Sea Lanes Protection Between the First and Second Island Chains in a Notional Sino-American War

On Tuesday, I summarized China’s potential wartime anti-ship capabilities between the First and Second Island Chains. It stands to reason that the U.S. and allied ability to avoid or parry any PLA attacks in these waters would depend upon the margin of temporary localized maritime superiority—or sea control, if you will—that could be extended around a transiting convoy, replenishment group, or naval battleforce.[i] This margin would likely be highest in the waters that could be persistently covered by fighters, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and wide-area anti-submarine aircraft operating from the Marianas, Japanese home islands, or the central/southern Philippines.

As this sea control coverage thinned out with range, PLA forces would in theory gain more operational flexibility. This might be offset, however, through the intelligent use of the one or two U.S. Navy aircraft carriers available in theater during a war’s opening weeks. I’ve previously noted how these carriers ought to be used to provide situation-dependent sea control support to Surface Action Groups (SAG) operating further forward, and alluded to their utility in providing situation-dependent tactical support to defenders in embattled First Island Chain territories like the Ryukyus. The positioning required for those tasks could also allow their fighters and AEW aircraft to screen CLF groups, military sealift convoys, and prioritized commercial vessels transiting outside effective land-based air coverage. With two carriers working together, it might even be possible to occasionally use actual or simulated shipping as ‘bait’ for luring Chinese strike aircraft raids into aerial ambushes.

It additionally should be noted that the U.S. and allied ability to delay or prevent the Chinese Ocean Surveillance System (COSS) from locating and correctly classifying transiting ships would severely complicate the PLA’s ability to cue effective anti-ship attacks. Emissions control, operational and tactical deception, and physical as well as electronic attacks against COSS assets would be essential aspects of any U.S. and allied sea lanes protection campaign. Emissions control and tactical deception would also greatly complicate PLA strike aircraft and submarines’ job of locating, correctly classifying, and targeting protected shipping. The use of “decoy groups,” perhaps using a mix of unmanned systems and actual manned low campaign-value platforms that together simulated a convoy or naval battleforce, might induce PLA attackers to waste precious time and weapons inventories engaging false targets. Better yet, it might cause them to move out of positions from which they could detect and intercept actual shipping. Attacking decoys would be particularly harmful to PLAN submarines, as every weapon wasted (and in the case of AIP boats, fuel burned moving into attack position and then "breaking datum") would eat into the amount of time the boat could remain on patrol before needing to head home for replenishment, and the time spent "breaking datum" would be time the boat would not be able to hunt effectively. Effective deception and concealment would likely have detrimental psychological effects on PLAAF and PLAN crews; over time these effects might become debilitating—and highly exploitable by U.S. and allied forces in their own right.

Lastly, U.S. political leadership might opt to selectively strike PLAAF airbases, PLAN submarine bases, and related PLA infrastructure on the Chinese mainland with long-range guided munitions in order to suppress PLA operational tempo. This would be especially likely if the PLA had set the escalation precedent of striking allied territories first at the opening of the war. Such strikes would have to be highly bounded and selective in terms of their targets in order to mitigate escalation risks. U.S. Navy submarines and U.S. Air Force intercontinental-range strike aircraft would probably perform these strikes, with additional strikes launched from Aegis combatants operating as offensive SAGs. Reducing the PLA’s ability to cycle anti-ship attackers into the Western Pacific would be of immeasurable help to the sea lanes protection effort.

With all these combined arms contributions in mind, the principal screening challenge from a surface combatant standpoint would be defending convoys and CLF ships against “leaker” anti-ship missiles fired by PLA strike aircraft and "pop-up” missile or torpedo attacks by PLAN submarines. The density of the PLA threat in a given area arguably would determine an escort’s necessary capabilities. Aegis combatants’ area air defense capabilities would probably be highly desirable for escort missions in the vicinity of the Ryukyus, Taiwan, and Luzon given the proximity to the Chinese mainland. It’s important to remember, though, that the U.S. only has nine Aegis combatants permanently homeported in Japan (with two more coming by 2017), and these warships would probably be charged with escorting the Navy’s Japan-homeported carrier, protecting the Navy’s Japan-homeported amphibious warships, executing offensive SAG missions, and performing ballistic missile defense tasks. The Navy has thirty-eight other Aegis combatants homeported in the Pacific, eleven of which are homeported in Pearl Harbor. However, not all would be surgeable due to the inter-deployment maintenance and training cycle (and this says nothing of the surge-readiness impacts stemming from the 2011 Budget Control Act). We might theorize that of the five West Coast-based carrier battleforces, the first might already be forward deployed in or near the Western Pacific as a crisis peaked, the second and third might be surgeable for arrival forward within 30 days, the fourth might be surgeable within 90 days, and the fifth would have to complete its ships’ (abbreviated) overhauls and pre-deployment workups before surging. Some of these Aegis combatants would not be detachable from their carrier battleforces, and those that were detachable might be needed more for offensive SAG operations.

Not all of the Aegis combatants would necessarily deploy with carriers, though. If we assume that two-thirds of the Pearl Harbor contingent surged as a crisis peaked, we might have seven Aegis combatants available for tasking along the First Island Chain. These warships would be well-placed for protecting shipping to the Ryukyus, Luzon, or eastern Taiwan. Even so, their use for these missions would trade against their use in offensive SAG operations.

The story would be similar with respect to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) Aegis contingent. Japan fields six Aegis DDGs and plans to build two more by 2020. Nevertheless, their principal mission of homeland ballistic missile defense would prevent some number of them from performing sea lanes defense operations. The South Korean Navy’s three Aegis DDGs are not counted in this analysis as it is unlikely they would be offered up for operations that did not involve direct defense of their country’s sea lanes.

It should be clear that Aegis combatants’ use for direct protection of shipping would trade against a large number of other high-priority missions. Moreover, Aegis combatants would generally be tethered to the western half of the waters between the two island chain lines. This would hardly preclude their use for sea lanes and CLF protection, for example as a forward screening layer by virtue of their positions, but they probably wouldn’t be able to closely escort shipping all the way from port to port.

Therein lies the logic of a small surface combatant possessing medium-range anti-air and anti-submarine capabilities. Such a combatant would be entirely sufficient for close escort within waters in which air defense is provided by friendly AEW and fighter aircraft supported by aerial refueling aircraft. Closer to the Ryukyus-Taiwan-Luzon line, this kind of combatant would backstop Aegis combatants’ defensive coverage of a convoy.

The proposed LCS-derived frigate will possess the towed active and passive sonar arrays as well as helicopter capabilities needed for effective anti-submarine warfare. CSBA’s Bryan Clark has also outlined how it could receive the requisite anti-air capabilities for shipping escort.[ii] These improvements would not allow the LCS-derived frigate to detect a submarine-launched sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missile raid beyond effective shipboard radar coverage, though. Land or sea-based AEW support via the Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air capability would be crucial to that end.

Bryan has additionally proposed a longer-range shipboard anti-submarine missile than the legacy Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rocket; such a weapon could be very effective in disrupting a PLAN submarine’s attack preparations.[iii] It’s worth pointing out that if COSS could not provide a PLAN submarine with a targeting-quality tactical picture to support firing anti-ship cruise missiles from over-the-horizon, the PLAN submarine would have to close within the range of its onboard sensors. If we assume the primary use of sonar for this purpose, that range might be one to two convergence zones from a target (perhaps 30 nautical miles in the first case and 60 nautical miles in the second case). A shipboard “rocket-thrown torpedo” able to quickly reach out to the first convergence zone and ideally also the second would thus be highly useful.

It’s important to note that the JMSDF already fields two light destroyer/heavy frigate classes that would anchor shipping protection in the approaches to the Japanese home islands and Ryukyus.[iv] As I noted earlier, though, there might not be enough of them to fully carry the shipping escort load within the waters Japan was primarily responsible for protecting. This suggests the utility of the LCS-derived frigate gaining medium-range anti-air capabilities.

One final point is that there would be a demand for LCS-derived frigates to participate in offensive SAGs. It would accordingly be desirable to backfit as much of the LCS-derived frigates’ anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities as possible into legacy LCS hulls in order to free up as many of the frigates as possible for shipping protection tasks. The logic for using backfit LCSs instead of the frigates in forward-operating SAGs is simple: since the frigates are not presently slotted to receive medium-range air defense capabilities, and since Aegis combatants would be principally responsible for SAG air defense anyway, then the inclusion of backfit-improved LCSs instead of air defense-capable frigates in the SAGs would not alter the existing concept of operations.

The bottom line is that protection of shipping, including the CLF, would likely be far more resource-intensive than is often assumed in the strategy debates. Sea lanes protection would be absolutely critical to the U.S. prevailing in the war, and as such merits extensive study and analysis. I will note that I have never participated in campaign analysis of these questions, nor have I ever been “read into” any such analyses that might have been conducted. Detailed quantitative analysis may very well prove that some of my key assumptions and conclusions are incorrect. Even so, my errors almost certainly center on the specifics of the threat and not on its general nature or the needed seriousness of the offsetting response.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

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[i] The discussion that follows is heavily influenced by CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.” Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6, June 2014. Toti’s article is seminal on modern anti-submarine warfare and should be read in its entirety in parallel to this post.

[ii] See Bryan Clark. “Commanding the Seas: A Plan to Reinvigorate U.S. Navy Surface Warfare.” (Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2014), 27, 50-51.

[iii] Ibid; 27.

[iv] A third similarly-capable JMSDF destroyer class exists but would generally be tied to providing air defense support to Kongo-class DDGs on ballistic missile defense patrols.

USS Chancellorsville: New Details Tell a Different Story

This is the official press release by the US Navy.

PACIFIC OCEAN (NNS) -- An aerial target drone malfunctioned and struck guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) off the coast of Southern California at approximately 1:25 pm local time today, Nov. 16, while the ship was conducting a radar tracking exercise during routine training at sea.

No Sailors were seriously injured, but two Sailors were treated for minor burns. The ship remains capable of operations, however it did sustain some damage and will return to its homeport of San Diego to have the damage assessed. The Navy is investigating the cause of the malfunction.

That is very vague, so what if we add a bit of factual detail?

PACIFIC OCEAN (NNS) -- A BQM-74 aerial target missile drone malfunctioned and struck a direct hit in the port side of the guided missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) off the coast of Southern California at approximately 1:25 pm local time today, Nov. 16, while the ship was conducting a radar tracking exercise of the BQM-74 during routine training at sea. USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) is currently conducting Combat System Ships Qualification Trials for Baseline 9 of the AEGIS combat system - the most advanced version of the AEGIS combat system. USS Chancellorsville is currently the only US Navy ship certified with the latest version of the AEGIS combat system.

No Sailors were seriously injured by the direct hit of the missile tracked all the way into the hull of the cruiser, but two Sailors were treated for minor burns. The ships officers and crew may or may not have bravely and intelligently attempted to defend itself from the rogue drone, but what's really important enough to mention is that the ship and technology on the ship remains capable of operations. However it did sustain some damage from the direct hit that put a two foot hole in the port side of the ship, and as a result USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) will return to its homeport of San Diego to have the damage assessed. The Navy is investigating the cause of the malfunction.

So how is it exactly that the one ship on the planet with the most advanced version of the worlds best anti-missile combat system took a direct hit from a rogue missile drone?

The Navy tells us the drone malfunctioned, and apparently the combat system on the ship had no problems if the ship remains capable of operations, so based on those details of the press release the officers and crew of the USS Chancellorsville tracked the target missile drone - during the radar tracking exercise - apparently as it scored a direct hit into side of the ship.

But the ship was unable to defend itself? I get it that the safety systems were probably engaged that would prevent the full capabilities of the AEGIS combat system from being employed against the rogue drone, but what about the independent close-in point defenses of the cruiser?

The official story, based on the details as released officially, is that the most advanced AEGIS warship in the world tracked a direct hit by a missile drone and was apparently unable to defend itself successfully. Did the ship even try to defend itself from a rogue drone? We don't know, because the press release focuses on telling the public the technology of the ship is sufficient enough for the ship to conduct normal operations, but tells us no details at all regarding what the crew did or did not do to defend the ship from a direct hit.

There is a detail that is omitted in the official press release, and because it is a detail of the incident known at the time of the press release, we can only assume the omission is intentional for purposes of protecting a reputation. The ships officers and crew apparently did try to defend the ship. The CIWS apparently fired at the BQM-74 but was unsuccessful in defending the ship. That detail matters, because the omission of that detail is the difference between protecting the reputation of the ships officers and crew who tried to defend the ship, or protecting the reputation of a piece of technology that was unsuccessful - for unknown reasons - in performing the technologies primary role as the last line of defense for the ship.

Let's hope that while the Navy investigates the drone malfunction they also look into why the CIWS was unsuccessful in engaging the rogue drone in defense of the ship. It seems to me the CIWS investigation is much more important than an investigation into the malfunction of a target drone.

Based on where the rogue drone hit the ship, had it been a real ASCM - it could have easily been a mission kill for the ship. This is a very serious incident involving the most advanced AEGIS warship in the US Navy, and the Navy has started the incident with a press release that intentionally omits a critical detail - that the ship tried to defend itself and the specific technology designed to defend the ship for this specific situation failed.

This incident is a big deal, and on the first day there is already a deception effort underway to conceal key details of the incident - an omission that only serves to cast doubt upon the reputation of sailors for purposes of protecting the reputation of a piece of technology. Why did the Navy conceal from the public that the point defense system of the most advanced AEGIS ship in the US Navy failed to protect the ship from a direct hit from a rogue drone?

From the PACOM Playbook to PACOM's Plan B(MD)

WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA (March 17, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), front, the Republic of Korea Navy Aegis-class destroyer ROKS Seoae-Yu-Seong-Ryong (DDG 993), middle, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) move into formation during exercise Foal Eagle 2013. McCampbell and McCain are members of Destroyer Squadron 15, forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, and are underway to conduct exercise Foal Eagle 2013 with allied nation Republic of Korea in support of regional security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Declan Barnes/Released)

Every year as winter ends in March, North Korea holds an annual military exercises as part of their spring training period that usually concludes with a big meeting with all the leaders in early April. This years meeting appears to have occurred on April 1st with the announcement that North Korea will restart their dead reactor. Despite news reports, I am skeptical that reactor will be back online this calendar year.

This annual training period in North Korea typically coincides with South Korea and the United States holding their annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises. For the past few years the pattern has been fairly consistent with North Korea being extra threatening (and feeling extra threatened) and usually a war of words breaks out for about a month or so. Once the US/South Korean military exercises end, North Korea will call for negotiations and take credit for resolving the crisis they manufactured in the first place. Last year when this chess game was over, many in the US had a bad taste in their mouth unhappy with the result, and as a result a lot of thought and planning by PACOM went into this years Foal Eagle 2013 exercises.

Everyone who follows me on Twitter might have noticed about mid-February that I was gearing up for this years annual chess match on the North Korean peninsula. I will never be an Asia expert, but I admit to being fascinated by the North Korean government that has somehow remained completely resilient to any type of external influence for over a half century. In particular North Korea, not China, is a subject I like to raise when talking about geopolitical issues in the Pacific with Admirals and Generals, because with North Korea the biggest threat is the lack of good intelligence.

Earlier this year I was following up with various Admirals and Generals I had met over 2012. As part of those calls I had a long conversation with someone I have gotten to know at PACOM on AirSea Battle and specifically the Pacific region; and more specifically we often discuss North Korea, not China. I was informed that the 2013 Foal Eagle exercise would be something I, in particular, would appreciate because it truly leverages public affairs within the context of both strategic communications and operations; a topic I have frequently written about. I was given no hints as to what this meant, except I was told Secretary Panetta had set aside extra funding for the Air Force for Foal Eagle 2013, and most of the details were already worked out. This conversation took place 2 months ago.

The Playbook

Adam Entous and Julian Barnes at the Wall Street Journal have revealed the US script that has played out over the month of March. Described as the 'Playbook', they detail events in their latest Wall Street Journal article.

The U.S. is putting a pause to what several officials described as a step-by-step plan the Obama administration approved earlier this year, dubbed "the playbook," that laid out the sequence and publicity plans for U.S. shows of force during annual war games with South Korea. The playbook included well-publicized flights in recent weeks near North Korea by nuclear-capable B-52 and stealth B-2 bombers, as well as advanced F-22 warplanes.

The U.S. stepped back from the plans this week, as U.S. officials began to worry that the North, which has a small nuclear arsenal and an unpredictable new leader, may be more provoked than the U.S. had intended, the officials said.

"The concern was that we were heightening the prospect of misperceptions on the part of the North Koreans, and that that could lead to miscalculations," a senior administration official said.

The Wall Street Journal goes on to detail the Playbook, even describing Secretary Hagel as one of the playbook's chief backers, even though I know for fact the Playbook was actually written by PACOM on Secretary Panetta's watch and with his full support. The article then highlights the meat of the politics.

The public-relations effort was designed not only to send a message to North Korea, but also to assure a hawkish new government in South Korea that it had full U.S. backing and there was no need for it to respond militarily to the North's provocations.

U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the risks associated with the playbook and concluded there was a low probability of a North Korean military response because the regime's top priority has been self-preservation. U.S. officials believe the North understands that taking military action could prompt a devastating U.S. and South Korean counter-strike that could destabilize the regime.

"Everyone is concerned about miscalculation and the outbreak of war. But the sense across the U.S. government is that the North Koreans are not going to wage all-out war," a senior Obama administration official said. "They are interested first and foremost in regime survival."

The U.S. plan was discussed during several high-level White House meetings, according to participants. The effort was backed by Mr. Hagel in one of his first acts as defense secretary. John Kerry, the new secretary of State, supported the Pentagon, as did other top administration officials, according to meeting participants.

In the deliberations, supporters said it was better for the U.S. to control the escalating steps, to ensure the situation didn't spin out of control. In part, according to these officials, the plan was an effort to ensure that South Korea's new government wouldn't feel compelled to respond to North Korean threats, which often emerge at the time of the exercises, as the North conducts its own annual legislative meeting.

But within the administration, some officials voiced concern about unintended consequences of provoking North Korea. Some of these officials questioned the faith the White House and Pentagon placed in the intelligence agencies, which have a mixed record of predicting North Korean behavior.

The intelligence gaps are particularly acute when it comes to reading new North Korean leader Kim Jong Eun, who remains an obscure figure and someone who intelligence agencies themselves have described as potentially more unpredictable than his father.

However, few objections were raised at the highest levels during the meetings, according to participants—unlike in other Obama administration deliberations about using military force abroad, including Libya, Northwest Africa and Syria, that have been marked by protracted debates. President Barack Obama gave the green light to proceed with the playbook, these people said.

The First Quarter: March

The Playbook was intended to function as escalation control by the Obama administration. As someone who jumps online every night at 8pm EST to read the morning news in North Korea, allow me to suggest the Playbook worked better than expected. When North Korea abandoned the Armistice back on March 10, it was clear to observers that North Korea was operating from a script. As I discussed at that time, escalation control was the key to managing the tensions, and I do think the US still maintains escalation control over the situation today, with or without the old Playbook.

As I have observed the US airpower show of force that has visited South Korea over the past month, I found myself in huge admiration for how well the US was playing the game with North Korea in 2013. What headlines that bluster the presence of US military power failed to mention is that every single aircraft that has been flown over South Korea over the past month had been planned many months ago as part of the planning process for the Foal Eagle 2013 exercise. This was never a secret btw, I exchanged emails with a public affairs officer who confirmed this for me right after B-52s made their appearance on March 19. The B-52s, the B-2s, the F-22s, etc... all those flights and activities were planned to appear in Foal Eagle long ago, and there was nothing new or reactionary by the United States taking place as events unfolded throughout March. While bombers and advanced fighters have been involved in previous Foal Eagle exercises, the key distinction this year was the announced use of those platforms.

Unlike previous years, this year the US publicized the presence of B-2s and F-22s through defense public affairs, because otherwise North Korea (or you and I) would never know they were involved in the exercises, even though the actual flights by those aircraft were planned and paid for months ago. So what is new this year? The public affairs piece that mentions their presence and activity, and the PA professionals who were able to mingle those activities into the context of the North Korean rhetoric - so reporters could go write plenty of news stories - is the only thing that is actually different from the US/SK perspective relative to previous years. Talk is cheap, which may explain why our defense public affairs folks are actually pretty good at it when given the green light.

Throughout the entire month of March as North Korea has stepped through their well orchestrated script for escalating tensions in the region, the US has been following a script of their own; a script written long ago for the Foal Eagle exercises and supported fully by the White House. In my opinion, everything North Korea is doing - even through today - is part of their script, and everything we have been doing has been part of our script. The intelligence officials in the WSJ report are right, there is no evidence that North Korea is off script. We do not know what their script is, but there does appear to be broad agreement that North Korea didn't write a script that ends with them being wiped out in a war. Neither script was written in a way that predicted the others actions, and public affairs and the use of media by both North Korea and the US is solely responsible for connecting the activities of the other side.

It would appear that in the end, the actions contained in the North Korean script forced us to abandon our script.

April Fools Day

If the US and North Korea have been playing a game of chicken as each side executed their scripted events in the public sphere, it is now clear that beginning on April Fools Day North Korea won that game of chicken, and the US was the first to flinch.

Every military activity related to the Korean peninsula discussed in the public was part of the script until on Tuesday - for the first time - the narrative being produced by US media was no longer fully incorporated into the Playbook. The retasking of USS Decatur (DDG 73) to head towards North Korea was a new event, and everyone who follows naval power closely knew it. The problem was, PACOM was one ballistic missile defense destroyer short of what was needed to meet demand signal coming from North Korean activities.

While most of the media made a big deal about the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) being close to the Korean peninsula, the fact is the US Navy has a BMD capable destroyer on that patrol every single day of the year. Without going into too much detail, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) is on a regular patrol that gives the United States an early warning detection capability should someone in Asia launch a ballistic missile at us. There is an AEGIS warship there 24/7/365 and on leap year day too. As soon as the media started talking about USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and USS Decatur (DDG 73), neither of which has any attachment to Foal Eagle 2013 or the Playbook, apparently that is when the Obama administration got nervous and pulled back on the Playbook.

But here is the issue: PACOM needed USS Decatur (DDG 73) because there wasn't another BMD ship available. Attention Congress, there is a capacity issue in 7th Fleet for BMD capable destroyers in the Obama administrations 'pivot to Asia' plan, because the Navy fell short one forward deployed BMD capable warship when PACOM came calling in regards to a North Korean crisis.

The challenge PACOM faces is that PACOM believes North Korea is going to be launching a ballistic missile soon, but the difference between this ballistic missile and previous North Korean ballistic missile launches is that this missile has a mobile launching platform. That makes the launch time of the next ballistic missile an unknown, and just as important the launch point for the next ballistic missile an unknown. This combination of unknown time and unknown launch location requires PACOM to cover every threat axis from North Korea in this threat environment, just in case, to insure regional security.

What you have been reading in the press is only partially correct, because there are actually nine US Navy ballistic missile defense capable warships operating throughout the 7th Fleet today, not two or three as has been reported. As we navalists know, AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense is an integrated network approach to developing a very large regional shield where each ship is both a radar and a shooter, and by integrating other assets in the region, the Navy can track a ballistic missile at launch and potentially develop a firing solution within only a handful of seconds. The more sensors and the better the quality of data, the faster a threat assessment can be made by AEGIS thereby enabling options for response quickly. This process is one that the Navy is well trained for, and in complicated exercises has practiced successfully in actual intercept events that last no longer than 20-30 seconds in practice windows that have spanned days.

While Foal Eagle and the "Playbook" was essentially a strategic communications exercise with North Korea in this environment of higher tension, when PACOM faced a situation where the potential for an actual missile launch in this environment became a legitimate possibility, PACOM has reacted by establishing a regional ballistic missile shield around our partners and bases. This regional ballistic missile defense shield layers around the Japanese ballistic missile defense capabilities, which can be integrated with the US Navy capability through AEGIS.

The US already has an X-Band radar in Japan that can track launches, additional radars in South Korea that can be utilized for launch detection, and nine BMD capable warships that can help track and develop firing solutions for intercepting any ballistic missile threat. Because the area that requires defense from the particular missile North Korea intends to launch is fairly vast, the US Navy ultimately was one ship short to meet the ballistic missile shield demand PACOM needed for full protection. When USS Decatur (DDG 73) was retasked, as a public asset outside the Playbook, political leaders got the impression they had lost escalation control with the Playbook and apparently gave it up. It is somewhat disappointing the Playbook was so rigid it couldn't adapt when inserting a new asset into it's strategic messaging.

Seapower as Strategic Deterrent

Throughout the duration of the cold war, mutually assured destruction is often credited for deterring nuclear war. While the debate over mutually assured destruction still exists today regarding the wisdom of the policy; the bottom line is MAD worked. Ballistic missile defense, in theory, adds a new strategic option for the United States in dealing with nuclear powers like North Korea that have limited capabilities. For the first time in human history, the United States is fielding a fully mature and developed ballistic missile defense shield to protect US allies and territories from an announced threat of nuclear attack.

One of the key strategic differences between ballistic missile defense as a deterrent and mutually assured destruction as a deterrent is that the United States is basically saying the enemy can shoot first, and if the attack is a nuclear attack but is also successfully defended against, then the United States reserves the option of responding without using nuclear weapons. This is a critical point critics of ballistic missile defense apparently don't believe is important, because a successful nuclear attack against US allies or territories requires a nuclear response. The option of not having to respond to a nuclear attack with nuclear weapons is the value of successful ballistic missile defense, and why smart investment and stewardship of ballistic missile defense is in the best interests of the United States.

It has been reported that the deployment of land based interceptors to Alaska is going to cost one billion dollars. That suggests the latest announcement that THAAD interceptors will be deployed to Guam will probably also cost one billion dollars. THAAD interceptors are expensive, and about half the time they even work. Those two land based ballistic missile defense deployments cost as much as a single new AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer, and while the AEGIS system is only capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in the very early and final stages of a ballistic missiles flight, the AEGIS BMD system has a much more reliable track record and has been tested under much more realistic conditions, including multiple targets and decoys, unlike the THAAD system. An AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer is also mobile, which is why the US Navy will be protecting Guam with an AEGIS ballistic missile defense warship for the next several weeks until the THAAD system can be deployed to Guam.

In theory THAAD is more capable than the AEGIS system because it can intercept at a higher altitude. The problem is THAAD is less reliable than AEGIS, less mature than AEGIS, and more expensive than AEGIS; but for now it is all the US has.

There is another reason why I believe Seapower is important right now as a strategic deterrent. I believe North Korea's creativity is interesting primarily because they are limited by means and are simplistic in method, and sometimes North Korean methods are so simple they appear absurd at first glance. North Korea publicized today that they have "smaller, lighter and diversified" nuclear weapons, which in theory makes some sense because they have only a limited supply of material to make nuclear weapons with. I know it has been something of a running joke for years, but if things go hot I would not be surprised if North Korea tried to deliver a nuclear weapon via a sea mine rather than by missile. North Korea is very skilled in developing sea mines, but not so much when it comes to rocket technologies. The ability to keep North Korea's naval forces from causing any problems is going to be important over the next month in preventing a war. An incident like the sinking of the Cheonan 3 years ago right now could spark a chain of events that leads to Korean War II, but an even worst case scenario is if North Korea was to find a way to sink a US or Japanese warship, because that puts South Korea in the middle of a crossfire.

Halftime Adjustments

While I can understand why PACOM called in the US Navy to build a regional ballistic missile defense shield when it became clear North Korea might launch a ballistic missile from a mobile launcher, I don't understand why the Obama administration threw out the Playbook and then ran off to tell the Wall Street Journal about it. Regardless, someone clearly needs to clue Hagel in on a little secret: Seapower is the winning playbook if the objective is to prevent war.

The ballistic missile defense shield PACOM is setting up is a defensive capability. It is also a very limited piece of the US Navy's capability - indeed it's only a small piece of the surface combatants being used for the ballistic missile defense shield. There are no carriers projecting power into the Yellow Sea, there are no submarines launching missiles, and there are no amphibious ships preparing to send Marines ashore in South Korea.

If North Korea does continue to escalate further, and I believe they will, the Stennis Carrier Strike Group is deployed and is currently in port in Singapore, and the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is deployed currently off the US west coast heading east. Those two carriers represent 100+ aircraft that can project power as needed in any contingency, and can do so right into downtown Pyonyang if necessary.

And if tensions result in a hot war, those submarines nobody in North Korea can detect will be the first strike that knocks out the Command and Control capabilities of North Korea in the first minutes of hot war.

And if for some reason the US needs to reinforce the South Korean Army, US Marines will be delivered into theater from amphibious ships.

And if, God forbid, a nuclear device goes off in South Korea, the nearby SSBN that no nation on the planet can find today will make sure Pyonyang is melted off the face of the planet.

American Seapower is inherently designed to be an escalation control mechanism for political leaders during a crisis. Seapower is a stabilizing presence capable of preserving peace through projecting strength or providing defensive, and an enabling capability when it is time to deliver the US Army to win a war.

No matter what the Playbook was last week, the winning Playbook for the US going forward dealing with North Korea is Seapower. Military strategists have spent most of the 21st century convincing political leaders in Washington that US military power is best exercised with land power - in Asia of all places, but hopefully with a splash of cold water called the threat of nuclear war, political leaders are waking up to the historical reality that Seapower is how Superpowers manage enduring peace without being intrusive on the sovereignty of partners. Seapower enables nations to enjoy enduring prosperity through maintenance of stability, lines of communication for trade, and security. Seapower is also going to be how PACOM will be managing peace in the Pacific crisis of the present and future, so I hope those involved with Hagel's strategic review are paying attention.

It's only April 4th, Foal Eagle still has 25+ more days. It is going to be a long month with plenty more threatening rhetoric and behavior ahead. Is a ballistic missile launch how this ends? Maybe, but I still believe North Korea desires a limited skirmish of some sort as part of their script, although it could be that the Playbook has actively deterred that potential outcome.

There is a lot of good analysis of the situation in North Korea out there. I highly recommend two sites in particular that may not be part of your regular web readings. The Interpreter Blog at the Australian Lowy Institute is always a great source for analysis of events in the Pacific, and in particular North Korea right now; and just about everything written by Jeffery Lewis these days covers every angle of North Korean nukes and missiles.

Autonomy, Offense-Defense, and Naval Power

Inside the Pentagon has reported (gated) that the Navy is considering exploring autonomy in robotic systems to deal with the anti-access/area denial threat (A2/AD):

The Navy is eying potential investments in revolutionary unmanned systems
with greater autonomy than today's drones to counter advanced Chinese
weapons capable of threatening U.S. warships, according to draft guidance
for a new assessment.

The report goes on to note that Naval leaders are looking for autonomous solutions to functions including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, information management, decision-making, logistics and weapon systems.  Killer robots on the loose? Well, no. "Autonomy" is a vexing term, and as a Lawfare research paper notes it is difficult to conceptualize autonomy vs. automation in an absolute sense. Instead, autonomy and automation should be thought of as a sliding scale. Moreover, an autonomous system should be regarded as a component of three interlocking characteristics: frequency of operator interaction, ability to cope with an uncertain environment, and level of assertiveness to alter the means by which it completes human-designated ends.

Because of the imperfections of language, we will likely continue to use "autonomous" instead of "more autonomous," but we should understand that automated and autonomous are rarely absolute states. A truly autonomous weapon would be one that could alter the ends to which force is applied, not the means. At that point, we've gone too far into the realm of science fiction and Jessica Biel.

Any reader of P.W. Singer's book knows that weapons platforms and command and control systems with greater levels of autonomy are on the horizon, but we've lived with precursors for some time.
Indeed, the advent of missile warfare and modern air defense has necessitated greater automation of command and control systems, and the result has been systems with significant degrees of autonomy. These systems, ranging from the Semi-Automated Ground Environment (SAGE) to the AEGIS arose because the speed of tactical kinetic engagement in some areas of warfare outpaced the ability of human operators to engage.

Others have written more eloquently on the tactical possibilities of autonomous unmanned aircraft and undersea craft in a naval campaign, but some comment on the strategic aspects are warranted. It is likely that such systems will face significant resistance to employment from moral/legal and practical perspectives. The former are overrepresented in the debate, and the latter are underappreciated. Writing about nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, Solly Zuckerman argued that a more technologically complex military that relies on revolutionary weaponry tends to frustrate rather than enable commanders seeking freedom of action. The more complex a weapon, the greater its personnel requirements and backbone of supporting technologies and systems. And when a weapon is politically sensitive, it also will require specialized command and control arrangements that may decrease overall military effectiveness.

There is, however, as I've noted while conversing with Gulliver and Dan Trombly on Twitter, an implicit bias in autonomous weapons discussions against tactically offensive systems. People do not like autonomous robots or autonomous cyberweapons because they seem risky to employ without collateral damage and encourage robo-aggression. But offense and defense is a matter of context. Defensive systems midway on the automated/autonomy spectrum could be easily positioned to support a strategic offensive while sitting on the tactical defense. In regards to naval warfare, one could easily envision a scenario in which naval platforms with defensive systems are concentrated in a theater of engagement to support a primarily offensive joint campaign. Moreover, when it comes to missile warfare even tactical distinctions between offense and defense easily break down.

Likewise, tactically offensive weapons are likely to appeal most to those seeking to mount what they consider to be a strategic defensive. Dictators pursuing domestic regime survival come to mind as do many states with either insecure borders or the threat of great power projection. Due to the higher stakes involved, they will likely possess far less scruples than major Western powers seeking autonomous military solutions.

2012 Prediction Sure to Go Wrong, or Not

The only sure prediction for 2012 is that it will be an interesting year for surface warfare discussions. The DDG-1000 is going to be an amazing ship, assuming the software side works out. Will it be a better investment than the DDG-51 restart? The answer is starting to look more and more like YES everyday, primarily because the DDG-51 restart isn't restarting the DDG-51 you think it is. AVIATION WEEK has been discussing this topic all year, specifically Michael Fabey in his many DDG-1000 vs DDG-51 articles, which in hindsight will be the background material for events soon to unfold in the coming year.

Here is his latest, an important read. I'll predict it here and now (again) - the GAO is going to look very favorably on the DDG-1000 over the DDG-51 restart. I'm looking forward to observing the SWO community reaction, because I expect to observe a great deal of denial and irrational reactions resulting from the GAOs analysis. I could be wrong about that, but I don't think so. The ugly side of AEGIS is soon to go public, and AEGIS is not simply a technology in the Navy - it's something similar to a religion.

Interesting times.

Burkes For Saudi Arabia

I thought this was just a rumor, but maybe there is more to it?

Saudi Arabia, which has long considered the purchase of American littoral combat ships (LCS) with a lightweight Aegis combat system, is contemplating the acquisition of new DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers that could be fitted with ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability.

The U.S. Navy briefed Saudi officials in late May on the capabilities of the destroyers, which would be far more powerful than any ship currently in the kingdom's service.

The U.S. Navy would not confirm whether the brief included BMD options, but sources did not deny that it was part of the presentation.

Saudi Arabia has been looking at Aegis-equipped LCS designs from both Lockheed Martin and Austal USA since mid-2008. Those designs, which range in size from 3,000 to about 4,000 tons, would be equipped with SPY-1F lightweight Aegis radars similar to those fitted on Norwegian frigates. But the SPY-1F lacks the fidelity and software to perform the BMD mission, and the ships probably wouldn't have the electrical capacity to power a BMD radar.

The U.S. Navy's 9,100-ton DDG 51s are the heart of the fleet's BMD force. About 20 U.S. cruisers and destroyers have had their SPY-1D Aegis systems upgraded to perform the BMD mission, and more are being backfitted. Future DDG 51s will be built with the BMD capability.

Read the rest at Defense News.

Both versions of the Littoral Combat Ship version of the AEGIS surface combatant have been thoroughly criticized. I find that interesting, because I hear from both Austal and Lockheed Martin that the hull design for both variants of the AEGIS version is heavily modified, although no details are ever offered to explain exactly what about the hulls are heavily modified. The choice of DDG-51s instead of LCS would be a significant change, because it implies a much smaller purchase of naval vessels from the US than the 8-12 often cited for the AEGIS version of the LCS. The Defense News article mentions a potential mix that includes 2 DDG-51 Flight IIAs w/ BMD.

From an industrial perspective, this would allow the US Navy to build 2 destroyers per year - one at each yard over the next several years - as the Navy moves toward the DDG-51 Flight III, which is having other issues we'll discuss later.

The trade-offs here would apparently be quantity vs quality, as crew sizes and cost would ultimately run about the same. There will be other issues though, political concerns like selling top tier military equipment to Saudi Arabia. The sale would also ignore how survivability isn't so much a technical issue - rather a crewing issue in most cases - meaning the big Burkes are not likely to be more survivable with Saudi crews than the LCS AEGIS ships would be, not unless Saudi Navy crews have become a lot better in the last few years.

The Saudi Navy surface warship deal is reportedly worth between $20-$25 billion, depending upon your source. Keep in mind a lot of that money is for infrastructure. Also worth noting a high-low BMD mix that uses the new DDG-51 Flight IIAs and smaller AEGIS LCS 'shooters' fits a distributed CEC model for BMD often discussed for the way the Navy should do BMD in the future. Under that model, there are radars of various types, both on ships and on shore, for tracking/targeting data that gets fed forward in the network of smaller vessel "shooters" which in this scenario would be the little LCS AEGIS ships. While those smaller AEGIS LCS with the SPY-F radar could not independently track and kill ballistic missiles, leveraging the data from the network and with the AEGIS combat system, those ships act as forward missile launchers with VLS. A similar model was once promoted as a way to field a high end AMDR from a modern ship hull like DDG-1000, before it was decided a smaller AMDR would be fielded on every DDG-51 Flight III destroyer.

There is another possibility... some of the Flight I Burkes are in very poor condition, and it could be the US sells those to Saudi Arabia for much less and the money is used to repair/refit those ships. Most, if not all, of those older Flight I Burkes are BMD capable.

Interesting stuff, but the Saudi's do not appear to be in a hurry to buy their new warships, so it is unclear if any of this will ever happen.