5th Fleet Focus: BRAVO ZULU CTF-151

The last hijacking off the coast of Somalia was on May 12th, 2009 according to NATO. Today is June 12th, meaning we have gone an entire month without a hijacking while disrupting many, many attacks.

Bravo Zulu to CTF-151, the Sailors and Airmen in the US Navy, naval coalition partner forces, and the maritime industry who have contributed towards this milestone. Keep up the great work, and stay safe.

As a side note, while it is easy to suggest that weather is playing a major factor, weather has not prevented a relative consistent number of attacks against commercial shipping from occuring. Additionally, it is pretty clear that when the pirates adjusted to activities east of Somalia in March and April, naval forces made a similar adjustment necessary to curb attacks.

While I will be the first to note this is certainly an enormous effort involving many folks, I think Rear Adm. Michelle J. Howard deserves a lot of credit here. Clearly she is doing something very right, even as we don't know much at all about how naval forces are operating.

I recall speaking to Noah Shachtman following a blogger roundtable in January, and we were both struck by how odd it was to here an Admiral discussing all the great things everyone but the US Navy was doing. At the time RADM Terry McKnight promised the US Navy was soon to engage, and I think 5 months later the tactical results suggest a promise has been forfilled.

I do not believe this is over by any means, and as Eagle One noted on Wednesday, neither does the US Navy. We are in a period of higher seas and have just entered the tsunami season off the east coast of Somalia, so for a few months anyway the Navy has time to prepare for the next phase. The second half of 2008 was a brutal period of consistent piracy, and there are few signs the second half of 2009 will be any different.

There is one thing I am looking forward to learning about. There is this enormous international naval armada off the coast of Somalia, and one thing I'd like to know is how the logistics of this operation is working. Is every nation supporting their own logistics? Obviously not, several nations have warships in the region but do not have logistics ships. Who is supporting who and how does this work exactly. What level of coordination truly exists? There is a great study to be done with this operation, particularly in regards to the cooperation of international naval forces, and I hope one day to read such a study in full.

The Navy has bought the administration time for Somalia, but without a solution on land, it can become time wasted. Hopefully the diplomatic effort is quietly in motion, and results on land are forthcoming.

Navy Ships Collide in Strait of Hormuz - Updated -Bumped

Early reporting, so the details may or may not be accurate.

A US Navy submarine and a US amphibious vessel collided in the Strait of Hormuz on Friday leaving 15 sailors slightly injured, the US Navy Fifth Fleet said.

"The collision between USS Hartford (SSN 768) and USS New Orleans (LPD 18) occurred at approximately 1:00 am local time (2030 GMT on Thursday)," the Bahrain-based navy command said.

"Fifteen sailors aboard the Hartford were slightly injured and returned to duty. No personnel aboard New Orleans were injured," it added.

Middle of the night. The condition of the submarine at the time of the accident, on the surface or submerged, will be an interesting detail to watch for. UNCLOS implications there you know.

Updated: As you might expect, the submarine kicked the amphibious ships ass. From the DoD press statement:

Overall damage to both ships is being evaluated. The propulsion plant of the submarine was unaffected by this collision. A fuel tank ruptured on the New Orleans, which resulted in an oil spill of about 25,000 gallons of fuel. Both ships are currently operating under their own power.

Not a good day. We just dumped oil on Iran's front lawn.

Is it time to be superstitious? Is the entire San Antonio class cursed?

Update2: Good discussion over at bubblehead's place. He has some early professional speculation.

Obviously, there are no specifics out yet, but if the submarine had that many people injured, it's safe to assume she was going faster that you might expect a submarine to go at periscope depth; or, if she was at PD, that she got spun over fairly far onto her side before righting herself.

He says he is at PD. Translation: he'll have more as details unfold.

Update3: Navy Times has a damage report.

Campbell said initial assessments showed two ballast tanks on New Orleans were ruptured, resulting in seawater flooding that required the ship to be stabilized. A fuel tank was also ruptured, causing an estimated 25,000 gallons of marine diesel fuel to spill into the gulf.

“She had flooding in three distinct compartments,” Campbell said. “The flooding is secure, and the ship is making way on her own power.”

P-3 Orion aircraft flew over the area looking for a sheen of spilled oil, but “there’s no indication of that,” she said.

Hartford suffered “visible” damage to the sail and to a bow plane. Campbell could not say if components of the sail such as masts and periscopes are damaged.

More at Navy Times. Sounds like it has been a busy day at the damage control locker on New Orleans. Wasn't the USS Mesa Verfe (LPD 19) the first San Antonio class to have a shock test? Early lessons for a class of ship that can't seem to catch a break.

Robert D. Kaplan Expands His Elegant Decline Narrative

Shortly after the release of the US Navy's maritime strategy, the Navy was blindsided by an article printed in The Atlantic by Robert D. Kaplan titled The Navy's Flat Earth Strategy. The narrative of that article was expanded a month later when Kaplan ran another article in The Atlantic titled America's Elegant Decline. In both articles Kaplan is supportive of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (PDF), but the analysis hit the Navy like a backhanded slap across the face, and in my opinion the Navy has had a difficult time promoting their own maritime strategy.

The fundamental idea of conceding dominance of the maritime domain does not sit well with a Navy that has only known dominance of the oceans with seapower. I got the impression Kaplan picked up on that with his latest expansion of the Navy's elegant decline titled Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century where Kaplan concludes indispensability, rather than dominance, must be its goal. Kaplan's article is simply too rich with content to blog in a single post, indeed there are several important ideas being promoted, but in keeping with the strategic intent of the article I think highlighting this point is where to begin the discussion.

In other words, more than just a geographic feature, the Indian Ocean is also an idea. It combines the centrality of Islam with global energy politics and the rise of India and China to reveal a multilayered, multipolar world. The dramatic economic growth of India and China has been duly noted, but the equally dramatic military ramifications of this development have not. India's and China's great-power aspirations, as well as their quests for energy security, have compelled the two countries "to redirect their gazes from land to the seas," according to James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. And the very fact that they are focusing on their sea power indicates how much more self-confident they feel on land. And so a map of the Indian Ocean exposes the contours of power politics in the twenty-first century.

Yet this is still an environment in which the United States will have to keep the peace and help guard the global commons -- interdicting terrorists, pirates, and smugglers; providing humanitarian assistance; managing the competition between India and China. It will have to do so not, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, as a land-based, in-your-face meddler, leaning on far-flung army divisions at risk of getting caught up in sectarian conflict, but as a sea-based balancer lurking just over the horizon. Sea power has always been less threatening than land power: as the cliché goes, navies make port visits, and armies invade. Ships take a long time to get to a war zone, allowing diplomacy to work its magic. And as the U.S. response to the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean showed, with most sailors and marines returning to their ships each night, navies can exert great influence on shore while leaving a small footprint. The more the United States becomes a maritime hegemon, as opposed to a land-based one, the less threatening it will seem to others.

Moreover, precisely because India and China are emphasizing their sea power, the job of managing their peaceful rise will fall on the U.S. Navy to a significant extent.

The image of the Indian Ocean (see above) is from page 32 of the Joint Operating Environment 2008 report (JOE 2008 PDF), and I believe represents better than any the Navy's New Map. Included in this map with the label "String of Pearls" are the critical maritime regions extending from the mouth of the Red Sea across the Indian Ocean into the South China Sea and north into the East China Sea. It is this stretch of maritime commerce where the Navy finds itself addressing every level of the threat environment from the skiffs off Somalia to the rising Chinese and Indian Navies. This vast sea lane represents where the Navy will be called to be the most in the first half of the 21st century.

The region includes concentrations of both state and non-state threats, and while the small boat threats off Somalia and Sri Lanka get the headlines; the largest concentration of submarine expansion in the world is taking place among the countries noted on the map. No less than sixteen nations on the map are increasing the size of their Air Force, while the nations on this map also include the top importers of military equipment from Russia, France, and the United States.

As the number of US Navy ships continues to decline in numbers, keep in mind this area is the furthest region from the United States and land bases in this region are scarce. This area is one of the most expensive locations for the United States to project military power. What passes as Grand Strategy of the United States (essentially everything left from the Bush administration) today currently includes an expansion of the US Army. Which country on the map will the US Army be asked to invade in the future?

Given the populations of the countries on the map, the answer is very likely, none. The Obama administration is essentially being handed a blank slate when it comes to the future military forces of the United States. It will be interesting what decisions the new administration makes as it shapes the US military force structure looking into the future, a future that almost certainly will unfold in the regions depicted on this map.

If you haven't read Robert D. Kaplan's new article in Foreign Affairs, you are missing a good one. I can't say I agree with it all, but I appreciate the way Kaplan encourages critical thinking with his analysis.

Observing PLA Navy Indian Ocean Operations

The Chinese Navy now has two deployments in the Indian Ocean. The deployment of the destroyer "Guangzhou" now sailing in the Indian Ocean on the way to Pakistan for the Peace 09 exercise is a quiet addition to the force mix the PLA Navy currently has operating in the Indian Ocean.

March 2008 Proceedings has a public article available titled Welcome China to the Fight Against Pirates by Andrew S. Erickson, Naval War College; and Lieutenant Justin D. Mikolay, U.S. Navy. As I have said many times on the blog, everything written by Andrew Erickson about China is solid gold, and this piece is an excellent read. One of the early points made in the article is an important point when discussing the PLA Navy deployment to Somalia:

The Chinese effort does not represent, for instance, an immediate power shift in the Indian Ocean, or a Chinese power grab in Africa. To those who remain wary of Chinese ambitions, one important distinction should remain clear: China joined the international community to challenge piracy. It did not join the counter-piracy effort to challenge the international community.

The entire article beginning to end is worth the read, but this is a key point that goes to the heart of so many things I have discussed regarding the US Navy policy regarding Somali piracy.

Beijing appears ready to acknowledge publicly that its increasingly global interests will require a global presence-at least in the commercial and humanitarian dimensions. According to Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao, a fifth of the 1,265 Chinese-owned, -cargoed, or -crewed ships transiting Somali waters in 2008 "faced piracy," and seven were attacked. "Piracy has become a serious threat to shipping, trade and safety on the seas," he explained. "That's why we decided to send naval ships to crack down."

For China, the timing is sublime: at the moment when it feels compelled to venture beyond its shores, the international community gives it ample space to do so. This allows China to move from its position as the only permanent member of the UNSC not to have contributed to international maritime security operations, toward becoming a responsible power that makes all types of contributions.

China undoubtedly senses a strategic opportunity in the relatively limited U.S. response to piracy in the Horn of Africa. "Apart from fighting pirates, another key goal is to register the presence of the Chinese navy," states Professor Li Jie, a prominent expert at the Navy Research Institute in Beijing. In this regard, the deployment should remind the Obama administration of an important reality: To the extent that we are not perceived to provide public benefits, such as reliable security for sea lines of communication, other nations will take matters into their own hands. The United States may increasingly find itself working with partners that joined the effort of their own accord.

I have taken a very unpopular position regarding Somali piracy, but I still maintain that the US Navy has handled this situation brilliantly to date. The strategy became apparent sometime around the August time frame that the US Navy was intentionally avoiding directly addressing the Somali piracy issue, and I still believe it was an intentional decision not to tackle the piracy problem that ran rampant off the Horn of Africa last year. Even as I outlined this on the blog, many called me a fool.

The intent to create an international coalition of warships to manage this problem, and the commitment by nations worldwide to contribute to this coalition, is one of the biggest yet least understood or recognized strategic successes of the US Navy in the 21st century. Nations continue to commit naval ships to the problem, the United States has been successful in getting Europe to take action, the strategy has been successful bringing the PLA Navy into position to participate with other nations towards a common good, and we have seen the worlds largest military powers cooperating towards a shared threat to the common good.

And the strategy has been so successful that within three weeks of inauguration, the Obama administration was perfectly positioned to change the RoE for dealing with Somali piracy. In the history of our nation, no president has ever committed military forces to action within three weeks of being inaugurated, but the Obama administration was able to do it in a time when the nation was already fighting two wars, and not only did nobody even noticed the historical significance, he was praised for taking action.

Now that the US Navy has cooperation from the international community, what happens from here sets the stage for future cooperation. If you haven't seen it, China has a fairly robust media relations campaign going for domestic consumption regarding their pirate fighting activities. Images of PLA Navy Indian Ocean operations can be found here, here, and here.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61) (CTF-151)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 6)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) (CTF-151)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F 209)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
HMS Northumberland (F238)
SPS Victoria (F 82)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16) (CTF-151)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602)
TCG Giresun (F 491) (CTF-151)
HMS Portland (F79) (CTF-151)
HMS Richmond (F239)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
RBNS Sabha (FFG 90)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Mahan (DDG 72) (CTF-151)
USS Milius (DDG 69)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Ariake (DD 109)
JS Towada (AOE 422)

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 6)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) (CTF-151)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Rheinland-Pfalz (F 209)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Commandant Ducuing (F795)
HMS Northumberland (F238)
SPS Victoria (F 82)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Pyotr Veliky (BCGN 099)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
RFS Yamal (BDK 156)
RFS Azov (BDK 151)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602)
TCG Giresun (F 491) (CTF-151)
HMS Portland (F79) (CTF-151)
HMS Richmond (F239)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Mahan (DDG 72) (CTF-151)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Diligence (A132)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JS Ariake (DD 109)
JS Towada (AOE 422)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 6


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)
SPS Victoria (F 82)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Pyotr Veliky (BCGN 099)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
RFS Yamal (BDK 156)
RFS Azov (BDK 151)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602
HMS Portland (F79)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Warramunga (FFH 152)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Mahan (DDG 72)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JDS Ariake (DD 109)
JDS Towada (AOE 422)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 6


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Pyotr Veliky (BCGN 099)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
RFS Yamal (BDK 156)
RFS Azov (BDK 151)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602
HMS Portland (F79)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Mahan (DDG 72)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
HMS Grimsby (M108)
HMS Pembroke (M107)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JDS Ariake (DD 109)
JDS Towada (AOE 422)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

Picture of the Day: Fleet Tug

Ironic how when it is Russia deploying a fleet tug the comments fill with sarcasm, then we see this picture and it is a reminder how useful they are in the wilds of the maritime domain.

This is what it looks like when merchant mariners and sailors from USS Mason (DDG 87) team up and do what our fleet does best, rendering assistance to those in need.

SOMALIA (Feb. 6, 2009) - The U.S. Navy fleet ocean tug USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168) provides fuel and fresh water to Motor Vessel Faina following its release by Somali pirates Feb. 5, after holding it for more than four months. The U.S. Navy has remained within visual range of the ship and maintained a 24-hour, 7-days a week presence since it was captured. The Belize-flagged cargo ship is owned and operated by Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine and is carrying a cargo of Ukrainian T-72 tanks and related equipment. The ship was attacked on Sept. 25 and forced to proceed to anchorage off the Somali Coast. U.S. 5th Fleet conducts maritime security operations to promote stability and regional economic prosperity. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael R. McCormick/Released)

Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) To CENTCOM

The end of Amy Butler's Aviation Week article on BAMS is noteworthy.

Meantime, the first Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) UAS deployed to the U.S. Central Command has arrived in its Middle East-Central Asian theater of operations. The system is expected to conduct its first flight shortly, Shannon says.

The aircraft, a precursor to the full BAMS design, will support maritime surveillance requirements there. Navy officials demurred on deployment details, but it is likely the UAS would be collocated with Air Force Global Hawks that operate out of Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates.

While there are plenty of activities in the Persian Gulf that can keep this platform busy, I keep thinking this may be an effective system for dealing with pirates.

I don't believe that any of the international partners fighting piracy have the capabilities to prevent an attack, but the real challenge is catching the folks who attack and fail. BAMS appears to be a system that can address that challenge, by keeping tabs on the small boats that get chased off following attacks.

As it is right now, often when a pirate attack is broken up by a coalition response, or a successful defense by a ships crew, the pirate ship simply disappears into the mass of fishing boats by blending into the populated seas.

BAMS might be the capability that can keep the pirate vessel flagged for coalition forces for a much longer duration allowing coalition naval forces to track down and inspect the pirate vessel. This goes to the heart of the problem fighting piracy, everything is responsive, but if the responsive capabilities can be made more capable, that can have a long term effect of curbing pirate efforts, and reduce the risk to commercial shipping.

Previous discussion on the GHMD deployment here.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 6


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Pyotr Veliky (BCGN 099)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
RFS Yamal (BDK 156)
RFS Azov (BDK 151)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602
HMS Portland (F79)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Mahan (DDG 72)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)
JDS Ariake (DD 109)
JDS Towada (AOE 422)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

When Guessing Become News

The speculation regarding the intercept of an Iranian owned ship in the Red Sea is growing, and not due to any additional facts. The new twist to this story is that the US Navy ran a covert op, which is interesting. I wouldn't bet on it.

The interception of an Iranian arms ship by the US Navy in the Red Sea last week likely was conducted as a covert operation and is being played down by the US military due to the lack of a clear legal framework for such operations, an American expert on Iran told The Jerusalem Post on Saturday evening.

International media reported that an Iranian-owned merchant vessel flying a Cypriot flag was boarded early last week by US Navy personnel who discovered artillery shells on board.

The ship was initially suspected of being en route to delivering its cargo to smugglers in Sinai who would transfer the ammunition to Hamas in Gaza, but the US Navy became uncertain over the identity of the intended recipient since "Hamas is not known to use artillery," The Associated Press cited a defense official as saying.

The most likely scenario us that the ships master allowed the boarding party on the ship, and did not expect them to find any weapons on board. The reason why that is the most likely scenario is because the ship was essentially released and allowed to continue on, and will supposedly be searched by Egypt before the ship is allowed through the Suez canal. If it was a serious incident, or a 'covert op' as is now being claimed, we wouldn't know anything about this incident at all.

What I see here is Israeli media that can't get good information out of CENTCOM, and is now guessing to keep this in the news. Can't get information about ongoing operations from CENTCON? Get in line. CENTCOM doesn't like sharing information with the Pentagon because the Pentagon is a leak machine, so it is hardly surprising people in the Pentagon have no idea what is going on. It also isn't surprising CENTCOM isn't releasing any details, they never do. When Admiral Gortney held his press conference at the Pentagon a few weeks ago, that briefing ended up being a wealth of information. Why? Because it was the first time we got real details about what is happening in the 5th Fleet AOR in months.

What is the story here? The CTF-151 flagship is doing a CTF-150 function, which isn't surprising because CTF-150 is more important to the interests of the US than CTF-151. The other story is the media is getting paranoid because CENTCOM doesn't run around talking about operations while still underway, like the Pentagon will for example. Being patient and understanding first reports usually get it wrong is about all we can do while we see what this story is really all about.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Pyotr Veliky (BCGN 099)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602
HMS Portland (F79)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Mahan (DDG 72)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

As Piracy Slows in Somalia, EagleOne Notes Why

The frequency of piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa appears to be down in January 2009, and while governments may be tempted to suggest the attacks are down due to a growing international naval presence in the region, EagleOne is noting a more realistic set of circumstances that can explain unfolding events, by noting the weather.

I could be wrong, but the way I read that chart above is that the sea winds in the Gulf of Aden are running 10 -25 knots - a little steep, I would think, for the small boats operated by the pirates. I don't think I'll be drinking any champagne over the success of the counter pirate operations just yet . . .

Eagleone posts a chart of wind patterns to go along with his analysis, check it out. In the comments, Mr. Michael Murrell, Director of Operations, Training and Deployment for International Ships Support Group (ISSG), a maritime security company that provides security services to insure best practices for protection for shipping companies, notes another valid reason. There have been a number of ships released by pirates over the last several days.

Both points in conjunction explain a lot. Weather, in particular wind and sea state, make it very difficult for pirates to get in position to hijack a ship, as control of the attacking vessel is critical to the tactics of scaling a ship. Eagleone cites information from an ONI report from October that further discusses the influence of weather on pirate operations.

But Mr. Michael Murrell's point is also important, and he is observing patterns in motion. We have seen a pattern in the past that upon the release of ships a downtime period occurs followed by a surge in attacks. It is speculation as to why the downtime occurs, but some have speculated the reasons range from a 'lessons learned' period where pirates actually share lessons with one another to develop better tactics, while others have noted the downtime is assoicated with a spending period where pirates seek out ways to spend their new cash, sometimes in the black market in Somalia for better equipment to execute their pirate trade.

The combination of poor weather conditions off the Horn of Africa and a number of ships being released better explain why there is a small lull in pirate activity off Somalia. The increase in naval force does not explain it, there have been very few instances where naval activity has resulted in either an action that uses lethal force or capture of pirates that would deter pirate activities, so until pirates are either being killed or captured, it is difficult to suggest the coalition naval forces are having impact... yet.

It would appear there is a Reuters reporter reading Eagleone, because the analysis today notes weather being a factor even as the article does not explain why or how they came to that conclusion. The article isn't a loss though, it notes that the pirates in the Central region have grown from six companies to nine companies, and suggests they have scouts out monitoring coalition warships as they develop tactics. This is interesting, because in last weeks Pentigon press briefing from 5th Fleet, Admiral Gortney noted the expanding capabilities of the pirates in Northern Somalia as being primarily responsible for the increase in attacks. If both Reuters and Admiral Gortney are discussing two different groups of pirates, which appears to be the case, we are soon to see an expansion of pirate attacks to coincide with the next surge, meaning it is about to get ugly out there.

When one observes the timing of the various events taking place, I think we potentially on the verge of major naval operations off the coast of Somalia, and it will be interesting to see how long CTF-151 consists of only 3 ships. I would expect that number to grow, not only in the form of coalition ships but in the number of US Navy ships as well.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (FFG 712)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602
HMS Portland (F79)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Beas (F24)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

5th Fleet Focus: Regional Status Report

The US Navy is preparing to go hot in the 5th fleet.

This is the required reading of the day. The press conference transcript by Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, U.S. 5TH Fleet, Vice Adm. William Gortney. CENTCOM is a tough nut to crack when you are looking for information, they simply don't say much and they offer nothing, so this press conference Q&A with Vice Adm. Gortney turned into this enormous gold mine of information that really explains about a dozen different "the rest of the story" moments regarding the US Naval activity in the 5th fleet.

Starting out by noting a fact that might be new to many, the US Navy has 13,000 sailors on the ground in 5th Fleet (6000 IAs in Iraq, 2000 IAs in Afghanistan), but only 10,000 sailors at sea. In other words, the 5th fleet has more sailors on the ground helping fill the gaps for the war than at sea doing the work of the sea service. He also explains in detail the reasons why Adm Gortney established CTF-151. Here are a few quotes that I thought were worth highlighting.

In response to a question about the relationships between the various international Navies operating in the actions to curb piracy:

ADM. GORTNEY: It's coordination of effort, it's not a command and control, because there are so many different nations involved that don't belong in the Combined Maritime Forces in a clean chain of command. So we coordinate at the operational level in my headquarters at the Combined Maritime Forces with those nations that are there. The EU has liaison officers in my staff, embedded into my staff, and we coordinate at that level.

And at the tactical level or on the waterfront, CTF-151 is now responsible to manage that tactical deconfliction. And we do that by publishing our intentions and our effectiveness and our schedules. It's all unclassified. We share that through all unclassified means. With the Chinese, we're exchanging e-mails with them on the unclassified net. With the Russians it's a little different. We're transmitting that over bridge-to-bridge radio. So it's from the most basic form of radio transmission to -- for the nations that are part of CENTRIX, that are part of our coalition to a very networked operation.

Then we had an excellent question asked by an unnamed reporter, and a very revealing answer.

Q) Can you talk a little bit about the operation in more detail? And what do your forces do if they encounter suspicious boats, especially if they're not in the act of doing something? Do you have the authority to deal with those folks, in any way, in international waters? And what are your orders regarding any detainees that you might take?

A) ADM. GORTNEY: Currently I'm going to have to take you back just a few, take you back just a few days. But when the activity spiked in the middle of August, we sat down. We knew we had -- our current process wasn't working, and we had to take a new look at it.

We knew that the problem of piracy started ashore. And it's because there is not a rule of law. There isn't a governance. There isn't economic stability. There isn't a court system that will hold these criminals responsible for their actions. And so the ultimate solution is ashore proper.

So we had to focus on prevention efforts at sea. And we developed a campaign plan. We created, working with the International Maritime Organization, the Maritime Security Patrol Area, a place to channel the shipping, so that we can concentrate naval activity, to make our naval activity more effective, because we knew we would be ineffective alone. And we went off on three lines of influence.

The first one was to bring more navies into it, international navies, to bring more of the international community to help solve this international problem and to bring more navies into it.

The second one was to work with the shipping industry on best practices to, what can they do to prevent pirates from successfully getting onboard their vessel?

And the third line of influence was to work through the interagency process to find a way to solve what we call the persons under control: When we capture a pirate, where do we take him? Where do we hold him? Where -- what court system tries him and holds him? If they're found guilty, hold them accountable for their actions.

We've had great effects in the first two -- once again, 14 nations at that are down there. The shipping industry is having the greatest impact. They're doing a terrific job of sharing best practices, speed, maneuver and non-kinetic defensive measures that will prevent pirates from getting on board the vessel. And we have had great effect on that. And we've actually gotten -- in the last six weeks there's only been four successful piracy attacks.

The down side of that, though, is that the attacks continue. And if we're going to be -- whether there's -- the -- they're all -- all the rest have been unsuccessful, and if we're going to be effective, it's coming to closure on our last one, where we capture the pirates and take them to a court of law and, if they're found guilty, hold them accountable for their actions.

We're close with that. The State Department's close on finalizing an agreement with one of the nations out there. And once we get that authority, then we're going to change my orders. And my orders right now to the coalition are disrupt, deter, but do not capture. But once we get the authorities, what we -- that we need there and a place to take them, then we're going to go -- my orders will change to disrupt, deter and capture, and try and hold them accountable for their actions.

Wow, very interesting. Two major pieces of information that tell the story. First, it would appear the "strategy of do nothing to get the international community to do something" was planned after all, because apparently in August NAVCENT command developed the strategy to bring Navies into the region. As regulars on the blog know, ID tracked the action off Somalia almost daily while constantly observing the US Navy was intentionally noting the problem. In other words, all indications are NAVCENT's intentional inaction became the enabling tactic to insure a successful strategy of building international naval presence. I admit to being impressed, not only because the process worked, but that Adm. Gortney will admit that we have been working towards building international presence at a time the entire world was noting how absent we were from the process of curbing piracy ourselves.

Second part is just as important, we appear to be willing to admit that the RoE is to "not capture." Adm Gortney would never admit this in public if the process for capture wasn't already developed. Apparently, we are simply waiting for an official announcement? Clearly we know why, which I think also tells us which country?

So what is going to change? Later in the interview, Adm Gortney discusses tactics.

Q) Once you get the agreement with the country on where to prosecute these pirates, will that mean putting small boats in the water, doing more proactive things, boarding some of the pirates' vessels?

A) ADM. GORTNEY: We are going to aggressively go after the pirates that are conducting pirate activity. And it's going to be a mixture of surveillance and then rapid action once we observe them, because we have to -- you know we're going to have to adhere to rules of evidence. And so what's very clear in the UNSCR is if someone is in the act of piracy then they're pirates. And if we maintain a positive ID on them while they watch it and then we track them down and we coerce them into surrendering and then we'll arrest them and take them to that particular country that will hold them accountable for their actions if they're found guilty. So the rules of evidence is very, very important to us.

If we come across a vessel that has what we call pirate paraphernalia, which -- this is what we're seeing right now. They're very small skiffs and they have small arms, AK-47s, RPGs and ladders. And although from a distance they may be small skiffs being towed by another mother ship, they look just like any other fishing vessel out there in the region. It's the most -- kind of some of the best fishing area in the world. So they're all over the place.

But when you come upon them and you look into their skiffs and they have AK-47s, RPGs and ladders, they're not very good for pirates. I mean to -- I mean, that's not very good equipment to fish with. So then we take it; we document it; we throw the pirate paraphernalia overboard and then we let them go. And we will arrest them once we get those authority. Once we come across them like that we'll arrest them, see if we then have the rules of evidence that the country will try them.

We'll discuss tactics in detail once the policy changes.

Later in the press conference, a question is asked about the mythical pirate-terrorism nexis, and it is confirmed yet again, no such nexis exists.

Q) Can you target -- do you yet see any links to radical Islamic movements inside Somalia? Do you see clan links here? Do you see links to the Islamic Courts Union?

A) ADM. GORTNEY: Thanks for asking that question. No, we look very, very carefully for links to terrorism and -- any form of terrorism -- and we do not see that link right now. And the reason we watch for it is terrorism is fueled by money. And so anywhere that there -- people are making a lot of money, we think the terrorists will go. But right now we do not see that linkage.

Al-Shabab, which is operating in the south -- the al-Shabab and the pirates, they hate each other. The clans and al-Shabab hate each other right now. We'd want to be very careful that whatever we do, we don't drive them together.

But we do not see that link now and we -- it would be a significant game-changer if we see it develop.

In the absence of the nexis, the US Navy has been able to do nothing about piracy as a way to encourage other nations to take action. This was always a precondition to the US strategy of doing nothing. Later on, the subject of terrorism comes up again, in the form of a question regarding CTF-150. Interesting, CTF-150 has become a drug busting and anti-smuggling operation.

Q) Yes, sir. Could you give us the updated information on the older taskforce CTF-150? Has there been any late detention or capture of the suspected terrorists?

A) ADM. GORTNEY: We haven't picked up a terrorist in CTF-150 in quite a few years. Probably, I think the last one was when I was an airwing commander on Kennedy in the opening days of OEF.

We've focused our efforts now on understanding the smuggling networks that the terrorists might use, and we now are focusing on the smugglers that are moving hashish out of the Makran Coast and smuggling it down into Somalia and into Yemen for further transit into the West, into Saudi Arabia and then into the Western European nations.

And I think this last year we busted over -- got 68 tons of hashish. We haven't found the opium, and that's what we're looking for. But the real purpose there is to understand that network, because we know that network feeds the Taliban. Drugs are the fuel for terrorists, and they're poisoning our youth, and we're focusing on that to get a better understanding of that network.

Then we get two brilliant questions.

Q) What's Taskforce 151 going to look like in a year? As I understand it now, it's a coalition, but of three United States ships only. So who do you expect to join, when, and what's it going to -- what's it going to look like full force?

A) ADM. GORTNEY: Yeah. The only reason 151 is U.S. only -- and now U.K. will be signing up for it -- is because the nations have to get a mandate. Their forces have to get a mandate to serve with the CTF. So it takes a while for that process to work. And we see great -- a great deal of interest in people joining, the nations joining 151, because they now have a mandate to do the counterpiracy. It's CTF that gives them the authorities to do that.

So we see, either working within 151 or an associated, we see Saudi, UAE, the U.K., Pakistan, Australia has made interest into it, Turkey has made very positive signs into it. So there's a number of countries, a significant number of countries, to be frank, that we -- I think six months, a year from now, once they're processed and they get the authorities, will be a part of CTF-151, as well as CTF-150.

Q) Any interest from the Chinese?

A) ADM. GORTNEY: Not to join the coalition, but we are sharing information with them. I've seen that -- we've seen that in there. We're exchanging unclassified e-mails and radio transmissions. We're receiving their reports of what they have done. We look forward to being able to get reports with what they're going to do, what their planned events are going to do, because we share that with them so that we can better coordinate our activities down there.

What a huge success it would be to have Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Pakistan in CTF-151 with the mandate requirements membership requires. I do not hide that I'd love to see the US Navy somehow get China to sign up, and maybe they will sometime in the future, but there is tremendous value in having an active military coalition with 4 Islamic countries in the Middle East as well.

I did not cover all of the press briefing, not even close actually. A lot of stuff about Iran, a lot of stuff about the Northern clan in Somalia that has increased the piracy in that region, a lot of talk about fishing for those looking to read more about that, and even a "what if" briefing for the President Elect regarding the situation in the 5th Fleet maritime domain. What a content rich briefing, a must read for anyone looking to see what the US Navy is doing in the Middle East.

So what did we learn? Apparently, in less than a week the State Department will work out the remaining issues in the legal framework to fight piracy, and as a result the US Navy is going to change tactics towards piracy.

When that happens, we will soon start hearing about a little fighting.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Psara (F454) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Floréal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (FFG 712)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jeanne d'Arc (R97)
FS Georges Leygues (D640)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
FS Var (A608)
FS Saphir (S602
HMS Portland (F79)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Sri Indera Sakti (A1503)
KD Mahawangsa (A1504)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Ganga (F22)
HMS Al Riyadh (812) (RSNF)
HMS Makkah (814) (RSNF)
HMS Al Dammal (816) (RSNF)
PLAN Haikou (D171)
PLAN Wuhan (D169)
PLAN Weishanhu (A887)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)
RFA Wave Knight (A386)
RFA Cardigan Bay (L3009)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

With the number of ships in the area it is getting very difficult to keep track. I appreciate all of you helping me keep this current during the international surge of warships to the region.

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Nikiforos Fokas (F 466) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (FFG 712)
RFS Admiral Vinogradov (DDG 572)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Floreal (F730)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Mahawangsa (AOR 1504)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Ganga (F22)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)

*Fotiy Krylov - Russian fleet Tug
*Boris Butoma - Russian Boris Chilikin class fleet oiler
*Pechenga - Russian Dubna class oiler

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Nikiforos Fokas (F 466) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Jean-de-Vienne (D643)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
HMS Northumberland (F238)



In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (712)
FS Floreal (F730)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
KD Sri Inderapura (L 1505)
KD Lekiu (F30)
KD Mahawangsa (AOR 1504)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Ganga (F22)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)

5th Fleet Focus: Order of Battle

Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group

USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)
USS Monterey (CG 61)
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)
USS Mason (DDG 87)
USS Nitze (DDG 94)
USNS Supply (T-AOE 3)


Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group

USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7)
USS San Antonio (LPD 17)
USS Carter Hall (LSD 50)
USS Vella Gulf (CG 72)
USS Roosevelt (DDG 80)
USS Ramage (DDG 61)
USS Hartford (SSN 768)


EU NAVFOR

HS Nikiforos Fokas (F 466) - Command
FGS Karlsruhe (F212)
FGS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (F 218)
FS Nivôse (F732)
HMS Northumberland (F238)
HMS Cumberland - (F85)


In Theater

Ocean 6
HDMS Absalon (L16)
RFS Neustrashimyy (712)
FS Courbet (F712)
FS Floreal (F730)
FS Premier-Maître L'Her (F792)
FS La Boudeuse (P683)
HMS Lancaster (F229)
HMAS Parramatta (FFH 154)
INS Mysore (D60)
INS Tabar (F44)
INS Ganga (F22)
USS Scout (MCM 8)
USS Gladiator (MCM 11)
USS Ardent (MCM 12)
USS Dexterous (MCM 13)
USS Typhoon (PC 5)
USS Sirocco (PC 6)
USS Chinook (PC 9)
USS Firebolt (PC 10)
USS Whirlwind (PC 11)
USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)
USCGC Maui (WPB 1304)
USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)
USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)
USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)
USCGC Monomoy (WPB 1326)
HMS Ramsay (M 110)
HMS Blyth (M 111)
HMS Atherstone (M38)
HMS Chiddingfold (M37)
USNS Tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
USNS Laramie (T-AO 203).
USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1)

** Take a close look at the photo with LPD-17, note the aircraft type on the fight deck.