Thoughts on the Farsi Island Incident January 12

By now most of you have heard the news of the initial incident and have read several details of the incident that have been reported in the press. The bottom line, there are still a lot of unknowns even as the incident was resolved diplomatically within 24 hours. Below are a few thoughts.

1) Even 48 hours after the initial incident it doesn't even appear CENTCOM or the Pentagon has a full accounting of the details of exactly what happened. People who have been telling the narrative since the incident first occurred are sure to be proven wrong, since they have almost certainly been guessing as to causes and motives. In the end, it is starting to look to be exactly what it looks like... a bunch of young sailors lost because of reliance on technology and/or machinery that failed. There is also, potentially, a training issue here related to navigation and leadership.

2) Those who are claiming the US Navy should have shot their way out of the standoff - when it appears the US Navy sailors actually involved appeared to have convinced themselves their ships were inside Iranian waters - make very interesting and yet terrible arguments for shooting at Iranians. Farsi Island may be a disputed Island in the Persian Gulf, but there is an IRGC naval base on that island and presence in the first rule of ownership. If the Iranian Navy, or Russian Navy, or any Navy drifted armed boats into US waters off Kings Bay, I suspect the US Coast Guard and/or US Navy would be very quick to point guns and be active in detaining the drifters.

3) I am unable to see any strategic advantage the US would have gained by fighting Iran inside the 3 mile zone of Iranian territory, and I am unable to see any strategic consequence to the US by not fighting Iran inside the 3 mile zone of Iranian territory. However, had the US Navy tried to shoot their way out of that situation, the strategic consequences would have been significant, and not just how it relates to Iran. Such a violent action would have given China a valid example to act the same way in disputed places in the South China Sea. If the US Navy is going to lead the global commons based on our interpretation of the rules at sea, the LT who apologized (and everyone on the political right is flogging) just forwarded America strategically. I note it is primarily the parochial arguments from people whose expertise lies in other military services like the Army who have completely ignored the details like global rule sets at sea who have been the loudest to shout at the Navy in this incident. With all due respect, this is an incredibly parochial and shortsided overreaction of the incident, because the National Review can and should do better than finding an Army guy - Bing West (whom I know and respect but wtf...) when it comes to a complex naval incident. This isn't the Pueblo, nor is it the Korean War. There will be no museum in Iran, and both the boats and the crews were returned.

4) This is one of those difficult issues that, in my mind, separates serious people who care about serious strategic issues the US faces in the 21st century and demagogues who see conspiracy and opportunity in every political crisis. If you are a partisan who sees a conspiracy, go away. For the rest of us, there are serious naval issues here that need serious answers. These are a few of the initial questions that should be considered.

- Is the maintenance of the riverine command boats contracted to the point the onboard crew was unable to repair the problem? The crew of only 5 sailors per boat suggests to me that something might be off with the manpower and maintenance procedures surrounding these very capable chess pieces of naval equipment. The RCB is made to fight in the Persian Gulf, but a broken RCB isn't going to win.

 - This is a teaching moment if there ever was one, and as an incident this appears to represent a textbook case study on the reasons why the Navy needs more, not fewer, Commands for junior officers. It may be the opinion of some hard core political demagogues who have over a decade of tactical success combined with over a decade of strategic failure that this incident is somehow a defeat for America, but each new fact that emerges from this incident suggests to me this may be a case of procedural failure far beyond the scope of a LT... but when shit happened, strategic acumen by the officer in charge (LT) is potentially emerging as a feature in handling a bad situation and not making it worse. The facts are still unknown, and we may not know for sure for awhile, but regardless of what the facts are in the end I see this as a very teachable moment that favors the argument for early Command as often as possible for junior officers.

- I have no problem with high profile diplomatic incidents like this between the US Navy and Iran, as long as for each incident the actions of the US Navy is aligned with the strategic aims of the United States. If the US Navy had attacked the IRGC inside the territorial waters of Farsi Island to defend their boats, this would be a major strategic setback for the US. Had the incident occurred outside the territorial waters of Iran and the US Navy not fought back; that would also be a strategic setback for the US. Right now it appears the US Navy sailors on the scene did everything right.

- The only way to produce a genuine strategic failure from this incident is to unfairly punish those involved, in other words... if the Navy wants better commanders, handle early career mistakes the right way. Tell me how any of those 10 sailors are somehow worse off for this incident. If legitimate mistakes were made, deal with it appropriately, but pinning blame for things out of their control would be a failure of leadership, and in my mind an unforgivable sin.

- At the end of the day, this was a real diplomatic test of the US and Iran who under the recent agreement are partners in Iran's nuclear energy ambitions. The outcome is very positive for the United States. I don't trust the government of Iran, but I am yet to see anything from this incident that suggests to me Iran has has been inappropriate. If you're the American Idiot who doesn't think it was appropriate for the US Navy sailors to have their hands on their heads at any point in the engagement near the IRGC base on Farsi Island, try drifting your private armed boat into the US Navy area of Kings Bay or Norfolk or New London and pretend like there is a snowballs chance in hell you will get out of there without your hands on your head. You will have your hands on your head, or if you point a gun back at the US Navy or US Coast Guard, you will be shot dead by very serious people who protect that location and will be pointing guns at you. You don't even have to be an Iranian for that outcome to occur, nor will you need an Iranian flag on your boat, a US flag will result in the same action. Wake up people, don't let the silly season control your ability to think with objectivity.

I look forward to learning what really happened, because at the end of the day we have a well armed naval craft in the middle of the Persian Gulf with a serious mechanical problem that couldn't be quickly resolved apparently combined with some incredibly bad navigation from two crews who somehow found their way to the only piece of land between their departure location and destination that could create a diplomatic problem. When you swim past all the political bullshit, the serious naval specific issues on the table leave a lot of serious questions that deserve serious answers.

Iran's Escalating Shadow Wars

Weapons seized at sea 15 July. (Photo Credit - Gulf Daily News Online)

Beyond a hint of teargas in the air around Juffair and some additional off-limits areas for Sailors, the February 2011 Pearl Roundabout uprisings weren't terribly disruptive to the U.S. Navy's FIFTH Fleet, headquartered in Manama, Bahrain. However, recent indications that Iran has increased support to Bahraini Shia resistance elements show potential to put U.S. and U.K naval presence in the Kingdom at risk. Last week, a bombing outside a girls school near the predominantly Shia village of Sitra killed two policemen and wounded six other people.

Prior to this bombing, several likely related weapons seizures occurred:

• 28 December 2024 - A shipment containing 38 blocks of C4 explosives and grenades was interdicted at sea. Additional material was found in a warehouse Al Qurayyah the next day. 
• 15 March 2024 - Two Bahraini men were detained by Saudi Arabia for smuggling high explosives across the Gulf causeway from Bahrain, ostensibly for employment in the KSA. 
• 6 June 2024 - IED components including C4, commercial detonators, advanced circuitry, chemicals, and mobile phones were seized from a warehouse near Manama. 
• 15 July 2024 - Bahrain's coast guard seized an inbound vessel that had just linked up with another vessel outside of territorial waters containing 44 kg of C4, eight Kalashnikov assault rifles, 32 Kalashnikov magazines, ammunition, and detonators. One of the two suspects detained onboard admitted to receiving firearms and IED manufacturing training in Iran in August 2013 at an Iranian Revolutionary Guards' camp.

Up until recently, insurgent explosive devices in Bahrain consisted of smallish homemade black powder pipe bombs sometimes augmented with gas cylinders or gasoline containers.  The introduction of C4 high explosives and numerous recent smuggling actions represent an escalation in Iranian lethal aid to Shia resistance elements. Bahrain's interior ministry reported that there were similarities between the explosives and components seized in the Gulf with those used by Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iranian surrogate paramilitary group active in Iraq (which by the way, was responsible for the deaths of a number of American servicemembers during the height of the Iraq War).

Proxy warfare is Iran's favored method of expanding its influence across the Middle East. Shia militias in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria have benefited from lethal and non-lethal support generally smuggled in by the IRGC via air or ocean transport. Iran's primary unconventional warfare arm is the IRGC-Quds Force, very roughly equivalent to U.S. Army Special Forces.

As I discussed  here in 2013 and as evidenced in some of the seizures above, Iran continues to support its armed surrogates via the sea. As sanctions against Treasury Department designated terrorist entities are lifted, the nuclear deal with Iran will inevitably increase this nefarious activity. Even the National Security Advisor has admitted as much: “We should expect that some portion of that money would go to the Iranian military and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior that we’ve seen in the region up until now,” Susan Rice said during a recent CNN interview of the up to $150 billion that will flow into regime coffers.

Specifically, the Vienna agreement lifts sanctions on a number of suspect organizations including Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and South Shipping Line Iran, along with dozens of other global transportation entities, many of which are probably front companies for IRGC smuggling activities.  Regardless of any details contained in the agreement, it is very unlikely that the IRGC-QF will change its bellicose behavior unless the Ayatollah's regime itself changes.

Make no mistake, many of the human rights grievances expressed by Bahrain's Shia population leading up to the "14 February Revolution" of 2011 were legitimate, and deserve attention by Bahrain's Sunni rulers. But Iran's meddling in the conflict is troublesome, and increases the likelihood of sectarian violence spilling over to the American footprint in Bahrain. Given these developments, it would be wise if the US enhanced counter-UW efforts in the region. Intelligence sharing and interagency cooperation are key to disrupting the flow of lethal aid on the sea, air, and land.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Conducting Naval Operations in the Arabian Gulf: An Essential Mission Capability

ARABIAN GULF (Dec. 8, 2014) The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) prepares for flight operations. Carl Vinson is deployed in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility supporting Operation Inherent Resolve, strike operations in Iraq and Syria as directed, maritime security operations, and theater security cooperation efforts in the region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Alex King/Released)

The following contribution is from Daniel J. Whiteneck, Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses.

Introduction

The conduct of naval operations in the Arabian Gulf region has been the source of extensive debate as political tensions between Iran and Israel, the future of Iran's nuclear program, and the role of the United States as the guarantor of Gulf security continue to frame the security environment of the Arabian Gulf. While Iran's evolving anti-access, area denial (A2AD) capabilities drive some to argue that America's most valuable naval assets would be at high risk if operating inside the Arabian Gulf, there are important reasons for the Navy to maintain a persistent, combat credible presence in the Gulf.

Integrated naval strike force (carrier strike groups, amphibious ships, ballistic missile defence (BMD) shooters, and other necessary surface forces) operations inside the Gulf should be conducted because they are the most effective method for deterring and countering Iranian threats to:  regional stability, the security of US allies, and the free flow of commerce.  Robust naval forces, centered on capable strike forces, are the centerpiece of a combined arms concept of offensive and defensive capabilities. Their unique capabilities and their presence in the Gulf facilitate the accomplishment of US strategic and political objectives.

Strategic Considerations

The first issue to be addressed is to realize that the US does not control the timing of a potential conflict. Because of that reality, the decision has to be made before a crisis breaks out on the normal operating posture for naval forces. The Strait of Hormuz is the chokepoint where Iran's ability to threaten US naval forces is the strongest, and a transit either in or out during hostilities exposes naval forces to the full range of Iran's A2AD threat.  Iran's investments in fast attack craft (FAC/FIAC) with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), mines, coastal defence cruise missiles (CDCMs), and diesel submarines can be most effectively brought to bear in the Strait.

The Navy has to decide before a conflict to fight inside or outside the Arabian Gulf. Fighting from outside means that the Navy would have to "roll back" Iranian capabilities from the Gulf of Oman, through the Strait, and then into the Gulf.     Naval air power will have to run the gauntlet of the Strait's air defences, or be granted access and over flight and tanking by GCC nations. This rollback of air defences and CDCMs will be necessary to address a mine threat in the chokepoint because it would be imprudent to operate MCM assets in •contested water spaces. All of this will take more time and resources, and potentially American lives, because Iranian capabilities in the central and northern parts of the Gulf and country will be under far less pressure allowing Iran to concentrate its defensive capabilities against a single avenue of attack.

If the Navy's carrier and other high value units are inside the Gulf when a crisis erupts and the Navy wants to fight from outside, it would have to exit the Gulf through the very threat envelope that everyone wants it to avoid. Leaving the Gulf during a period of high tension would send a negative message to all of America's partners and allies in the region.  America's position as the military leader in the Gulf and the guarantor of regional security and global commerce would be questioned.  Without US naval forces to deter and support allied defence of the Gulf, GCC partners face strong incentives to bargain with Iran or risk having island territories, energy infrastructure, and shipping subjected to harassment and attack. Iranian naval forces could operate in small groups or in unconventional attacks and would count on US forces making responses lower priorities than anti-access operations outside the Gulf and in the Strait. GCC countries might be faced with meeting such a threat mostly on their own,or with responses by US forces that might be too late to prevent damages to vital economic assets. US presence and power, visible and ready, is required to assure these partners.

Because these two realities can not be escaped (no control of conflict initiation and zero risk tolerance inside the Iranian threat envelope), there will be heavy pressure to operate outside the Gulf at all times. And because the carrier strike group (CSG) and its air power are essential to the safe operations of BMD ships, MCMs, AFSBs, and PCs, these forces will have to operate at higher risk or be forced to withdraw from the Gulf for their own protection.

US naval forces also center a coalition of other national navies that are invested in the security of the Gulf and its resources. US naval forces are the only forces capable of strike operations on a large scale, defence of the forces, and defeating multiple Iranian maritime threats.  The allied forces in the Gulf (MCMs, escorts for shipping, ISR) are all dependent on the offensive and defensive capabilities of US naval forces.  Without those forces, allied navies will be forced to reconsider their posture in the Gulf, with the ultimate strategic effect of re-thinking their commitments to Gulf security and support for deterring and defeating Iran.

There would also be negative economic and political impacts if US naval forces were not postured to protect and defend commercial shipping and the flow of commerce.  Routinely operating outside the Gulf leaves the area vulnerable to Iranian forces. It could expose commercial shipping to Iranian harassment and coercion in the central and northern parts of the Gulf. Reactions from the commercial sector could include increased insurance rates (with cascade effects on prices), or more likely, accommodations to Iranian demands on the control of shipping inside the Gulf.

If US naval forces are unable to prevent Iran from deploying mines in the northern and central parts of the Gulf, commercial shipping would be halted until secure routes could be established and safe transit guaranteed by constant air and surface escort. At the extreme, these conditions might not be enough for some commerce, and it might stop transits until the 'threat is gone.

A worst case scenario is that regional states and commercial interests might cut deals with Iran that create adverse impacts for US regional presence and influence.  A long term change in the US security role in the Gulf could also cause major European allies to change their strategies and postures towards Gulf security and the certainty of energy supplies. In addition, other outside powers might increase their own presence to assure access for their commercial interests.

Mission accomplishment from inside the Arabian Gulf

Naval forces postured inside the Gulf ensure that the US has a visible sign of commitment at all times. That force possesses essential deter and defeat attributes of prompt denial and punishment of Iranian maritime coercion or aggression. It is a force positioned to carry out operations, not just respond to Iranian actions from an “over the horizon" posture.

Prompt denial and punishment capabilities are the hallmark of a naval striking force (TACAIR, TLAMs, and amphibious forces) that can carry out strike missions against Iranian targets from north to south throughout the Gulf. The ability to deliver short-notice striking power at a time and place of US choosing is especially important in an environment where the US does not control the initiation of conflict, and the use of shore-based aircraft and tanking is largely dependent on access and authorities from partner nations.  Lastly, US naval power to deter and defeat is based on a mobile asset. Shore­based air power is subject to disruption by Iranian short-range ballistic missiles that can fire at pre­determined targets. Naval forces are much more secure from this threat, providing a survivable conventional deterrent force.  While Iran has claimed that it can threaten US ships with anti-ship ballistic missiles, at this time they are likely unable to field an operational capability that can seriously threaten ships at sea for some time.

Naval forces must also be postured and ready to establish sea control and contribute to the joint force commander's ability to control the escalation and de-escalation of the conflict in response to an evolving strategic environment.  A CSG-centered naval force in the Gulf prevents Iran from seizing the initiative for sea control.  The US will continue to maintain superior situational awareness by its tactical forces, integrated with joint, national, and allied ISR assets. US forces will be able to use show of force missions to deter, and use the escalation of force in the event deterrence fails.

Naval forces are scalable, enabling deterrent postures and proportional or non-proportional responses to threats.   CSG TACAIR can range surface threats and counter at-sea swarms of FAC and/or FIAC. It can also scale up to deliver strike packages against naval bases, support facilities, and missile or mine forces/sites as required.  A CSG-Ied strike force will enable amphibious operations, and its planes and ships can be part of strikes against a wide range of targets in Iran. This capability would force an adversary to "honor the threat." Iran would not be able to mass forces in the Strait without exposing its territory and forces in the Northern and Central Arabian Gulf to US power.

Operating inside the Gulf provides maximum protection to commercial shipping and communicates American commitment to maintaining the free flow of commerce and global access to the Gulfs energy resources. This is arguably, the vital mission, for US forces. It is important to remember that it is not enough to force open the Strait of Hormuz if the shipping and energy infrastructure of the Gulf are subject to days of harassment and attack by Iranian forces.

Operating inside the Gulf means that TACAIR will support US and allied forces that are escorting merchant traffic. In the Tanker Wars of the 1980s, the US only escorted its own and Kuwaiti-flagged ships, and as a result was responsible for a limited  number of air and surface sorties and assets. The current nature of trade and energy interdependence in the global economy are strong factors against a repeat of such a policy, as nations and the private economic actors all look to US naval forces as the guarantor of commercial traffic.  The CSG will be called on to cover a range of missions all designed to protect the flow of commerce and energy ,including; escort operations, energy infrastructure protection, and mine countermeasures.

Naval forces are tasked with contributing to the mutual security of allies and partners throughout the Gulf. That ability also encourages regional partners to participate in coalition actions. If a robust naval strike force is operating inside the Gulf, it will be optimally postured to carry out this mission. BMD ships postured in the Gulf must be protected in order to concentrate their capabilities on their mission. CSG assets must be positioned for persistent defence of these ships. CSG assets will also be called on to protect  smaller patrol craft, afloat forward staging bases (AFSBs), and MCM ships as they work with GCC partners to :secure territorial waters and energy infrastructure. GCC partners and other allies factor their own strategic and operational plans on the presence of US naval power, and air and missile defences. Without these capabilities inside the Gulf, those allies and partners will be forced to re­ evaluate their strategies and operational concepts.

Naval tactics against Iranian threats

Properly structured and organized naval strike forces work as a unit at the tactical level to defend against and defeat Iranian threats. They can do this effectively inside the Gulf, even as Iran has been steadily trying to enhance its A2AD capabilities.  In a tactical confrontation with a US naval force inside the Gulf, Iran would likely try to inflict a serious blow against a major US naval combatant to raise the human cost and support an information campaign designed to make the cost of US presence in the Gulf too expensive for political decision makers to pay.

A strike force operating inside the Arabian Gulf can use its organic integrated defensive and offensive capabilities to defeat, not just mitigate, potential Iranian threats, as well as relying on position, maneuver, and established logistical support for its persistent presence. The CSG is the focal point for aggregated naval forces that use mutually reinforcing tactics and capabilities to maintain escalation dominance and control the initiative to defeat layered anti-access threats.

Fixed-wing TACAIR is an asymmetric US advantage based on a history of investment decisions and tactical developments.  USN airpower is "the" answer to FAC and FIAC threats. It engages and disrupts the threat at range, while rotary-wing aircraft (which can be USN/USMC/USA) of the CSG or ARG-MEU form the second ring of defence in depth of the CVN. Lastly, the surface escorts also engage the surface threat and any leakers that could threaten US high value assets.

The carrier's Aegis escorts, with their anti-air capabilities (integrated C2 system, missiles, and radars), will be able to engage and defeat air attacks on the strike force and its CVN, amphibious ships, or CLF ships. Those same ships, operating as surface action groups {SAGs) outside of the CSG-Ied strike force

could face opposing fast attack craft armed with ASCMs with greater range and they may lack the ISR
and TACAIR umbrella provided by joint air assets.

Iranian mine threats are addressed first by the strike force's organic ISR capabilities (air, and surface) and their connectivity  to joint and national ISR assets. Developing situational awareness of the Gulf and the operating patterns of Iranian regular and unconventional mine threats provides the potential for early strikes against those assets.

The strike force also works as a one combined arms force to defeat undersea threats, employing rotary wing assets from throughout the CSG to work with P-3s, US and allied submarines, and national assets to conduct ASW against diesel submarines.

This combined arms concept can be put into action inside the Gulf by a strike force that uses position and maneuver to its advantage. A stand-off posture and TACAIR power expose any potential Iranian air, surface, or sub-surface attack vectors to disruption and defeat by concentrated naval power that can take advantage of ISR cueing. The CSG can also use its maneuver capability to complicate Iranian targeting, and force Iranian ISR to navigate through US and coalition air and surface screens to determine location. Speed and maneuver also help mitigate the still unproven Iranian ballistic missile threat, should Iran try to use those nascent capabilities after other attack options have been defeated.

Conclusions

If US naval forces were to respond to higher tensions by leaving the Gulf, the calculation that risk to force would be dramatically lowered may be true, but it would be at the cost of even higher risks to the naval, joint, and national mission. The balance between these two risks is unfavorable for leaving the Gulf.

CSG-Ied naval forces inside the Gulf provide unique capabilities to accomplish the full spectrum of missions within a joint operating environment.    The CSG-Ied force is integral to working with and protecting allied partners throughout the joint campaign. Without the credible presence of US naval forces, commercial traffic in the Gulf would face the choice of operating under increased risks and costs, ceasing operations in the Gulf, or accommodating Iranian interests.

The assured access of naval forces guarantees that these missions will be performed  if shore-based assets face limited access or authorities  by nations, or if they are threatened by ballistic missiles, or if force protection issues limit operations.

The current and future security environment is likely to result in a situation where naval forces at sea are the pre-dominant US military presence in the region. Those forces can operate effectively in the Arabian Gulf. They can operate as an integrated, combined arms force with mutually reinforcing offensive and defensive capabilities to: mitigate existing Iranian threats to the force, enable the establishment of sea control, and support power projection throughout the Gulf.

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Daniel J. Whiteneck is a Senior Research Scientist at the Center for Naval Analyses in the CNA Corporation.  His assignments at CNA have included carrier strike group deployments, numbered fleet staffs, and scientific analyst positions with multiple OPNAV offices.  The opinions expressed in the article are those of the author and do not represent CNA or the Department of the Navy.

Hard to Believe

This comes from the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) Facebook page today.

Dear Families and Friends of TRUMAN,

As you may know, the Secretary of Defense announced yesterday afternoon his decision to delay the deployment of the Harry S. Truman Strike Group, which was scheduled for tomorrow.

At this moment, I do not know when we are set to deploy. However, as we start to receive more information and as dates start to solidify, we’ll be sure to inform your Sailors.

With our uncertain schedule, my focus is on our larger TRUMAN Team - our Sailors and their families. You have all done such a wonderful job preparing for a February deployment in an accelerated work-up cycle. From arranging long-term storage of your vehicle to changing your housing situation, I appreciate all the actions you took in order to ensure you were ready for extended time away from your loved ones.

I understand the impact this sudden change has on all of us, both logistically and emotionally. It is important to recognize the heightened stress levels we may all feel and seek healthy ways to cope with this change. We are committed to taking care of all of our Sailors and their families. For our single Sailors, we are investigating lodging opportunities ashore. Our Family Readiness Group, Ombudsmen and the Fleet and Family Support Center are always great resources available for you.

It is also significant to note that TRUMAN’s mission has not changed. We are still required to provide combat power from the sea and be ready when our nation calls us into action. Although we have been certified to deploy after successfully completing our Composite Training Unit Exercise, taking care of our Sailors and their families will always be a priority that will enable us to fulfill this mission. Additionally, we’ll continue to maintain our war fighting proficiencies through various training opportunities.
In the meantime, your Sailors have additional time off this weekend to take care of personal affairs. Whether it’s reinstating their cell phone plan or simply being with their families, it’s important to take time to decompress and make necessary adjustments.

I thank you so much for your flexibility, which I truly believe contributes to the strength of our Navy. You have certainly endured a few significant changes to our schedule. However, I have seen Team TRUMAN assemble into a well-oiled machine like no other. The nation asked us to be ready, and we are more ready now than ever. The love and support of our families have gotten us through each day, and knowing that you are by our sides provides us the motivation and fighting spirit to accomplish the mission.

I am proud of each and every one of your Sailors. Team TRUMAN is ready to overcome all obstacles, meet all challenges and give ‘em hell!

Sincerely,
Bob

CAPT S. Robert Roth, USN
Commanding Officer
USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75)

All indications are that Captain Roth found out that USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) and USS Gettysburg (CG 64) were not deploying on Wednesday, the same day the press broke the news to the public. This is the official DoD press release.

“The secretary of defense has delayed the deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), Norfolk, Va., and the USS Gettysburg (CG-64), Mayport, Fla., which were scheduled to depart later this week for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility.

“Facing budget uncertainty -- including a continuing resolution and the looming potential for across-the-board sequestration cuts -- the U.S. Navy made this request to the secretary and he approved. This prudent decision enables the U.S. Navy to maintain these ships to deploy on short notice in the event they are needed to respond to national security contingencies. 

“The United States will continue to maintain a robust military presence in the CENTCOM region, including the current carrier presence and a mix of other assets, to fulfill enduring commitments to our partners.  The U.S. military continues to stand ready to respond to any contingency and to confront any threat in the region.”

So let me get this straight, the US Navy was who asked OSD to cancel the deployment because of the budget, which of course implies the US Navy was completely unprepared for the impact of the Truman deployment to the budget and somehow couldn't get approval until just two days before the aircraft carrier deployed? If that is true, and I am struggling to believe it is, members of Congress should be demanding the head of whatever Admiral in the Navy or individual in OSD screwed over sailors for huge amounts of money. More than 5000 sailors on those ships have each spent hundreds of dollars preparing for a deployment and the Navy, facing well known budget problems, couldn't cancel the deployment before sailors had to spend all that money?

The Navy doesn't like the budget situation, but I reject as an assumption the Navy is so completely unprepared for the budget situation that they would screw 5000 sailors intentionally by waiting to the 11th hour to cancel an aircraft carrier deployment. There must be more going on that we don't know for this to make any sense.

I find it a bit hard to believe Navy leadership was who was pushing for this. If the Navy wanted to cancel a deployment, the Navy would have made the request over a month ago and put a hard deadline in mid January, before sailors started spending their money for storage, canceled cell phone subscriptions, etc. in preparation for the deployment.

So what we are led to believe is the cancellation of the deployment has nothing to do with anything except the budget? There are other events going on though, for example, the Administration is suddenly pushing General Mattis out of CENTCOM (see here, here, and here). I also find it hard to believe that only a few days after the SECDEF nomination hearing the Navy is supposedly pushing to cancel an aircraft carrier deployment, the implication being the Navy is pushing for the Navy to be used less. It has been reported that CENTCOM has reduced the 2 carrier requirement to a 1 carrier requirement in the region, but if I remember correctly, General Mattis was who asked for the 2 carrier requirement to be met.

Based on the DoD press release the Navy is apparently so disorganized and unprepared for the budget challenges facing the Navy, and despite the whole country being aware of the tight budget situation, the Navy needed to wait until more than 5000 sailors had spent their money preparing for deployment - the last possible moment - to cancel an aircraft carrier deployment.

That doesn't really sound believable when you say it out loud. Blaming the budget looks more like a convenient distraction.

At the same time we are seeing Mattis being pushed out, CENTCOM requirements for naval presence suddenly changing, and Hagel on his way in as the new SECDEF the US Navy is supposedly advocating for less US Navy? Seriously, who believes that? Sorry, but that DoD press statement is either total bullshit and spin, or someone in the Navy needs to be fired for being completely unprepared for the budget situation.

Bottom line, if that DoD press statement is true, either OSD or the Navy is led by unprepared, incompetent fools, because that is basically what the press statement is saying if OSD and the Navy didn't react to budget problems until 2 days before an aircraft carrier with 5000 sailors was set to deploy. Yes, I realize I am repeating the same point... because if you say it a few times to yourself and think about it, the budget reasons cited don't make any sense.

Unless people whom I know to be really smart have suddenly become really incompetent, it looks to me like there is a lot more going on than what is being said.

Submaine Collision in the Arabian Gulf

YOKOSUKA, Japan (Nov. 15, 2012) The Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) moored at Fleet Activities Yokosuka. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class David Mercil/Released)

This happened yesterday.

No one was hurt when the periscope on USS Jacksonville (SSN 699), a Los Angeles-class submarine, struck a vessel while operating in the Arabian Gulf Jan. 10 at approximately 5 a.m. local time.

Jacksonville surfaced from periscope depth to ascertain if there was any damage to the unidentified vessel. The vessel continued on a consistent course and speed offering no indication of distress or acknowledgement of a collision.

Damage appears to be limited to one of Jacksonville's two periscopes. The reactor remains in a safe condition, there was no damage to the propulsion plant systems and there is no concern regarding watertight integrity.

A U.S. P-3 Orion aircraft conducted a search of the area and saw no debris in the water or vessels in distress. The airborne search of the area is complete.

The incident is under investigation.

Jacksonville is on a scheduled deployment to the U.S. 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility.

After the submarine got hit, they tried to raise the first periscope and could not, so they raised the second periscope and were able to ascertain a bit of understanding of the damage before surfacing.

Due to accidents, the number of submarines in the force able to report as fully prepared is steadily dropping in number. This marks the third nuclear attack submarine put out of action due to damage in an accident; USS Miami (SSN 755), USS Montpelier (SSN 765), and now USS Jacksonville (SSN 699); all in the last 10 months.

While USS Jacksonville (SSN 699) hasn't officially been sent home from deployment yet, unless the Navy is able to completely mitigate the damage, the submarine will likely be sent home. Even the slightest damage to one of our nuclear attack submarines can disrupt the stealth advantage of the submarine, and because they do dangerous work every day that no one should be talking about publicly, I do expect for the Navy to send the submarine back to homeport in Pearl Harbor.

The littorals are becoming more crowded. It is not unreasonable to assume this type of accident will happen from time to time, indeed it is probably more unreasonable to assume that every single instance of something like this happening can be mitigated by the vessels crew.

With that said, with the zero-tolerance policy environment for Commanding Officers of ships, submarines, and aircraft in the US Navy today, I suspect the career of the CO is likely over. I personally find sympathy with both sides of the argument regarding whether the policy is good or bad for the Navy, and I can't say the verdict regarding the effectiveness of that policy is cut and dry.

IMCMEX12

U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Aug. 29, 2012)The mine countermeasures ships USS Pioneer (MCM 9), left, USS Devastator (MCM 6), USS Sentry (MCM 3) and USS Dexrous (MCM 13) approach for an astern replenishment at sea with Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim) USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15). Ponce, formerly designated as an amphibious transport dock ship, was converted and reclassified in April to fulfill a long-standing U.S. Central Command request for an AFSB to be located in its area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Toni Burton/Released)

I think this is a big deal.

Navies from six continents and more than 30 nations kick off the most widely attended international exercise ever held in the region, Sept. 16.

International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX) 12 is the first of what is intended to be a recurring partnership event.

"This exercise is about mines and the international effort to clear them," said Vice Admiral John W. Miller, commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. "Represented here are the best of our individual countries' efforts dedicated to securing the global maritime commons and I look forward to  seeing how this exceptional team of professionals moves forward."

The wholly defensive exercise consists of two distinct phases, the first is a symposium where senior leaders from participating countries will exchange ideas and view the latest mine hunting, sweeping and neutralization technologies provided by a panel of industry representatives and presenters.

In the second phase, ships, crews and observers get underway to train together to prepare for tactical execution. Ships will conduct at-sea maneuvers in three separate geographic areas, which will include mine  hunting operations; helicopter mine countermeasure operations; international explosive ordnance disposal mine hunting and diving operations and small  boat operations focused toward underwater improvised explosive devices.

"Everyone here at IMCMEX 12 understands that countering the threat posed by mines is a critical mission to ensure security in the maritime domain," said  Rear Adm. Kenneth Perry, commander, Task Force 522 and exercise director. "The work we will do here will strengthen relationships and enhance mine countermeasures interoperability among participating navies."

The exercise will finish with leaders, liaison officers and observers gathering to discuss lessons learned during the three phases to further foster interoperability among participants.

I think we all recognize this is one of the constructive way the region is responding to Iranian threats, so there is no need to discuss the geopolitical angles here. Several other thoughts come to mind.

First, 2012 has been a busy year for the US Navy, but in my opinion the most impressive thing the US Navy has done is rapidly forward deploy 5 ships for mine warfare to the CENTCOM area of responsibility on a simi-permenant basis. Starting with the four MCMs from San Diego, for the Navy to basically pick up and completely relocate the infrastructure for 4 Mine Countermeasures ships, including the ships and crews, and move them from San Diego to Bahrain - and insure the vessels are mission functional all within about a 6-8 month time period is truly remarkable. When one starts to think through all the various people with responsibility and touch to this activity it truly is incredible what the Navy has done. It was almost certainly a huge mess, but nothing hard work couldn't accomplish - and did accomplish. Throw in the refit and forward deployment of the USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15) and in my opinion this activity has been to date in 2012 the single most impressive activity by the US Navy.

Second, the participation of over 30 nations for a mine warfare exercise in that part of the world is a big deal. I spoke with Rear Admiral Kenneth Perry on Friday afternoon and he mentioned this is the largest mine warfare exercise in that regions history in terms of scope and size. Getting the international community together for this kind of exercise - specifically in that part of the world - is incredibly important because it sets up exactly the kind of real work cooperation and experience necessary in practice should the activity ever be necessary in a real world emergency. Exercises like this help sailors from various parts of the world come together and understand not only what each others capabilities are, but how they can work together more productively. It is important, because mine warfare is time consuming art towards detection and neutralization as much as it is a science of the same activity, and through cooperation naval forces can reduce the time necessary in conducting the hard, ugly business of removing mines.

Third, everyone knows that mines have done more damage to US Naval forces than any other weapon system since WWII, but that still didn't stop the Navy from spending less money and providing sufficient resources for mine warfare for the last several decades. If you have ever heard an insult of US Navy mine warfare (MIW) capabilities relative to other nations - particularly NATO nations, it was almost certainly a well earned insult. Things are changing though. Over the last few years investment in US Navy MIW is up, considerably, and as a warfare area it is no longer seen as something the US Navy could ignore as critical to the way we fight. The reuse of USS Ponce for purposes of an Afloat Staging Base and modernization of the MCMs to use the Expendable Mine Neutralization System (EMNS) and SeaFox UUV are only a few examples of technology capabilities being upgraded, but just as important (I think) over the long haul are the software and data systems on the back end that will help sailors get better at their warfare specialty by being able to accumulate and use mine warfare data - both ours and the data of our partners - in ways not previously available. Whether it is art or science, having better, more accessible data improves the quality of work being done and can have huge payoffs over time - and I believe that is the impact we will see. ICMCEX 2012 is testing new software and data management systems, and while it is a very small part of the exercise, it is a part I believe matters a lot.

Fourth, I asked Rear Admiral Perry about CONOPs for the USS Ponce and he felt they were all in place, that the Navy is ready to go with a Mine Warfare Command Ship. USS Ponce is not a tender, but the ship does have a logistical support capability for the MCMs in addition to the aviation, manned and unmanned deployable, and C2 capabilities one would expect from a mine warfare command ship converted from an LPD. Mine Warfare is more than just sensor and neutralization technologies - indeed it can quickly become manpower intensive work requiring small boats, divers, and all kinds of other specialists depending upon environment and conditions. The addition of a capability like USS Ponce is a huge upgrade for US Navy mine warfare capabilities, because it doesn't steal from the already over tasked Marine Corps an amphibious ship to conduct US Navy specific operations.

CDR Chris Rawley has more on IMCMEX12 and MIW on his blog Naval Drones - worth checking out.

Collision in the Strait of Hormuz

The following is the official US Navy release on the collision of USS Porter (DDG 78) and the Japanese owned bulk oil tanker M/V Otowasan.

No one was hurt Sunday morning when a U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer and a large Japanese owned merchant vessel collided near the Strait of Hormuz.

The collision between USS Porter (DDG 78) and the Panamanian-flagged bulk oil tanker M/V Otowasan occurred at approximately 1:00 a.m. local time.

Porter transited under its own power to Jebel Ali, UAE and is now pierside for assessment and repair.

The incident is under investigation.

USS Porter is on a scheduled deployment to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts.

5th Fleet has released a short video on YouTube of the damage. More pictures are here. That second picture appears to show some water being pumped out, some sort of flooding control from broken pipes maybe?

Check this out from AIS.

That has to be about the location of the incident, but that is very odd considering the damage on the destroyer was on the starboard front. The last AIS report before it pulled that Crazy Ivan maneuver above was 14.1 knots heading 74 degrees at 12:51am. At 12:55am the ship was slowed to 9.7 knots heading 122 degrees, so presumably the collision had already occurred? If you zoom in you can see see the track where a small box forms, which may be the area where the destroyer came to a full stop and the tanker circles around the ship passing behind, across the port side for a bit, then circles around and passes in front of the destroyer before resuming course.

The destroyer is underway under her own power. USS Porter (DDG 78) is one of the few east coast ballistic missile defense capable AEGIS destroyers and is scheduled to be homeported in Rota, Spain in the future. Neither the destroyer nor the tanker is reporting any leaks as a result of the collision.

This was the weather forecast, but I am not sure where to find reliable weather data for that point and time. Depending upon conditions visibility can get rough this time of year there at 1:00am in the morning.

I am very curious if there was Iranian small boat activity at the time, whether there were any squalls, and if the surface search radars on the ship were functioning properly. The lack of situational awareness in hindsight of this incident suggests some explaining is necessary, because one would think a modern US Navy AEGIS destroyer could avoid ramming a 300,000 ton super tanker that reportedly has 95% of her 2 million barrels of fuel loaded and is apparently using AIS.

It is a great thing no one was injured. It is also worth pointing out that if a 300,000 ton ship rams a 9000 ton ship that isn't as well built as a US Navy destroyer, there is a very good chance that other ship probably sinks.

Naval Presence Shifts Towards 2020

These slides from OPNAV were passed around several months ago as an example of the pivot to Asia. Some have identified these slides as representative of the slides presented at a recent CNO press conference. The first slide begins with the expected Naval Presence of 2013.

This is basically today. Note the gold ships are the sustained, forward deployed ships and the blue ships are the rotational CONUS forces. Noteworthy how the SSGNs are counted as steady state, forward deployed operational assets.

It continues with a slide of Naval Presence of 2017.

This is where the map starts getting interesting.

South America
Note that the Navy intends to move 10 PCs, many of which are currently in the Middle East, to the South American theater in support of SOUTHCOM by 2017. I am interested to see how that works with 1 amphibious ship and no combat logistics. In my opinion there looks to be a real opportunity for Navy/Coast Guard cooperation in that theater that is not getting a close enough look, for example, why wouldn't an AFSB for MSO and logistics not be very effective in that region? Everything has short legs, and having a place to move spare parts around at sea isn't a bad thing. It also doesn't hurt to have a UAV pad in the middle of the water. Just saying... that environment isn't likely to get better anytime soon, and has a real potential to get much worse - particularly if we start seeing more legit submarines instead of semi-submersables. It is worth noting the CG/DDG/FFGs in SOUTHCOM are replaced by 10 PCs and 2 JHSVs, not Littoral Combat Ships.

Europe/Africa
Rota is now a BMD base, and sailors will be lining up for duty on those ships. It is still very much unclear what ships the US Navy intends to station there. If it is me, I send 4 DDG Flight Is with BMD so I don't have to send and pay for RW (sorry guys!). Worth noting the full time amphibious ship is now augmented by 2 JHSVs assigned to Africa, which have replaced two large surface combatants. These ships almost certainly represent engagement work the Marine Corps is working on today towards tailored Enhanced Rifle Companies and other tailored Blue/Green assets for Partnership Station type of activity. What I find noteworthy, and useful, is that these platforms are retaining their RW capabilities, and all three ships are well suited for SOF activities if tasking is necessary. These are very flexible forces, but it means UAVs will be the only assured option to provide direct fires in contingency. That's OK, but I still think putting VLS in the San Antonio class amphibious ships for long range cruise missile capability remains an important omission in the modern force, and something the Navy needs to reconsider as an important capability as the large surface combatants move away from theaters that are traditional hotspots for SOF operations.

Middle East
Worth noting the 12 PC/MCMs has become 4 LCS, 4 MCM, and 2 JHSV. Note that the SSGN and 2 CG/DDGs that had been operating down in Africa in 2013 are moved up to the Persian Gulf region by 2017, basically suggesting an assumption that all naval activities off Africa today can be replaced in whole by two JHSVs. That is a remarkable assumption that I have a hard time believing has any merit whatsoever.

Pacific
Look closely and note that by 2017 the great pivot to Asia strategy being touted by Secretary Panetta will be the massive increase in naval forces of - four Littoral Combat Ships and two Joint High Speed Vessels. It is one thing to try not to provoke China into an arms race, but when this is the massive maritime shift towards the Pacific touted at the political level as national defense strategy, one has to wonder what our allies are truly thinking about our empty words policy. I'll also make a brief point - the reason I keep jabbing the Army with a stick and pointing to the Pacific is because it is plainly obvious the Navy is talking a big game but isn't doing anything significant there, and the force is not growing in the future, so the US Army needs to expect as an opening assumption that they will be left completely ineffective as a fighting force in the Pacific if they are dependent upon the US Navy, because the US Army will never get where they need to be unless the Army can figure out a way to make the islands of the Pacific a network of forward operating bases by which the Navy has no responsibility for their limited forces to defend, because every ship defending an island is one less ship to move the Army into the combat zone by force.

General Notes
The requirement appears to be around 1200 VLS in the Middle East in 2017, and 1500 VLS in the Pacific in 2020. Also, in my opinion, with the exception of SOUTHCOM this map looks to me what a "strategy of holding the line" looks like. You know what else bothers me about this map? It is a reminder that in 2017 US forces are basically organized in traditional heavy task forces like CSGs and ARGs, and with the exception of SSGNs and the 10 PCs in SOUTHCOM, nothing about this map sticks out as having a capability that is inherently disruptive for a bad actor in any specific area. LCS and JHSVs will be useful for their limited purposes, which is ISR and engagement respectively, but the US Navy has a shortage of assets that stand out as disruptive - punching politically and diplomatically above their weight.

It conclude with a slide of Naval Presence in 2020.

Pacific
The pivot to the Pacific has completed, and this major pivot ends up being 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 2 Joint High Speed Vessels. I am very unclear how the politics of the pivot to Asia somehow became a public diplomacy centered around the maritime domain with the US Navy doesn't even move a single major surface combatant or submarine to the Pacific as part of this touted pivot.


Europe/Africa/South America
Note that in all three places the major change the primary feature is the addition of a pair of Littoral Combat Ships. What I find very interesting is that for both Africa and South America the pair of Littoral Combat Ships is replacing the presence previously filled by an amphibious ship. This is the first document I have seen from OPNAV (that I can publish anyway) that supports the arguments I have made on this blog regarding how the LCS is more of an amphibious ship capability than a surface combatant capability it is usually generally referred to as. While that is an interesting side note, I'm not convinced it means anything other than how the numbers fit together in PPT.

General Notes
Note that the suggested plan according to this PPT is for 8 LCS in the Persian Gulf before more than 4 are in the Pacific, indeed 18 Littoral Combat Ships are specifically accounted for on this graphic, but only 4 in the Pacific. Obviously this is a moment in time look at what the Navy is thinking, but they are interesting moments and time, and interesting thoughts about future force dispersion.

Pushing the Fleet to the Breaking Point, For What Exactly?

US Navy Photo

This is not how we should be celebrating the early retirement of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Bold emphasis by me.

The Navy will deploy the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis and its strike group four months early and shift its destination to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, DOD officials said here today.

The deployment late this summer is in response to Central Command’s requirement for an extended carrier presence, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little said. The move affects 5,500 sailors aboard the Stennis and the Aegis cruiser USS Mobile Bay.

Last week, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta approved a request from Central Command commander Marine Corps General James N. Mattis to accelerate Stennis’ deployment. “The decision will help support existing naval force requirements in the Middle East and reduce the gap caused by the upcoming departure of the USS Enterprise Strike Group,” Little said. “It is in keeping with our long-standing commitments to the region.”

Aircraft carrier strike groups provide commanders with ample and flexible air assets to enhance interoperability with partner nations and maintain strong military-to-military relations as well as respond to a wide variety of contingencies, Little said.

The Bremerton, Wash.-based Stennis strike group was due to deploy at the end of the year to U.S. Pacific Command. The group returned from duty in the Middle East in March.

The accelerated deployment to the Central Command area of responsibility is not aimed at any specific threat. “In keeping with Centcom’s requirements, this is a very important region for our defense strategy,” Little said. “We’ve had a presence in the region for decades and we have a range of interests that this extension of our capabilities will support.”

Nor, he said, is the deployment a direct response to tensions with Iran. The U.S. military is “always mindful of the challenges posed by Iran, but … this is not a decision based solely on the challenges posed by Iran,” Little said.

Currently the USS Enterprise and USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike groups are deployed to U.S. Central Command. The USS Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group is due to relieve the Lincoln group shortly. The Stennis group will relieve Enterprise.

The Navy continues to operate at a high operational tempo in order to meet U.S. security needs around the world,. “Our deployment strain is as great as or greater today than it has been at any time in the past 10 years,” a Navy official said.

Sailors and their families have been informed of the change, Little said. Navy officials looked at a wide range of options to ensure Navy commitments and combatant commander mission requirements are met and to lessen the impact of schedule changes.

The carrier strike group will be ready to deploy even given the accelerated timeline, Little said. “The U.S. Navy is well-equipped to ensure our sailors are trained and ready for this deployment,” he said.

Navy leaders understand the operational and personnel impacts this accelerated deployment will have. These include training cycle adjustments, crew and family uncertainty and reductions to quality of life port visits.

As more information becomes available, the Navy will release it, officials said, noting defense leaders are “committed to keeping sailors and their families informed about current and future deployments to the best of our ability.”

The Stennis will be deployed for eight months, meaning the original 6 month Western Pacific deployment scheduled for later this fall is now an eight month deployment in the Middle East only a few weeks away. And for a reason the DoD can't explain, except to say it's not specific to Iran, Navy families get screwed over yet again. If it really is not specific to Iran, something is very wrong.

The Kearsarge deployment last year was eight months. The Bataan deployment last year was eleven months. The Lincoln, to be relieved any day now, departed Naval Station Everett on December 7, 2011, and won't arrive in Norfolk until mid-August; eight months. Eisenhower, which will relieve Lincoln, is on a nine month deployment. Now Stennis, leaving four months early will be on an eight month deployment. I'm sure I forgot a few long deployments among those...

Someone needs to tell the President no, or maybe the President needs to tell General Mattis no. The very real issue is, if the United States is not about to fight a war with Iran, the US Navy is going to wear out their equipment pretending to fight Iran, and the toll on people is very real.We are reducing the number of carriers and amphibious ships at a time we are clearly pushing them at an operational tempo higher than at anytime ever, including the cold war? WTF? The Bataan, which returned in February, has the second longest deployment by a US Navy ship since World War II!

Hey Congress, wake up! That's a red flag!

What exactly is the Navy killing itself for? If these long deployments aren't a domestic political agenda to avoid a public spat between the President and General Mattis, then the answer must be these deployments are intended to prevent war with Iran. There really is no middle ground here, because there really can't be any other justification for this type of persistent operational tempo where Admirals are constantly bitching in public (rightfully, good for them!) about the high operational tempo - but when it comes time to just get back to a normal operational tempo, those same Admirals refuse to stand up to someone and push the fleet further down the dark path.

Bottom line, those Admirals are only saying yes for one of two reasons: either because the need for the CVN is a legitimate reason of state specific to the prevention of war, or the reason is specific for the sake of their own job - in other words they lack the guts to say no to a politician, and that probably goes double in an election year where saying no would have a political amplification impact. I guess it's better the sailors and their families bend over backwards so Admirals don't have to strain themselves, or something like that.

Or maybe we really are legitimately on the brink of war with Iran, and General Mattis is keeping the peace in the Middle East one extended aircraft carrier deployment at a time. I suppose it's possible - color me a skeptic, but that is scary if true. Either way, at what point are the tens of thousands of Navy sailors going to find a single DC reporter with the guts to ask a tough question?

Dangerous Business

PACIFIC OCEAN (March 17, 2024) The Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) pulls alongside the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) for a replenishment at sea. Boxer is the flagship of the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group, which is underway with the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (13th MEU) on a deployment to the western Pacific Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Trevor Welsh/Released)

In case you were wondering, the .50 Cal on the US Navy oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) does work.

An embarked security team aboard a U.S. Navy vessel fired upon a small motor vessel after it disregarded warnings and rapidly approached the U.S. ship near Jebel Ali, United Arab Emirates today.

In accordance with Navy force protection procedures, the sailors on the USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) used a series of non-lethal, preplanned responses to warn the vessel before resorting to lethal force.

The U.S. crew repeatedly attempted to warn the vessel's operators to turn away from their deliberate approach. When those efforts failed to deter the approaching vessel, the security team on the Rappahannock fired rounds from a .50-caliber machine gun.

The incident is under investigation.

An Oiler in a dangerous part of the world monitoring a threatening approach by a vessel ignoring the warnings of the force protection team on the ship? That wasn't going to end well. It becomes a damned if you do, damned if you don't situation for well trained folks who have seconds to make a decision. Tough call.

We want people who can make the right decision. We don't want people who can't make a tough decision. The investigation will reveal where within those categories this incident falls.

According to local reports in UAE, the incident left 1 dead and 3 wounded.

A bit of a historical note - if you have seen photo's on the internet of the M/V Hyundai Fortune incident, those photos were taken by the crew of the HNLMS De Zeven Provincien (F 802). For that incident, the French Navy aircraft carrier FS Charles De Gaulle (R 91) was where the crew of M/V Hyundai Fortune were evacuated to. The US vessel that responded to that incident was the USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204). As of a few years ago, there were still folks on the ship who remember M/V Hyundai Fortune. I bet they remember that incident today.

The Navy's Multi-tool

The US Navy’s rotary wing community is truly the Gerber multi-tool of the aviation world. Navy helos deployed globally on all types of ships routinely conduct a wide variety of missions including maritime security operations, logistics, ISR, to SOF support, and when required can rapidly switch to sea control missions such as ASW and ASUW. As BJ Armstrong writes concerning his Det's recent operations, "The MH-60S Block III Armed Helo’s that now deploy with amphibious assault ships like BATAAN come in the gunship variant. These aircraft have a wide range of armament options that make it a highly capable platform. You can buy nearly a squadron of them for the cost of one Joint Strike Fighter."

The other thing I like about BJ's post and others like it is that it provides a knowledgeable, passionate, first hand perspective on the action, rather than the watered down version of events we usually get from the Navy’s PAO community.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Fairly Obvious What He Meant By "Conditions"

I am not nor would ever claim to be an expert on Bahrain and the issues involved with the protests that are taking place there, but I think like most Americans, I understand the US response (or non-response) is based entirely on the presence of the 5th Fleet in Bahrain. I, like most Americans, am also fully aware that Saudi Arabia and UAE have sent in military and police capabilities into Bahrain to break up the protests.

Where protests in North Africa began as struggles for the rights of civilian and citizen, it has been my impression that Bahrain from the beginning has been a sectarian struggle first with a civil rights argument layered on top. I have no idea if that is true, but Iranian influence in Bahrain has been cited by many people including US government officials.

Progressive Realist has a post by Shayan Ghajar of InsideIRAN worth reading on the tensions between Iran and Bahrain. The entire article is important, but you don't need to be a rocket scientist to understand what this is saying.

One day earlier, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, commander of the Basij militia, issued a belligerent call for more direct action towards Bahrain. Criticizing the political divisions plaguing Iran-perhaps a reference to the infighting between president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader over the Minister of Intelligence-Naqdi urged Iranians to unite against the brutal suppression of protesters in Bahrain:

“If the current conditions do not allow us to get directly involved in the battlefield, we should change the conditions and play a direct role on this scene,” Naqdi declared, according to Fars News, which is affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The brigadier general did not clarify precisely how “conditions” might be changed to facilitate direct involvement in Bahrain; however, recent events indicate there may be growing pressure within Iran to do precisely that.

What is the "condition" that needs to change in order to facilitate direct involvement by Iran?

You don't have to be an expert to know the answer is neutralize the United States presence in Bahrain, indeed as I said earlier, everyone knows that the presence of 5th fleet is why we have done nothing in Bahrain to date.

Many weeks ago when discussing the events across the Middle East with several folks, one comment in particular stood out. Someone I know and consider a very serious person told me that before the Arab wave is over, the US will be lucky if Bahrain doesn't lead to a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the time I discussed this possibility with a few people, like Rob and Bryan for example, but I just didn't see it.

But I don't like the comments by Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi any. In fact, it is difficult to read his comments as anything other than a threat against United States presence and interests in Bahrain.

A Positive Development

You don't see this every day - from the official Chinese military website.

On the morning of December 10, local time, the ship formation of the Navy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army which was on a visit to Al Manamah, capital of Bahrain, carried out exchanges and inter-visits with the Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy (USN). Li Pengcheng, commander of the Chinese naval ship formation and director of the Navigation Support Department of the Headquarters of the Chinese PLA Navy, paid a visit to the Headquarters of the Fifth Fleet of the USN. Soon afterwards, the senior military officer delegation of the Fifth Fleet of the USN paid a return visit to the Chinese naval ship formation.

At 10:30 of the very day, Li Pengcheng came to the Headquarters of the Fifth Fleet of the USN in the company of Yang Weiguo, Chinese ambassador to Bahrain. The deputy commander of the Fifth Fleet of the USN extended warm welcome to the visit of the Chinese naval ship formation. Both sides carried out exchanges on such issues as pirate information exchange, use of escort strength and international cooperation on escort.

At 11:30, the 13-member senior officer delegation of the Fifth Fleet of the USN headed by Rear Admiral Bryan, commander of the 5th Expedition Formation of the USN, and Commodore Baldwin, deputy commander of the Marine Corps of the U.S. Central Command, paid a return visit to the Chinese naval ship formation and visited the “Kunlunshan” dock landing ship of the PLA Navy.

The news only gets better actually - these events happened the next day with the other PLA Navy ships in the region.

Same Sad Story, Different Country - The Futility of Sanctions

From 1991 - 2003, the US Navy (myself included, as a former boarding officer) spent considerable money, manpower, and energy conducting MIO to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq. Despite thousands of boardings, a relatively small percentage of contraband coming out of Iraq was diverted, while Iraq continued to supply its military machine (mostly through Chinese and Western European companies who ignored the sanctions). These sanctions did however make life difficult for the already oppressed Iraqi people and legitimate trade interest. Worse still, the Oil for Food fiasco enriched the very regime we opposed, along with a lot of other shady characters, including senior UN kleptocrats.

The UN has launched another sanctions regime in the same neighborhood, which will involve some of the same cast of characters as the failed Iraq sanctions.

You’re using pinpoint sanctions against the very entity that’s best positioned
to evade those sanctions,” says Matthew Levitt, a counterterrorism expert at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. An Iranian businessman in Dubai,
asking not to be named because of the subject’s sensitivity, puts it succinctly:
“You’re enriching the people the sanctions are trying to target.

Why should we expect different results this time?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

5th Fleet Prepares for War

The US strike in Yemen back in December was reported to be air-launched cruise missiles, likely from a bomber in Diego Garcia. Well, it appears the Navy is being repositioned to support military operations in Yemen.

The US will not put troops on the ground, which again, highlights the utility of naval power to support partners. The interesting part of Yemen operations is that it marks the first time since 1990 that the US is supporting a Middle Eastern nation in military operations by invitation. The last time was Saudi Arabia prior to the first Gulf War.

This distinction is part of the subtle but critical distinctions in the Obama administration policy towards using military power and the Bush administration policies.

Al Qaeda Looks to Sea With Latest Threats

The Osen-Hunter Group is a global, private security company that also puts out daily intelligence assessments, similar to the intelligence services of the popular STRATFOR service. Today's analysis concluded with an assessment worth consideration:

Assessment: Just as a strike against an American ship in the Suez would double the value for AL QAEDA, we would warn that Mombasa is a port of concern, given its proximity to southern Somalia where AL SHABAAB is strongest and where piracy contacts in the Kenyan port authority are ample. Inasmuch as this represents a second reference to ships at sea - unprecedented in a single AL QAEDA statement - we make the following, unequivocal judgment:

We assess a direct, grave threat, by AL QAEDA, against U.S. Navy warships and U.S.-flagged vessels. Moreover, if U.S.-flagged merchantmen are still steaming anywhere in the U.S. FIFTH FLEET Area of Responsibility without armed security, they do so now at a considerably elevated risk.

In this connection, we should also note a reference to the Fort Hood massacre and a call to Muslims “in the Crusader armies” and “agent governments” to replicate the 5 November killings at Fort Hood. We would interpret this as a call on sufficiently radicalized sailors to sabotage warships.

They come to this conclusion based on an observation that I do think is certainly noteworthy. On December 27th, Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQIY) responded to airstrikes in the eastern province of Shabwa conducted by Yemen air force with new threats. The full English transcript (PDF) of the AQIY threat is here, but this part stuck out.

“And lastly, we call upon the proud tribes of Yemen—people of support and victory—and the people of the Arabian Peninsula, to face the crusader campaign and their cooperatives on the peninsula of Muhammad, prayer and peace upon him, and that’s through attacking their military bases, intelligence embassies, and their fleets that exist on the water and land of the Arabian Peninsula; until we stop the continuous massacres on the Muslim countries."

While not unheard of, it is uncommon for any Al Qaeda statement to mention attacking western fleets or attacks on water in general. Plenty of threats discuss planes, bases, and embassies... but rarely targets at sea. That is why the Al Qaeda in Yemen AQIY claim of responsibility for the Christmas airline attack was also interesting. Full English transcript here (PDF), but again, this part stuck out:

“We call upon every Muslim protective of his religion and doctrine to remove the polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula and that’s through killing every crusader working in the embassies or other places, and you ought to declare it a full-scale war against every crusader in the [Arabian] Peninsula of Muhammad, Allah’s prayer and peace upon him, on land, on water, and in the air.”

The Osen-Hunter Group's assessment is in direct response to threats made by Al Qaeda against sea targets twice in one week, because as it turns out, Al Qaeda has never made threats against targets at sea twice in one week, ever.

I'm not going to speculate the conclusions, but let me give the folks in DC something to consider regarding this issue.

If you have followed the fallout from the underwear bomber, the only clear conclusion is that the Department of Homeland Security, and in particular Secretary Janet Napolitano, got caught with their pants down. They had no plan of action in place to respond to the attempted bombing of the airline, and when the event took place on a slow news day like Christmas, it became the only thing to talk about and a major issue to the American people.

So now everyone is talking about the event, and to make things worse, now we have instant experts on everything from underwear bombs to Al Qaeda in Yemen, and in many cases those "experts" couldn't name the Capitol city of Yemen if they had a gun to their head. In politics, actual expertise is completely irrelevant though, and that is the problem. The STRATCOM fallout from the bomber got out of control quickly, and with no coherent response ready to either a successful terrorist attack or even a failed attack, DHS looks like an agency of fools.

So what if Al Qaeda is successful, or even fails, an attack on a commercial or even naval warship in the Gulf of Aden? Who is the lucky person (or people) who will take the plane to New York and be on Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC? How ready is the Navy to defend the bombardment of questions rooted in total ignorance sure to come from the host of any given show? How might such an event influence FY 2011, and would a successful terrorist event against a warship throw a curve ball into the ongoing QDR assessment?

Consider some of the questions. It will be noted that piracy in 2009 peaked in that region, highest level in decades. It will be noted that Al Qaeda is operating not just in Yemen, but Somalia, and Iran will be a constant point of discussion. It will be noted how important oil transport at sea is. The multi-national effort in the Gulf of Aden will be discussed, which will lead to topics such as the Chinese and Russian naval vessels in the region. They may bring up the UN statistics for the human trafficking in the region, stunning numbers of human suffering. Most importantly though, they are going to ask what the Navy is doing there and if the Navy is lucky, they won't ask for some form of tangible results of naval operations...

but what if they do?

What is the STRATCOM when the Navy accurately notes the few number of ships hijacked in the Gulf of Aden since July of 09 when at the same time, more ships are being hijacked just south in the Indian Ocean than ever before, including as far as 1000 nautical miles east of Somalia. When asked how the Navy intends to deal with the piracy problem or Al Qaeda in Somalia or Yemen, what is the answer that doesn't turn millions of politically active Americans into millions of politically frustrated Americans?

How will the Navy explain themselves to the American people following a highly dramatic crisis at sea that unfolds on TV when it doesn't end like the Maersk Alabama? We just spent the entire first year of the Obama administration publicly debating military strategy for Afghanistan on TV and on the internet. Should a few incidents at sea occur in early 2010, the Navy is going to get that conversation with the country on maritime strategy two years later than anticipated, and unless the Navy is ready for that conversation from the very beginning, expect the opinions of "experts" to dominate any Navy STRATCOM and more importantly - watch those "experts" heavily influence the political reaction.

The Force Structure Excuses Grow Old - UPDATED AND CORRECTED

I have made a mistake, completely my fault. This corrected image (green arrow) shows the correct location of the attack. The attack actually occurred~1200 nautical miles from Mogadishu and about ~715 nautical miles from Mumbai.

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For subscribers to Proceedings magazine, there is an article in the January 2010 issue by Commander Stephen J. Coughlin discussing the Cyclones. The article, Good Things Come in Small Packages, is essentially a brief history and short support for the PC as a platform. If you can't read the article, it is time to renew your subscription for the new year.

The article does not take on one of the primary complaints about PCs, specifically the lack of range and endurance. There might be a good reason though, because that argument is getting harder and harder to make.

There was a report tonight of an unsuccessful pirate attack against a merchant ship 525 nautical miles southeast of the Seychelles. The attack apparently consisted of more than one vessel, with one of the vessels potentially a mothership. RPGs were fired at the commercial vessel, but the ship was able to avoid capture.

What is interesting is that the location of the attack was about ~750 nautical miles from Diego Garcia, but ~1220 nautical miles from Mogadishu (see pic above). Can someone explain to me how a bunch of dudes with machine guns in speedboats can operate ~1220 nautical miles from Mogadishu, and the worlds only superpower cannot build a ship less than 3,000 tons without complaining about range and endurance.

Either the Somali pirates have a better small vessel logistics model than we do, or the range/endurance complaint by USN officers for small vessels is bullshit. If pirates can operate motherships and skiffs for 2500+ nautical mile round trip piracy operations to hijack commercial ships, surely the worlds largest Navy can come up with a plan to operate smaller vessels without complaining about endurance.

As I was reading the January 2010 issue of Proceedings, the Surface Warfare issue, I found it entertaining that no less than four articles are discussing force structure. I'll pick up Captain Addison's article in more detail next week to start the new year, but I note his article really gets to the heart of the matter.

Right now in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden we have irregular warfare at sea in spades with a full gambit of human trafficking, drug smuggling, arms smuggling (unless we refuse to believe arms to Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, or Afghanistan move by sea), and piracy all over the place, and while the seas are overrun with IW problems in the region where our Army is struggling on land... SWOs are looking to justify the same force structure they developed during the cold war.

The question for Congress leading into 2010 is very simple. Is the Navy part of the IW problem, or part of the IW solution? If the Navy's inability to successfully deal with IW at sea is contributing to the problems in the region from Iraq to Yemen to Somalia to Afghanistan, then who should be held accountable and what needs to get done? If the Navy is part of the IW solution, then why is Al Qaeda expanding regionally while growing stronger?

At some point force structure has to stop being the excuse why the Surface Navy can't contain the IW problems at sea in the CENTCOM AOR. If the Navy can't break up the black markets moving drugs and arms by sea in that region - activities that represent the economy of the enemy - how do we expect the Army to stop the violence on land short of killing every enemy?