Expanding A2/AD: Is it Time to Start Worrying about the Eastern Mediterranean?

Note from Jon Solomon: My Systems Planning and Analysis colleague Jonathan Altman has long been interested in the Mahanian aspects of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean. Overshadowed by the ongoing Russian ground intervention in Ukraine or the headline-grabbing bomber sorties into the North Atlantic and Arctic, Russia’s cultivation of “places” and potential bases for its forces in that region over the past few years simply has not received much public attention from the security studies community. This needs to change, as the Mediterranean not only remains central to U.S. and European defense strategies, but is also a vital market as well as thoroughfare for Western economies. Jonathan has generously taken the time to outline his thoughts below on this overlooked topic.

Much has been written about the challenges posed by the Chinese adoption of what the U.S. military calls “A2/AD” (anti access area denial) in the Western Pacific. Accordingly, the Pacific remains a key focus area for both the U.S. Navy and Air Force, with the Navy promising to put 60% of its forces in that theater as part of the so-called “Pacific pivot.” Yet as focus remains on PACOM, the rest of the world is not standing still. This is exemplified in the Eastern Mediterranean, as the Russians have already begun laying the seeds to create an A2/AD zone in the region against the U.S. and its allies. If fully realized, an A2/AD envelope could put Western access to the Suez Canal, the Black Sea and the resource-rich Eastern Mediterranean at the mercy of Vladimir Putin.

There are three interrelated elements that make the development of an A2/AD zone in the Eastern Mediterranean possible for the Russians. The first of these is the prospect of a credible military presence, which in this case would most likely be provided by forward deployments from the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Armed with three (six by 2016) new enhanced Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines, 11,000 marines and a surface flotilla of 42 ships[1] as of last year, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is probably the most capable maritime force in the region. By contrast, the U.S. Sixth Fleet has a single command ship and four DDGs that will be permanently assigned to it from 2015 onward (though those DDGs are based on the other end of the Mediterranean in Spain), with only occasional rotational presence from ships passing through its area of regard on the way to or back from the Middle East. Though the U.S. does have allies in the region with credible maritime combat power, the Russians are working to drive wedges into these relationships; which not coincidentally is the second pillar of regional Russian strategy.

The Russian effort to decouple longstanding allies such as Turkey, Greece, and Egypt from political and military alignment with the U.S. is helped by policy choices the U.S. has made, as well as favorable circumstances the Russians can exploit. In the case of Greece, the formation of a coalition government by far-left and right wing parties that are deeply resentful of the European Union (and its American allies), committed to breaking out of the fiscal austerity “straitjacket” imposed as terms for European Union loans, and ideologically aligned with Russian “Eurasianist” geopolitical theory has opened new opportunities for extending Russian influence. The Russians have waded into this fray, supporting the Greek government politically and entertaining the possibility of assisting Greece with its debt issues. Greco-Russian relations have unsurprisingly warmed considerably. In the case of Turkey, Russia has taken advantage of a decade-long trend by the Erdogan government away from democracy toward authoritarianism. As the West has criticized Erdogan for imprisoning journalists, fabricating charges against political opponents, and repressing civil dissent, the Russians have remained supportive to the point that Erdogan is now praising Putin directly. The other Russian charm offensive in the region has been focused on Egypt. Faced with a virulent insurgency in the Sinai, and a U.S. Administration that until recently was withholding military aid as punishment for the suspension of democracy, Egypt's repressive military junta has instead turned towards the Russians for military equipment procurement for the first time since the mid-Cold War. The sum total of these actions is to cultivate Russian goodwill with three countries that control chokepoint access to and freedom of maneuver within the Eastern Mediterranean, not to mention use of the Eastern Mediterranean to access the Black and Red Seas. Neutrality by these countries in the event of a Russian-American crisis or conflict could be devastating to U.S. strategy.

With access for their credible maritime combat power vastly improved, the final aspect of Russian regional strategy is to secure and expand basing agreements. Limited by geography, the Russians have no port on the Mediterranean; anything they want to put in the region would likely come via the Black Sea (though assets could be deployed from there other fleets as well assuming they could pass through Gibraltar or Suez). Even though Turkey may be friendly with Russia now, basing agreements hedge against a risk of change in the political winds that could bottle the Black Sea Fleet up. Additionally, as Admiral Greenert states again and again, forward basing allows a Navy to keep more assets in theater, multiplying the impact of a smaller force. Russia's only base outside of the former Soviet Union is in Tartus, Syria, which of course is in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recently the Cypriots, long prone to Russian sympathies, agreed to an expansion of Russian port calls and even potentially an air base, giving the Russians an additional strategic location to use in the region. Current deployment of land based Russian-supplied Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles in Syria provides an additional boon to the area denial aspect of their approach, which could be augmented by further sales or deployments of Russian forces equipped with ASCMs to friendly countries.

According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the presence of Yakhont ASCMs in Syria alone has been enough to create a surface naval A2/AD zone in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, rolling the three Russian thrusts together, it becomes clear how an expanded Eastern Mediterranean A2/AD envelope could be enacted in the very near future. As Mahan famously wrote, the land features of a region can play a large role in determining maritime influence and access. For example, consider the military implications of a Russian deployment of advanced long-range SAMs alongside its existing Yakhonts in Syria, or perhaps a deployment of those SAMs in notional locations in Cyprus. Much has been written about the capabilities of Russian “triple digit” SAMs (in service S-300s and S-400s and the developmental S-500). S-500s will have up to a 600 km anti-air range according to some Russian sources - enough to blanket the region from Crete east assuming they are based in Cyprus (the same sources cite S-400 range at 400km and newer S-300 variants at a more modest 200km). The Russians may also seek to adapt these systems to enable integration aboard surface ships beyond the existing S-300F integration in Russian cruisers; further increasing deployment flexibility. A Russian deployment of Kilo-class submarines to the region would insert a further threat into the undersea domain at a time when more advanced but already overtasked U.S. nuclear submarines continue to decline in force structure. The degree to which U.S. and allied surface and air access in the Eastern Mediterranean would be imperiled by any single one of these potentialities, and especially by combinations of them, should be clear.

Fortunately there are options available to mitigate the risks of such an outcome. Beyond political, economic and diplomatic solutions, of which there are a great many possibilities, there are three broad Navy-focused options that could be pursued. The first of these, and the least desirable, would be transferring forces from other theaters to increase our capability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The issues in the Eastern Mediterranean are fundamentally a symptom of a U.S. Navy that is undersized for the global tasks assigned it and a NATO maritime force that no longer provides sufficient deterrent effect. To redeploy existing U.S. forces to the Mediterranean would simply exacerbate these symptoms in another part of the world. The second option, which is from a navalist's perspective the most desirable but simultaneously the most politically challenging, is to grow the size of the U.S. Navy. During the Cold War, carrier and amphibious group deployments to the Eastern Mediterranean were routine and kept the Soviet fleet in check. By contrast, the Navy’s current supply of day to day deterrence through credible combat power and presence is far outstripped by demand the world over.

Acknowledging this issue, and taking the fiscal policy conflict between Congress and the Administration into account, reinvigorating NATO Standing Maritime Groups may be the quickest and most feasible way to push back on the Russian A2/AD threat. Currently NATO operates two Standing Maritime Groups, though between them both only seven ships are combatants (and three of those were recently augmented above normal force structure). Given that no allied submarines and only a handful of helicopters exist within both combined groups, this force is highly vulnerable to Russian submarine attack or coercion. This could be addressed by augmenting the standing group assigned to the Mediterranean with allied undersea forces. Furthermore, with the allocation of dedicated land-based air power and additional surface combatants, NATO maritime forces’ credibility in the region would be greatly increased. To be maximally effective, this Standing Group should field electronic warfare capabilities and be trained to employ counter-surveillance techniques that can together defeat the over-the-horizon targeting systems supporting the Syria-based Yakhonts. Additionally, Standing Groups have the deterrent benefit of tying nations together as an attack on the group would affect at least a half-dozen different countries. To add further effect, NATO leadership should work to ensure Greek and Turkish participation (though perhaps not concurrently for historical reasons) in the Mediterranean Standing Group and cycle it through the Eastern Mediterranean regularly.

Whatever course of action the U.S. and NATO ultimately pursue, it is important for policymakers and strategists alike to recognize the gross implications of a Russian A2/AD envelope in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such an envelope would present grave challenges to U.S. influence in the region, and would imperil the free flow of commerce that is essential to U.S. (and global) prosperity.

Jonathan Altman is a Program Analyst with Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc. who holds a Master’s Degree in International Security from the Korbel School at the University of Denver. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis Inc., and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

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[1] Though not all of these ships can be assumed to be self-deployable. Counting only principal combatants and amphibious ships, the Black Sea Fleet has 14 self-deployable ships; though it should be assumed that any deployment of these ships would be accompanied by some number of smaller combatants (missile boats or patrol craft), of which the Black Sea Fleet has 19.

Three Theaters Shape Context

There was one area of the CNA study related to the 1970s that I found lacking, and that was how the political uses of of United States naval power in the Mediterranean Sea shaped opinions inside the US Navy and how the US Navy viewed the world outside of the Korean and Vietnam wars. It is very easy to get sucked into the Korean War followed by the Vietnam War and note how carrier aviation and naval support of Marines in both conflicts shaped the perspective of naval leaders, but I would argue you can only reconcile naval strategy in the cold war leading into the 1980s by studying the three major theaters and what they represented.

The Atlantic

Once upon a time the nuclear threat was the dominant military discussion in the DoD. As someone whose only up close and personal experience with the cold war was watching Pink Floyd at Brandenburg Gate in July of 1990 at 14 years old... clearly I struggle to relate to the time period and threat of nuclear war. I read about it, I study it, I know the stories, but I simply cannot relate.

Naval power in the Atlantic for nearly the entirety of the cold war was about maintaining a balance of power for nuclear war. The expected use of tactical nuclear weapons and the various kinds of nuclear weapons revealed during this period speaks to how virtually all strategic planning in the North Atlantic was probably unrealistic, because if nuclear war broke out there would be no supply from the US to Europe, the US would be too busy picking up the pieces of a nuclear strike. The primary mission was really the only mission that mattered - keeping track of Soviet ballistic missile submarines. I have no sense for how effective the US may or may not have been in actually protecting the US from that threat, but the all nuclear powered submarine force of today is a direct product of developing the deterrence regime underwater necessary to protect the United States from nuclear attack.

That Hymen Rickover experimented with nuclear power on aircraft carriers and surface combatants was part of the innovation process, and like all true innovation some of it didn't quite work out. Ultimately nuclear power worked for aircraft carriers and submarines, but not so much for everything else. The Atlantic theater throughout the cold war is primarily about strategic deterrence where the US Navy was heavily engaged in a sea control and sea denial campaign against the Soviet Union, specifically the US Navy tracked and monitored Soviet submarines.

The Pacific

The Korean War and the Vietnam War confirm what has been said of naval power since the cold war, command of the global commons has for the most part been conceded to the US Navy since 1945. In both wars the US Navy basically operated as they pleased off shore feeding aircraft into the theater of war operations, and at no point were aircraft carriers ever considered under legitimate threat.

Consider how completely different the experiences of Vietnam were for Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Holloway, both CNOs - back to back even. Admiral Zumwalt fought a violent green and brown water war attempting to control inland waterways and littorals with an Army of sailors, while Admiral Holloway and the rest of big Navy sailed around Yankee Station and Dixie Station where ships sailed as they pleased rarely encountering a legitimate threat. The burden of danger for big Navy was entirely on the shoulders of airmen flying sorties in support of the war, a burden of danger sailors in big Navy never faced.

The Navy has been organized for projecting power in uncontested seas in the Pacific since 1945. The question facing navy planners today, indeed the reason for Air Sea Battle, is to ask difficult questions of whether the US Navy that has been organized around aircraft carriers since 1945 is prepared for an emerging maritime environment where the seas are contested. Beyond tailing a submarine every now and then, the US Navy has not needed sea control capabilities in the Pacific for almost 70 years. That inexperience suggests to me it is hard to believe the US Navy is very good at sea control today.

The Mediterranean Sea

To me, everything about who the US Navy is today can be found in studying the political use of naval power in the Mediterranean Sea since 1945.

• In April 1946 the US supported Turkey to deter the USSR. We sent a battleship.
• In July 1946 the US Navy operated in the Adriatic Sea to deter Yugoslavia and Italy from hostilities.
• In September 1946 the US Navy deployed to Greece in support of the Greek government, and continued that support for Greece at sea through 1949 to deter Soviet influence.
• In May 1956 US naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med in support of Jordon to deter Egypt.
• In October-November 1956 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med in support of Israel, France, and the U.K. and to deter Soviet meddling.
• In April 1957 naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in support of Jordon and to deter Egypt.
• In May 1958 naval forces deployed off the shores of Lebanon in support of Lebanese politics, trying to deter Egypt.
• In August of 1958 naval forces deployed to support Jordon and deter the Soviets.
• In April 1963 naval forces against deployed to support Jordon, but this time to deter Egypt.
• In June 1967 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med to deter the Soviet Union from engaging in the regional conflict.
• In September 1970 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med to coerce Syria and deter Soviet influence, while supporting Jordon.
• In October 1973 naval forces against deployed to the Eastern Med to deter the Soviet Union from engaging in the regional conflict.

The United States maintained between two and four aircraft carriers at all times in the Mediterranean Sea throughout the entirety of the cold war. The 6th Fleets job was to protect Europe's southern flank but project American power into North Africa and the Middle East.

Strategically, the United States Navy enjoyed freedom to maneuver in the Mediterranean Sea, because there were very few ways to see how the Russians would attack the US without getting nuked. This gave the US Navy in the Mediterranean Sea tremendous flexibility to engage with partners and deter aggression throughout the region.

If one did not believe that interests in the Mediterranean Sea justified nuclear war, and it is clear that neither the US nor Russia ever believed that,  then influence in the Mediterranean Sea was determined almost entirely by naval presence and the threat of credible combat power. All indications are the Soviets accepted the balance and understood that naval presence was the essential piece to influence and power in the region, but the Soviet Union fell apart before the ships that would provide vital naval presence were built.

I note this because it would appear the Russians remember well the lessons of the cold war. It was recently reported the Russians are sending their aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean Sea in support of Syria. Hard to see a scenario where the US gets involved in Syria when the Russians are cruising a large deck aircraft carrier with escorts off the Syrian coast. The Russian carrier deployment schedule for later in 2013 is a vivid reminder of how influential presence can be in supporting allies or how armed suasion can influence competitors.

It seems to me that the CNA study could have done a better job focusing on the three primary theaters in the 1970s, particularly operations in the Mediterranean Sea, but simply how each theater was different but each theater shaped the context by which naval leaders were looking at the world. In my opinion this was something Admiral Holloway did very well in his book Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation, using personal stories to explain how the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters shaped his views. Another excellent book that covers much of this is The Political Uses of Sea Power by Professor Edward Luttwak. His follow up Strategy and History, Collected Essays, Volume 2 is easily one of my favorite book of all time.

Each theater contributed towards the strategic deterrence, naval presence, power projection, and sea control strategic framework that was developed at the time. It is noteworthy that as the Navy moved into the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s as the Navy became less involved in the historic naval strategic missions in the Mediterranean and Atlantic theaters, the Navy also put less emphasis in strategy on the traditional naval missions associated with those theaters.

Naval Presence Shifts Towards 2020

These slides from OPNAV were passed around several months ago as an example of the pivot to Asia. Some have identified these slides as representative of the slides presented at a recent CNO press conference. The first slide begins with the expected Naval Presence of 2013.

This is basically today. Note the gold ships are the sustained, forward deployed ships and the blue ships are the rotational CONUS forces. Noteworthy how the SSGNs are counted as steady state, forward deployed operational assets.

It continues with a slide of Naval Presence of 2017.

This is where the map starts getting interesting.

South America
Note that the Navy intends to move 10 PCs, many of which are currently in the Middle East, to the South American theater in support of SOUTHCOM by 2017. I am interested to see how that works with 1 amphibious ship and no combat logistics. In my opinion there looks to be a real opportunity for Navy/Coast Guard cooperation in that theater that is not getting a close enough look, for example, why wouldn't an AFSB for MSO and logistics not be very effective in that region? Everything has short legs, and having a place to move spare parts around at sea isn't a bad thing. It also doesn't hurt to have a UAV pad in the middle of the water. Just saying... that environment isn't likely to get better anytime soon, and has a real potential to get much worse - particularly if we start seeing more legit submarines instead of semi-submersables. It is worth noting the CG/DDG/FFGs in SOUTHCOM are replaced by 10 PCs and 2 JHSVs, not Littoral Combat Ships.

Europe/Africa
Rota is now a BMD base, and sailors will be lining up for duty on those ships. It is still very much unclear what ships the US Navy intends to station there. If it is me, I send 4 DDG Flight Is with BMD so I don't have to send and pay for RW (sorry guys!). Worth noting the full time amphibious ship is now augmented by 2 JHSVs assigned to Africa, which have replaced two large surface combatants. These ships almost certainly represent engagement work the Marine Corps is working on today towards tailored Enhanced Rifle Companies and other tailored Blue/Green assets for Partnership Station type of activity. What I find noteworthy, and useful, is that these platforms are retaining their RW capabilities, and all three ships are well suited for SOF activities if tasking is necessary. These are very flexible forces, but it means UAVs will be the only assured option to provide direct fires in contingency. That's OK, but I still think putting VLS in the San Antonio class amphibious ships for long range cruise missile capability remains an important omission in the modern force, and something the Navy needs to reconsider as an important capability as the large surface combatants move away from theaters that are traditional hotspots for SOF operations.

Middle East
Worth noting the 12 PC/MCMs has become 4 LCS, 4 MCM, and 2 JHSV. Note that the SSGN and 2 CG/DDGs that had been operating down in Africa in 2013 are moved up to the Persian Gulf region by 2017, basically suggesting an assumption that all naval activities off Africa today can be replaced in whole by two JHSVs. That is a remarkable assumption that I have a hard time believing has any merit whatsoever.

Pacific
Look closely and note that by 2017 the great pivot to Asia strategy being touted by Secretary Panetta will be the massive increase in naval forces of - four Littoral Combat Ships and two Joint High Speed Vessels. It is one thing to try not to provoke China into an arms race, but when this is the massive maritime shift towards the Pacific touted at the political level as national defense strategy, one has to wonder what our allies are truly thinking about our empty words policy. I'll also make a brief point - the reason I keep jabbing the Army with a stick and pointing to the Pacific is because it is plainly obvious the Navy is talking a big game but isn't doing anything significant there, and the force is not growing in the future, so the US Army needs to expect as an opening assumption that they will be left completely ineffective as a fighting force in the Pacific if they are dependent upon the US Navy, because the US Army will never get where they need to be unless the Army can figure out a way to make the islands of the Pacific a network of forward operating bases by which the Navy has no responsibility for their limited forces to defend, because every ship defending an island is one less ship to move the Army into the combat zone by force.

General Notes
The requirement appears to be around 1200 VLS in the Middle East in 2017, and 1500 VLS in the Pacific in 2020. Also, in my opinion, with the exception of SOUTHCOM this map looks to me what a "strategy of holding the line" looks like. You know what else bothers me about this map? It is a reminder that in 2017 US forces are basically organized in traditional heavy task forces like CSGs and ARGs, and with the exception of SSGNs and the 10 PCs in SOUTHCOM, nothing about this map sticks out as having a capability that is inherently disruptive for a bad actor in any specific area. LCS and JHSVs will be useful for their limited purposes, which is ISR and engagement respectively, but the US Navy has a shortage of assets that stand out as disruptive - punching politically and diplomatically above their weight.

It conclude with a slide of Naval Presence in 2020.

Pacific
The pivot to the Pacific has completed, and this major pivot ends up being 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 2 Joint High Speed Vessels. I am very unclear how the politics of the pivot to Asia somehow became a public diplomacy centered around the maritime domain with the US Navy doesn't even move a single major surface combatant or submarine to the Pacific as part of this touted pivot.


Europe/Africa/South America
Note that in all three places the major change the primary feature is the addition of a pair of Littoral Combat Ships. What I find very interesting is that for both Africa and South America the pair of Littoral Combat Ships is replacing the presence previously filled by an amphibious ship. This is the first document I have seen from OPNAV (that I can publish anyway) that supports the arguments I have made on this blog regarding how the LCS is more of an amphibious ship capability than a surface combatant capability it is usually generally referred to as. While that is an interesting side note, I'm not convinced it means anything other than how the numbers fit together in PPT.

General Notes
Note that the suggested plan according to this PPT is for 8 LCS in the Persian Gulf before more than 4 are in the Pacific, indeed 18 Littoral Combat Ships are specifically accounted for on this graphic, but only 4 in the Pacific. Obviously this is a moment in time look at what the Navy is thinking, but they are interesting moments and time, and interesting thoughts about future force dispersion.

Bataan ARG Sails in the Wake of History

As told by Kennedy Hickman here.

In 1804, during the fourth year of the First Barbary War, the former American consul to Tunis, William Eaton returned to the Mediterranean. Titled "Naval Agent to the Barbary States," Eaton had received support from the US government for a plan to overthrow the pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli. After meeting with the commander of US naval forces in the area, Commodore Samuel Barron, Eaton traveled to Alexandria, Egypt with $20,000 to seek out Yusuf's brother Hamet. The former pasha of Tripoli, Hamet had been deposed in 1793, and then exiled by his brother in 1795.

After contacting Hamet, Eaton explained that he wished to raise a mercenary army to help the former pasha regain his throne. Eager to retake power, Hamet agreed and work began to build a small army. Eaton was aided in this process by First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon and eight US Marines, as well as Midshipman Pascal Peck. Assembling a ragtag group of around 500 men, mostly Arab, Greek, and Levantine mercenaries, Eaton and O'Bannon set off across the desert to capture the Tripolitan port of Derna.

Departing Alexandria on March 8, 1805, the column moved along the coast pausing at El Alamein and Tobruk. Their march was supported from the sea by the warships USS Argus, USS Hornet, and USS Nautilus under the command of Master Commandant Isaac Hull. Shortly after the march began, Eaton, now referring to himself as General Eaton, was forced to deal with a growing rift between the Christian and Muslim elements in his army. This was made worse by the fact that his $20,000 had been used and money to fund the expedition was growing scarce.

On at least two occasions, Eaton was forced to contend with near mutinies. The first involved his Arab cavalry and was put down at bayonet-point by O'Bannon's Marines. A second occurred when the column lost contact with Argus and food became scarce. Convincing his men to eat a pack camel, Eaton was able to stall until the ships reappeared. Pressing on through heat and sand storms, Eaton's force arrived near Derna on April 25 and was resupplied by Hull. After his demand for the city's surrender was refused, Eaton maneuvered for two days before initiating his attack.

Dividing his force in two, he sent Hamet southwest to severe the road to Tripoli and then attack the western side of the city. Moving forward with the Marines and the other mercenaries, Eaton planned to assault the harbor fortress. Attacking on the afternoon of April 27, Eaton's force, supported by naval gunfire, met determined resistance as the city's commander, Hassan Bey, had reinforced the harbor defenses. This permitted Hamet to sweep into the western side of the city and capture the governor's palace.

Grabbing a musket, Eaton personally led his men forward and was wounded in the wrist as they drove the defenders back. By the end of the day, the city had been secured and O'Bannon hoisted the US flag over the harbor defenses. It was the first time the flag had flown over a foreign battlefield. In Tripoli, Yusuf had been aware of the approach of Eaton's column and had dispatched reinforcements to Derna. Arriving after Eaton had taken the city, they briefly laid siege before assaulting it on May 13. Though they pushed Eaton's men back, the attack was defeated by fire from the harbor batteries and Hull's ships.

I find it appropriate that on this day, April 27, the 206th anniversary of the first major battle conducted overseas by the United States of America, the Bataan ARG and Marines of the 22nd MEU take station off the shores of Tripoli.

The United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps have been in these waters before, and just like 206 years ago the maritime services find themselves fighting a tyrant in Tripoli while supporting an insurgency movement across Libya. One wonders if the outcome in 2011 will be similar to 1805.

Aftermath:

The Battle of Derna cost Eaton a total of fourteen dead and several wounded. Of his force of Marines, two were killed and two wounded. O'Bannon and his Marines' role has been commemorated by the line "to the shores of Tripoli" in the Marine Corps Hymn as well as the adoption of the Mamaluke sword by the Corps. Following the battle, Eaton began planning a second march with the goal of taking Tripoli. Concerned about Eaton's success, Yusuf began suing for peace. Much to Eaton's displeasure, Consul Tobias Lear concluded a peace treaty with Yusuf on June 4, 1805, which ended the conflict. As a result, Hamet was sent back to Egypt, while Eaton and O'Bannon returned to the United States as heroes.

Is it possible in 2011 that landing Marines ashore is the next step towards pushing Libya towards a negotiated settlement? In 1805, it was the presence of an Army near Tripoli, not the use of an Army in Tripoli, that let to a negotiated solution. It is sad how our political leaders no longer think of military power in the context of limited objectives, rather only in context of limited use - the distinction being very important.

The Rest of the Story

In 1815, Stephen Decatur delivered swift and decisive blows against Algiers that forced a settlement with all three Barbary states and the United States. Algiers backed out of the treaty the day after it was signed, but with no American hostages held the United States observed the activities of Algiers without involvement.

It wasn't until August of 1816 that a combined British and Dutch fleet crushed Algiers and finally removed the piracy threat represented by the Barbary states. Algiers and Tunis became protectorates of France, while Tripoli fell under the domain of the Ottoman Empire until September of 1911, when Italy declared war on Tripoli and later assumed control of the colony.

In January of 1943, Tripoli was conquered once again by the British under Montgomery with allied support from New Zealand. Tripoli was administrated under British rule until declaring independence in 1951.

Zero Tolerence During Peace and War

For Stout: Vice Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., commander, C6F,...

relieved Cmdr. Nathan Borchers, Stout's commanding officer, due to loss of confidence in his ability to command.

Harris also relieved Stout's command master chief, Master Chief Susan Bruce-Ross, due to loss of confidence in Bruce-Ross' ability to effectively lead and serve as command master chief aboard Stout.

The relief of Borchers occurred due to a loss of confidence in his ability to address a pervasive pattern of unprofessional behavior in overseas ports and a substandard command climate on board following an investigation into multiple allegations of crew misconduct.

"We hold our leaders to a high standard. Our nation expects no less, and our Sailors deserve no less," said Harris.

For Ponce: Vice Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., commander, C6F,...

relieved Cmdr. Etta Jones, Ponce's commanding officer, due to demonstrated poor leadership, and failure to appropriately investigate, report, and hold accountable Sailors found involved in hazing incidents. Additionally, she failed to properly handle a loaded weapon during a security alert which endangered some of her crew.

The relief of the executive officer, Lt. Cmdr. Kurt Boenisch, was due to his failure to provide support to the command and commanding officer.

"Leaders who fail to set proper examples or fail to uphold proper standards, fail to serve our Sailors, our Navy and, ultimately, our nation," said Harris.

We should also note that Commander of Naval Activities Spain and Commanding Officer of Naval Station Rota was relieved of command April 18.

Of the ships operating in the Mediterranean Seas off the shores of Egypt and Libya during recent events, 50% of US Navy destroyer COs and 50% US Navy amphibious ship COs have been relieved of command.

Selling Sea Power to Africa

African nations face an extremely complex and challenging maritime environment: terrorist facilitation at sea, narcotics, human, and weapons trafficking, and of course, piracy. Yet when it comes to investing in land power or sea power, most African countries with coastlines choose to skew their limited defense budgets towards their armies. This week, I had an interesting discussion with a gentleman from the National Defense University whose job it was to sell African leaders on the imperative to invest in maritime security. This executive-level policy dialogue complements the operational and tactical level engagements of Naval Forces Africa.

Why do these leaders yearn for T-72 tanks rather than offshore patrol vessels? Cultural and historical factors may play a part. Our own neglect and self-imposed obstacles for navy to navy (or to Coast Guard or marine police) are certainly another contributor to this land-bias. Naval force structure is only one aspect of sea power that needs to be addressed in Africa; other areas such as fisheries law and border control measures should be included in any security assistance strategies. Given growing interest in humanitarian, security, economic, and natural resource demand issues in Africa, it would behoove us to shift additional engagement away from our fiscally well off and tactically competent European partners towards these nascent navies. The counter-argument is that we need to maintain strong relations with our European partners so that we will be interoperable with them in during combined operations. The irony of this position is that lately, most of these combined operations have occurred because the African nations involved don't have the capacity to deal with these issues themselves.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Libya: The First Real World Test of President Obama's Cooperative National Security Strategy

Today, we need to be clear-eyed about the strengths and shortcomings of international institutions that were developed to deal with the challenges of an earlier time and the shortage of political will that has at times stymied the enforcement of international norms. Yet it would be destructive to both American national security and global security if the United States used the emergence of new challenges and the shortcomings of the international system as a reason to walk away from it. Instead, we must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests such as combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic disease.

The starting point for that collective action will be our engagement with other countries. The cornerstone of this engagement is the relationship between the United States and our close friends and allies in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East—ties which are rooted in shared interests and shared values, and which serve our mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the world. We are working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia, as well as increasingly influential nations such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia—so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concern, with the recognition that power, in an interconnected world, is no longer a zero sum game. We are expanding our outreach to emerging nations, particularly those that can be models of regional success and stability, from the Americas to Africa to Southeast Asia. And we will pursue engagement with hostile nations to test their intentions, give their governments the opportunity to change course, reach out to their people, and mobilize international coalitions.

National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010 (PDF)

I stood against the policy to intervene with military power in Libya. I have discussed my reasons, and others have articulated my reasons better than I have. I feel trapped when writing about Libya because my gut tells me I am watching a political train wreck in slow motion.

Of all the arguments that support the necessity for US involvement, I simply do not buy the strategic arguments made with one exception - we must support our allies. This argument was best articulated by Secretary Clinton following the Paris Summit Saturday. I remain unconvinced in my position on Libya, but that press conference by her was excellent.

"Supporting our allies" is the best argument the Obama administration has made. The President himself articulated that argument so poorly and so infrequently prior to taking military action that it never made an impact on me. I have to remind myself that the ugliness of the process by which policy was developed does not mean that the policy is bad. I remain skeptical of the Presidents policy, and I admit that skepticism makes it difficult to believe what the President is saying, but there is nothing to be done about it now except trust him until evidence suggests otherwise.

If we believe US policy for Libya is what the President says, then we can articulate the policy objectives of the United States to be:

1. Set Conditions for Coalition Operations
2. Support Coalition Operations With Unique US Capabilities
3. Support Coalition Nation Objectives

I am so used to the United States leading military operations globally that I actually find it difficult to believe there is a realistic alternative - let others lead. Some might say the US should never let others lead, but I would remind them that the existing National Defense Strategy of the United States is to concede that position of leadership when necessary.

I will note there is a lot of evidence that the United States military strategy being executed is in support of the policy articulated above. There are significant differences in Libya that suggests military operations reflect almost exactly what President Obama is saying.

Set Conditions for Coalition Operations

The unique military capabilities that have been demonstrated in Libya by the United States are taken for granted. Both Fox News and MSNBC reported on Sunday that 122 of the 124 Tomahawk missiles fired against Libya so far were from US ships and submarines. In other words, the United States took out the entire air defense of Libya in less than 36 hours with the USS Stout (DDG 55), USS Barry (DDG 52), USS Scranton (SSN 76), USS Providence (SSN 719), and USS Florida (SSGN 728). According to various sources, the USAF also flew a total of 15 U.S. Air Force aircraft made up of F-15s, F-16s, and three B-2 Spirit Bombers. Also in the air were 4 U.S. Marine Corps AV-8Bs and an unspecific number of support aircraft including at least 1 EC-130J ( <--hit that link and listen) and a handful of EA-18G Growlers.

That makes the US contribution an Expeditionary Strike Group (ARG + escorts and submarines) and no more than 40 USAF aircraft, only 15 of which are actually USAF strike aircraft so far. Libya is the first war participated in by America outside the Western hemisphere since WWII where the US has not deployed an aircraft carrier. The reason that is significant is because a single US nuclear aircraft carrier has more strike fighter aircraft than what the USAF has committed to Libyan operations to date. Despite the overwhelming show of force the last 24 hours, the US military footprint supporting operations against Libya is actually very small by US military standards.

Kicking down the door by destroying the entire air defense and command and control capacity of Libya in 36 hours is a capability unique to the United States. It would take at least 100 more aircraft or perhaps every Tomahawk capable ship from all European nations to do what the US Navy and USAF did this weekend - and we made it look so easy on TV with 5 naval vessels and less than 40 USAF aircraft that the whole world, including American citizens, takes that unique military capability of the United States for granted.

I'm not suggesting Libya was a bastion of defense, but I challenge anyone to develop a way Europe could have knocked out the Libyan air defense and C2 networks without using significantly more assets or nuclear weapons. What the US military did to Libya in a 36 hour period was a lot more impressive than folks realize, because no one else in the world could do it.

It seems to me this initial phase of military operations meets the criteria for the first policy objective of the United States stated above.

Support Coalition Operations With Unique US Capabilities

I am hesitant to make predictions, but I do believe that if we draw upon the policy as laid out by President Obama, US military operations are about to scale down considerably relative to the last few days. There will still be support aircraft like EA-18s, EC-130J, tankers, etc... operating but it won't surprise me if USAF strike fighter sorties become much less frequent as the fixed targets are eliminated.

Based on my read of US policy, the following assets will conduct the majority of operations over and around Libya from now on:

• Italy* - NMM Giuseppe Garibaldi (CVS 551), NMM Francesco Mimbelli (D 561), NMM Andrea Doria (D 553), NMM Euro (F 575), NMM Chimera (F 556), NMM Fenice (F 557), NMM San Marco (L 9893), NMM San Giorgio (L 9892), NMM Libra (P402), Elettra (A 5340), Etna (A-5326)
• France* - FS Forbin (D 620), FS Jean Bart (D 615), Charles de Gaulle (R 91), FS Dupleix (D 641), FS Aconit (F 713), FS La Meuse (A 607)
• United Kingdom* - HMS Triumph (S93), HMS Westminster (F237), HMS Cumberland (F85)
• Belgium - 6 F-16s
• Canada - 6 CF-18s for Operation MOBILE. Also HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)
• Denmark - 6 F-16s
• Greece - 4 F-16s, 1 R-99, HS Themistoklis (F465) and HS Limnos (F451)
• Norway - 6 F-16s, 1 P-3
• Qatar - 4 Mirage 2000-5EDA Fighters.
• Spain - 4 F-18s, 1 CN-235, 1 tanker aircraft, SPS Méndez Núñez (F104), SPS Tramontana (S74)
• United Arab Emirates - mix of 24 Mirage 2000-9s and F-16s

* I am unable to keep track of the number of aircraft involved by these nations, but they represent numbers of aircraft on par or greater than the United States.

Noteworthy that is at least 60 strike aircraft from the Libya coalition without adding in the US, France, UK, or Italy to conduct operations over Libya. Additionally, I suspect the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) may be used in some circumstances helping civilians, as close air support against ground targets is what the aircraft on that ship can do.

Support Coalition Nation Objectives

It is noteworthy that the only aircraft carriers supporting operations for Libya are being fielded by Italy and France. There is evidence both nations will continue to contribute strike fighters as part of the coalition. Based on naval presence and numbers of contributing strike aircraft my assumption is that the United States will turn military operations over to either France or the UK, and the US policy objective will be to support the French and UK policy objective - which I read to be remove Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi from power.

This policy, while shared by many Americans, may drive Americans nuts. The political left is split, with many not happy because President Obama has allowed the US to get involved in another war against an Arab nation. The right is also split, with many not happy the US is spending money for a third war when we already have two wars on our hands. The real political question going forward is whether the supporters of the President's Libya policy on both sides of the political isle will accept US involvement in a war where the outcome of objectives will be determined by someone else - specifically European and Middle Eastern nations both politically and militarily.

This approach that concedes political and military leadership in war to others is uncharted waters for existing generations of Americans, but it explains why Admiral Mullen told "Meet the Press" that one outcome is Gaddafi remaining in power. If US policy was deciding the outcome in Libya instead of others, Admiral Mullen would never have said that.

What is at stake in this political struggle regarding military use? As I see it, the fundamental promise of cooperative partnership that everything else in President Obama's National Security Strategy of the United States is built upon is at stake with Libya. The only way cooperative partnership will work as a strategic theory going forward in the 21st century is if the United States concedes ownership of political objectives to others when they take the lead to regional problems. Welcome to Libya, the first real world regional war where this theory is tested. The politics are likely to be ugly without strong Presidential leadership - leadership that has not existed to date.

If the strategic argument that Barack Obama has built US policy for Libya on is indeed to support our allies, now that we are involved - in my opinion what is at stake is the viability of existing European international partnerships as a legitimate foundation for national security strategy for the United States in the emerging 21st century global heterogeneous political and economic environment. We either trust in our European allies, or we don't. The President has made the policy of the United States to trust European leaders in France and the UK. Since they recently placed their trust in us for Iraq and Afghanistan, we know one possible ending.

US Navy Surging Vessels for Mediterranean Operations- Updated

The United States Navy has moved up the deployment of the Bataan ARG.

There's word Thursday that the USS Bataan, homeported in Norfolk, will head out on deployment later this month.

Navy officials tell WVEC.com that the Bataan is surging to replace the Kearsarge, as part of a contingency operation.

The surge is designed to give the president flexibility regarding the recent uprising in Northern Africa and in the Middle East.

There's no word on the exact time of the deployment or for how long it will last.

There are several things here.

The Kearsarge had unloaded Marines into Afghanistan, and while the ship has been reinforced with additional Marines, the Bataan ARG will represent a fully prepared MEU for operations in that theater, if called upon. If the Bataan is being called to the Med, as reported, that would suggest the Boxer ARG recently deployed from California would be sent to the 5th fleet to meet the presence requirements for Marines in that theater.

The Bataan ARG was planned to deploy later this year, but this deployment is a surge because the deployment date has been moved up in response to recent events in Northern Africa.

This deployment represents an increase in presence requirements for the 6th fleet. Once again, the operational tempo of the US Navy is being increased. The continuous and nearly annual increases in operational tempo and requirements demand by the US Navy - whether it is for HA/DR, contingency planning like North Africa, or Ballistic Missile Defense - needs to be noted as there has been no subsequent increase in funding towards the construction of Navy vessels to account for the demand increases.

Another question. There are two serious events taking place worldwide right now, in North Africa/Middle East with the protests and in Japan. When there are wartime challenges, the President is known to ask "Where are the Carriers?" When there are challenges short of war, the question is "Where are the Amphibs?" As the requirement creep continues to increase for operations other than war, the question is whether the minimal number of 33 amphibious ships the current plan budgets for is enough. It would appear 33 is not enough.

Update: Aviation Week is reporting that F-22s of the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Va. are quietly bring readied for deployment just in case they are called upon for a Libyan no-fly zone.

Europe's Offshore Dog and Pony Show For Libya

I love the American people. For a wealthy nation we really are one of the most compassionate peoples that have ever existed on the planet. I think of this when I see all kinds of different ideas being promoted on how to help the Libyan rebels fight their dictator.

While I am sympathetic to the struggle by Libyan rebels, I am firmly against the United States taking any sort of military action against Libya in support of the rebels. I am not against the United States helping the Europeans take military actions, but for context, the US role should look and feel like the German contribution to Afghanistan - and I have to tell ya, that isn't saying much. As I watch events unfold I keep thinking to myself that if the US gets involved, we will eventually get stuck doing everything. Why? Because when you see what the Europeans want to do, it is all style and no substance - for example.

European Union and NATO ships should patrol the international waters off the coast of Libya to prevent arms smuggling and check on migrants trying to enter into the EU, Italy proposed Thursday.

In an informal 'non-paper' seen by the German Press Agency dpa, Italian officials called for 'a joint EU-NATO maritime surveillance operation off the Libyan coast to implement the arms embargo,' declared by the United Nations Security Council.

This call by the Italians is nothing more than a naval dog and pony show for domestic political consumption, because why would NATO or the EU need to blockade Libya when in fact there is no known threat at all of arms shipments being sent to Libya by sea - unless there is some intelligence that is being withheld by governments. Even if there is a ship with arms heading to Libya, does that really mean the U.S. Navy needs more presence?

Having at least 1 amphibious ship ready to respond to American civilians makes sense, but sending in a fleet to 'watch' Libya and enforce an arms embargo against a phantom fleet of arms smugglers does not. Right now we have 2 amphibious ships, a few other surface ships, and at least two submarines in the Med. I'd say that's about the right level of naval presence, and any more quickly becomes overkill and politics.

I also got a bit of a laugh out of this paper from CSBA (PDF) that examines options for a "no-fly zone" in Libya. I am don't know what is in the water at CSBA that made this sound like a good idea to publish, but I do question the seriousness of this proposal.

A third option would be to establish a partial no-fly zone using standoff systems that would take advantage of the fact that the vast majority of Libya’s population centers and air bases are located near its coastline. A combination of sea and air assets operating off the coast could enforce a no-fly zone covering most of Libya’s contested cities, including those hit by recent airstrikes. Ship-based Aegis radars and land-based AWACS aircraft could identify and track hostile aircraft at long range. Aircraft violating the no-fly zone could be intercepted using ship-based SM-2 surface-to-air missiles or land-based fighter aircraft armed with beyond-visual-range AIM-120 air-to-air missiles. This approach differs substantially from those employed in the Balkans and Iraq, and thus there is no historical cost basis upon which it can be compared. A notional plan would use three Aegis destroyers positioned off the coast in combination with persistent day and night coverage from AWACS aircraft and an associated combat air patrol. Given the operating cost of these systems and related munitions, this approach could cost in the range of $15 million to $25 million per week. Importantly, since the aircraft involved would remain off the coast of Libya and US forces would use standoff missiles to intercept aircraft violating the no-fly zone, strikes on Libyan air defenses may not be necessary.

Let me get this straight. The U.S. Navy cited before Congress in testimony that the anti-ship missile threat from Hezbollah was so credible that greater AAW capability in the U.S. Navy was needed, and the result at the time was the U.S. Navy truncating the DDG-1000. The same ASM threat by Hezbollah has been cited to suggest the U.S. Navy cannot get closer than 25 miles of shore to offload Marines.

But now we have defense professionals who believe the U.S. Navy can sit off the coastline of a nation, Libya, and shoot down aircraft like they are skeet, and not expect Libya to counter with every ASM in their inventory? I thought CSBA was being paid to dedicate time and resources to the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threat? Is the anti-ship missile threat by the political organization Hezbollah really a greater legitimate threat than the anti-ship missile threat by the nation of Libya?

If anyone wants to establish a "no-fly zone" in Libya, it starts with a declaration of war by Congress, because anything short of that is a boondoggle. There is no way any nation is going to run around and shoot down aircraft inside Libya without taking out the defense infrastructure including SAM and ASM sites, virtually the entire Libyan Navy, every airfield being used, every aircraft that is in the open on the ground, and every radar and electronic emission site. That means thousands of strike sorties just to set the conditions for a no-fly zone, because establishing air superiority is the prerequisite of any no-fly zone.

If the Europeans want to do that, we should support them, but we should not bail them out if it gets hard. In my opinion, Libya represents an opportunity for the US to make a serious mistake. The U.S. Navy is already stretched very thin given the maintenance situation and the recent increase in presence requirements of aircraft carriers in the 5th fleet. The very last thing the U.S. Navy needs right now is presence requirement creep from 6th fleet that will contribute towards stretching the U.S. Navy to a serious breaking point.

Robert Gates needs to be honest with the American people and admit the U.S. Navy is too small to address the requirement creep of non-strategic interests like Libya. If you think events like Libya are important to the United States, you need to start telling President Obama and Congress that the United States needs a bigger Navy.

Hopefully the President will not get caught up in feeling the need to participate in Europe's offshore dog and pony show. If they want to take action, I fully support the US helping our European allies, but we can legitimately support our European friends without adding Libya to the list of US military commitments.

Photo: MEDITERRANEAN SEA (March 3, 2024) The guided-missile destroyer USS Stout (DDG 55) transits the Mediterranean Sea. Stout is currently underway supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Gary A Prill/Released)

Remember When the Navy/Marine Corps Did NEO?

Remember when naval forces could conduct non-combat evacuation operations of American civilians in trouble? I do too, which is why I am very curious why after many weeks of governments falling on the North African coastline the US Navy doesn't have any ships in the region capable of making it happen. Instead we get stuff like this.

"As always, the safety and well-being of Americans has to be our highest priority," she said. Clinton didn't mention Gadhafi by name.

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said 35 U.S. Embassy personnel and families, who were ordered to leave Libya on Monday, haven't yet been able to depart. "The fact is today we were not able to move any of our personnel out of the country," he said.

The State Department said late Tuesday that it had chartered a ferry for U.S. citizens wanting to leave Libya that would depart from Tripoli on Wednesday to the islands of Malta, across the Mediterranean Sea.

So who is responsible for making sure the Navy is prepared for these type of operations when unrest is now into its seventh week in the region? Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Locklear, Vice Admiral Harris, or Rear Admiral Wary? Did any of these folks request a ship and get denied?

After seven weeks without a single ship surged, I am starting to wonder if the problems related to the San Antonio class has prevented the Navy from surging an amphibious ship to the Mediterranean Sea. I get it that the Kearsarge ARG might be in a holding pattern near 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain due to the tensions in that region right now, but is the Navy so short on Amphibious ships that despite the last month and a half of protests in North African coastal nations we lack the ability to get an amphibious ship from Norfolk to the Med?

The JHSV sure would be handy right about now. For that matter, if LCS-2 was actually operating as designed, she could move the 300 folks in Tripoli to Malta without any trouble.

The Ungoverned African Coastline is Becoming Enormous

As I continue to observe the events unfold in Libya, allow me to play the role of Captain Obvious and raise a bit of concern regarding what we have been watching over the last several weeks.

If we just look at a typical map of Africa, like the one in this blog post, allow us to look closely at how much Africa is transforming before our eyes and why now is probably the right time to get the US Navy over there in force.

Start at southeast Africa at the border between Somalia and Kenya and start tracing Africa around the HOA, and we find Djibouti, then we find Eritrea, then Sudan, then Egypt, then Libya, then Tunisia until we get to the Algeria border. The tiny country of Djibouti is now the most stable country along that enormous coast line. Eritrea and Sudan, both of which contribute nothing positive to security of the region, are the next most stable (unless you count South Sudan, which I'm not), but ultimately Somalia, Egypt, and Tunisia currently have no functional government today. The actions by the government in Libya on Monday were very disturbing, and we should keep in mind that Algeria and Morocco could be next.

That is a lot of coastline to be ungoverned along major sea lines of communication trade routes for Europe. I find it a bit disturbing that the EU isn't calling for a surge of European naval power to the Mediterranean Sea, because the US Navy may have one, possibly two ships, in the entire Med right now while the entire northern coastline of Africa is suffering from government revolts? I keep thinking any day now Russia is going to announce a huge naval deployment to the Med, because Putin has a history of seeing political opportunity in the midst of chaos.

I was thinking about that when I read the last two paragraphs in this Navy.mil article titled: USS George H.W. Bush Strike Group Certified Combat Ready.

"The scenarios [the crew] experienced during COMPTUEX/JTFEX are based on real-world operations today's carrier strike groups can expect to face in the deployed environment," said FitzPatrick. "Geo-political situations are fluid and ever-changing across the globe, and leadership needs the multi-mission flexibility a strike group brings to their area of responsibility. The mission of our carrier strike groups can change at a moment's notice depending on real time events, and the George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group Sailors are ready to deploy and accept any mission given to them."

"The Navy's carrier strike groups are critical to the nation's maritime strategy," said Tyson. "Our combined capabilities allow us to deploy to any region around the globe to lend support, whether it's to U.S. forces on the ground or to mariners in distress or to countries reeling from natural disaster. We are a powerful force for good, and our success during COMPTUEX and JTFEX is proof that this Strike Group is ready to take on any tasking we are given."

When that much coastline of Africa is in turmoil, I just don't see a scenario where NATO can stand by and watch. For all the talk about how NATO doesn't have a mission, I'd suggest it might be time to shelve such talk; because the mission just popped up on Europe's southern lawn. The hit to the European markets is likely to get much bigger before it gets smaller, particularly when there were quite a few unconfirmed reports going around on Monday night that several oil rigs off the Libyan coast were on fire. Libya is an important oil producer for Europe, or at least was until now.

The next 6 months in the southern Mediterranean Sea is going to be very important to shaping the next several years of what could be a renaissance in North Africa, but the same region could also become a complete meltdown of security and stability. Engagement is going to be key in deciding the outcome there, and not being engaged politically is absolutely the worst approach.

It seems to me that if the George H.W. Bush (GHWB) Carrier Strike Group has indeed been training for this mission, now might be the time to send them on their mission.

The GHWB Strike Group ships and units include, USS George H. W. Bush, USS Mitscher (DDG 57), USS Gettysburg (CG 64), USS Truxtun (DDG 103), USS Anzio (CG 68), the squadrons of Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 8, as well as Spanish frigate ESPS Almirante Juan de Borbon (F 102), French Frigate Primauguet (D644) and French Submarine Perle (S606). Carrier Strike Group TWO is led by Rear Adm. Nora W. Tyson.

If one was to add Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 with additional ships from contributing European countries under a NATO flag, I believe naval power can be leveraged to diplomatically and economically support the region to buy time until the election periods in Egypt and Tunisia, and potentially even prevent a colossal bloodbath in Libya by enforcing a No-Fly zone and other potential UN mandated assistance.

There are many good reasons not to get involved in the activities taking place in North Africa today, but when one considers the sheer size of the coastline of Africa we are dealing with that has fragile littoral governance and security - at best, one glance in the direction of Somalia informs what happens when you don't engage in the stability of volatile regional issues. NATO and the UN must engage, and the US must contribute, at least initially.

Picture of the Day

One would think that when a US nuclear aircraft carrier crosses the Suez Canal on the 4th of July, all those paranoid news services would be pitching their 'war in Iran soon' theories.



Guess it isn't news when the aircraft carrier is traveling north. Click the pic for more information.

6th Fleet Focus: Port Search

There are all kinds of good reasons why Rota, Spain would be a great place to forward station AEGIS BMD ships - the main reason being Spain deploys AEGIS ships and Rota can support that. Location, location, location though... From Navy Times.

The Navy is in talks with European countries about where and when it could forward-deploy the surface ships that will be assigned standing patrols to defend the continent from ballistic missiles, the commander of 6th Fleet said June 14.

But Vice Adm. Harry Harris, the Navy’s No. 2 commander for Europe, said that because the negotiations were still taking place, he would not name the countries under consideration.

“Many locations are being looked at,” he said. “I can’t go into the locations because we haven’t decided on one yet; there are location and country-to-country issues and all that, but certainly we’re looking at it — and no decision has been made yet, but it’s certainly something that’s on the table.”

But where exactly?

So, where could the Navy be looking? One spot likely high on commanders’ list is Gaeta, Italy, which is already the home port for Harris’ flagship, the amphibious command ship Mount Whitney, and has hosted U.S. and NATO warships since 1967.

Another contender could be Rota, Spain, where the U.S. Navy has shared a base with the Spanish navy since 1953. Although it’s less geographically convenient than Italy, Rota has the advantage of having more repair facilities, which American ships could share with their Spanish hosts.

If it was me, I'd advocate like hell for Rota and tell Congress that we also need a BMD tender to provide forward capability to the Eastern Med. It is probably more expensive, but maybe by not as much as you think, to build onto the existing facilities at Rota and build a tender for forward support. While the operation of the tender will probably be expensive, someone please explain why we won't absolutely require a BMD tender in the Pacific at some point in the future anyway.

Might as well start discussing it now.

Pirates! In the Baltic Sea?

This is something you wouldn't expect to read about.

Swedish police are investigating the suspected hijacking of a Finnish ship in Swedish territorial waters, in which the crew was tied up and assaulted while the pirates searched the cargo vessel.

The Arctic Sea was en route to Algeria from Finland with timber when it was boarded between the Swedish islands of Oeland and Gotland in the Baltic Sea on July 24 by the group who identified themselves as police officers, Swedish police said in a statement today. The ship is owned by Oy Solchart Management AB, sails under Maltese flag, and has a crew of 15 Russians.

Sweden has provided warships and soldiers to the European Union’s anti-piracy operation, Atalanta, in the Gulf of Aden. Pirates have attacked vessels off the coast of Somalia 130 times so far this year, with 28 ships seized, the U.S. Navy has said.

Incidents like the detention in the Baltic Sea have never happened “in my life,” Victor Matveev, chief executive officer of Solchart, said in a telephone interview from Helsinki today.

MV Arctic Sea is a 4706 DWT General Cargo Vessel. It isn't often we hear about a ship being attacked by pirates in waters NORTH of contential Europe.

USS Barry Port Visit to Poti

The USS Barry (DDG 52) arrived in Poti over the weekend instead of move with the other ships of SNMG-2 towards Somalia. Below is the Russian news report of the ships arrival.

The ship would have departed port today. It will be interesting to see if USS Barry (DDG 52) rejoins SNMG2 once the USS Leyte Gulf (CG 55) arrives in the Mediterranean Sea.

H/T Russian Naval Blog

And Now You Know, the Rest of the Story...

The editors at RIA Novosti took the day off from work today. The first sentence of this remarkably stupid news report made me laugh.

The USS Mason, an Evarts-class destroyer escort that is part of the U.S. missile-defense system, could dock in Georgia in the next few days, a Russian intelligence source said on Friday.

He said the USS Mason is currently in the eastern part of the Black Sea.

"It is not being ruled out that the USS Mason may call at one of Georgia's ports," he said, adding that it entered the Black Sea in mid-September.

He said that the U.S. combatant vessel is equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system and that the purpose of its presence in the Black Sea is unknown.

The picture in the RIA Novosti article is the USS Lassen (DDG 82), which is calls home in Yokosuka, Japan. The "Evarts-class destroyer escorts" were built in the United States between 1942-1944. A total of 73 of the destroyer escorts were built during WWII, 32 of which were sold to the Royal Navy.

USS Mason (DE-529) was an Evarts-class destroyer escort named for Ensign Newton Henry Mason, who was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his skill and courage in the Battle of the Coral Sea. USS Mason (DE-529) was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 1 November 2024 and later sold for scrap. Clearly she is not operating in the Black Sea today.

RIA Novosti could be talking about the USS Mason (DDG 87), which is currently on deployment. USS Mason (DDG 87) was named in honor of the crew of the USS Mason (DE-529). The history as told on the USS Mason (DDG 87) website is a good short read.

MASON (DE-529) has the distinction of being the only U.S. Navy destroyer to be manned with a predominantly black enlisted crew. This was the first time black Americans were permitted to be trained and serve in ratings other than cooks and stewards. In late 1943, the Navy announced its plan to place an all-black crew with white officers aboard MASON. One hundred and sixty black Sailors were enrolled in all fields of operational and technical training and manned the ship at commissioning. Although known as “Eleanor’s Folly” for Eleanor Roosevelt’s introduction of the idea for an all-black crew, the MASON served with distinction during World War II. During the worst North Atlantic storm of the Century, MASON was serving as an escort to a convoy of merchant ships bound for England. During the storm, the convoy was forced the break up and MASON was chosen to escort a section of ships to their destiny. With land in sight, MASON’s deck split under the strain of heavy sea, threatening the structural integrity of the ship. Emergency repairs were conducted and MASON returned immediately to assist the remainder of the convoy.

The MASON crew was recommended for commendation from their Captain, Lieutenant Commander Bill Blackford, and the Convoy Commander, Commander Alfred Lind. The commendations were never rewarded. At the end of the war MASON was assigned as a training ship operating from Miami, Florida until being decommissioned and sold for scrap in 1947. On July 26, 2024 President Truman signed Executive Order 9981, officially desegregating the Armed Forces.

Through the efforts of the Mason veterans and the author Mary Pat Kelly, the MASON story has been chronicled in the book “Proudly We Served.” Their persistence in telling the MASON story paid off in 1994 when President Clinton awarded the long-overdue commendation to sixty-seven surviving crewmembers. In 1998, the Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton made official his decision to name an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer the USS MASON (DDG-87) in order to mark the contributions of USS MASON DE 529 Sailors equality and desegregation in Today’s.

USS Mason (DDG 87) deployed on September 12th, 2008 with the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) was scheduled to arrived in South Africa today, and would make port in Cape Town’s Table Bay with the USS Monterey (CG 61). There has been almost no word from the strike group in the media since it departed, so it is entirely possible the USS Mason (DDG 78) is in the Black Sea. The last US Navy ship the press reported to be in the Black Sea was the USS McFaul (DDG 74), which crossed the Turkish straits on September 12th (mid September, like the RIA Novosti article states), exactly 21 days ago today. The 1936 Montreux Convention allows foreign vessels to stay in the Black Sea for only 21 days.

Perhaps the USS McFaul (DDG 74) was leaving the Black Sea and the Russian media has no idea what they are talking about? We certainly know that is true of the RIA Novosti article, because whether the ship was the Evarts-class destroyer escort USS Mason (DE-529), the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Mason (DDG-87), or the USS McFaul (DDG 74) the ship is not equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system as claimed in the Russian article. The only two East Coast AEGIS destroyers with the AEGIS BMD system are the USS Ramage (DDG 61) and the USS Stout (DDG 55). The USS Ramage (DDG 61) is on deployment with the Iwo Jima ESG and is in the Indian Ocean. The USS Stout (DDG 55) has not been deployed since returning from deployment around Christmas of 2007.

As to what ship is operating in the Black Sea? The best guess would be the USS Mason (DDG-87), as it is the only ship in the conversation that is both forward deployed and whose activities cannot be easily accounted for. That ship name and location may be the only part of that entire RIA Novosti article that is accurate. That is of coarse if we believe that there actually is a US Navy ship in the Black Sea. If there is, it would be the first US warship to cross the Turkish straits since the Russian-Georgian conflict and not had its crossing make the news in Turkey, a noteworthy sign that things are returning to normal in the Black Sea.

As Paul Harvey would say...

Global Naval Operations: Order of Battle

Blog note: This post substitutes for our usual weekend 5th Fleet Order of Battle.

With naval forces deployed in Georgia, the Persian Gulf, the Pacific, and South America, and with so much disinformation being put out on the internet regarding US Navy activities, we thought we would give a general update of global Navy operations. Forgive me if I don't cover your ship.

In South America the US Navy is currently involved in two operations. The first is PANAMAX 2008, an annual exercise that simulates the protection of the Panama canal against attack. Participating in PANAMAX 2008 is the USS Tarawa (LHA 1) , USS Farragut (DDG 99), USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98), USS Kauffman (FFG 59), USS Devastator (MCM 6), USS Chief (MCM 14), and the USCGC Harriet Lane (WMEC 903).

The second current operation in South America is Operation Continuing Promise involving the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3).

In the Pacific the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike group has departed Malaysia. If we were guessing we would say the Ronald Reagan CSG is on its way to the 5th Fleet to relieve the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group that has been operating there for the last four months. That is a guess, but the Lincoln CSG deployed in March and is rapidly approaching the end of its deployment, and will be heading back soon. With no US carrier currently deployed in the Atlantic the Reagan makes the most likely replacement in the 5th Fleet to support operations in both theaters of war. The Reagan CSG consists of the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Gridley (DDG 101), USS Decatur (DDG 73), USS Thach (FFG 43), and the USS Springfield (SSN 761).

The Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group consists of USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72), USS Mobile Bay (CG 53), USS Russell (DDG 59), USS Shoup (DDG 86), USS Momsen (DDG 92), and USS Curts (FFG 38).

The USS George Washington (CVN 73) has departed San Diego and is on its way to her new home port in Japan. This deployment would allow the Reagan to redeploy to the 5th Fleet.

The Peleliu Expeditionary Strike Group is still in the 5th Fleet, but may soon be getting relieved by the Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group. The Peleliu ESG deployed in early May, so they are only about half way through their deployment, but news today is that the Iwo Jima ESG will deploy next week. Given the time overlap, the Iwo Jima ESG may operate either in the Med or around Africa before relieving the Peleliu ESG, although that is purely speculation.

The Peleliu ESG consists of the USS Peleliu (LHA 5), USS Dubuque (LPD 8), USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52), USS Cape St. George (CG 71), USS Benfold (DDG 65), and USS Halsey (DDG 97).

The Iwo Jima ESG consists of the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), USS San Antonio (LPD 17), USS Carter Hall (LSD 50), USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), USS Roosevelt (DDG 80), and USS Ramage (DDG 61).

Already forward deployed in the 6th fleet, by now you are no doubt aware that the USS McFaul (DDG 74) and USCGC Dallas (WHBC 716) are in the Black Sea on a humanitarian deployment to Georgia.

Also deploying into the Black Sea is Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE consisting of the Spanish frigate SPS Juan de Borbon (F102), the Polish frigate ORP General K. Pulaski (272), the German frigate FGS Lubeck (F214), and the US frigate USS Nicholas (FFG 47). These ships will visit the ports of Constanza in Romania and Varna in Bulgaria in the west Black Sea where they will do exercises with both Navies. SNMG-1 is also scheduled to make port in İstanbul for training during its Black Sea tour. These ships are not expected to visit Georgia and these activities had been scheduled and approved with Turkey back in October of 2007.

USS Barry (DDG 52) deployed two weeks ago and will do a tour with Standing NATO Maritime Group TWO. It is worth noting that usually SNMG-1 operates in the northern Atlantic and SNMG-2 operates in the Mediterranean Sea, but with SNMG-1 in the Black Sea it is unclear where SNMG-1 will be operating.

Other naval news. INS Delhi (D61), INS Talwar (F40), INS Godavari (F20) and INS Aditya (A59) are currently deployed off east Africa and are expected to make port in Mombasa, Kenya followed by Darasalam, Nigeria and other ports including Madagascar. Some of these ships are expected to participate in Malabar 08 in October.

FGS Pegnitz (M1091) and FGS Laboe (M1097) and FGS Main (A515) have taken up UNIFIL duties off of Lebanon.

HMS Lancaster (F229) departed Portsmouth yesterday and will be replacing HMS Montrose (F236) currently operating in the Persian Gulf. HMS Portland (F79) is reportedly preparing for deployment, and is suspected of relieving HMS Kent (F78) currently on a Far East deployment.

HDMS Absalon (L16) has a port visit scheduled in Malta on August 26-28, after which she is expected to operate with Task Force 150. HMCS Iroquois (DDH 280) and HMCS Calgary (FFH 335) are operating in Task Force 150, while HMCS Ville de Quebec (FFH 332) is escorting ships for the World Food Program instead of participating with SNMG-1 in the Black Sea.