Fleet region Global Fleet Station (PDF) at the last blogger round table discussion.

This year we have a Global Fleet Station. That's a diving platform. That deploys this summer and will go into a majority of the Caribbean countries and do an awful lot of diving, training, port security, harbor protection type of things. And the following year, even later on in the fall, we may get Swift back, before her contract with the Navy ends, to continue some of the things that we started last year.

The diving ship being deployed is the USNS Grasp (T-ARS 51), an interesting choice. As a Global Fleet Station ship we observe the ship doesn't bring a lot of berthing, raising the question whether another ship will also be involved (probably via charter). Still, we see the Navy leveraging the MSC in this role as very wise, a way to sustain engagement with regional partners in a way that is clearly relevant to those regional nations.

The next phase in the Gulf Of Guinea will also look different this summer. While I haven't seen confirmation anywhere else yet, back in March Zachary M. Peterson reported for Inside The Navy (subscription only) that plans are already in motion for sustaining the African Partnership Station as well.

A Coast Guard cutter, Dallas, will deploy to the Gulf of Guinea this summer and plans for a French ship to steam in the region with embedded U.S. Navy training teams are also under way, he noted.

“APS doesn’t end when Fort McHenry [and Swift] go home,” Nowell argued. Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, commander of Naval Forces Europe, has said that the Navy is “here to stay” in West African waters, but details of how engagements in the region will fold into the nascent U.S. Africa Command remain to be determined, the captain said.

Zachary Peterson had another article on Tuesday in Inside The Navy that hit on the subject again. It was picked up in the CHINFO Clips.

This fall, the sea service plans to further efforts to build naval and coast guard capacity in coastal Western African countries by deploying a “variety of delivery platforms” ranging from frigates to destroyers and P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft detachments to the region, Capt. John Nowell, commodore of Task Force 365 (focused on West and Central Africa) and Destroyer Squadron Six Zero, said in a telephone interview April 21.

“Next year we expect another amphibious ship, probably the Nashville (LPD-13), to continue to conduct a similar mission to what we did with Fort McHenry (LSD-43),” Nowell said...

Guess that answers the questions regarding the USS Nashville (LPD 13) sale to India. The article goes on to note that blue water naval forces aren't always the best tools for the region though.

The APS effort incorporates a wide variety of projects in the region and is not specifically tied to gray-hull ships, Rear Adm. Anthony Kurta, director of policy, resources and strategy for Naval Forces Europe, said in a telephone interview April 23.

“There will be activity [in West Africa] under the APS banner for the next sixto-eight months,” Kurta noted.

These activities include the deployment of the Coast Guard cutter Dallas (WHEC-716) this summer and ongoing deployments of training teams throughout the region.

Phase 1 is an Amphibious Ship and a HSV. while phase 2 includes a MSC vessel and a Coast Guard Cutter. Admiral Clarke used to talk about using existing platforms and capabilities in new and innovative ways, we observe Global Fleet Stations and the resources being committed fits that description well. While the capabilities utilized for Global Fleet Stations are not new, the approach is innovative, a trend in ideas for the maritime domain that reflects a 4GW world.

4th Fleet Green Water Strategy

Today, I observed the winds of change. In today's blogger roundtable, SteelJaw Scribe was unable to attend, but he had submitted his questions and it was read anyway. The response captured the various angles of 4th Fleets Green Water Strategy.

Q: "With the decline of the supporting infrastructure in the region and the closure of naval stations Roosevelt Roads and Rodman, et cetera, how sustainable do you see the Fourth Fleet's small unit presence in the AOR, particularly outside the Caribbean?"

A: I would think that if you do an analysis of the countries -- I mean, 15 years ago, there wasn't any democracies in Central or South America, period. And this year, if you look, you'll see just about all democracies with the exception of one and a couple that are very, very far left. But that is the good thing. And the good thing about that is that they welcome the United States into their ports, and so the at-sea sustainment really isn't an issue.

However, if you look at, you know, the capabilities that the United States have -- has if you have have a big-deck amphibious ship, if you have aircraft carriers, if you have high-speed vessels, then essentially you can kind of have your own afloat staging base, where, you know, acting as mother ships and can refuel ships, and we can maintain our presence down here, and we can maintain our cooperation through exercises and training venues and what have you.

So I think it's dependent, and I think that's the huge value that our Navy brings in some of its core competencies, which is its forward presence and the ability to sail anywhere, any time and sustain itself.

(PDF Transcript)

Our initial impressions of the Navy standing up 4th Fleet was one in the context of leadership and strategy. After participating in today's blogger roundtable on the subject, I think our instincts on this was right. Rear Adm. James Stevenson is very impressive, after speaking with him I admit a bit of frustration that he is retiring, and hope that in his next profession he finds a useful medium to articulate his strategic ideas regarding leveraging the Sea as Base as clearly as he did today. The strategic vision for naval Sea Basing he discussed during the roundtable regarding operations for the 4th Fleet could have been ripped right from the content of this blog, and there were a few times that I had a huge cheesy grin on my face listening to him speak.

Based on our observations of previous deployments for SOUTHCOM, the leadership style and priorities of Adm. Stavridis, and the appointment of Rear Adm. Joseph Kernan, we believe 4th Fleet is about to execute a very unique Green Water Strategy that may serve as a model for peacetime strategy in the 21st Century. Adm. Stevenson continuously highlighted the value of amphibious forces during today's roundtable, but when speaking of them in an operational context outlined the strategic value they bring to peacetime operations. With access to regional ports, with good relations with many regional neighbors, 4th Fleet is taking an engagement approach across the spectrum ranging from security cooperation to proactive humanitarian impact while it deals with the low end naval requirements of dealing with illicit trafficking.

The engagement by the US Navy to the 4th Fleet AOR is well known historically for response to natural disasters. Whether hurricanes, mudslides, earthquakes, forest fires, or flooding; the 4th fleet AOR brings a range of peacemaking challenges to the Navy to be responsive in peacetime. The value of amphibious forces for meeting these challenges was continuously articulated by Adm. Stevenson.

While this sounds good, we foresee some major challenges in execution here. We do not believe the Navy will be able to sustain forward deployed amphibious ships to 4th Fleet, there simply aren't enough amphibious ships to do that. We would also note that every metric Adm. Stevenson listed regarding why he likes amphibious ships is virtually every metric the Littoral Combat Ship doesn't offer for peacetime missions in the future. In that context, we see the 4th fleet strategy having well defined ends and ways but lacking the means either presently or in the future to execute strategy. It will be interesting to observe how the Navy addresses that issue, or even recognizes it as an issue before it is too late to do something about it.

During the roundtable the only issue discussed that really bothered me is that 4th Fleet is commanded by a 2-star billet, not a 3-star billet like other fleets. I missed this during the announcement, and I think that decision sends the wrong message. It is something that should be addressed, although I think there may be a Congressional requirement for that. It doesn't make sense to elevate a peacetime strategy to equal levels of wartime strategy as stated in 21st Century Seapower, stand up a new fleet with the peacetime strategic purpose in mind, and then fall short in equality for leadership billets. Consistency is important, and when there is evidence of a lack of consistency in regards to maritime strategy, in serves only to weaken the strategy.

4th Fleet represents the first major decision for CNO Roughead, as all other major initiatives have been inherited. While we think the decision to go 2-star is one in need of correction, we see the establishment of 4th Fleet as positive for the Navy. We believe the strategic vision 4th Fleet will execute for peacetime sustained presence and engagement will be quite different than what is traditionally associated with the deployment of naval forces to other regions, and will be more evident compared to the token SOUTHCOM deployments of the past. We look forward to observing the strategy for leveraging maritime forces in what is primarily a green water operational theater, and believe we will get a good early peek into the strategic vision for 4th Fleet this summer as hurricane season approaches.

There was some other news from the roundtable, including Unitas Gold (50) next year being hosted off the Jacksonville coast, the next Global Fleet Station to South America using a diving ship as a platform, and more information regarding the Kearsarge/Boxer deployments to South America. We got the impression the Kearsarge deployment will be timed with Hurricane season in mind prepared to respond to any potential disaster zones. In all it was an interesting conversation.

Navy Will Stand Up 4th Fleet in July

When we first heard about this in January, we didn't expect it to happen until next year. Apparently, the Navy will stand up the 4th Fleet in July.

The Navy will create a 4th Fleet headquartered at Naval Station Mayport, Fla., and will tap a two-star SEAL officer to lead it, according to a Pentagon announcement Thursday.

Rear Adm. Joseph Kernan, head of Naval Special Warfare Command in Coronado, Calif., has been chosen to command the new fleet. Kernan will take control of both 4th Fleet and the current Naval Forces Southern Command, the Navy component of U.S. Southern Command.

The command will oversee maritime operations in Central and South American waters, and is similar to the command structure of 5th Fleet, which is also Naval Forces Central Command.

Our first impression of this news was that we expected the discussion to focus in on the relationship between the United States and South America. The general decline in relations is something we have discussed in the past as we have observed the mission profiles and intent of the US Navy in dealing with our southern neighbors. We don't observe this event in that context though, the mission in July will be the same mission as today, and the challenges will also be the same, so we will let others lead that discussion.

We see this event in the context of leadership and strategy. We note this is the first strategic decision regarding the direction of the Navy Admiral Roughead has made as CNO. Up until this point, Admiral Roughead had inherited all strategic decisions, whether it was the fleet constitution plan (313 plan) or the new maritime strategy, the strategic direction of the Navy had already been decided by either CNO Clark or CNO Mullen.

Another aspect of this event that sticks out is how the monopoly of leadership may be changing, and that strikes us as important. Admiral Roughead, a surface warfare officer of the AEGIS community, is standing up a fleet to support SOUTHCOM, currently commanded by Adm. James Stavridis, another surface warfare officer of the AEGIS community, but has appointed Rear Adm. Joseph Kernan, who comes from the SEAL community. While that may not seem like a big deal, we explained the other day that we believe that just as the AEGIS community and naval aviation community leads the Navy today, it will be the expeditionary community and submarine community, including COs of XOs of those ship types today, who will make up the Navy leadership of tomorrow. This has nothing to do with a bias against AEGIS COs and XOs, rather we believe as the Navy tackles the challenges of a comprehensive strategy there will be more balance evident in commands. How obvious is this issue? We quote the Navy Times article for an example.

“I am likewise thrilled with the choice of a Navy SEAL for this important and expeditionary job,” Stavridis said “He is the right officer for the challenging tasks in the region, and additionally has a strong sense of theater security cooperation and interaction with our partner nations.”

Although he’s a SEAL, Kernan isn’t a stranger to the conventional fleet. As a junior officer, he served aboard the cruiser Horne.

Comments like that explain why the IA program in the Navy is seen in the context of career killer for officers. We can only hope that Adm. Stavridis didn't emphasize that point, and its the article author who is making that point.

In January my first impression of the 4th fleet proposal was that the last thing the Navy needs to do is add another staff to a shrinking fleet, we now take the opposite position. Given the challenges the Navy will manage in the 21st century, we see the 4th fleet and the 6th fleet as the primary drivers for better balance in leadership promotions, because it is within the responsibilities of these fleets where we believe the conventional warfare forces of the Navy will hold minor relevance to executing strategy.

Adm. James Stavridis, who we believe is the next CNO in waiting, has a lot of interesting comments. We really like these quotes.

The fleet, he said, will be focused on preventing and responding to mass migration of refugees, as has happened in the past in Haiti and Cuba, as well as interdicting the flow of illegal drugs and partnering with countries throughout the region.

“We will also seek to build the ability of the 4th Fleet to work with interagency partners like U.S. Department of State, [U.S. Agency for International Development] and Department of Homeland Security,” he said.

Stavridis said anti-drug operations, humanitarian and cooperative training missions are expected to be the new command’s primary engagements.

We have long believed that as the maritime strategy was developed, Admiral Stavridis was very influential in its direction. 4th fleet represents all the unique, unconventional approaches that will be required to effectively sustain long term peace in the 21st century. While maritime law enforcement will be important, and in that regard traditional naval forces will need to be present, it is the pursuit of the peacemaker objects in maritime strategy where 4th fleet will be focused.

The article continues.

“One particularly important mission for the 4th Fleet will be medical diplomacy, as exemplified by the voyage last summer of [the hospital ship] Comfort, which conducted nearly 400,000 patient encounters during a four-month cruise to 12 countries in the region,” Stavridis said.

This year, the amphibious assault ships Boxer and Kearsarge will “return on similar missions in the region this summer,” he said, “all under the aegis of 4th Fleet.”

Medical Diplomacy continues to develop buzz. While it is not the Great White Fleet we discussed earlier this year, the pattern to use of amphibious ships without Marines for exercising soft power towards our national interest continues. 4th Fleet is going to be interesting to observe, because it will likely be heavy on LPD and MSC and light on carrier and cruiser.

4th Fleet Focus: Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick

It started with the Monroe Doctrine, but it was the timeless phrase President Theodore Roosevelt that nicely summarized Americas foreign policy towards South America... or was supposed to anyway. In reality, American foreign policy towards South America is complicated and can be legitimately argued as non-existent, at least the public coherent and explained policy anyway. It was around 1950 the American foreign policy attention span waned in South America, and arguably it continues to be poorly defined.

Ironically, it was 1950 when the US Navy folded the 4th fleet into the US 2nd fleet in Norfolk. Is that a coincidence? Perhaps, but the Great White Fleet started its journey by going to South America first, and that wasn't an accident. Today South America doesn't look anything like the South America of the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore Roosevelt, or 1950. Today, South America is an emerging economic market the US needs to get engaged with diplomatically, and this little bit of news reflects that reality.

U.S. 4th Fleet, which hunted submarines in the South Atlantic during World War II until it was dissolved almost six decades ago, is on its way back.

The new 4th Fleet would cover a similar area, with plans to operate from Naval Station Mayport, Fla., and oversee operations in Central and South America. The commander of Naval Forces Southern Command would also be the head of 4th Fleet, Navy officials said.

The fleet would not own any ships. Instead, it would operate in the same way Navy forces do in the Persian Gulf region. In U.S. Central Command, one admiral serves as head of both Naval Forces Central Command and 5th Fleet. Therefore, the dual-hatted admiral in charge of 4th Fleet and NavSouth would be under the commander of Southern Command.

And when will the 4th Fleet stand up?

The decision to stand up the fleet, Navy officials said, is within the scope of the chief of naval operations, as changing ship home ports are. But a final go-ahead is still a ways off, though sources say the Navy’s leadership is actively working the issue and strongly in favor of the idea.

A final decision will not come until the Navy has briefed military and congressional leaders.

Sounds like we are still a few years off. We are not sure what to make of this, and expect, like AFRICOM, there is more to this story than what the early press stories reveal. Our initial reaction to this bit of news was sarcasm. Is this an inside move to create more staff positions? The thought crossed our mind, but it is more likely there is some good logic here.

There are regional players that can no longer be ignored. Brazil, for example, shouldn't be ignored. Brazil in 20 years could very easily be what India or China is today, a rising economic and military power. Brazil has a lot of problems to overcome to realize that potential, but the potential most certainly exists and the US is wise not to ignore it, and would be very wise to get engaged with Brazil on the level sooner rather than later.

Another regional player is Venezuela. Huge Chavez may be the darling of western socialists, but his military moves, particularly in regards to building paramilitary forces and questionable policies with assault rifles is troubling. Should Venezuela actually follow through and put 9 AIP submarines in the Caribbean Sea that would be a valid national security concern for a 4th fleet.

It is hard to tell exactly what the reasons are for this move, as it is still early in the process. Regardless, there has been a lot of attention given to South America, between Global Fleet Stations, hospital ship deployments, humanitarian missions, and Partnership deployments the Navy has certainly remained engaged without a numbered fleet.

Final thought: While we threw a bit of snark at this announcement as a first reaction, the best snark is here. It is an old entry, but reddog's comment is a classic!