From the PACOM Playbook to PACOM's Plan B(MD)

WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA (March 17, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), front, the Republic of Korea Navy Aegis-class destroyer ROKS Seoae-Yu-Seong-Ryong (DDG 993), middle, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) move into formation during exercise Foal Eagle 2013. McCampbell and McCain are members of Destroyer Squadron 15, forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, and are underway to conduct exercise Foal Eagle 2013 with allied nation Republic of Korea in support of regional security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Declan Barnes/Released)

Every year as winter ends in March, North Korea holds an annual military exercises as part of their spring training period that usually concludes with a big meeting with all the leaders in early April. This years meeting appears to have occurred on April 1st with the announcement that North Korea will restart their dead reactor. Despite news reports, I am skeptical that reactor will be back online this calendar year.

This annual training period in North Korea typically coincides with South Korea and the United States holding their annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises. For the past few years the pattern has been fairly consistent with North Korea being extra threatening (and feeling extra threatened) and usually a war of words breaks out for about a month or so. Once the US/South Korean military exercises end, North Korea will call for negotiations and take credit for resolving the crisis they manufactured in the first place. Last year when this chess game was over, many in the US had a bad taste in their mouth unhappy with the result, and as a result a lot of thought and planning by PACOM went into this years Foal Eagle 2013 exercises.

Everyone who follows me on Twitter might have noticed about mid-February that I was gearing up for this years annual chess match on the North Korean peninsula. I will never be an Asia expert, but I admit to being fascinated by the North Korean government that has somehow remained completely resilient to any type of external influence for over a half century. In particular North Korea, not China, is a subject I like to raise when talking about geopolitical issues in the Pacific with Admirals and Generals, because with North Korea the biggest threat is the lack of good intelligence.

Earlier this year I was following up with various Admirals and Generals I had met over 2012. As part of those calls I had a long conversation with someone I have gotten to know at PACOM on AirSea Battle and specifically the Pacific region; and more specifically we often discuss North Korea, not China. I was informed that the 2013 Foal Eagle exercise would be something I, in particular, would appreciate because it truly leverages public affairs within the context of both strategic communications and operations; a topic I have frequently written about. I was given no hints as to what this meant, except I was told Secretary Panetta had set aside extra funding for the Air Force for Foal Eagle 2013, and most of the details were already worked out. This conversation took place 2 months ago.

The Playbook

Adam Entous and Julian Barnes at the Wall Street Journal have revealed the US script that has played out over the month of March. Described as the 'Playbook', they detail events in their latest Wall Street Journal article.

The U.S. is putting a pause to what several officials described as a step-by-step plan the Obama administration approved earlier this year, dubbed "the playbook," that laid out the sequence and publicity plans for U.S. shows of force during annual war games with South Korea. The playbook included well-publicized flights in recent weeks near North Korea by nuclear-capable B-52 and stealth B-2 bombers, as well as advanced F-22 warplanes.

The U.S. stepped back from the plans this week, as U.S. officials began to worry that the North, which has a small nuclear arsenal and an unpredictable new leader, may be more provoked than the U.S. had intended, the officials said.

"The concern was that we were heightening the prospect of misperceptions on the part of the North Koreans, and that that could lead to miscalculations," a senior administration official said.

The Wall Street Journal goes on to detail the Playbook, even describing Secretary Hagel as one of the playbook's chief backers, even though I know for fact the Playbook was actually written by PACOM on Secretary Panetta's watch and with his full support. The article then highlights the meat of the politics.

The public-relations effort was designed not only to send a message to North Korea, but also to assure a hawkish new government in South Korea that it had full U.S. backing and there was no need for it to respond militarily to the North's provocations.

U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the risks associated with the playbook and concluded there was a low probability of a North Korean military response because the regime's top priority has been self-preservation. U.S. officials believe the North understands that taking military action could prompt a devastating U.S. and South Korean counter-strike that could destabilize the regime.

"Everyone is concerned about miscalculation and the outbreak of war. But the sense across the U.S. government is that the North Koreans are not going to wage all-out war," a senior Obama administration official said. "They are interested first and foremost in regime survival."

The U.S. plan was discussed during several high-level White House meetings, according to participants. The effort was backed by Mr. Hagel in one of his first acts as defense secretary. John Kerry, the new secretary of State, supported the Pentagon, as did other top administration officials, according to meeting participants.

In the deliberations, supporters said it was better for the U.S. to control the escalating steps, to ensure the situation didn't spin out of control. In part, according to these officials, the plan was an effort to ensure that South Korea's new government wouldn't feel compelled to respond to North Korean threats, which often emerge at the time of the exercises, as the North conducts its own annual legislative meeting.

But within the administration, some officials voiced concern about unintended consequences of provoking North Korea. Some of these officials questioned the faith the White House and Pentagon placed in the intelligence agencies, which have a mixed record of predicting North Korean behavior.

The intelligence gaps are particularly acute when it comes to reading new North Korean leader Kim Jong Eun, who remains an obscure figure and someone who intelligence agencies themselves have described as potentially more unpredictable than his father.

However, few objections were raised at the highest levels during the meetings, according to participants—unlike in other Obama administration deliberations about using military force abroad, including Libya, Northwest Africa and Syria, that have been marked by protracted debates. President Barack Obama gave the green light to proceed with the playbook, these people said.

The First Quarter: March

The Playbook was intended to function as escalation control by the Obama administration. As someone who jumps online every night at 8pm EST to read the morning news in North Korea, allow me to suggest the Playbook worked better than expected. When North Korea abandoned the Armistice back on March 10, it was clear to observers that North Korea was operating from a script. As I discussed at that time, escalation control was the key to managing the tensions, and I do think the US still maintains escalation control over the situation today, with or without the old Playbook.

As I have observed the US airpower show of force that has visited South Korea over the past month, I found myself in huge admiration for how well the US was playing the game with North Korea in 2013. What headlines that bluster the presence of US military power failed to mention is that every single aircraft that has been flown over South Korea over the past month had been planned many months ago as part of the planning process for the Foal Eagle 2013 exercise. This was never a secret btw, I exchanged emails with a public affairs officer who confirmed this for me right after B-52s made their appearance on March 19. The B-52s, the B-2s, the F-22s, etc... all those flights and activities were planned to appear in Foal Eagle long ago, and there was nothing new or reactionary by the United States taking place as events unfolded throughout March. While bombers and advanced fighters have been involved in previous Foal Eagle exercises, the key distinction this year was the announced use of those platforms.

Unlike previous years, this year the US publicized the presence of B-2s and F-22s through defense public affairs, because otherwise North Korea (or you and I) would never know they were involved in the exercises, even though the actual flights by those aircraft were planned and paid for months ago. So what is new this year? The public affairs piece that mentions their presence and activity, and the PA professionals who were able to mingle those activities into the context of the North Korean rhetoric - so reporters could go write plenty of news stories - is the only thing that is actually different from the US/SK perspective relative to previous years. Talk is cheap, which may explain why our defense public affairs folks are actually pretty good at it when given the green light.

Throughout the entire month of March as North Korea has stepped through their well orchestrated script for escalating tensions in the region, the US has been following a script of their own; a script written long ago for the Foal Eagle exercises and supported fully by the White House. In my opinion, everything North Korea is doing - even through today - is part of their script, and everything we have been doing has been part of our script. The intelligence officials in the WSJ report are right, there is no evidence that North Korea is off script. We do not know what their script is, but there does appear to be broad agreement that North Korea didn't write a script that ends with them being wiped out in a war. Neither script was written in a way that predicted the others actions, and public affairs and the use of media by both North Korea and the US is solely responsible for connecting the activities of the other side.

It would appear that in the end, the actions contained in the North Korean script forced us to abandon our script.

April Fools Day

If the US and North Korea have been playing a game of chicken as each side executed their scripted events in the public sphere, it is now clear that beginning on April Fools Day North Korea won that game of chicken, and the US was the first to flinch.

Every military activity related to the Korean peninsula discussed in the public was part of the script until on Tuesday - for the first time - the narrative being produced by US media was no longer fully incorporated into the Playbook. The retasking of USS Decatur (DDG 73) to head towards North Korea was a new event, and everyone who follows naval power closely knew it. The problem was, PACOM was one ballistic missile defense destroyer short of what was needed to meet demand signal coming from North Korean activities.

While most of the media made a big deal about the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) being close to the Korean peninsula, the fact is the US Navy has a BMD capable destroyer on that patrol every single day of the year. Without going into too much detail, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) is on a regular patrol that gives the United States an early warning detection capability should someone in Asia launch a ballistic missile at us. There is an AEGIS warship there 24/7/365 and on leap year day too. As soon as the media started talking about USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and USS Decatur (DDG 73), neither of which has any attachment to Foal Eagle 2013 or the Playbook, apparently that is when the Obama administration got nervous and pulled back on the Playbook.

But here is the issue: PACOM needed USS Decatur (DDG 73) because there wasn't another BMD ship available. Attention Congress, there is a capacity issue in 7th Fleet for BMD capable destroyers in the Obama administrations 'pivot to Asia' plan, because the Navy fell short one forward deployed BMD capable warship when PACOM came calling in regards to a North Korean crisis.

The challenge PACOM faces is that PACOM believes North Korea is going to be launching a ballistic missile soon, but the difference between this ballistic missile and previous North Korean ballistic missile launches is that this missile has a mobile launching platform. That makes the launch time of the next ballistic missile an unknown, and just as important the launch point for the next ballistic missile an unknown. This combination of unknown time and unknown launch location requires PACOM to cover every threat axis from North Korea in this threat environment, just in case, to insure regional security.

What you have been reading in the press is only partially correct, because there are actually nine US Navy ballistic missile defense capable warships operating throughout the 7th Fleet today, not two or three as has been reported. As we navalists know, AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense is an integrated network approach to developing a very large regional shield where each ship is both a radar and a shooter, and by integrating other assets in the region, the Navy can track a ballistic missile at launch and potentially develop a firing solution within only a handful of seconds. The more sensors and the better the quality of data, the faster a threat assessment can be made by AEGIS thereby enabling options for response quickly. This process is one that the Navy is well trained for, and in complicated exercises has practiced successfully in actual intercept events that last no longer than 20-30 seconds in practice windows that have spanned days.

While Foal Eagle and the "Playbook" was essentially a strategic communications exercise with North Korea in this environment of higher tension, when PACOM faced a situation where the potential for an actual missile launch in this environment became a legitimate possibility, PACOM has reacted by establishing a regional ballistic missile shield around our partners and bases. This regional ballistic missile defense shield layers around the Japanese ballistic missile defense capabilities, which can be integrated with the US Navy capability through AEGIS.

The US already has an X-Band radar in Japan that can track launches, additional radars in South Korea that can be utilized for launch detection, and nine BMD capable warships that can help track and develop firing solutions for intercepting any ballistic missile threat. Because the area that requires defense from the particular missile North Korea intends to launch is fairly vast, the US Navy ultimately was one ship short to meet the ballistic missile shield demand PACOM needed for full protection. When USS Decatur (DDG 73) was retasked, as a public asset outside the Playbook, political leaders got the impression they had lost escalation control with the Playbook and apparently gave it up. It is somewhat disappointing the Playbook was so rigid it couldn't adapt when inserting a new asset into it's strategic messaging.

Seapower as Strategic Deterrent

Throughout the duration of the cold war, mutually assured destruction is often credited for deterring nuclear war. While the debate over mutually assured destruction still exists today regarding the wisdom of the policy; the bottom line is MAD worked. Ballistic missile defense, in theory, adds a new strategic option for the United States in dealing with nuclear powers like North Korea that have limited capabilities. For the first time in human history, the United States is fielding a fully mature and developed ballistic missile defense shield to protect US allies and territories from an announced threat of nuclear attack.

One of the key strategic differences between ballistic missile defense as a deterrent and mutually assured destruction as a deterrent is that the United States is basically saying the enemy can shoot first, and if the attack is a nuclear attack but is also successfully defended against, then the United States reserves the option of responding without using nuclear weapons. This is a critical point critics of ballistic missile defense apparently don't believe is important, because a successful nuclear attack against US allies or territories requires a nuclear response. The option of not having to respond to a nuclear attack with nuclear weapons is the value of successful ballistic missile defense, and why smart investment and stewardship of ballistic missile defense is in the best interests of the United States.

It has been reported that the deployment of land based interceptors to Alaska is going to cost one billion dollars. That suggests the latest announcement that THAAD interceptors will be deployed to Guam will probably also cost one billion dollars. THAAD interceptors are expensive, and about half the time they even work. Those two land based ballistic missile defense deployments cost as much as a single new AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer, and while the AEGIS system is only capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in the very early and final stages of a ballistic missiles flight, the AEGIS BMD system has a much more reliable track record and has been tested under much more realistic conditions, including multiple targets and decoys, unlike the THAAD system. An AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer is also mobile, which is why the US Navy will be protecting Guam with an AEGIS ballistic missile defense warship for the next several weeks until the THAAD system can be deployed to Guam.

In theory THAAD is more capable than the AEGIS system because it can intercept at a higher altitude. The problem is THAAD is less reliable than AEGIS, less mature than AEGIS, and more expensive than AEGIS; but for now it is all the US has.

There is another reason why I believe Seapower is important right now as a strategic deterrent. I believe North Korea's creativity is interesting primarily because they are limited by means and are simplistic in method, and sometimes North Korean methods are so simple they appear absurd at first glance. North Korea publicized today that they have "smaller, lighter and diversified" nuclear weapons, which in theory makes some sense because they have only a limited supply of material to make nuclear weapons with. I know it has been something of a running joke for years, but if things go hot I would not be surprised if North Korea tried to deliver a nuclear weapon via a sea mine rather than by missile. North Korea is very skilled in developing sea mines, but not so much when it comes to rocket technologies. The ability to keep North Korea's naval forces from causing any problems is going to be important over the next month in preventing a war. An incident like the sinking of the Cheonan 3 years ago right now could spark a chain of events that leads to Korean War II, but an even worst case scenario is if North Korea was to find a way to sink a US or Japanese warship, because that puts South Korea in the middle of a crossfire.

Halftime Adjustments

While I can understand why PACOM called in the US Navy to build a regional ballistic missile defense shield when it became clear North Korea might launch a ballistic missile from a mobile launcher, I don't understand why the Obama administration threw out the Playbook and then ran off to tell the Wall Street Journal about it. Regardless, someone clearly needs to clue Hagel in on a little secret: Seapower is the winning playbook if the objective is to prevent war.

The ballistic missile defense shield PACOM is setting up is a defensive capability. It is also a very limited piece of the US Navy's capability - indeed it's only a small piece of the surface combatants being used for the ballistic missile defense shield. There are no carriers projecting power into the Yellow Sea, there are no submarines launching missiles, and there are no amphibious ships preparing to send Marines ashore in South Korea.

If North Korea does continue to escalate further, and I believe they will, the Stennis Carrier Strike Group is deployed and is currently in port in Singapore, and the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is deployed currently off the US west coast heading east. Those two carriers represent 100+ aircraft that can project power as needed in any contingency, and can do so right into downtown Pyonyang if necessary.

And if tensions result in a hot war, those submarines nobody in North Korea can detect will be the first strike that knocks out the Command and Control capabilities of North Korea in the first minutes of hot war.

And if for some reason the US needs to reinforce the South Korean Army, US Marines will be delivered into theater from amphibious ships.

And if, God forbid, a nuclear device goes off in South Korea, the nearby SSBN that no nation on the planet can find today will make sure Pyonyang is melted off the face of the planet.

American Seapower is inherently designed to be an escalation control mechanism for political leaders during a crisis. Seapower is a stabilizing presence capable of preserving peace through projecting strength or providing defensive, and an enabling capability when it is time to deliver the US Army to win a war.

No matter what the Playbook was last week, the winning Playbook for the US going forward dealing with North Korea is Seapower. Military strategists have spent most of the 21st century convincing political leaders in Washington that US military power is best exercised with land power - in Asia of all places, but hopefully with a splash of cold water called the threat of nuclear war, political leaders are waking up to the historical reality that Seapower is how Superpowers manage enduring peace without being intrusive on the sovereignty of partners. Seapower enables nations to enjoy enduring prosperity through maintenance of stability, lines of communication for trade, and security. Seapower is also going to be how PACOM will be managing peace in the Pacific crisis of the present and future, so I hope those involved with Hagel's strategic review are paying attention.

It's only April 4th, Foal Eagle still has 25+ more days. It is going to be a long month with plenty more threatening rhetoric and behavior ahead. Is a ballistic missile launch how this ends? Maybe, but I still believe North Korea desires a limited skirmish of some sort as part of their script, although it could be that the Playbook has actively deterred that potential outcome.

There is a lot of good analysis of the situation in North Korea out there. I highly recommend two sites in particular that may not be part of your regular web readings. The Interpreter Blog at the Australian Lowy Institute is always a great source for analysis of events in the Pacific, and in particular North Korea right now; and just about everything written by Jeffery Lewis these days covers every angle of North Korean nukes and missiles.

Operation Guardian

As you can see in the picture, the USS Guardian (MCM 5) has taken a pounding as she has been hard aground on the Tabbahata Reef. On the day this photograph was taken Rear Admiral Tom Carney told the media during a press conference the ship is approximately 20-30 meters from the edge with several hull penetrations, as you can see clearly in this photograph. Over the past several days I have been accumulating as much information as possible related to the USS Guardian (MCM 5) grounding, and unfortunately, there really isn't any good news to share except that no one has been hurt by the incident.

First, I think the Rear Admiral Tom Carney has done a great job. We often discuss the diplomatic role that naval power serves for the nation, and as the fleet disperses across the world naval officers often find themselves serving in the role of a diplomat. Given the overreaction by some in the Philippines it is clear that Rear Admiral Carney has executed his role as an American diplomat with nothing but class in the face of what is obviously a challenging situation. I also very much appreciate the assistance of several PAOs in helping me track down information related to the USS Guardian (MCM 5) situation - in particular LT Anthony Falvo and LCDR Christopher Servello.

As you might imagine when a wooden ship crashes into a coral reef at about 13 knots, the ship immediately got lodged into the coral and became unable to pull out. All indications are that the little wooden minesweeper simply didn't have the engine power to pull itself off the reef, but even if she would have had enough power, backing off the reef could have caused even more damage to the wooden hull and potentially ripped the ship apart further thus sinking her right there on the reef. From what i understand, the ship took on water almost immediately upon grounding. In many ways, this is a worse case scenario where a wooden ship meets coral and loses, where as a steel hulled vessel with more engine power likely would have suffered much less damage and would potentially have been able to dislodge itself.

USS Guardian (MCM 5) is flooded internally to the tide line, with the Auxiliary Machine Room and Pump Room completely flooded. There is coral underneath the hull in both the Auxiliary Machine Room and the Engine Room. The internal bulkhead between the Auxiliary Machine Room and the Engine Room is no longer water tight, and the several internal bulkheads are slowly losing integrity. There are also several cracks in the superstructure, and as you can see in the photo there are several holes in the hull along the length of the ship.

Because even US Navy ships made of wood are well built and engineered for survivability, and despite all the damage the ship has taken being stranded on the reef for over 10 days, no fuel apparently leaked from the fuel tanks, and the tug Vos Apollo has removed all of the fuel and replaced the fuel with seawater to keep the ship stable on the reef. All indications are that all hazardous materials have been removed from USS Guardian (MCM 5), and as of Saturday the ship was not in immediate danger of a catastrophic failure. The latest news today is that the Navy continues to remove everything possible from the ship that can be removed safely.

In a press conference on January 24, 2024 Rear Admiral Tom Carney told media the ship could not be towed off the reef or to port, indeed he specifically said the ship would likely sink if they tried. The ship must be lifted off the reef and carried via ship back to port. SMIT owns the NAVSEA 00C salvage contract for the Pacific region, and SMIT Borneo and SMIT Cyclone are reportedly en-route to USS Guardian (MCM 5) to salvage and recover the vessel. While the Navy is yet to publicly say so, the ship is almost certainly lost, and this will almost certainly be a salvage and recovery operation primarily designed to protect the Tabbahata Reefs National Park, and not recover the ship for future use.

On location is the guided missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) with embarked helo det; the oceanographic survey ship USNS Bowditch (T-AGS 62); the rescue and salvage ship USNS Salvor (T-ARS 52); M/V Trabajador; and the Malaysian tug VOS Apollo in supporting operations. P-3s from Commander Task Force 72 are also supporting with daily overflights. SMIT Cyclone (1,000-ton crane), the SMIT Borneo (500-ton crane), and the SMIT Andaman (barge) are en route from Singapore and should arrive on Friday. As of last week the Navy was also investigating the availability of Jasper 25 (PDF) for salvage and recovery operations, but I have not heard a status on that. Regardless, none of these crane vessels will be capable of lifting Guardian intact, which again informs us where this is likely going.

For those interested in the digital map issue, several in this community have been contributing to this discussion over at Panbo. Not only is the post interesting, but the comments are very informative.

USS Guardian Grounding

Jan. 20, 2013 released by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Western Command (AFP-WESCOM) taken on Jan. 19.

We are kind of late to the discussion, but it is slowly trending towards the nightmare scenario. The latest report is still valid, as today the Navy said the situation has not changed. From the Navy Times.

“Multiple spaces” are flooded aboard the minesweeper Guardian, still stranded on a reef in the Philippines since Jan. 17.

While the ship’s condition remains stable, a U.S. destroyer has arrived on the scene in the Sulu Sea and a salvage team headed by a rear admiral is being established as more ships and assets head to the area.

Weather conditions remain rough, and the ship, once pointed straight into the reef with her bow hard aground, has swung broadside on, where most of the starboard hull is in contact with the coral.

As of Saturday night Eastern Standard Time, the ship experienced a “slight increase to a port list,” according to the Navy. But as of Sunday night Philippine time, there was no evidence the ship was taking on more water. Concerns persist, however, that the ship will sustain further damage.

No injuries have been reported, and the entire crew of 79 sailors was taken off the ship Jan. 17. No one has been back on board the Guardian, the Navy confirmed.

The destroyer is USS Mustin (DDG 89) where Rear Admiral Thomas Carney has taken over as the on-site commander.

I'm not going to speculate cause and will wait for the investigation to run its course.

I hear nothing but great things about the CO. I do not know if it is still true, but it used to be that the navigator of the Minesweepers was the XO, but that was several years ago and the minesweeper I visited was using paper, not digital maps. This was also back when the mine ships were still homeported in Texas - much has changed with our nations mine ships since then, starting with the fact that nearly all of our Avenger class ships are now homeported overseas and the coastal minesweepers are long retired.

Speaking of digital maps, I look forward to the investigation explaining how the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) misplaced the Tabbataha Reef? This is just a mistake right, and not some very clever cyber sabotage? In cyber, the threat is not that someone will delete your data or steal your data - that kind of sabotage and espionage can be repaired and is in fact the kind of cyber capabilities the system is set up to protect itself against. No, the real cyber threat that keeps people up at night is when someone changes data in a way no one notices until it is too late. Stuxnet, often described as the first nasty cyber payload, didn't delete or steal information - Stuxnet changed the information in a covert way. That's the key distinction between the vast majority of cyber graffiti payloads and a legit cyber smart bomb. Hopefully the map issue at NGA is simply a mistake.

Another place for good pictures of USS Guardian (MCM 5) stuck on the reef can be found here.

The Philippines has fined the US Navy for destroying natural resources, which is clearly a political overreaction since we have no idea how much damage has actually been done, and it is hard to believe the fine is going to actually pay for any damages. For the record, the fine amounts to around $7,300 US for violation of at least five laws including unauthorized entry, non-payment of conservation fees, obstruction of law enforcement (we haven't allowed their park ranger on the ship), damage to the reef and destruction of resources. The fine is little more than a domestic political circus, and if it makes them feel better then I think they can go ahead and have their circus, because it certainly could be and still might get much worse....

because the ship isn't leaking oil or fuel, yet.

The good news is that no one was hurt. The bad news is the ship is in a very tough spot and may not survive this incident, and given the weather conditions any attempt to save the ship is almost certainly going to be dangerous. Keep everyone in your prayers as this plays out because mother ocean can be a bitch on a good day, and these aren't the good days in the history of USS Guardian (MCM 5).

Naval Presence Shifts Towards 2020

These slides from OPNAV were passed around several months ago as an example of the pivot to Asia. Some have identified these slides as representative of the slides presented at a recent CNO press conference. The first slide begins with the expected Naval Presence of 2013.

This is basically today. Note the gold ships are the sustained, forward deployed ships and the blue ships are the rotational CONUS forces. Noteworthy how the SSGNs are counted as steady state, forward deployed operational assets.

It continues with a slide of Naval Presence of 2017.

This is where the map starts getting interesting.

South America
Note that the Navy intends to move 10 PCs, many of which are currently in the Middle East, to the South American theater in support of SOUTHCOM by 2017. I am interested to see how that works with 1 amphibious ship and no combat logistics. In my opinion there looks to be a real opportunity for Navy/Coast Guard cooperation in that theater that is not getting a close enough look, for example, why wouldn't an AFSB for MSO and logistics not be very effective in that region? Everything has short legs, and having a place to move spare parts around at sea isn't a bad thing. It also doesn't hurt to have a UAV pad in the middle of the water. Just saying... that environment isn't likely to get better anytime soon, and has a real potential to get much worse - particularly if we start seeing more legit submarines instead of semi-submersables. It is worth noting the CG/DDG/FFGs in SOUTHCOM are replaced by 10 PCs and 2 JHSVs, not Littoral Combat Ships.

Europe/Africa
Rota is now a BMD base, and sailors will be lining up for duty on those ships. It is still very much unclear what ships the US Navy intends to station there. If it is me, I send 4 DDG Flight Is with BMD so I don't have to send and pay for RW (sorry guys!). Worth noting the full time amphibious ship is now augmented by 2 JHSVs assigned to Africa, which have replaced two large surface combatants. These ships almost certainly represent engagement work the Marine Corps is working on today towards tailored Enhanced Rifle Companies and other tailored Blue/Green assets for Partnership Station type of activity. What I find noteworthy, and useful, is that these platforms are retaining their RW capabilities, and all three ships are well suited for SOF activities if tasking is necessary. These are very flexible forces, but it means UAVs will be the only assured option to provide direct fires in contingency. That's OK, but I still think putting VLS in the San Antonio class amphibious ships for long range cruise missile capability remains an important omission in the modern force, and something the Navy needs to reconsider as an important capability as the large surface combatants move away from theaters that are traditional hotspots for SOF operations.

Middle East
Worth noting the 12 PC/MCMs has become 4 LCS, 4 MCM, and 2 JHSV. Note that the SSGN and 2 CG/DDGs that had been operating down in Africa in 2013 are moved up to the Persian Gulf region by 2017, basically suggesting an assumption that all naval activities off Africa today can be replaced in whole by two JHSVs. That is a remarkable assumption that I have a hard time believing has any merit whatsoever.

Pacific
Look closely and note that by 2017 the great pivot to Asia strategy being touted by Secretary Panetta will be the massive increase in naval forces of - four Littoral Combat Ships and two Joint High Speed Vessels. It is one thing to try not to provoke China into an arms race, but when this is the massive maritime shift towards the Pacific touted at the political level as national defense strategy, one has to wonder what our allies are truly thinking about our empty words policy. I'll also make a brief point - the reason I keep jabbing the Army with a stick and pointing to the Pacific is because it is plainly obvious the Navy is talking a big game but isn't doing anything significant there, and the force is not growing in the future, so the US Army needs to expect as an opening assumption that they will be left completely ineffective as a fighting force in the Pacific if they are dependent upon the US Navy, because the US Army will never get where they need to be unless the Army can figure out a way to make the islands of the Pacific a network of forward operating bases by which the Navy has no responsibility for their limited forces to defend, because every ship defending an island is one less ship to move the Army into the combat zone by force.

General Notes
The requirement appears to be around 1200 VLS in the Middle East in 2017, and 1500 VLS in the Pacific in 2020. Also, in my opinion, with the exception of SOUTHCOM this map looks to me what a "strategy of holding the line" looks like. You know what else bothers me about this map? It is a reminder that in 2017 US forces are basically organized in traditional heavy task forces like CSGs and ARGs, and with the exception of SSGNs and the 10 PCs in SOUTHCOM, nothing about this map sticks out as having a capability that is inherently disruptive for a bad actor in any specific area. LCS and JHSVs will be useful for their limited purposes, which is ISR and engagement respectively, but the US Navy has a shortage of assets that stand out as disruptive - punching politically and diplomatically above their weight.

It conclude with a slide of Naval Presence in 2020.

Pacific
The pivot to the Pacific has completed, and this major pivot ends up being 4 Littoral Combat Ships, 3 amphibious ships, and 2 Joint High Speed Vessels. I am very unclear how the politics of the pivot to Asia somehow became a public diplomacy centered around the maritime domain with the US Navy doesn't even move a single major surface combatant or submarine to the Pacific as part of this touted pivot.


Europe/Africa/South America
Note that in all three places the major change the primary feature is the addition of a pair of Littoral Combat Ships. What I find very interesting is that for both Africa and South America the pair of Littoral Combat Ships is replacing the presence previously filled by an amphibious ship. This is the first document I have seen from OPNAV (that I can publish anyway) that supports the arguments I have made on this blog regarding how the LCS is more of an amphibious ship capability than a surface combatant capability it is usually generally referred to as. While that is an interesting side note, I'm not convinced it means anything other than how the numbers fit together in PPT.

General Notes
Note that the suggested plan according to this PPT is for 8 LCS in the Persian Gulf before more than 4 are in the Pacific, indeed 18 Littoral Combat Ships are specifically accounted for on this graphic, but only 4 in the Pacific. Obviously this is a moment in time look at what the Navy is thinking, but they are interesting moments and time, and interesting thoughts about future force dispersion.

Questionable Assumptions

SAN DIEGO (May 2, 2024) The first of class littoral combat ships USS Freedom (LCS 1), rear, and USS Independence (LCS 2) maneuver together during an exercise off the coast of Southern California. The littoral combat ship is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant designed to operate in the near-shore environment, while capable of open-ocean tasking, and win against 21st-century coastal threats such as submarines, mines, and swarming small craft. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jan Shultis/Released)

Robert Haddick's contribution back on March 30, 2024 in the Foreign Policy/Small Wars Journal This Week at War series is an interesting and yet very familiar take on naval developments unfolding in the Pacific theater. Even as time has passed since Bob Work spoke at Surface Navy Association conference, a theme has emerged with staying power that continues to find itself as a part of nearly every Pacific discussion lately.

Robert Haddick eloquently discusses the issues like this.

Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work, in a January 2012 speech to the Surface Navy Association, dismissed concerns about the Navy's shrinking ship count. Work asserted that the Navy's robust plans for long-range air reconnaissance, conducted by new aircraft such as the P-8A Poseidon and a Navy version of the Global Hawk drone, will do much of the routine maritime patrolling previously done by ships. Bases in Australia, the Cocos Islands, and elsewhere in the southwest Pacific would support surveillance of the South China Sea. If ships were required to respond to problems, admirals could send them in as always. But under Work's assumption, fewer ships will be needed for routine patrolling. And with less routine steaming, the Navy will save money and keep its ships better maintained.

The question is whether more aerial maritime reconnaissance and fewer ships making fewer port visits around the South China Sea and elsewhere will provide the reassuring and stabilizing presence that the visible presence of Navy ships has heretofore provided. Work's air reconnaissance doctrine and the Navy's slumping fleet size combine to form a new theory for providing a stabilizing presence in global commons such as the South China Sea. We will know that this theory is not working if the leaders of U.S. allies increase their diplomatic hedging behavior. Regional arms races, another response to a perceived decline in U.S. military power, would be another indication of failure. China's ongoing annual double-digit increases in defense spending and a looming submarine arms race in the region are not good signs.

These two paragraphs by Robert Haddick sum up nicely the two biggest issues surrounding the US Navy today, and do so in the context of the South China Sea. The first issue is what Robert Haddick is calling Work's air reconnaissance doctrine, but the second issue is at least as important - the role the Littoral Combat Ship is expected to perform for the nation in the future.

Bob Work's air reconnaissance doctrine is probably one of the most interesting evolutions of sea power theory since WWI, and easily one of the least discussed major changes taking place in the Navy right now. At Surface Navy Association - ironically - Bob Work made clear the Navy will replace the presence of ships with ISR aircraft, and he stated that ship numbers do carry the same importance as in previous eras primarily because advanced ISR will give fewer ships more information than they have ever had, thus allow fewer ships to perform the same mission just as effectively as more ships without the ISR could. The argument that technology enables a smaller fleet to be as effective as larger fleets in previous eras is not new, indeed it is an argument Bob Work has made in several ways in the past - including at SNA when he stated the 300 ship Navy will be far more capable than the 600 ship Navy of the 1980s.

The key questions to ask as this theory is executed include whether aircraft can legitimately replace the presence of a ship, what is lost in the context of political influence as ships are substituted with aircraft, and whether replacing ships with aircraft is a legitimate approach towards maritime battlespaces in peacetime when that same effort has been largely ineffective dealing with other low intensity maritime problems like narcotics and piracy.

An aircraft, submarine, and unmanned system all suffer from a very specific problem in the maritime domain - they cannot influence any ship at sea unless they do so through fear or threat, and ultimately aircraft, submarines, and unmanned systems can either observe a target or destroy a target - with virtually no middle ground along the scales of escalation. One of the primary political values of surface warfare is the range of scalable options that naval forces have in dealing with ships of other nations; whether observe, search, seize, deny, destroy, etc.. - and the execution of these roles can be sustained with public visibility, meaning executed as an enduring political communication. An aircraft returns to base for fuel, while a ship can have fuel brought to where the ship is. I liken the presence of aircraft relative to ships the difference between virtual presence and physical presence, and while virtual presence is better than no presence, it cannot trump physical presence.

Information certainly beings a lot of power to the fleet, and aircraft are certainly viable alternatives for exercising control of the sea during wartime, but it gets highly questionable when information becomes a substitute for physical presence during peacetime.

However, it is the combination of aircraft ISR and the emerging LCS non-combat doctrine that really describes what is taking place in the minds of planners. The CNO has basically outlined the conceptual purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship, as discussed in this AOL Defense article.

the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged that the Navy's prized new Littoral Combat Ship might not survive a shooting war against a well-armed adversary like China. But, Adm. Jonathan Greenert said this morning at a National Press Club breakfast organized by Government Executive magazine, the small, versatile vessel could free up larger warships from the day-to-day policing, presence, and partnership-building missions that are the best way to prevent a crisis from erupting in the first place.

"These are not large surface combatants that are going to sail into the South China Sea and challenge the Chinese military; that's not what they're made for," Greenert said of the LCS class. Even the LCS contingent soon to start operating out of Singapore will focus on exercises, port visits, humanitarian assistance, and counter-piracy operations with Southeast Asian partners -- taking that burden off the more war-worthy carrier, cruisers, and destroyers based in Japan.

Worldwide, said Greenert, "Littoral Combat Ships will tend to displace amphibious ships and destroyers in Africa and South America. That will free up surface combatants, more high-end ships," for East Asia.

The role of the Littoral Combat Ship for the fleet of the future is probably one of the most controversial discussions in sea power theory the US Navy has had since the Navy began fielding the aircraft carrier, and easily one of the most discussed changes taking place in the Navy right now. In my opinion, both the criticisms and defenses of the Littoral Combat Ship have largely become too absurd for just about anyone to be taken seriously anymore, and even several reporters find themselves incapable of looking to the future as they focus entirely on the past. The article about LCS in AOL Defense today that includes an interview with RADM Rowden is both really good and really rare, because it lacks the usual bullshit that accompanies a discussion of LCS. It's also worth noting the discussion over at the CIMSEC NextWar blog on LCS, including this article by LT Albaugh, this article by LTJG Matt Hipple, and this article by LT Scott Cheney-Peters. All in all, this might be the first time in my five years of blogging that 4 different uniformed members of the US Navy who are not PAOs discussed publicly the Littoral Combat Ship in a 48 hour period. It's refreshing, the goggles have been backward facing on LCS for too long, and with it coming - it's time to flip the goggles around and look forward.

It is important to note the Navy has decided the Littoral Combat Ship will be forward deployed to at least two places initially - Bahrain in the Persian Gulf and Singapore in the South China Sea. That's a big damn deal, because that is exactly where the anti-access / area denial threats are being developed with the most rigor - by Iran and China respectively. The places the LCS will be forward deployed flies in the face of what even the CNO is saying about the environment the LCS will supposedly not operate in. All indications are we are leading up to an inflection point with LCS, a pivot that will in some way reflect lessons learned from actually using the ship. With still many, many months before USS Freedom (LCS 1) will deploy to Singapore, I suspect the pivot for LCS will take place long before the first LCS calls a port in Asia home. We probably won't hear about it until the FY15 budget in late 2014 though, because to be blunt, the Navy really can't afford anything new with LCS until the FY15 budget and beyond.

The use of ISR aircraft as a substitute for ships in the South China Sea as per Bob Work's own presentation at SNA combined with the Navy's intent to base Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore for regional port visits are both new operational concepts intended to perform the same function - free up larger surface combatants for other purposes. That raises the question, once larger surface combatants are not being used for sustained presence, what will they be doing? If we follow logic driven by traditional Mahanian naval warfare doctrine, the big blue fleet will then be consolidated and concentrated in task forces towards the traditional role of maritime power projection - to the 5th and 7th fleet according to maritime strategy.

On paper (or better yet in theory) this light footprint forward approach might work, but are the planning assumptions correct? If the Littoral Combat Ship "might not survive a shooting war against a well-armed adversary like China" then why is the first place the Navy sending the Littoral Combat Ship Singapore, in the South China Sea region, where any shooting war involving China is most likely to take place? Since we are talking about the South China Sea, one could presume the challenger is China - "a well-armed adversary," so that raises the question where major combatant forces will be consolidated and concentrated in times of tension, crisis, or at the outbreak of hostilities? With the emphasis on Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles and submarines, and based on what is known about AirSea Battle in the open source - it appears that any initial consolidation of surface forces including aircraft carriers will be outside the South China Sea, indeed outside the range of China's anti-access/area denial capabilities.

Again, that leads us back to whether the US Navy has their planning assumptions correct. How does the United States assure allies with naval presence if the primary purpose in execution of both doctrines Robert Haddick hints to in his article is specific to insuring major naval combat capabilities are NOT in the area to support allies, rather out of harms way to insure the US Navy's fleet survives during opening phases of the war. Has the US Navy designed an operational model that insures the US Navy will not be present on the front lines to defend the national interests the fleet exists to defend in the first place? Such an operational theory towards protecting the major battle force elements of the fleet during the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific is not new to the US Navy, the same theory insured the battleships were consolidated and protected at Pearl Harbor on December 1941. With that said, the Royal Navy was on the front lines of the Pacific in December 1941, and one of the most capable battleships in the world at that time - the Prince of Whales - was sunk 3 days after Pearl Harbor.

Work's air reconnaissance doctrine and the expected role for the LCS still require much more intellectual rigor towards explanation that what has been provided to date. Aircraft provide the nation very limited capacity to execute a political responsibility that is inherent to the value of naval vessels in influencing escalation of threat or tension, and the planning assumption that the LCS won't fight in A2AD environments while being forward based in Bahrain and Singapore is intellectually dishonest at best. The Navy has produced both doctrines as ad-hoc fixes to fill the gaps for a fleet that last year had a floor of 313 ships and this year has a ceiling of 300 ships - just so that the Navy can defend present force structure.

I want the LCS to work, but the LCS looks to me like a platform that needs changes right now that reflect the nations recent pivot towards Asia, and I do suspect those changes are coming - eventually. A modular ship with no modules to swap wastes a lot of money on modularity, and that speed requirement is basically a $100 million mistake designed into each hull. The LCS lacks legitimate firepower and still has no payloads to speak of. Regardless, I still believe the concept of motherships is sound and the Littoral Combat Ship makes a lot of sense as an entry level mothership platform. The network side of unmanned systems is going to be a monumental task for the Navy to execute, and assuming the modules ever arrive - that is one issue the LCS can help the US Navy solve in an operational capacity.

But I am having trouble buying into any theory that suggests ISR aircraft can somehow replace a Navy ship, because the planning assumptions of that theory undermines the political value of seapower as part of national power. Manned naval ships have the capacity to influence national interests forward in all kinds of political activities short of major war in ways standing Army's and Air Forces cannot, but the US Navy does not appear to be interested in those aspects of manned surface naval power.

With $1.2 trillion worth of US trade in transit in the South China Sea annually, and over a million people from around the world conducting commerce on the South China Seas nearly every day - the South China Seas represents the center of gravity of the global economy, so every detail in how the US Navy operates and conducts business in the South China Sea matters a great deal, and has global ramifications. Smart people like Bob Work say the size of the fleet doesn't matter as much as it used to, but how can it not matter when the lack of ships leads to promoting theories like aircraft replacing the presence role of warships, LCS replacing the presence roles of high end warships, and maritime power projection in support of allies becomes a task for the small Navy while big blue fleet concentrates out of range of the bad guys.

The US Navy today is trying to rewrite the book on US seapower to reflect our overall decline of maritime power and our numerical decline in naval power by theorizing about advantages we have from our technical and military superiority. It is an absolutely valid exercise, but I have serious questions about the validity of the planning assumptions and believe poor assumptions up front distorts the validity of the conclusions.

President Expected to Announce New Marine Base in Australia

Building upon statements by former Secretary Gates back in June, President Obama is expected to make more naval headlines this week by announcing a Marine basing agreement in Darwin, Australia. While there are few specific details announced publicly yet, the articles in the The Sydney Morning Herald and Wall Street Journal both suggest the basing arrangement in Australia will be specific to the Marine Corps. So far there is no indication that there will be any forward deployment of naval vessels, either warships or amphibious ships, but it is also unclear exactly how much of the details for the new basing arrangement have been worked out.

For smart analysis from Australia regarding these unfolding events, I encourage readers to keep an eye on the Lowy Institute for International Policy Interpreter Blog. The first reactions there by Sam Roggeveen, Ross Babbage, and Raoul Heinrichs are all worth checking out, and I suspect we will see more reactions as the official announcement is made. Sam Roggeveen makes a particularly interesting point discussing the comments in The Sydney Morning Herald article (linked above) by Alan Dupont and Hugh White:

It seems to me we could take Dupont's argument to arrive at the opposite conclusion to that reached by White. If the US is indeed moving its forces further away from China in order to buy them some safety from Beijing's increasing military reach, why would China be alarmed by this? If this move is actually accompanied by a reduced US military presence in Northeast Asia (which Dupont implies, though I'm not certain it is true) doesn't it in fact weaken America's ability to contain China?

Hugh White argues (convincingly, in my view) that Washington needs to cede some strategic space in the Asia Pacific to a rising China. If the Darwin basing arrangement is in fact a redistribution of US forces in the Asia Pacific and not a reinforcement, then that's just what the US is doing.

Thanks to transparency in the United States government, we can assume with a high degree of certainty this will be redistribution, because there is no evidence that the Obama administration has substantially increased funding for new naval combatants beyond existing plans that already do not number enough to replace retiring vessels in the coming decade. The US Navy's CG(X) program was cancelled, and while the administration is saying the DDG-51s will last 40 years, that's a bunch of nonsense with surface maintenance always underfunded - not to mention operational tempo's still above normal. While I know the US Navy would absolutely love to base a DESRON in Australia for all the obvious, legitimate reasons, it is hard to imagine any Senator or Congressman is going to allow warships to be reassigned out of their district unless a major west coast naval base in the Continental US is closed. If not from Japan or new construction, where exactly will the new warships come from? Anyone who has watched Mayport, FL politics has seen to the extent ship basing is a hot political issue.

This marks the third new basing arrangement announced this year by the Obama administration, with previous announcements claiming the US Navy will base Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, and AEGIS BMD destroyers in Rota, Spain. How these round pegs square with the current Obama shipbuilding budget which has to date included no increases for more BMD warships nor any significant increase in ships to offset forward basing is very much unclear. That doesn't even include the CBO’s estimate that the Navy shipbuilding budget is about 7% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the first 10 years of the current Navy shipbuilding plan, about 10% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the second 10 years of that plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy’s estimate for the final 10 years of the current plan.

Unless the Obama administration has big plans for Navy shipbuilding following the current $450 billion defense cuts already proposed - never mind what comes from the super-committee budget discussion - it is hard to see a blueprint that is guiding Obama administration policy choices. Obviously the US has good reasons to develop new places like Spain, Singapore, and Australia where the US Navy can stage force in a forward deployed posture, but is there a budget for that? Are there ships for such a plan? Where are all these BMD ships going to come from for the Rota, Spain base, for example?

At a time the fleet numbers appear to be in long term decline and surface maintenance remains a big problem, the future Navy is being loaned out globally by the same Obama administration that really hasn't addressed any of the long term challenges facing the Navy. Industrial capacity is in decline and the fleet is numerically smaller than any point since WWI, nearly a century ago. I'm all for seeing the Obama administration making bold global security policy plans, but the Obama administration never increased shipbuilding resources for the Navy after placing the burden of the phased, adapted ballistic missile defense plan in 2009 on the Navy. Will these new forward naval bases receive adequate resourcing to meet the administrations foreign policy?

I have doubts the agreement with Australia is going to include any significant increase in forward deployed US forces in Australia. Unfortunately for our allies in the Pacific, at the policy level the Obama administration makes big promises in public that gives a public impression of substantial action, but if this announcement is made absent specific details - I wouldn't expect the final result to be as substantial as the public statement implies.

Operation Tomodachi: Fukushima Plant Still Struggles

Luis Martinez of ABC News is reporting that a US nuclear emergency response team of Marines is being sent to Japan.

Approximately 155 Marines from the Marines' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) received their deployment orders for Japan earlier today and are scheduled to arrive on Friday.

The team is being sent as what a Defense Department official calls "an initial response force" because they are only a portion of the much larger CBIRF unit.

Based at the Indian Head Naval Surface Warfare Center in Maryland, CBIRF is a Marine unit specially trained to counter the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incident. Usually, that entails being available to assist local, state and federal agencies with domestic emergency responses to CBRNE incidents.

The unit's deployment to Japan "will provide the U.S. on-scene commander a rapid response capability and, if requested, [allow the commander to] assist Japanese authorities by providing advice and expertise in the areas of agent detection and identification, casualty search, rescue, personnel decontamination and emergency medical care," a defense official said.

The deployment of the initial response force is not of an emergency nature, but more as a precautionary move in case they are needed, another defense official said.

The report goes on to note they will operate from Yokota Air Base outside of Tokyo, which is outside the 50 mile exclusion zone. Also reported today was news that seawater around the Fukushima plant is 4,385 times more than the legal limit, and radiation is potentially entering directly into the seawater from an unknown source.

Also important, Wednesdays update from Operation Tomodachi.

Seventh Fleet forces continue support of Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) in Operation Tomodachi. With Sendai airport now open for military flights - and soon to be opened for commercial flights as well -- 7th Fleet’s focus has shifted to harbor clearance, consolidating relief supplies at airfields ashore, and preparing to assist with clean-up of debris.

USNS Safeguard (ARS 50) and USS Tortuga (LSD 46), Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit 1, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 5 and Underwater Construction Team 2 conducted additional surveys in preparation for port clearance operations at the port of Miyako. Visual surveys show extensive damage including commercial and pleasure craft sunk, concrete pier supports washed ashore and a permanent pier destroyed. Tortuga launched a Landing Craft Unit (LCU) equipped with side scan sonar to survey additional areas of the port. The side scan sonar provides detailed visuals of the harbor bottom to identify and prioritize dive sites for clearing. During today’s survey, the dive team discovered the remains of a victim of the tsunami of March 11. The Navy team immediately communicated the discovery to the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force, whose divers retrieved them.

Sailors and Marines from the USS Essex amphibious ready group and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are planning for Operation “Field Day”, a clearing and clean up mission on the remote island of Oshima off the coast of Kessennuma. In conjunction with the Japan Ground Self Defense Force, the effort will include clearing the port, and clearing debris from local schools and government buildings. The island is dependent upon ferry service to and from the mainland, is the primary method for travel to/from the island and clearing the port allows this vital lifeline to resume. Clearing and opening of schools and government buildings is a significant step towards restoring the island to normal.

Helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 moved an additional 13 pallets of relief supplies from USS Essex (LHD 2), USS Germantown (LSD 42) and USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) to Misawa, where they will moved via C-130 aircraft to Sendai. From there, JGSDF and civilian relief authorities will able to distribute the items to disaster areas as needed. The JGSDF has opened most roads in the disaster areas, and are able to move most goods to displaced persons via ground transportation.

USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) and USNS Pecos (T-AO 197) arrived at the port of Yokosuka today. The Rappahannock transported 312 pallets of water it picked up from the port city of Gwangyang, South Korea. The water will be used by Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) to support ongoing relief efforts. USNS Carl Brashear (T-AKE 7) arrived in Sasebo. Both Pecos and Carl Brashear are taking on fuel and ships stores prior to returning to the fleet to support relief operations.

A P-3 “Orion” aircraft from the Skinny Dragons of Patrol Squadron Four (VP-4) conducted a search and rescue flight down the east coast of Japan to search for debris or objects at sea that could interfere with shipping. The P-3 returned to Kadena Air Force Base (AFB) upon completion of the mission and will stage from there for continued relief efforts.

The first of two U.S. Navy barges containing 500,000 gallons of fresh water from Commander, Facilities Activities Yokosuka (CFAY) was moved to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant today. The second will arrive tomorrow. Japanese authorities will use the fresh water to replace salt water currently in some of the reactors.

USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10) conducted resupply at sea (RAS) activities with USS McCampbell (DDG 85), USS Preble (DDG 88), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Mustin (DDG 89), USS Cowpens (CG 63), and USS Shiloh (CG 67), ships of the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) Carrier Strike Group (CSG), supplying fuel and additional supplies. Most of the relief supplies on these ships have been moved ashore to airfields in Misawa or Sendai where the JSDF can better access them to deliver to people in need.

Currently 16 ships, 130 aircraft and 13,076 personnel are actively engaged in operation Tomodachi. Those ships include USS Tortuga (LSD 46), USNS Safeguard (T-ARS-50), USS Essex (LHD 2), USS Germantown (LSD 42), USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), USS Preble (DDG 88), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Mustin (DDG 89), USS Cowpens (CG 63), USS Shiloh (CG 67), USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10), USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54) and USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4).

Since Operation Tomodachi started, U.S. 7th Fleet forces have delivered more than 250 tons of relief supplies to survivors of the tsunami and earthquake in support of Japan Self Defense Force efforts.

A few thoughts.

1) I am still blown away by the magnitude of the disaster in Japan. It isn't just the regional damage that has probably killed more than 20,000 people. The ongoing struggle at the nuclear reactor adds uncertainty to just about everything. Radiation concerns apply to their food sources, water supplies, and the wind has been blowing radiation all over their land. Many people are still struggling for electricity, and oh btw it's been snowing. Yet, the people of Japan move forward. The picture above reads "To everybody in the U.S. 7th Fleet: Thank you. The Japanese people will not be beaten."

2) The PAOs in the Pacific are doing a fabulous job. Seriously... they have been outstanding in their efforts in matching the efforts of those in field. There is only one example of stupidity by a PAO on Facebook, and it has been scrubbed from all official sites although not before the poor guy was torn a new asshole on SailorBob. It was a good story (see Google cache here while it lasts), but the guy made an error by speaking in an official capacity with those opinions regarding Americans - even if they aren't necessarily disagreeable opinions.

3) It was controversial when the Navy elevated humanitarian assistance and disaster response to a strategic priority in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Does anyone still have any lingering doubts about that decision? I've been thinking about how many officers there are in Navy Medicine, perhaps one of the most underrated Federally funded health care organizations in America. I've been thinking about the Continuing Promise deployment of USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) and the Pacific Partnership 2011 deployment of USS Cleveland (LPD 7), and I think about Haiti, the Pakistan floods, and now Japan...and I think the maritime strategists got it right. HA/DR is strategic, HA/DR is influence, and HA/DR is one of the best peacetime defense investments per dollar the United States government is making today.

An At Sea Working Model

I think this is worth highlighting. From the GW Facebook page:

PACIFIC OCEAN (March 29, 2024) -Aviation Boatswain’s Mates (Fuel) aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) accomplished an unprecedented undertaking at sea by moving a massive fuel purifier seven decks below with help from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard workers, March 29.

The 4,000 lbs. jet propellant five (JP-5) fuel purifier being moved is responsible for separating the usable, raw fuel from water and sediment. JP-5 is repeatedly refined via the purifier to remove contaminants that have accumulated while the fuel sits in storage containers for later use.

The JP-5 fuel is extremely important to the functionality of an aircraft carrier. The fuel is used to perform a variety of functions including controlling the ship’s balance; fueling the fighter jets on the flight deck and the tractors that move stage them; and running the emergency diesel engines and auxiliary generators.

“We are replacing this critical piece of equipment while at sea because we did not have an opportunity to do it in port,” said Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Fuel) 1st Class (AW/SW) Nelson Lubin, leading petty officer of George Washington’s Air Department, V4 division. “Under normal conditions, the unit would be replaced by qualified shipyard workers while the ship is in port. A large hole in the ship is generally cut to facilitate the installation of the unit—so us getting it done at sea, on our own, is an incredible feat.”

George Washington recently deployed from her homeport of Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka due to complex nature of the natural disaster that struck Japan on March 11. The turnaround time from under maintenance to fit for sea occurred in just five days. This resulted in some open projects and installations to be postponed until she was first safe and sea-worthy.

“I continue to be amazed each and every day we are at sea by what our Sailors and these civilian craftsmen are accomplishing,” said George Washington’s Commanding Officer, Capt. David A. Lausman. “They are working around the clock, putting their heart and soul into their work and I couldn’t be prouder to call them shipmates.”

The team of Sailors and their Shipyard counterparts successfully relocated the now-disassembled fuel purifying unit— similar in size to a Volkswagen Beetle—from the ship’s open hangar bay, down seven decks to a pump room via a ladderwell in less than eight hours time.

“I’m really proud of what our team did today. It might be the first time something like this has ever been attempted—at least for us it is,” said Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Fuel) 3rd Class Richard Bell from Syracuse, N.Y.

“I really have to hand it to the civilian riggers. Without their help we would not have been able to accomplish this,” said Bell.

George Washington is the Navy’s only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier, ensuring security and stability across the western Pacific Ocean.

-GW-

The first thing I thought of when I read this story was how much work is being accomplished at sea vs at port. Japan isn't a war zone, but it looks like one, and while the USS George Washington (CVN 73) isn't exactly a causality of war... given the work being done on her, she might look like one.

I suppose I am wondering if what is being done on the USS George Washington (CVN 73) translates into a model for battle damage repair in the future. I don't see a scenario where battle damage can be done on an aircraft carrier at sea without civilian counterparts, so I do wonder if there are lessons here for developing an at sea battle damage recovery capability for our nuclear aircraft carriers.

Because quite honestly, in a major war where carriers are being damaged, I don't think the US is going to be in a position return a carrier to the US to put in dry dock for any length of time, and most battle damage will have to be repaired very quickly while the ship is avoiding the enemy at sea.

Operation Tomodachi update - 21 March

This was the Navy update yesterday for Operation Tomodachi.

Residents of Hadenya load essential supplies delivered from a MH-60 helicopter from HS-4.

A total of 12,750 personnel, 20 ships, and 140 aircraft of U.S. 7th Fleet are continuing to participate in Operation Tomodachi. Today, utilizing 14 helicopters, the fleet delivered more than 47 tons of relief supplies bringing the total of aid delivered to Japan since the beginning of the crisis to 227 tons.

USS Harpers Ferry (LSD 49), USS Germantown (LSD 42), USS Tortuga (LSD 46) along with USS Essex (LHD 2) and the embarked 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit are off the coast near Hachinohe to assist humanitarian aid efforts along the affected northeastern coast to reach people in remote areas where the tsunami hit hardest. Ships of the Essex ARG conducted underway replenishment today with the USNS Matthew Perry.

Helicopters with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (Reinforced), 31st MEU, flew two CH-46 helicopters from the USS Essex to deliver humanitarian aid supplies including blankets and fresh water to Miyako city. The pilots also conducted aerial surveys of 200 miles of the affected coastline between Miyako and Ofunato.

A P-3 from VP-4 deployed to Misawa conducted reconnaissance of coastal areas to continue the search for displaced people and to find new landing zones to service them.

USS George Washington got underway from Yokosuka today to assure the ship can sustain a state of readiness in the long term for the defense of Japan. The forward deployed carrier is scheduled to remain in the local waters off Japan. Moving USS George Washington is a precaution given the capabilities of the vessel and the complex nature of this disaster. USS Lassen also departed Yokosuka today.

The USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group to include USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Preble (DDG 88), USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), USS Mustin (89) and USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54) along with USS Cowpens (CG-63) and USS Shiloh (CG-67) continued operations north of Sendai. Strike group helicopters carried 17 tons of supplies to 24 separate sites, and identified 16 additional sites where groups of people are isolated to be serviced with supplies in the coming days. Aircrews report that people on the ground are particularly interested in receiving shipments of gasoline, kerosene or diesel fuel.

USS Blue Ridge (LCC-19), flagship for the United States Seventh Fleet, conducted a connected replenishment with USNS Pecos today in the vicinity of Nagasaki.

The commander, U.S. Pacific Command, directed that precautionary measures be taken due to the potential of future radiological exposures, including directing the distribution of potassium iodide (KI) tablets to military personnel and their families in Yokosuka and Atsugi. Personnel in Yokosuka and Atsugi will not actually take KI unless advised to do so by U.S. or Japanese authorities. Seventh Fleet personnel conducting disaster relief missions inside of 100 nautical miles from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi plant continue to take KI as a precautionary measure.

Families of Seventh Fleet Sailors are continuing to voluntarily depart Yokosuka and Atsugi as part of the Military Assisted Departure for Department of Defense personnel.

If you have not seen it, you should also check out this dispatch over at the US Naval Institute blog.

Whiskey Tango Foxtrot in Japan

This popped up today on Facebook.

Good morning PSNS & IMF family,

I would like to share with you a recent update from U.S. 7th Fleet. USS George Washington (CVN 73) got underway from Yokosuka last night to assure she can sustain a state of readiness in the long term for the defense of Japan. The forward deployed carrier remains in the local waters off Japan. Moving George Washington is a precaution given the capabilities of the vessel and the complex nature of this disaster.

PSNS & IMF has more than 460 project personnel onboard George Washington, nine of whom are our Yokosuka Detachment workers. This team continues to perform work on her Selected Restricted Availability. I have every confidence our team will accomplish this availability despite the additional challenges presented over the last week and a half.

Also as a precautionary measure, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, ordered that Potassium Iodide (KI) be available for all DoD personnel and dependents currently located at Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Ikego Housing Detachment, Negishi Housing Detachment, and Naval Air Facility Atsugi in case a need is identified. People are being directed not to take any KI until official notification is given, and then only to take the recommended dosage; there is enough KI for all personnel. Medical personnel will be standing by at each distribution location to answer any questions and explain about possible side effects from KI.

To those of you still in Japan, and to the many of you onboard George Washington—know you have the support, respect and admiration of your Command family. We are all proud of you working through the disaster that hit Japan and the resulting transitional challenges of shifting location and, in some cases, your families.

To those of you stateside—it’s because of your tremendous support, planning and flexibility that we are able to continue our work to meet the fleet’s needs.

We continue to monitor the situation in Japan, and it is still our top priority to look out for the safety and well-being of our workers and their families.

R/CAPT Mark Whitney
Commander, PSNS & IMF

Followed by this on Facebook.

There will be a Town Hall meeting tonight, Tuesday, March 22, 2024 at the Benny Decker Theater. The meeting begins at 1730. Taking your questions will be Admiral Patrick M. Walsh, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. We hope to see you there.

Followed by this by CNN.

The U.S. military is considering the mandatory evacuation of thousands of American troops and their families in Japan out of concern over rising radiation levels, a senior defense official tells CNN.

The official, who did not want to be on the record talking about ongoing deliberations, says there are no discussions to evacuate all U.S. troops across the country. The talks have focused exclusively on U.S. troops in Yokosuka, just south of Tokyo, the official said. Yokosuka is home to America's largest naval base in Japan. The military is monitoring radiation levels on a constant basis.

As of Monday, the U.S. Navy had no more warships in port at the base. The aircraft carrier USS George Washington, which had been undergoing maintenance in Yokosuka, left port Monday in order to get away from the plume of radioactive particles that could blow over the base. Because it left port with a much smaller than normal crew, the George Washington will not take part in the Japanese relief effort.

No organization on the planet has more experience and expertise with all things nuclear than the United States Navy. No ship in the world is better equipped in a nuclear emergency than a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. When the US Navy and US Navy aircraft carriers start leaving Japan, something serious is happening. The US even contemplating pulling out of Japan right now would represent an extraordinary shift in the balance of power in the Pacific, and yet that they are even considering doing so suggests the seriousness of the situation at Fukushima.

It is going to take someone near the very top of government, at minimum Secretary Gates, to interrupt the maintenance of the nations only forward deployed aircraft carrier and put her out to sea with a skeleton crew while still undergoing maintenance. USS George Washington (CVN 73) isn't just some warship, it is one of the 10 most expensive and capable strategic assets on the planet run by an organization with a thorough understanding of the dangers of nuclear radiation. Simply moving the carrier out of dry dock and out to sea during an emergency is no small thing.

When combined with news that ADM Walsh and ADM Willard, the two most senior Navy officers in the Pacific, addressed the families of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) what are we supposed to think? That meeting is followed by news reports concerning a potential mandatory evacuation from Yokosuka in the works?

If the US Navy pulls their families out of Yokosuka, the carrier won't be returning there for a long time, if ever. The question is, where can the US Navy move the forward deployed ships? A few destroyers to Guam? Would GW be pulled all the way back to Pearl Harbor? Would South Korea, Australia, or Singapore be interested in hosting a US Navy DESRON?

What is the message being sent to Japan? Tokyo is on the other side of the bay from Yokosuka; Tokyo is closer to Fukushima than Yokosuka is. Our national decision makers are considering all options with a full understanding that once the US Navy leaves Japan, the political fallout most likely will be we will never be allowed to return.

Sea Base Developing Off Japan

Based on the information released from various press outlets and the 7th fleet, a Sea Base appears to be developing off Miyagi Prefecture to assist Japanese authorities with providing at-sea search and rescue and recovery operations. The US contribution of this sea base will be centered around the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), USS Preble (DDG 88), USS McCampbell (DDG 85), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS Mustin (DDG 89), USS Tortuga (LSD 46), and USNS Bridge (T-AOE 10).

A number of US Navy ships will be following this initial force including the Essex ARG and the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19).

Early reporting suggests the US Navy forces will be tasked to support primarily Japanese SDF but also US Navy and Marine Corps helicopters for search and rescue operations in the area, as well as provide humanitarian operations as requested. This disaster response and humanitarian assistance Sea Base will be very similar to the Sea Base established off the coast of Haiti in early 2010, except in this case the Sea Base will be more international in nature with Japan taking the lead in tasking.

Japan is leading the disaster response and recovery effort. Based on various news reports, Japan has dispatched 50,000 troops to the region including over 190 aircraft so far. Japan has asked for the US military to transport 900 troops and 250 vehicles as part of the relocation of thousands of Japanese SDF troops from various regions of the country. News reports also indicate a large (but unknown number) of Marine Corps helicopters are being shifted from Okinawa to bases north in Japan to support operations.

While it is unclear what role the US Marine Corps will play in Japan, one possibility is that the Marine Corps will serve in a more logistical role in supporting SDF rescue and recovery operations. With transportation throughout the impacted region impacted, logistics will likely be very difficult in the first few weeks.

Another support service US Navy personnel are expected to undertake involves resupplying or augmenting in some way medical services throughout the impacted region.

With the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) expected to serve as a helicopter support base offshore for both US Navy and Japanese SDF helicopters, once again the nuclear powered aircraft carrier is poised to be the most versatile and flexible capability in responding to the needs following an international catastrophe.

7th Fleet Back to Sea

After returning to port following exercises with South Korea and Japan, the USS George Washington (CVN 73) has returned to sea this morning. A Navy News Service report earlier this week titled USS George Washington Returns to Japan for Holidays gave the impression that the carrier was not due back to sea until after the beginning of the year.

With the GW Carrier Strike Group and also the Essex Amphibious Ready Group at sea, the bulk of the forward deployed US naval firepower in the Pacific has put to sea ahead of the South Korean exercises on Yeonpyeong island.

Keen Sword Cat and Mouse

Reuters is reporting that Russian Navy surveillance aircraft snooped in on the ships participating in the combined US-Japan naval exercise.

Roman Martov, a spokesman for Russia's Pacific Ocean Fleet, was quoted by the agency as saying: "They carried out their planned flights in the region of regular activity of (Russia's) fleet.

"There were no violations of international rules of the use of airspace or flight rules on the Russian side."

Given the proximity to some of the waters where the exercises are being conducted, namely ~500 nautical miles from Shanghai, I think it would be the height of hypocrisy for China to believe the US is a great threat to China and not have submarines watching an exercise that includes 60 warships.

In other words, I suspect there are more PLA Navy submarines spying on this naval exercise than Russian Navy surveillance aircraft.