Military Sealift Command: Flexible. Forward. Seapower.

Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14) conducts a replenishment-at-sea
with Royal Australian frigate HMAS Toowomba (FFG 156). 
(U.S. Navy photo by Master Capt. Rollin J. Bellfi/Released)

Like most of my fellow authors at ID, I’m an unabashed supporter of American Seapower and disappointed to see the slow decline in the Navy’s battle force ship-count.  Bryan has made some pretty compelling arguments for increasing our high end naval combat fleet combatants. But Seapower manifests in many forms. An often over-looked component of U.S. Navy Seapower is our fleet auxiliary force, run by the Military Sealift Command.  Most people are familiar with the oilers and supply ships that deliver fuel, food, parts, and ammo to our combatants, but the MSC’s fleet is much more diverse than combat logistics.

To get a better idea of the variety and importance of this force, allow me to highlight three ongoing missions, in three different theaters, using three completely different platforms.  In the far reaches of the southern Indian Ocean, a handful of international ships continue a wide-ranging search for any trace of missing Malaysia Air flight 370.  Keeping these ships moving and fed is USNS Cesar Chavez (T-AKE 14). This sort of underway replenishment combat logistics mission is MSC's bread and butter, with dozens of similar operations occurring around the globe every day and night.

In the Mediterranean, another MSC ship is deployed for a unique and historical mission - to dispose of Syria’s chemical weapons.  MV Cape Ray, part of the Transportation Department Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, departed Portsmouth in late January.  The ship has spent most of its deployment pier-side in Rota while Syria stalls in fulfilling its UN-mandated obligations to aggregate the stockpiles at Latakia for transport and neutralization at sea. Whether or not the ship will ever get to execute its intended mission remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the fact that this operation was able to spin up so quickly and embark the U.S. Army’s chemical neutralization equipment demonstrates the agility of our heavy sealift ships.

Along the volatile west coast of Africa, USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1) and her joint training teams are deployed for Africa Partnership Station (APS), conducting maritime security capacity building, and exercises.  The ship has even embarked African coast guards and navies for real-world fisheries enforcement operations.  Although APS deployments have been happening for several years, this marks the first trial of the concept using the new Joint High Speed Vessel.  Eventually 10 JSHVs will become part of MSC’s sealift fleet, conducting a wide range of logistics and combat support missions. From everything I’m hearing, they are already being fought over by the geographic combatant commanders.

U.S. Navy Sailors and members of the Liberian Coast Guard observe boat operations during a joint familiarization exercise aboard the U.S. Navy's joint high-speed vessel USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1). Spearhead, the U.S. Navy's first-in-class joint, high-speed vessel, is on its maiden deployment supporting theater security cooperation efforts and the international collaborative capacity-building program, Africa Partnership Station, in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Justin R. DiNiro/Released)  

At this point, I should brag on my fellow citizen Sailors.  Two of the missions I've mentioned couldn't happen without the dedication of Navy Reservists on extended active duty.  While the ships themselves are operated by the MSC's civil mariners, reservists make up a significant portion of the mission teams aboard Cape Ray and Spearhead, to include some key leadership positions. Reservists are also part of USS Ponce's mission in the Arabian Gulf.  Naval operations are often come-as-you-are affairs, and there are no better folks at rapidly and seamlessly partnering with the MSC for operational pick-up games than our reserve Sailors.

When considering long term budgets and acquisition plans, our capital combat ships are extremely important.  But the flexibility and strategic reach of our military sealift force is what makes us a global naval power.  The above ships represent just a small part of the MSC's inventory.  Other vessels are prepositioned around the world to support major contingency operations. Still others support salvage, submarine rescue, or special operations missions.  Time after time, MSC has demonstrated the ability to get equipment to the fight and sustain our warfighters.

Any opinions expressed in the preceding post are those of the author alone and not representative of the U.S. Navy or any other organization.

Africa Maritime Updates

With so much in the news this month, it's been easy to overlook the interesting events occurring in and around the water of today's most dynamic continent.

Somali Piracy remains practically non-existent this year, thanks to the continued presence of armed security detachments on commercial vessels.  While commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden is relatively safe, hundreds of smaller private sailing vessels and motor yachts remain unable to transit the area because they simply can’t afford armed security.

Two years ago this month, U.S. and NATO forces were pounding away at Libya's armed forces and pretty much totaled Gadhafi's Navy.  Earlier this month, Royal Navy frigate HMS Kent made an unprecedented good will visit to the port of Tripoli.  Other countries such as France and Malta have been helping Libya to rebuild its naval forces, which are critical for patrolling the country's 2,000 kilometer coast line, interdicting smugglers and migrants trying to reach Europe, and securing the export of more than 1.3 million barrels per day of petroleum.

The MEND is at it again.

On the west side of the continent, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) group killed 10 police in a boat and renewed attacks on maritime oil infrastructure.  More troubling though, are reports that MEND, historically a group with secular aims, may be entering the sectarian conflict started by Boko Haram terrorists in the North.  Threatening attacks on Muslims in the Niger Delta, the group's spokesman recently issued a statement: "On behalf of the hapless Christian population in Nigeria, The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta will from Friday, May 31, 2013, embark on a crusade to save Christianity in Nigeria from annihilation." Nigerian security forces are already overwhelmed fighting terrorist in the North (with very heavy handed tactics it must be noted) and a renewed insurgency in the South could threat stability in this important economic anchor for West Africa.

Also in the Gulf of Guinea, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration recently conducted a rather audacious under-cover operation at sea to detain Guinea-Bissau's former Chief of Naval Operations and drug kingpin Bubo Na Tchuto.  The impact of narcotics proceeds on the ledgers of terror groups in Africa has been overstated by DEA (at least in my opinion), but this operation was worthwhile if only to remove one of the most corrupt officials in West Africa.

 

In Northern Mali, French Forces have begun a gradual withdrawal from fighting al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM and its associated militant groups made use of the Niger River during the French intervention.  France is hoping for a U.N. force to replace African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) troops and that force will certainly need some sort of riverine capability to keep the waterways leading up to Timbuktu and Gao clear of extremist activity.

Malian military patrols the Niger River.

 The last update isn’t really maritime-related, but does involve the USN participating on a unique foreign internal defense mission in the Sahara.  Last month, four U.S. naval officers deployed with special operations forces (SOF) from all over the globe to West Africa to train African special operators for counter-terrorism missions in the region.   SEAL LCDR Kaj Larsen explains more here about FLINTLOCK 13.

 

Instability around the continent and the recent attacks on U.S. embassies last September have driven the military to examine various options for both future crisis response and steady state capacity-building operations.  The Army is regionally aligning some forces, with a dedicated Brigade Combat Team to support training missions and be prepared to intervene on the continent should the need arise.  Africa has been described as an "economy of force" operation for DOD and generally the introduction of any element other than culturally-attuned, small footprint forces (read SOF) raises the eyebrows of State Department diplomats.  I find it hard to believe that the Army could get a brigade-sized element - or even pieces of it - nimble enough to deploy rapidly, with a minimal number of "boots on the ground" and adequate logistics train to satisfy these requirements.  Along similar lines, the Marine Corps has instituted a company-sized crisis response element for this mission which leverages the speed and long-range mobility of the MV-22.   Expeditionary crisis-response is in the Marine Corps DNA, but without adequate amphibious shipping, the Corps' unique capabilities can't be exploited.  That said, it will be interesting to see which force the COCOM and Ambassador calls on next time there is a crisis in Africa.

 The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

US MARSEC Capability Development Programs in West Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects

US Navy Photo

The following contribution is from N.R. Jenzen-Jones &  LT Chad R. Hutchins, USN.

West Africa[1] today is plagued by a variety of serious maritime security (MARSEC) concerns. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, trafficking of persons, arms, and drugs, oil bunkering, illegal migration, and piracy have contributed to a maritime environment characterized by crime and corruption. The costs of these illegal activities are significant; the cost of illegal fishing alone is over $1 billion US Dollars annually, and an estimated 600,000 people are trafficked illegally each year[2]. Pirate attacks targeting oil product vessels in West Africa are occurring with increasing regularity, and are becoming increasingly violent[3].

Like much of the rest of Africa, the nations of West Africa have traditionally held a land-centric view of security. National navies, as well as other maritime entities such as coast guards and fisheries patrols, have never been in the vanguard of training or financial investment. Despite this, recent years have seen a renewed focus on maritime security in West Africa, driven by concerns of piracy, threats to oil production, and international programs of assistance. Many nations and organizations have strategic interests in building strong MARSEC partnerships with West African nations, most in the hopes of protecting or establishing maritime enterprise relationships. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Doctrine for 2012, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, discusses the importance of partnerships around the world, including those in Africa. This document sets forth a goal to “become the security partner of choice” in nations of interest, and advocates an “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approach”, with an emphasis on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities[4].

West Africa holds particular strategic significance for the United States, and European partner nations, and not only for its vast reserves of energy resources. The region is also an advantageous safe haven for terrorist and transnational criminal groups, a transhipment point for drugs being trafficked to Europe and further, and its ports are key components of the global maritime transportation network.

Capacity building is the most effective approach to building a sustainable, self-reliant maritime security environment in West Africa, whilst keeping to the small-footprint approach outlined by the DoD. These partnerships and training efforts allow regional nations to directly counter MARSEC threats within their domains, leveraging the vast experience in maritime operations provided by partner nations. They encourage a two-way exchange of ideas and skills, and allow participants from U.S. and European nations to get a glimpse at the problems plaguing the region first hand.

Africa Partnership Station (APS) is a U.S. Navy (USN) initiative designed to facilitate events that foster cooperation between African nations, the U.S., and European partner nations with the goal
of developing maritime safety and security capabilities on the African continent. The partners of APS work together through both sea and land based engagements, focusing on a broad range of MARSEC-related operations, joint exercises, and professional training programs. These endeavors focus on four main pillars of capability: Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Professionals, Maritime Infrastructure, and Maritime Enforcement[5].  A highly unique and advantageous aspect of APS is that it requires no permanent land base, as the ships participating act as the ‘base’ for engagements and training. This allows the USN to follow the small-footprint approach outlined in the Sustaining Global Leadership document, and leaves assets available for re-tasking if high-priority situations arise in the region.

The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) is a US Africa Command (AFRICOM) program that focuses on assisting partner nations within Africa with a view to building stronger maritime security through cooperative real-world law enforcement operations[6]. Partner nations work directly with the U.S. Coast Guard and/or U.S. Navy whilst conducting operations to counter common security threats such as IUU fishing, trafficking of weapons, people, or narcotics, and so on. This decreases the reliance of West African nations on foreign assistance to counter common MARSEC threats in the region, as well as enhancing operating cohesion, and fostering trust and confidence between partnering nations.

Private Security Companies (PSCs) also play a role in capacity building operations in Africa. One such company, Triton International Ltd., has conducted extensive training of the Somaliland Coast Guard, developing their capabilities to respond to a variety of threats in their area of responsibility[7]. Similarly, PSCs are participating in training local navies and coast guards in West Africa, and are even augmenting local coast guard and fisheries patrols in some cases. PSCs can play an important role in building maritime security capacity in West Africa, lessening the burden on the world’s navies, and allowing programs such as APS and AMLEP to target areas of specific interest or concern.

All of the above initiatives, as well as a handful of others falling outside the scope of this article[8], are innovative approaches to engaging with African nations in efforts to develop stronger local maritime presence, self-reliance, and response capabilities. However for these partnerships to be effective, especially in Africa, there exists a need for carefully structured milestones, robust oversight and accountability, and end state definitions that outline success. More can be done in order to prove that investment in African nations can provide a truly sustainable, self-reliant, and effective maritime presence. There is a common need for nations, commercial interests, private security companies (PSCs), and non-profit organizations to build cooperative partnerships with the nations of West Africa in order to develop MARSEC capacity in the region. US involvement should follow an interagency (‘whole of government’) approach, synergising the efforts of the DoD and the various services (particularly the USN and USCG), Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, and other USG stakeholders. Such interagency programs have enjoyed regional success in areas such as Colombia[9], and would be ideally suited to tackling the multifaceted challenges presented by the West African situation.

The numerous challenges of building a sustainable partnership and self-reliant West African maritime capability are widely recognized and understood. Most West African nations have a widely-acknowledged problem with corruption and nepotism, and the efficiency of military and civil command structures are often in question. Additionally, there is the challenge presented by integrating the efforts of the wide range of stakeholders seeking to promote enhanced MARSEC in West Africa. Nonetheless, much of the groundwork for achieving these goals is already in place, and it would require a comparatively modest investment to begin making a real impact. The lacking pieces of the puzzle are a unified strategic plan, and a designated body to coordinate various agencies’ and nations’ efforts.  

The U.S. State Department has already established a Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, an ad-hoc discussion group of international representatives that could provide a blueprint for the sort of collaborative body that could be established in order to implement maritime security development programs Africa-wide. The USN’s Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) has also implemented a monthly series of meetings focusing on piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings provide an opportunity for stakeholders from worldwide militaries, law enforcement agencies, and industry to coordinate counter-piracy efforts in the region. Such collaborative initiatives should be combined with the US interagency approach, in order to maximize the effective participation of all stakeholders in the region. We recommend a tiered approach to integrating these efforts:

The tactical level: Develop a cooperative training and engagement program consisting of navy, coast guard, and private security experts from around the world to continue building upon previous and current training in maritime operations, education, administration, and other relevant areas. 

The operational level: Develop a cooperative assistance program aimed at upgrading and maintaining maritime infrastructure in critical West African ports. Establish an interagency body tasked with coordinating maritime capacity building operations throughout the region, and recommending the best distribution of surplus US and European materiel gifted to nations in the region.

The strategic level:   Engage with individual West African nations, as well as ECOWAS and the African Union, through high-level exchanges across the interagency. Establish an interagency framework to organize MARSEC development at the strategic level, directly supporting U.S. and partner nations’ foreign policy goals. These engagements should focus on laying out a framework to work towards a sustainable end-state; the development of an effective, self-reliant maritime capability in West Africa.

If the U.S.’s strategic plan is to consider the benefits of West African partnerships seriously, then creating an international group that mirrors many aspects of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to fill the role as the ‘Contact Group for Maritime Security in Africa’ would be an admirable first step. Such a body should be responsible for the tiered approach outlined above, coordinating both interagency and international participation in programs to strengthen the MARSEC capabilities of nations throughout Africa, tailoring exercises, training, and operations to suit US and partner nations’ foreign policy goals, and reducing confusion and overlap between programs from different countries and agencies.




Sources
[1] Generally accepted to be the 15 nations comprising ECOWAS, plus Mauritania.
[2]http://www.ejfoundation.org/page275.html
[3]http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-04-24/global-pirate-attacks-becoming-more-violent/3967950
[4]http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
[5]http://www.naveur-navaf.navy.mil/about%20us.html
[6]www.africom.mil/fetchBinary.asp?pdfID=20100503145240
[7]http://pmso.net/PMSOSpecial%20Report_AnIndustryApproachToMaritimeSecurityInWestAfrica.html
[8]Including but not limited to the US DoD’s Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative, Maritime Liaison Officer (MARLO) programs, the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa), and programs administered by the EU’s CSDP.
[9]http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/run-through-the-jungle-colombia%E2%80%99s-jungla-commandos

Short Bios
Nic Jenzen-Jones is a security and defence industry consultant, writer, and analyst. He is the co-editor of Security Scholar and can be found on Twitter (@RogueAdventurer).
Chad Hutchins a Lieutenant in the United States Navy, currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School. He has previously served aboard ships participating in capability development operations in Africa. The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or any other agency.

Africa Maritime IW Potpourri

AQIM Maritime Terror Plot Disrupted: Algerian officials recently detained three terrorists from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb plotting a COLE-like attack against U.S. or European ships in the Med. Had this attack been executed, it would have represented a significant escalation in AQIM’s tactics, which thus far have been mostly focused on kidnapping Westerners for ransom and smaller local bombings.

al Shabaab Flees to Sea: Numerous reports have discussed al Shabaab's use of the sea as a means of travel both up and down Somalia's long coast and to and from Yemen. These stories demonstrate al Qaeda's continued interest in maritime attacks and the sea as a means for movement and support. They also reflect AQ's strategic shift out of the FATA into Africa as drone strikes have successfully hammered the networks's core leadership in Pakistan.

Also from East Africa:
Pirate/Human Smuggler Nexus: This is an interesting twist on the Pirate/al Shabaab nexus and demonstrates the extent that pirates have entrenched themselves into Somalia's illicit economy.

Finally, some new news on Africa's river wars: “A new 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement, now signed by most of the key upstream abutters, would give all riparian states (including the Congo, where a stream that flows into Lake Tanganyika is the acknowledged Nile source) equal access to the resources of the river. That would give preference to large scale upstream energy and industrial, as well as long-time agricultural and irrigation uses.

Egypt and Sudan have refused to sign the new agreement, despite years of discussions and many heated meetings. Given climate change, the drying up of water sources everywhere in Africa and the world, Egypt, which is guaranteed 56 billion of the annual flow of 84 billion cubic meters of Nile water each year, hardly wants to lose even a drop of its allocation. Nor does Sudan, guaranteed 15 billion cubic meters.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

East Africa Updates

A variety of interesting, though sometimes confusing news has emerged regarding Somalia in the past few weeks. What follows is an attempt to provide ID readers some insight into these developments and amplify Galrahn’s recent post.

Kenyan Offensive into Jubaland:
Kenya’s offensive into Southern Somalia under the guise of UN Article 51 (right to self-defense) began as retaliation for al Shabaab kidnappings in Kenyan refugee camps and coastal areas (more below on those). The Kenyan air force is dropping bombs, and ground troops have captured key coastal terrain and intend to push all the way to Kismaayo. Note, contrary to some reporting, the US is not supporting this offensive. There is no shortage of of interest and discussion on Somalia in US and European governments these days, but frankly, that interest hasn't translated into a desire for action, at least on the part of policy makers.

Unencumbered by bureaucratic paralysis, al Shabaab has already retaliated in Kenya with a series of minor grenade attacks in Nairobi. A future escalation of these attacks to include some of AS’s tactics regularly used in Mogadishu, such as suicide bombers, is certainly possible. However, if the Kenyans do take Kismaayo, this will be a huge blow to one of al Shabaab’s fundraising and facilitation hubs as a major revenue source disappears. Holding the terrain is a different matter, and probably best left to one of Kenya's proxies.

The political and diplomatic responses to Kenya’s incursions have been a little bit less straight-forward. On one hand are the TFG’s contradictory positions. On the other are those of pro-TFG militias Ras Kamboni and ASWJ, who have voiced their support to the effort. These pronouncements should not be surprising as they stand to gain significantly from a capture of Kismayo and the financial windfall it would bring either group. At least one US diplomat has publically discussed the potential of future support to the operation. Western countries should seriously consider immediate assistance to Kenya - logistics, intelligence sharing, ISR, and fires support, if needed. One idea is to provide airlift or sealift for a contingent of AMISOM and TFG troops (even a token presence) to Kismaayo to extend the reach of their governance into Southern Somalia and provide a means for Kenya to gradually withdraw. The longer Kenyan troops are in Southern Somalia, the staler their welcome will become, so anything Western countries can do to speed their victory and withdrawal will increase stability there and alleviate the millions of Somalis still suffering from the al Shabaab-exacerbated famine there.

Kidnappings: A series of high profile kidnappings/murders of European (and now an American) aid workers and vacationers in East Africa has occurred in the past months. At this point, these kidnappings appear to be a fundraising mechanism for various malign actors in Southern Somalia. Westerners have been valuable hostage targets for Islamic terror groups (see AQIM, AQI, AQAP, especially) the past decade. What we are seeing in East Africa seems (from my perspective) to be a mutually beneficial relationship evolving between various criminal/clan, al Shabaab, and pirate groups to capture and ransom Westerners in Somalia and Kenya. Al Shabaab has probably lost funding in the form of taxation as TFG/AMISOM have captured and held territory. Pirates are also likely seeing their revenue streams dry up as their attack success rate drops (primarily attributable to embarked armed security detachments, rather than the coalition naval presence). Larger shipping companies, which have better insurance and resources for paying ransoms, have shifted some of those resources to armed security. This leaves smaller, poorer shipping lines - and the handful of flag states who are still myopically failing to protect their crews - as vulnerable targets. Note, Somali piracy is non-traditional in that it is really kidnapping for ransom at sea, rather than cargo seizure. (The expanding piracy in West Africa is focused on profiting from captured cargoes, not crews.)

Developed countries’ inaction towards addressing shore-based pirate facilitators has left these networks intact and apparently some of them have moved onto new and potentially more profitable business. Until these actors are targeted - lethally, since there is no law enforcement reach into Somalia and mildly worded diplomatic press statements aren’t helping much - expect these kidnappings to continue, if not multiply.

Other Recent Related News:
- Al Shabaab in America Al Shabaab’s global facilitation network stretches throughout Africa, into Europe, Australia, and yes, even the United States. The tens of thousands of Somalis in America -- the vast majority of whom are law-abiding citizens -- create a challenge for law enforcement agencies who must sort out the small percentage (still probably hundreds) of bad apples in the diaspora.

- Finally, for the benefit of the random DOS person reading this blog, if I haven't already raised your hackles enough thus far - this - is a colossally dumb idea. Other agencies are still cleaning up the mess made from the last time do-good diplomats opened the floodgates to un-vetted refugees from “countries of concern.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Obama's Foreign Policy in Africa Wears Combat Boots

If you have been listening to what General Carter Ham has been saying lately, you would have seen this coming. This is the latest military deployment to make headlines, from ABC News.

Two days ago President Obama authorized the deployment to Uganda of approximately 100 combat-equipped U.S. forces to help regional forces “remove from the battlefield” - meaning capture or kill - Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony and senior leaders of the LRA.

The forces will deploy beginning with a small group and grow over the next month to 100. They will ultimately go to Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the permission of those countries.

The president made this announcement in a letter to House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, Friday afternoon, saying that “deploying these U.S. Armed Forces furthers U.S. national security interests and foreign policy and will be a significant contribution toward counter-LRA efforts in central Africa.”

Below is the letter.

Dear Mr. Speaker:

For more than two decades, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has murdered, raped, and kidnapped tens of thousands of men, women, and children in central Africa. The LRA continues to commit atrocities across the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan that have a disproportionate impact on regional security. Since 2008, the United States has supported regional military efforts to pursue the LRA and protect local communities. Even with some limited U.S. assistance, however, regional military efforts have thus far been unsuccessful in removing LRA leader Joseph Kony or his top commanders from the battlefield. In the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, Public Law 111-172, enacted May 24, 2010, the Congress also expressed support for increased, comprehensive U.S. efforts to help mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA to civilians and regional stability.

In furtherance of the Congress’s stated policy, I have authorized a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield. I believe that deploying these U.S. Armed Forces furthers U.S. national security interests and foreign policy and will be a significant contribution toward counter-LRA efforts in central Africa.

On October 12, the initial team of U.S. military personnel with appropriate combat equipment deployed to Uganda. During the next month, additional forces will deploy, including a second combat-equipped team and associated headquarters, communications, and logistics personnel. The total number of U.S. military personnel deploying for this mission is approximately 100. These forces will act as advisors to partner forces that have the goal of removing from the battlefield Joseph Kony and other senior leadership of the LRA. Our forces will provide information, advice, and assistance to select partner nation forces. Subject to the approval of each respective host nation, elements of these U.S. forces will deploy into Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The support provided by U.S. forces will enhance regional efforts against the LRA. However, although the U.S. forces are combat-equipped, they will only be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces, and they will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense. All appropriate precautions have been taken to ensure the safety of U.S. military personnel during their deployment.

I have directed this deployment, which is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. I am making this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). I appreciate the support of the Congress in this action.

Sincerely,
BARACK OBAMA

I think the old Vulcan proverb went something like this: "Only Nixon could go to China." I do wonder if in a few years another Vulcan proverb will suggest only Obama could go to Africa.

The messaging by the Obama administration - announcing this specific military deployment in this way - is very curious. Why, if this is simply a training engagement (and not operational), is the President of the US sending a letter to the House Speaker? When claiming the purpose of the letter is "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" then we have serious intentions that go beyond training. Sure, it may begin with training, but I expect over time we will see armed drones and other military assets being put into covert use in that region of Africa, and what might be 100 troops today will be well over a thousand in the near future. See Columbia, etc., for other examples of start small and creep up.

If this was simply a training engagement, there would be no need for this letter, no need to cite the War Powers Resolution, and this news would have been told from an Army PAO in AFRICOM in a news article that wouldn't get any attention at all in most of the media (like what no one sees hiding in plain sight all the time). Worth noting, one of the reasons the President probably invoked the War Powers Resolution in Uganda is because AFRICOM might desire the mission to be long term, thus with the War Powers Resolution, the US military can set up a permanent base in Uganda as an overseas contingency operation rather than by going through the normal political (ie. budget) and diplomatic process of setting up a permanent base in a foreign country on African soil.

This deployment has open ended activity written all over it. However, this deployment also appears to be a strategic move rather than the more tactical activities the US has been conducting in Africa lately (like Libya and Somalia).

By putting US troops in Uganda, the US is building the foundation for what is the next piece of containment for Al Shabaab in Somalia while at the same time adding an extra layer of support for the still very weak state of South Sudan. AFRICOM has apparently begun playing big boy chess, and by that I mean they are building the foundations (where possible) of US influence to help strengthen the African Union by selectively supporting major contributing states. Remember, Uganda is one of the big contributors to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), for example, so as the US military builds up the capability of Uganda it is also building up the capability of a regional military force that is and will in the future be fighting for interests in Africa that the US shares with Uganda.

Finally, for those who keep track of such things, the US is now apparently fighting wars on at least seven fronts - Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, and now Uganda.

Finally. Uganda is a land locked country, and while we can expect the Army and Air Force to step up and support whatever policy objectives are outlined, there is a potential serious oversight role here for the Navy. Between Lake Victoria, Lake Edward, Lake Albert, and the major rivers that connect these bodies of water; brown water elements of the US Navy might have a major role to play regionally and it relates to training and proficiency. Uganda has the potential to be another example where the US Navy has a major role to play, but big Navy under funds and under resources the necessary brown water naval capabilities in favor of some super tech with limited practical application short of World War IV.

West African Piracy

The Benin pirates are at it again. Since March, 12 tankers have been attacked in West African waters. Previous attacks by these pirates have been more violent than their East Coast brothers, such as those in May of this year and in the fall of 2009, which both killed crewmen. It is no surprise that piracy has escalated West Africa. Successful operations beget imitators.

Unfortunately the local countries involved shouldn't expect much assistance in fighting this growing problem, with the preponderance of Europe's navies heavily involved in countering the Somali pirates and stuck in a protracted maritime embargo against a north African dictator who knows better than to quit. Even for the USN, West Africa presents a challenging presence and logistics problem. We've been able to maintain a presence in the Indian Ocean mostly because the ships deploying for CP ops can be tasked for other CENTCOM and AFRICOM missions. However, other than APS, scheduled naval deployments to the other side of the continent are non-existent. Regrettably, West Africa presents a number of irregular challenges that cannot just be wished away: growing piracy; insurgent groups bent on disrupting the flow of oil; an increasingly militant Islamist movement in northern Nigeria (Boko Haram); and a burgeoning narcotics trade that in part, supports AQIM's broadening reach across North Africa. AFRICOM's naval requirements are growing, and US force structure is not. It's past time to buy ships we can afford in a quantity that can meet current and future demands for maritime security operations and security force assistance.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Military Future of South Sudan

Some unwarranted, poorly thought out advice that South Sudan would probably be best advised not to take:

• Small and well-trained is better than big and clumsy.
• Make sure your army is part of regional and global exchange and training networks.
• Acknowledge that Sudan will be a bad neighbor, nothing more and nothing less.
• Don’t become obsessed with big, fancy weapons.
• Take advantage of the international community’s assistance.
• Be wary of tight alignment with the United States.

Selling Seapower to Africa - PT II

Part I here. Why should developing nations in Africa (and US security force assistance efforts to those countries) be more focused on building maritime capacity rather than land power? As articulated by Geoffrey Till, seapower is the sum of all of a nation's civil and military maritime activities: "…there is more to seapower than grey painted ships with numbers on the
side... Seapower also includes the non-military aspects of sea use (merchant
shipping, fishing, marine insurance, shipbuilding and repair and so on) since
these contribute to naval power and since they can also influence the behaviour
of other people in their own right."

Certainly sea-borne trade is vital to just about any economy. Interestingly though, one of the most important factors in Africa’s recent and future economic growth is found under the sea. Mobile telephony and broadband Internet access are enabling some African countries to move directly from pastoral economies into the information age. Low cost connectivity facilitates many basic services for the developing world which the West has taken for granted for decades: a more transparent media, a platform for community organization and political activism, better access to health care and education, mobile banking and money exchange systems, and enhanced security for civilians in conflict zones. NDU’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies has produced an excellent study on this transformation. Even in Somalia, with all of its strife and problems, mobile telephony is one of the main (legitimate) drivers of economic growth.

Given the importance of broadband connectivity to the future of Africa; it stands to reason that the national security strategies of those countries should not ignore this economic lifeline. Undersea broadband cables are generally pretty robust and redundant, but there have been several recent notable outages around the world. And because groups like MEND and al Qaeda have become wise to the value of low cost, high impact attacks on maritime oil infrastructure, it stands to reason that they might expand into information infrastructure too. Along Africa's long coastlines, these cables could be disrupted intentionally by maritime guerrillas or more likely, just run over by wayward fishing trawlers. Monitoring and protection of their information infrastructure is yet another reason for African countries to spend a larger portion of their meager defense budgets on building competent coastal navies.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Selling Sea Power to Africa

African nations face an extremely complex and challenging maritime environment: terrorist facilitation at sea, narcotics, human, and weapons trafficking, and of course, piracy. Yet when it comes to investing in land power or sea power, most African countries with coastlines choose to skew their limited defense budgets towards their armies. This week, I had an interesting discussion with a gentleman from the National Defense University whose job it was to sell African leaders on the imperative to invest in maritime security. This executive-level policy dialogue complements the operational and tactical level engagements of Naval Forces Africa.

Why do these leaders yearn for T-72 tanks rather than offshore patrol vessels? Cultural and historical factors may play a part. Our own neglect and self-imposed obstacles for navy to navy (or to Coast Guard or marine police) are certainly another contributor to this land-bias. Naval force structure is only one aspect of sea power that needs to be addressed in Africa; other areas such as fisheries law and border control measures should be included in any security assistance strategies. Given growing interest in humanitarian, security, economic, and natural resource demand issues in Africa, it would behoove us to shift additional engagement away from our fiscally well off and tactically competent European partners towards these nascent navies. The counter-argument is that we need to maintain strong relations with our European partners so that we will be interoperable with them in during combined operations. The irony of this position is that lately, most of these combined operations have occurred because the African nations involved don't have the capacity to deal with these issues themselves.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Will War For Water

Remember all those predictions about how the world will go to war over peak oil? Well, those predictions never came from the US government. However, the US government has been predicting that we could, in the future, see war over water - and this is an example.

Ethiopia on Wednesday said it planned to build a huge dam on the Nile despite a long-running row with Egypt over use of the river and concern the dispute may spark a war.

The nine countries through which the river passes have for more than a decade been locked in often bitter talks to renegotiate colonial-era treaties that gave Egypt and Sudan the lion’s share of the river’s waters.

However, six of the nine upstream countries — Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi — have signed a new deal stripping Egypt of its veto.

“The Great Nile dam construction is scheduled to commence presently near the Ethio-Sudan border,” Water and Energy Minister Alemayehu Tegenu said.

In November, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told Reuters that Egypt was backing rebel groups in his country because of the Nile dispute and that if it went to war with upstream countries over the river it would lose.

More background on the issue here. Worth noting the timing as Nile River nations are moving against Egypt while their government is at the weakest point in several decades.

This could turn into a legitimate election issue in Egypt.

Libya: The First Real World Test of President Obama's Cooperative National Security Strategy

Today, we need to be clear-eyed about the strengths and shortcomings of international institutions that were developed to deal with the challenges of an earlier time and the shortage of political will that has at times stymied the enforcement of international norms. Yet it would be destructive to both American national security and global security if the United States used the emergence of new challenges and the shortcomings of the international system as a reason to walk away from it. Instead, we must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests such as combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic disease.

The starting point for that collective action will be our engagement with other countries. The cornerstone of this engagement is the relationship between the United States and our close friends and allies in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East—ties which are rooted in shared interests and shared values, and which serve our mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the world. We are working to build deeper and more effective partnerships with other key centers of influence—including China, India, and Russia, as well as increasingly influential nations such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia—so that we can cooperate on issues of bilateral and global concern, with the recognition that power, in an interconnected world, is no longer a zero sum game. We are expanding our outreach to emerging nations, particularly those that can be models of regional success and stability, from the Americas to Africa to Southeast Asia. And we will pursue engagement with hostile nations to test their intentions, give their governments the opportunity to change course, reach out to their people, and mobilize international coalitions.

National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010 (PDF)

I stood against the policy to intervene with military power in Libya. I have discussed my reasons, and others have articulated my reasons better than I have. I feel trapped when writing about Libya because my gut tells me I am watching a political train wreck in slow motion.

Of all the arguments that support the necessity for US involvement, I simply do not buy the strategic arguments made with one exception - we must support our allies. This argument was best articulated by Secretary Clinton following the Paris Summit Saturday. I remain unconvinced in my position on Libya, but that press conference by her was excellent.

"Supporting our allies" is the best argument the Obama administration has made. The President himself articulated that argument so poorly and so infrequently prior to taking military action that it never made an impact on me. I have to remind myself that the ugliness of the process by which policy was developed does not mean that the policy is bad. I remain skeptical of the Presidents policy, and I admit that skepticism makes it difficult to believe what the President is saying, but there is nothing to be done about it now except trust him until evidence suggests otherwise.

If we believe US policy for Libya is what the President says, then we can articulate the policy objectives of the United States to be:

1. Set Conditions for Coalition Operations
2. Support Coalition Operations With Unique US Capabilities
3. Support Coalition Nation Objectives

I am so used to the United States leading military operations globally that I actually find it difficult to believe there is a realistic alternative - let others lead. Some might say the US should never let others lead, but I would remind them that the existing National Defense Strategy of the United States is to concede that position of leadership when necessary.

I will note there is a lot of evidence that the United States military strategy being executed is in support of the policy articulated above. There are significant differences in Libya that suggests military operations reflect almost exactly what President Obama is saying.

Set Conditions for Coalition Operations

The unique military capabilities that have been demonstrated in Libya by the United States are taken for granted. Both Fox News and MSNBC reported on Sunday that 122 of the 124 Tomahawk missiles fired against Libya so far were from US ships and submarines. In other words, the United States took out the entire air defense of Libya in less than 36 hours with the USS Stout (DDG 55), USS Barry (DDG 52), USS Scranton (SSN 76), USS Providence (SSN 719), and USS Florida (SSGN 728). According to various sources, the USAF also flew a total of 15 U.S. Air Force aircraft made up of F-15s, F-16s, and three B-2 Spirit Bombers. Also in the air were 4 U.S. Marine Corps AV-8Bs and an unspecific number of support aircraft including at least 1 EC-130J ( <--hit that link and listen) and a handful of EA-18G Growlers.

That makes the US contribution an Expeditionary Strike Group (ARG + escorts and submarines) and no more than 40 USAF aircraft, only 15 of which are actually USAF strike aircraft so far. Libya is the first war participated in by America outside the Western hemisphere since WWII where the US has not deployed an aircraft carrier. The reason that is significant is because a single US nuclear aircraft carrier has more strike fighter aircraft than what the USAF has committed to Libyan operations to date. Despite the overwhelming show of force the last 24 hours, the US military footprint supporting operations against Libya is actually very small by US military standards.

Kicking down the door by destroying the entire air defense and command and control capacity of Libya in 36 hours is a capability unique to the United States. It would take at least 100 more aircraft or perhaps every Tomahawk capable ship from all European nations to do what the US Navy and USAF did this weekend - and we made it look so easy on TV with 5 naval vessels and less than 40 USAF aircraft that the whole world, including American citizens, takes that unique military capability of the United States for granted.

I'm not suggesting Libya was a bastion of defense, but I challenge anyone to develop a way Europe could have knocked out the Libyan air defense and C2 networks without using significantly more assets or nuclear weapons. What the US military did to Libya in a 36 hour period was a lot more impressive than folks realize, because no one else in the world could do it.

It seems to me this initial phase of military operations meets the criteria for the first policy objective of the United States stated above.

Support Coalition Operations With Unique US Capabilities

I am hesitant to make predictions, but I do believe that if we draw upon the policy as laid out by President Obama, US military operations are about to scale down considerably relative to the last few days. There will still be support aircraft like EA-18s, EC-130J, tankers, etc... operating but it won't surprise me if USAF strike fighter sorties become much less frequent as the fixed targets are eliminated.

Based on my read of US policy, the following assets will conduct the majority of operations over and around Libya from now on:

• Italy* - NMM Giuseppe Garibaldi (CVS 551), NMM Francesco Mimbelli (D 561), NMM Andrea Doria (D 553), NMM Euro (F 575), NMM Chimera (F 556), NMM Fenice (F 557), NMM San Marco (L 9893), NMM San Giorgio (L 9892), NMM Libra (P402), Elettra (A 5340), Etna (A-5326)
• France* - FS Forbin (D 620), FS Jean Bart (D 615), Charles de Gaulle (R 91), FS Dupleix (D 641), FS Aconit (F 713), FS La Meuse (A 607)
• United Kingdom* - HMS Triumph (S93), HMS Westminster (F237), HMS Cumberland (F85)
• Belgium - 6 F-16s
• Canada - 6 CF-18s for Operation MOBILE. Also HMCS Charlottetown (FFH 339)
• Denmark - 6 F-16s
• Greece - 4 F-16s, 1 R-99, HS Themistoklis (F465) and HS Limnos (F451)
• Norway - 6 F-16s, 1 P-3
• Qatar - 4 Mirage 2000-5EDA Fighters.
• Spain - 4 F-18s, 1 CN-235, 1 tanker aircraft, SPS Méndez Núñez (F104), SPS Tramontana (S74)
• United Arab Emirates - mix of 24 Mirage 2000-9s and F-16s

* I am unable to keep track of the number of aircraft involved by these nations, but they represent numbers of aircraft on par or greater than the United States.

Noteworthy that is at least 60 strike aircraft from the Libya coalition without adding in the US, France, UK, or Italy to conduct operations over Libya. Additionally, I suspect the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) may be used in some circumstances helping civilians, as close air support against ground targets is what the aircraft on that ship can do.

Support Coalition Nation Objectives

It is noteworthy that the only aircraft carriers supporting operations for Libya are being fielded by Italy and France. There is evidence both nations will continue to contribute strike fighters as part of the coalition. Based on naval presence and numbers of contributing strike aircraft my assumption is that the United States will turn military operations over to either France or the UK, and the US policy objective will be to support the French and UK policy objective - which I read to be remove Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi from power.

This policy, while shared by many Americans, may drive Americans nuts. The political left is split, with many not happy because President Obama has allowed the US to get involved in another war against an Arab nation. The right is also split, with many not happy the US is spending money for a third war when we already have two wars on our hands. The real political question going forward is whether the supporters of the President's Libya policy on both sides of the political isle will accept US involvement in a war where the outcome of objectives will be determined by someone else - specifically European and Middle Eastern nations both politically and militarily.

This approach that concedes political and military leadership in war to others is uncharted waters for existing generations of Americans, but it explains why Admiral Mullen told "Meet the Press" that one outcome is Gaddafi remaining in power. If US policy was deciding the outcome in Libya instead of others, Admiral Mullen would never have said that.

What is at stake in this political struggle regarding military use? As I see it, the fundamental promise of cooperative partnership that everything else in President Obama's National Security Strategy of the United States is built upon is at stake with Libya. The only way cooperative partnership will work as a strategic theory going forward in the 21st century is if the United States concedes ownership of political objectives to others when they take the lead to regional problems. Welcome to Libya, the first real world regional war where this theory is tested. The politics are likely to be ugly without strong Presidential leadership - leadership that has not existed to date.

If the strategic argument that Barack Obama has built US policy for Libya on is indeed to support our allies, now that we are involved - in my opinion what is at stake is the viability of existing European international partnerships as a legitimate foundation for national security strategy for the United States in the emerging 21st century global heterogeneous political and economic environment. We either trust in our European allies, or we don't. The President has made the policy of the United States to trust European leaders in France and the UK. Since they recently placed their trust in us for Iraq and Afghanistan, we know one possible ending.

Optimizing APS

GAO has produced a new report on various interagency issues in AFRICOM including a focus on the Africa Partnership Stations. One item of interest is the table on page 54 listing the ships used over the 14 iterations of APS, which include US CRUDES and Amphibs, USCG cutters, and allied ships. Given the enduring nature of this mission, and others like it around the world, one wonders when the Navy will procure a vessel optimized to engage nascent navies. Certainly DDGs are overkill. If the primary goal is a platform that can hold the various training teams and interagency reps, then a JHSV will probably fit the bill. But if it's to give partners a realistically attainable platform to emulate for operations and training, then the USCG cutters, or better yet, a new green water vessel (something between a PC and FFG/LCS) would be appropriate. Maybe the right answer is a mix of the two.

Also worthwhile is the discussion of challenges involving various flavors of money in support of partner capacity building efforts, which include spending details from Nashville's APS deployment. The problems inherent with complex and inefficient funding and authorities for security force assistance have been reported consistently by multiple COCOMs for several years, yet OSD, Congress, and other relevant agencies have done next to nothing to address this critical shortfall to security cooperation.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Engaging Nascent Navies

Around the world, but especially on both coasts of Africa, small maritime units, some not even meeting the thresholds of a coast guard, conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy, fisheries protection patrols, and other low intensity missions. Others quietly go about developing asymmetric means to counter more powerful navies. As combatant commander naval components develop partner engagement strategies, writing off or marginalizing these nascent navies would be convenient. Conversely, navy intelligence analysts are often quick to ignore a potential adversary maritime force just because it doesn’t currently pose a threat to blue water fleet assets. It wasn't too long ago that the IRGCN was essentially a nascent navy consisting of a bunch of yahoos in small boats. The yahoos and small boats still exists, but today the force (which it must be noted resides in a separate chain of command from the Iranian Navy), has developed an array of sea denial capabilities, to include mines, anti-ship missiles, and suicide craft. Perhaps the Hamas Naval Police falls into this category today.

How can the US Navy best engage with burgeoning naval partners while countering potential adversaries? Increasingly, the best way to work in the littorals against non-state threats given limited force structure will be to develop close relationships with maritime partners and surrogates. Persistence presence, not periodic engagement is appropriate. Traditional USN engagements with smaller navies consist of not much more than a sporadic passex followed by high fives and a reception on the fantail with some lumpia hors d'oeuvres. Today's Africa Partnership Stations are a step in the right direction, but still lack the persistence required to build trust and share information, prerequisites to a beneficial relationship for both parties. NSW certainly understands the value of enduring relationships, having recently stood up Anchor Teams. There is no reason that the Navy writ large shouldn't embrace a similar concept, embedding small teams of mature, culturally attuned Sailors in nascent navies globally. Everybody wants to do a PEP tour in Australia or the Netherlands, but where's the line to sign up for an exchange tour with the Puntland Coast Guard or Sierra Leone's Navy?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Maritime Insurgents and Global Oil Disruption

While all eyes are focused on the oil pouring into the Gulf of Mexico, across the Atlantic, potentially more devastating spills threaten the Nigerian Delta. The MEND has resumed attacks on oil companies and is wreaking its own brand of ecological and economic warfare against the Nigerian government and the world's energy supplies. MEND's guerilla tactics against oil production include a combination of piracy and kidnapping on deepwater rigs, sabotage against coastal pipelines, and direct attacks on facilities. In 2009, 51 oil workers from Shell were kidnapped for ransom, an increase from 11 in 2008.

As can be expected in modern globalized insurgencies, additional groups with diverse motives and tactics have entered the fray against oil production in Nigeria. In the future one might expect the MEND to import additional tactics from other movements, including waterborne IEDs. And by the way, the US imports more oil from Nigeria than Saudi Arabia.

If tasked, would the US Navy be prepared to deal with this sort of problem? Are current force structure, training, and TTPs ready for a maritime-focused insurgency?

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or any of its agencies.

Anti-Piracy Reaper

Check out this pic. Looks like we have an anti-piracy pod.

Observing the Shift of Naval Strike Groups Towards Africa

We are observing a shift of naval operations that originate from the Atlantic fleet, and all indications are the shift may be permanent. For the past decade the Atlantic fleet has provided what is essentially a token presence in the Atlantic Ocean, with the majority of deploying forces heading for the Middle East. While Kosovo represents an exception, compared to the cold war, naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea had almost completely disappeared by 2005, activity that has included closing the Naval base at La Maddalena, Italy a few years ago.

However, there are several signs that the US Navy is reducing its naval presence in the Middle East, or put another way, beginning the process of more widely distributing the activity of its forward deployed Atlantic based strike groups. The current deployment of the empty ESG, the Nassau Expeditionary Strike Group, appears to be the first candidate executing this shift in naval deployment strategy. Rather than a return to a cold war posture of naval forces in the North Atlantic, it appears the Navy is making its shift from the waters of the Middle East towards the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and all points around Africa including and probably specifically the Gulf of Guinea. The Nassau ESG for example, spent several weeks in the Mediterranean Sea early in its 6 month deployment, then moved to the 5th Fleet AOR for a few months, and has pulled out of the region back into the Mediterranean Sea. Another example is the USS Ashland (LSD 48), which is part of the Nassau ESG, spent almost its entire time after crossing the Suez Canal in the Southeast African region building partnerships with regional nations. While not a unique mission profile, it has happened infrequently enough that it is worth noting.

Everyone is skeptical of AFRICOM, and to be honest, we are too. It simply is not popular to Africans and is having a very difficult time building an image that can be embraced. We believe there is only one solution for stopping the violence and improving the conditions in Africa, and it is economic power, not military power, although we acknowledge there is a role for military power to improve security conditions long enough for economic power to take its course.

We have read what amounts to whining from some circles that big foreign business wants to go to Africa and strip the land of its resources. While that is one way to phrase it, we certainly hope that is exactly what happens, because nothing would improve the conditions in Africa better and faster than the arrival of business interests that bring stability to governments, jobs to the people, and connection (thus interest) with the rest of the world. People who genuinely care about Africa want more economic investment there, people who don't care actually complain about the influx of opportunities that would become available to Africans if big business invests, as if the alternative of spontaneous economic combustion is likely to occur and change the culture instead.

The naval approach to Africa is not similar to AFRICOMs approach. The Navy is only going where it is being invited, specifically to train domestic security forces and improve the domestic security capacity to foster commerce. While these naval projects include humanitarian assistance and volunteer work to build infrastructure, the focus is to improve security capabilities to facilitate private sector investment.

For example, Naval engineers help build up a decapitated dock while a local contractor dredges a port. This leads to the port being able to accept deeper draft ships for commerce, thus kick starting the capacity of commerce by sea. The commerce is protected by the security forces (read coast guard) that are being trained through assistance programs set up by western navies. The trained security forces keep the commerce free of piracy, thus keep the lines of commerce open. These steps improve the conditions for foreign investment, and builds the domestic economic conditions towards a favorable conclusion. Everything is one step at a time, and the process will take years to get all the pieces in place, but the objective is not to build from the inside out (which is sort of how we see the AFRICOM approach), rather create multiple avenues in and out (read connectivity) thus expanding markets and economic oppertunity. We note the US Navy has been building a networked approach for working with regional nations at sea for years.

The next step in this process is presence by the US Navy to build partnerships in the region, and we observe forces like Expeditionary Strike Groups are an excellent way to do this. As large, shallow draft vessels with virtually every littoral capability, these ships can enter port in many places where a surface combatant cannot, and if there is security in the port and places to spend money, well hello economics! Consider the potential... the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) is entering Hong Kong today, and estimates are the visit will result in a minimum $1,000,000 boost to the local Hong Kong economy.

Now scale that potential to a ship like the USS Nassau (LHA 4) (crew slightly over 900) making port at Sao Tome while the USS Nashville (LPD 13) (crew of around 400) makes port in Santo Antonio. If 65% the crew of each ship takes liberty and spends $100 each day for 3 days in each port, that would be $253,500 for the local economies, and that is just two ships making a 3 day liberty. For perspective on local impact, $253,500 is nearly .1% of the GDP of Sao Tome and Principe. If the US Navy made 4 similar visits in one year, the GDP of Sao Tome and Principe would grow .4% on tourism by the US Navy alone.

From a force posture perspective, the shift of naval forces will essentially reduce the time an Atlantic fleet strike group tours in the Middle East thus increasing the naval presence off Africa. There will be some who are skeptical of motive, they are the ignorant. This is a smart move by the US Navy, not only to improve our image in Africa, but it connects the US national economic interest in Africa with military power, an alignment long overdue, and does so through presence without footprint allowing us to build relationships without imposing them, and has a nice side effect of boosting local economies to boot.

We are left with one unknown that will be interesting to observe. While amphibious ships can make port in more places than a surface combatant, it will be interesting where the CSGs go when they spend time off the African coast later this year. We believe it is very possible one side effect of this shift of naval forces from the Middle East could be a greater presence in the South Atlantic, and that could lead to more Carrier port visits to South American nations like Brazil. Very little was said about the liberty by the USS George Washington (CVN 73) crew in Rio earlier this year, but we imagine the local economic effect of four days liberty for ~4000 sailors was very positive. At $100 a day for 3 days, that potentially had a $1.2 million dollar local impact.

So what will the US Navy be doing off Africa when it's not in port? We won't speculate in detail, but this is an example of the kind of nonsense that will hopefully be put to an end with more US Navy presence:

If you read the news even casually, you have probably heard of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and his violent crusade for power. A couple months ago, a Chinese ship loaded with weapons was prevented from unloading those weapons in South Africa. The ship eventually left port an sailed around for a week before reportedly heading back to China. However, with no naval presence, the ship was able to do its thing unobserved, and reportedly made port in the Congo where the weapons were unloaded and eventually delivered. These same weapons are almost certainly being used in the violence we are seeing today. This is the Chinese naval approach to Africa, something that needs to be highlighted more often if the violence is to stop. Yes, we suggest they were PLAN, because middle of the night underway refueling at sea isn't the stuff of average mariners.

With the US Navy's attention focused on supporting the wars in the Middle East and piracy off Somalia, while the Europeans manage refugee problems in a number of places including the Mediterranean Sea while also shrinking their naval forces, and with most of the growing Navies condensed to the Pacific, the simple fact is if the US Navy isn't there, nobody is. Presence by the US Navy matters, and off Africa it is part of smart strategy towards the ends of improving the security conditions.

Accounting for the capabilities of Amphibious Ships not discussed, we note this is one of many reasons why we believe smart 21st century naval strategy for resources increases the number of amphibious ships as an emphasis. The US will do more with a LPD or a corvette flotilla off Africa in 2020 than it will ever possibly be able to do with a reduced crew, invisible, warfare centric first-rate battleship. The Strategic Maritime approach for Africa calls for metrics like visibility, manpower, and operational flexibility. Just saying...

What Gates and Bono Have In Common

In From the Cold has an interesting post up regarding the recent visit by Bono to the Pentagon, apparently where Bono had a 20 minute meeting with Secretary of Defense Gates. George Smiley (you have to love the spook nicknames) approaches the development with a healthy mix of skepticism and potential, and if it was anyone but Gates I would almost certain dismiss this as a development without a second thought, but our observation of Gates is 'he is one clever bastard' and we consider him one of the most impressive Presidential appointments in decades. Reuters has the story.

U2 lead singer and activist Bono visited the Pentagon to discuss Africa and the fight against global poverty with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, representatives of the two men said on Wednesday.

Among the topics at the 20-minute meeting on Tuesday afternoon were U.S. plans to set up a new U.S. military command for Africa, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said.

"I think this was a chance for two people who care about the problems facing the continent of Africa to talk about their shared interest in solving those problems," Morrell said of the meeting that was not publicized in advance.

A spokeswoman for DATA, the group co-founded by Bono to fight poverty and AIDS in Africa, said the singer had been in Washington to meet members of budget committees in Congress.

One could assume that this perhaps has something to do with AFRICOM, and it indeed may, but if Gates had done his homework and we are almost certain he does, he would have recognized that DATA is about AIDS, and when you are talking about AIDS one of the largest areas where AIDS related non governmental organizations have set up shop is in the nations around the Gulf of Guinea. It just so happens, the Navy is in that theater and AIDS is on the agenda. It's called the African Partnership Station, and it is unlikely Bono knows what he should about its purpose.

Consider this, the same week Gates is meeting with Bono about "issues involving poverty in Africa", the same Bono who sponsors one of the largest high profile AIDS organizations in the world (DATA), the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) is pulling into Sao Tome and Principe, a nation well known for AIDS issues.

We have discussed the African Partnership Station on this blog many times, but early on we specifically highlighted the desire of an international partnered, joint agency, and non-governmental organization approach, and in our example we specifically cited AIDS in in Sao Tome and Principe. At the time I discussed an observation made by a friend of mine who works in AIDS relief for an NGO in Sao Tome and Principe.

In that area there is a stigma from people regarding others with AIDS, and it leads to people with AIDS not getting treatments because they don't want others to know they have it.

He sees some of the other NGOs demonstrating the same stigma towards the API. While all the NGOs are trying to breakdown the stigma of AIDS, he sees some of the NGOs in hypocrisy because of their stigma over the US military.

The only weakness observed to date with the Global Fleet Station approach, and in particular the African Partnership Initiative is getting the NGOs to get involved. The European NGOs in particular are so skeptical of the US Military based on their perception of credibility issues that they would rather not work with the Americans for no other reason than their personal bias against the military.

If the African Partnership Initiative was able to get DATA involved in the process, and produce positive press regarding the enabling capability the US Navy can offer in their capacity, it could potentially break down the skepticism the Navy is encountering from the European NGOs and truly bridge the gap in creating a joint approach. The Navy desires to be the security enabler for the host nation, but also a logistical enabler for NGO contribution, leveraging civilian rather than military cooperation as a force enabler in connecting to African nations.

Did Gates and Bono discuss the African Partnership Initiative? Of the number of discussions about Africa where Gates and Bono could find common cause, we certainly believe it is one of the more likely topics the two could discuss and both contribute to the 20 minute discussion.

6th Fleet Focus: Guidance 2008 Reflects Maritime Strategy

U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa Guidance for 2008 was released Jan. 8, by Adm. Mark Fitzgerald Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa. It is available to read on the 6th Fleet website. The reason we find this an interesting read is because it highlights how some of the naval terminology has changed to put the 2008 Guidance in line with the new Maritime Strategy. Words have meaning, buzzwords not so much, but one needs to understand the buzzwords in naval terms to understand what the Navy is saying, the direction they are taking within the context of strategy, and they are doing.

Operational Objectives

1. Improve Maritime Safety and Security in Africa and Europe
2. Be Prepared for Any Contingency
3. Provide Exceptional Stewardship to Our Workforce and Families
4. Advance the Art and Science of Maritime Operations
5. Enhance Awareness of the Harmony of Partner and U.S. Interests and Activities
6. Support Other EUCOM, AFRICOM, and Navy Component Commanders

It would appear the phrase Maritime Safety and Security (MSS) is going to stay in the lexicon. Admiral Ulrich, whom Adm. Mark Fitzgerald recently replaced, can be credited for building a foundation for some the partnership strategies contained in the new Maritime Strategy. His low cost and effective implementation of a maritime traffic tracking system in the Mediterranean Sea has led to increased regional information collection of relevant maritime data, data which the Navy has encouraged cooperation with by bringing regional nations together to form a larger maritime partnership based on a regional mutual security interest. There have been problems, there always are, but there have also been successes in that regard.

The new Maritime Strategy transitions the Navy into a revolution of security affairs. 6th Fleet is rightfully shifting strategy from what was primarily a cold war defense role to a collective security and stabilization role. 6th Fleet is looking to export encouragement and services to help form international partnerships in troubled regions, particularly in its African theater, hoping to increase regional security and promote stability in Africa. What makes joining these regional partnerships attractive to regional nations is that the partnerships don't require the US to create a footprint within their countries, rather the US footprint remains at sea in what is one of many concepts being developed under Sea Basing. It will be interesting as we observe AFRICOM evolve where Sea Basing fits in their developing strategy.

The Navy is there to provide services; logistical, humanitarian, training, etc; to both the sovereign regional partners and other partnership agencies involved. These partnership agencies include the intelligence agencies, Coast Guard, the State Department, USAID, among others, and several private medical, social, and environmental organizations are encouraged to partnership as well. If the strategy is successful, individual nations will be who ultimately provides the safety and security for their respective region of these partnerships.

The soft power approach by 6th Fleet represents a grand strategy for theater cooperation in the maritime domain, and we are already seeing several examples in recent and current deployments. During the recently completed Enterprise CSG, the USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) spent almost the entire deployment on a tour of nations in both the 5th Fleet and 6th Fleet theaters, and appears to have hit several ports in the Black Sea and also circumvent Africa during that deployment. The SNMG1 and SNMG2 activities south of the Suez are also examples. Currently, the USS Bainbridge (DDG 96) serves with SNMG1 while the USS Laboon (DDG 58) serves with SNMG2, thus continuing the partnerships within the NATO framework.

The USS San Jacinto (CG 56), which deployed with the Truman CSG is operating in the Mediterranean Sea and we expect to see it visit a number of nations in the 5th and 6th fleet like the USS Forrest Sherman (DDG 98) did. When you consider the USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) African Partnership Initiative mission in the Gulf of Guinea, where we have also seen the USS Annapolis (SSN 760) make a stop, and the HSV Swift is inbound, American sailors operating in the 6th Fleet have become the ambassadors to Africa within the context of the new Maritime Strategy.

The nature of many of these maritime partnerships is informal, voluntary, and subject to change with the political winds for each nation, including the US, meaning this type of soft power strategic approach requires the United States to have an effective, consistent foreign policy that contains credible outreach to partner nations in the partnership if it is to be effective.

Of all the Fleets, the 6th Fleets continued gradual transition from a historically major war fleet supporting a garrison strategy of Europe against the Soviet Union into a tailored soft power expeditionary sea based fleet strikes us as an interesting barometer for measuring the soft power influences of the new Maritime Strategy. Tradition in the Navy tends to generate resistance to change, even when there is agreement that change is needed.

So far, other than the API we are not really seeing any major changes, the large surface combatant tours to various ports in the Black Sea and Africa isn't something new, it just hasn't been done in years while the Navy has been focused in the traditional cold war maritime regions. The only change we are observing is more ships operating near Africa than in past years. Will we see something new that connects to the regional nations emerge with these large surface combatant tours? We'll have to wait and see.