Theories and Realities of War

I think this article by Dan Cox over at the Small Wars Journal is an article everyone needs to go read. Read it from beginning to end.

Did you read it yet? Go read the damn article before reading this post any further.

I am going to ask you a serious question, which means if you post an answer in the comments within 5 minutes of being asked the question, your answer probably wasn't considered long enough...

How many different ways are we fooling ourselves? Is counterinsurgency doctrine as fragile as an applied military doctrine as that article suggests? How is it possible counterinsurgency is considered a practical military approach for theater campaign warfighting if as an applied military doctrine in a real war, it can be undone so easily?

If a few burned Korans and the actions of a single mentally unstable individual can set back a theater level military campaign by "months if not years" as suggested by Dan Cox, how sound is the judgment of the civilian and military leaders who pushed this course of action? How sound is the judgement of political leadership who went along with it?

If our nations theater level military strategy in Afghanistan truly is as fragile as Dan Cox suggests, there are many civilian and uniformed military leaders who need to be fired - and yes, it absolutely begins with the President who specifically picked this course of action and advanced it in that military campaign as his first act as Commander in Chief.

Think about the article before responding, because if you discover yourself believing the Koran burning and the rampage of a single individual truly does have the strategic impacts some (like Dan Cox) are suggesting, one only needs to wonder how many lies will be told to salvage the careers of existing civilian and uniformed military leaders who have committed one of the greatest military blunders in post WWII history.

I don't want to believe these events actually matter as much as Dan Cox suggests, because I don't want to believe the nation has this many Generals who supported a theater level war plan in Afghanistan that was truly this fragile. Perhaps I'm too optimistic, or perhaps there is too much overreaction to recent events in Afghanistan.

However, if Afghanistan does unravel by these very limited events, President Obama needs to fire the dozen top military leaders who pushed him for this military approach, and expect he himself could be fired come the next election for the same mistake. If these events are truly as damning as is suggested (and I truly am skeptical these incidents have staying power as strategic setbacks), COIN is a complete failure as an applied military doctrine for any war, ever.

The President is, based on the hype of these incidents, either the fool who picked COIN as the military approach for Afghanistan, or the fool who didn't know better. Regardless, the apparent fragility of COIN in application makes anyone who implements COIN at the theater level look like a fool, and it is a guarantee the American people will be lied to before the magnitude of the COIN mistake is ever admitted, or revealed, publicly.

Bottom line - President Obama isn't pulling out of Afghanistan, at least not this year. And these events aren't that big of a deal, because even if they are - they will get fixed come hell or high water in an election year. As sad as it may or may not be, in an election year soldiers become pawns in the political election. If you believe otherwise, you need to go read up on what was happening in Iraq back in 2004 - it was all flowers and rainbows until the day after the election.

In Our Prayers

From here.

A helicopter crash in Afghanistan's eastern Wardak province killed 31 U.S. special operation troops and seven Afghan soldiers, the country's president said Saturday. It was the highest number of American casualties recorded in a single incident in the decade-long war.

ABC News reported that as many as 25 Navy SEALs were on the aircraft at the time. The other casualties included seven Afghan Special Forces troops, an interpreter, five helicopter crew members and one dog.

The STRATCOM Opportunity of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame

No matter where I go or who I talk to in the US Navy, the one thing folks give me a hard time about is that it is suggested I often spend too much time focusing on piracy in Somalia and not enough time discussing Al Shabaab. That is fair, I guess, although I was the guy who suggested we buy the services of pirates to fight Al Shabaab, after all at least we know the motivation of pirates is money...

But on a more serious note, US officials have been talking up the threat posed by Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula over the last few months. It turns out, they had a very credible intelligence source of information regarding the threat of those two organizations. A few details from Luis Martinez of ABC News.

After secretly holding and interrogating a Somali man captured off the coast of Africa for two months, the United States indicted him, claiming he was a liaison between terrorist groups.

The Somali man, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, believed to be in his mid-20s, is a top leader in the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia who has been acting as a go-between with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the U.S. Justice Department alleged in an indictment Tuesday.

Many thoughts, not very well collected, come to mind as I observe this event.

First, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was captured at sea on April 19, 2024 and taken to USS Boxer (LHD 4) where he was interrogated and held before being transferred to New York. To capture the man while at sea obviously suggests an impressive intelligence operation took place behind the scenes, and while it shouldn't need to be said - the reason the US did capture him on what was almost certainly a short notice window to respond to intelligence is because the US Navy is globally deployed and always present. It is probably a bit of luck that some pirate event didn't have our ships out of position to respond to this intelligence, a detail that needs to be stated because it is important to note piracy is a distraction for maritime forces, not a maritime mission the US Navy is currently, actively dealing with directly.

Second, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame was captured at sea. The sea is playing an important but rarely discussed role in Al-Qaeda's lines of communications. Around The Horn of Africa there is a lot of attention given to piracy as the major problem at sea, but piracy is a symptom of the bigger regional lack-of stability problem and by no definition is piracy a threat to the national interests of the United States. Task Force 151, the international task force against piracy, is symbolic of US military activities lately - it is a halfhearted military solution that can never solve the political problem that sources the piracy in the first place. I do not know why it is the policy of the United States to sail the fleet in circles off the Horn of Africa pretending to protect commerce from piracy threats, but at some point effective and efficient use of the fleet needs to focus on forwarding legitimate security solutions. In this instance, that claim can be made.

Third, I intend to leave the legalities of taking Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame to civilian court to the experts, and highly recommend the good folks at the Lawfare Blog. They have made available a copy of the full indictment of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame at this link (PDF), and have already gone into the coverage of this very important development. Does it matter? Yes, how we deal with terrorists is a legal issue that rises to the level of a Presidential election issue. Will this trial get as much coverage as Casey Anthony? It would be a tragedy regarding the judgment and quality of American journalism that balances ratings in favor of national importance if it didn't, which also means it probably won't get anywhere near as much attention as Casey Anthony on the US cable news networks.

Fourth, the politics of this are also very important. George Bush left office with no way to deal with detained terrorists except to release them to the custody of other nations. Some people say the Guantanamo Bay solution works just fine, but it really doesn't. The bottom line on the Guantanamo Bay solution is that it has always been a temporary solution with no replacement, and both the Executive and Congress has been unable to come up with a better replacement for almost a decade now.

But more important than the detainment politics to me is the war narrative politics. For a couple of years now the US Army has cited only "hundreds" or less Al Qaeda operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, but Al Shabaab alone is well over 5,000, with access to tens of thousands more disenfranchised folks in Somalia alone. No one really knows how big Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is, but best verifiable numbers range over 500, and they have access to many thousands of disenfranchised folks in Yemen. While it is unlikely the Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame case will bring it up, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is on the rise and becoming the next big problem with thousands in their ranks.

The point is, Afghanistan gets all the attention but that isn't where Al Qaeda is. I've put together a little map to put my thoughts in context, and included a few pointers to where one might notice a few dumpster fires.

One Hot Mess

There are more Al Qaeda at the end of those arrows on this map than all other places not shown on this map combined, and you do not see major parts of Pakistan or Afghanistan on that map. The Obama administration knows this, hell everyone knows this, but the question is what is anyone going to do about it and what should the United States be doing about it?

The Obama administration is going to send Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame to civilian court, which means evidence will be presented publicly and a narrative will emerge from that evidence.

We are about to find out if the United States has any STRATCOM at all in the State Department, because this court case is without question the single most important STRATCOM moment of the next decade in the fight against terrorism - not just on the prosecution legal side but also on the operational side.

So lets all generically think about what is happening here. News reports are claiming Somalia is not only a failed state, but Somalia is a dead state with as many as 54,000 people fleeing the war stricken drought zone in June alone. Pirates are now organized enough to use the Yemen controlled island of Socotra as a fuel depot. News headlines tomorrow will discuss a pirate hijacking inside the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, about 30 miles from Aden if my sources are correct. But none of this news items about Somalia actually matters, because none of these developments represent a threat to the national interest of the United States.

Those are other peoples problems and should be left for other people to deal with. It might be hard to swallow, but when one starts counting problems in Somalia, piracy looks more and more like the least of the problems folks are facing, at least it is unless piracy is part of the income model for Al Shabaab. No government has officially made that claim yet though.

The threat comes from Al Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) - all of whom are capable and have desires to strike at US interests both globally and domestically. Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame represents the link between Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which makes him potentially the most important Al Qaeda member captured outside Pakistan or Afghanistan since 9/11. If similar links between these organizations and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) exist, we are in serious trouble... and those links probably exist.

Think about the map. Right now Libya is a dumpster fire with no local functioning security system, which means it represents a tremendous opportunity for organizations linked to Al Qaeda to move and operate freely around the current military contest for political control. Libya has all the makings of a prolonged, uncontrolled tribal war similar to Somalia where groups are likely to link up with elements of Al Qaeda like AQAP and AQIM for support towards taking political control once Gaddafi is removed.

Folks also better start paying attention to the news on the western side of Africa, because another front is starting to open up in Africa (see here, here, and here) - and I'm not talking about Independence day in Sudan this Saturday - which is where the UN is focused.

Right now we are fighting wars on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the political objective hopefully to reduce the military presence in both nations over the next few years. Pakistan is going to remain a target in an extended air campaign for years. The only sure thing we know from the announced arrest of Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame is that the United States is about to really spin up air operations in Yemen and Somalia over the next days, weeks, and months.

Libya is a strategic catastrophe, or as it is more commonly being called privately - an Obama Boondoggle - and it will surely look like one that even the best political spin doctors can't hide as European nations begin to withdraw from combat operations next month. Libya is also emerging as the new nexus in North Africa for Al Qaeda, and anyone who says otherwise is ignoring how that fight against Al Qaeda is the fight everyone knows is coming after Gaddafi loses power. The easiest prediction one can make right now is that some form of covert US military operations against AQIM and their efforts in Nigeria are coming - sooner rather than later. Finally, the Obama administration has a "no massacre" policy, so if things get heated after South Sudan declares independence, expect US military activity there too.

Since AFRICOM stood up, the focus has been engaging African nations at their request in what is described as a "supportive role" towards security. That must change in the very near future.

At some point it is time to admit that strategically, the US military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq to consolidate and contain Al Qaeda to those two states has failed miserably, and the US must adapt. I do not know what that adaptation looks like, but western, northern, and eastern Africa are dumpster fires where Al Qaeda presence is growing - and AFRICOM needs to grow up from its touchy, feely hands off approach and be a real Unified Combatant Command if they are going to productively deal with these emerging problems. The United States is facing Al Qaeda on three sides of a continent we have neglected as policy for decades, and our best friend on the continent - Egypt - is enduring some internal issues that remove the nation as a regional leader we can count on.

Which takes us back to Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame's day in court and the associated STRATCOM. What will the court files reveal about Al Qaeda? What will be the emerging narrative from a terrorist trial in the US at a time where the nation is suffering from war fatigue, and oh by the way, the future is darker than the present. How strong are our alliances and are they sufficient to address emerging challenges?

How can the US and China work together in solving the emerging Al Qaeda problem in Africa? We are engaged with China on this, right? If the answer isn't yes, we have much work to do. How long before Europe bails in dealing with problems on their own southern lawn? How much longer will US war hawks trumpet the cause in Afghanistan with other, much more serious problems emerging in Africa and the Middle East? How long can the US sustain "air campaigns" and claim that activity legitimately forwards a solution, as opposed to doing what air campaigns always do - prolong the problems?

The US Navy is heavily investing in force structure to fight the big war against China in the Pacific while the nation is engaged in 6 campaigns - none currently deployed from the sea - in 6 countries across the Middle East and Africa. The most important nation in Africa besides the United States is China. In other words, the Navy is organizing to fight the one nation that has the most shared interest with us towards an Africa that is connected to the global trade system - something Al Qaeda stands squarely against. Is this approach to national security interests our naval strategy, or our naval strategery?

What does the logistics of distributed regional naval support presence look like when low end counter terrorism problems are to be addressed in the maritime domain by the Littoral Combat Ship?

Tell me what WWIII might look like. Take your hand and rub it on a globe from Nigeria to Pakistan on land, and if we count piracy - go from the Gulf of Guinea up towards the Med, down the Red Sea and all the way over to the west Indian coast topped by the Persian Gulf all the way down to the southeastern coastline of Africa. Is that a sufficient amount of territorial mass to conduct military operations and potentially be big enough to be a world war? By 2012 that is almost certainly going to be the range of land and sea where the US is conducting air strikes and maritime security operations against legitimate Al Qaeda related terrorism threats. This is not a hollow prediction, the US has consistently fought Al Qaeda wherever they go, and right now that enormous swath of territory is the area Al Qaeda is attempting to influence politically. Think about it.

STRATCOM matters in ideological struggles, and right now the expansion of Al Qaeda across Africa represents a weakness in our ideological struggle against the legitimacy of Al Qaeda as a credible alternative to the global trade system. If the global trade system isn't effectively reaching the people of African nations, which in many cases it is not; Al Qaeda represents a legitimate alternative to an offering we can't make to disenfranchised people.

The STRATCOM from the Obama administration offers nothing productive to disenfranchised people in Africa, and unfortunately that is the one lesson everyone stands witness to with the Arab Spring. That also might explain why the Obama administration does not stand up for folks like Mubarak and Gaddafi, hoping the result will offer the US better access to disenfranchised people. Will we have compelling alternatives for the people once dictators are out of power? I don't think anyone really knows, primarily because we are still quite uncertain how it all turns out in Egypt.

Are we fighting the right fights with the right tools? Today the Obama administration claims air campaigns aren't war; they are simply an evolved variation of armed humanitarian intervention. If humanitarian air strikes isn't the STRATCOM for Libya, then what exactly is? What about Somalia? What about Pakistan? Yemen? Sudan? Nigeria? Are we shaping the information environment for political action, or simply shaping the battlefield for the next air campaign?

The United States is a strategic hot mess right now in our fight against Al Qaeda. We are engaged in two land wars and air campaigns in four countries, and we do not have a policy that can be articulated as an acceptable plan for successfully ending any of these military campaigns. Why is defense cuts the most highlighted spending issue by this administration when the Presidents policies continue to call for more and more open ended military activity across Africa and the Middle East? How does any of this end?

Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame is sure to be another political parade of some sort, but is the United States preparing to lead the parade by establishing a narrative that explains the use of global forces or are we simply going to operate as usual pretending 6 different simultaneous military campaigns are no big deal? I believe the event represents a real opportunity for the administration to take control of the counter terrorism narrative to forward a more reasonable realignment of counter terrorism policy.

If the President can't establish a narrative that explains the constantly expanding use of military force globally as his primary political tool in the war against terrorism, then he needs to be replaced for getting the United States involved in (and also failing to lead during) what is by any definition the largest hot battlefield globally the nation has fought on since World War II. It is quite concerning that US political leaders are not being held accountable for that remarkable fact.

The Afghanistan Focus on Fear and Consequences

I will admit it. When the Lexington Institute blog first started, I wasn't a fan, but I am now willing to admit that I read it every day. Daniel Goure and Loren Thompson have an uncanny ability of getting me to think about something in most of their posts - sometimes about something mentioned on the margins rather than the main idea they are discussing. Either way, sparking an idea should be the point of writing at all - and in that effort I find them successful.

That blog really deserves more credit than it gets, and has come a long way in demonstrating how a think tank can contribute to the daily narrative of ideas floating around the National Security discussion.

Naturally, I am giving the Early Warning Blog credit in the same post I am going to disagree with something said, because you know - that's how bloggers roll sometimes. A recent piece by Daniel Goure is beneath the quality I have come to enjoy from him. This blog post comes from June 22nd, before the announcement by the President regarding the troop drawdown, is what has been tumbling around in my head.

The President is expected to propose a time-phased withdrawal of the troops sent as part of the surge, possibly modified by the situation on the ground at the time. But what about the other 70,000 U.S. personnel and those from allied countries? If he does not make the case for a longer-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan he places the entire enterprise at risk. Without a compelling rationale for our presence in that country, in Southwest Asia and globally, any future economic shocks could see the collapse of the Afghan experiment, the defense budget and America’s global military position.

When Britain pulled out of Asia and the Middle East the United States was prepared and able to take its place. So the power vacuum in the world was temporary in duration and limited in scope. If the United States withdraws from either the Middle East or Asia, the world will be left with a yawning security chasm.

My problem with this argument, and many other articles written since the announcement by the President that it is time to draw down troops in Afghanistan is that there appears to be some link made between Afghanistan and the United States global commitment in Asia and the Middle East - as if pulling out of Afghanistan means retreating back to the Texas border with Mexico. Where does this presumed cause and effect rationale come from?

The US pulled out of Vietnam and the US didn't pull out of Asia, so why does pulling out of Afghanistan mean the US will retreat out of Asia or the Middle East?

Why is maintaining the "Afghan experiment" associated with "the defense budget and America’s global military position?" A set back in the "Afghan experiment" does not even necessarily mean a setback for US interests in the Middle East in the fight against radical extremism, and it is a real stretch to make the argument that withdrawing from a land war in Asia is somehow going to set back Americas global military position.

Look, I don't believe we need to pull out of Afghanistan 100%. I do believe we could scale down to a very small force and achieve the strategic objective of keeping America safe from attacks that originate from Afghanistan. Keeping America safe is only a subset of the much broader strategic objective we have embarked on in Afghanistan though, and I think the broad objective is part of the problem - not the solution.

Another example - enter Bob Kagan with this nonsense that I do not believe at all, because it would represent one of the most disturbing truths I have heard in years.

Make no mistake, however. The entire military leadership believes the president’s decision is a mistake, and especially the decision to withdraw the remainder of the surge forces by September 2012. They will soldier on and do their best, but as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, put it, in characteristic understatement, they believe the decision will increase the risk to the troops and increase the chance that the mission will not succeed. It bears repeating that the deadline imposed by the president has nothing to do with military or strategic calculation. It has everything to do with an electoral calculation. President Obama wants those troops out two months before Americans go to the voting booth.

The entire military leadership? If Bob Kagan is to be believed, the entire military leadership of the United States believes that only 1 strategy and 1 tactical application of that strategy exists in addressing strategic objectives in Afghanistan. If that is true, that would be the most disturbing thing I have ever read about the military in the 21st century - that the entire military leadership of the United States is fixated on only one way for the US to prevail strategically and tactically in Afghanistan.

Seriously? If what Bob Kagan is saying is true, then American decline is past the point of no return. We are left with two choices when considering what Bob Kagan is saying, either Bob Kagan is 1) completely full of crap or 2) we need to a wholesale clearance in military leadership to get rid of the group think. I'm thinking the correct answer is #1, and we are living in a national nightmare if I am wrong.

Fear Consequences

I have grown very weary of the fear approach towards Afghanistan policy. Why is it that for very smart and credible people to make a case for Afghanistan, the argument must be first and foremost the certainty that bad consequences will happen with any change in direction, whether tactically or strategically. Is there any more obvious sign the United States is currently following bad policy when fear and uncertainly of possible consequences is the only convincing argument offered in support of existing policy.

Whenever a policy cannot be articulated in the context of positives, and is reliant on the context that focuses on negatives; the policy is the problem. Read Daniel Goure's piece again and read Bob Kagan's piece again; and find for me what is gained - not lost - in Afghanistan under the policy we have been following under the surge. Both of their arguments suffer the same problem most arguments in favor of staying the course in Afghanistan suffer - there is nothing noteworthy to be gained even if we ever do reach the end of the COIN rainbow.

Presidents Speech on Afghanistan

The President of the United States gave an important speech Wednesday night on the way forward in Afghanistan. If you wish to review or read the speech, a transcript is available on the White House website. As has become common with this President, the speech was well written, but the delivery didn't seem to connect with the audience as authentic. If you viewed the speech, I would be curious the impression you had - because my impression sitting in a room with several friends was this President is perhaps one of the first US Presidents in American history who could not independently articulate the strategic objective of the war in Afghanistan he has committed the military to fight on behalf of the nation.

I find myself in 100% support of the direction President Obama has chosen for Afghanistan, and see the drawdown of 33,000 US forces in that country as a positive first step. The death of Osama bin Laden; regardless of whether it was symbolic or substantive, achieved the last important strategic objective a large, prolonged military presence in Afghanistan needed to achieve. The future of Afghanistan will be largely decided by the government of Afghanistan, and American strategic interests in any future of Afghanistan at this point can be achieved through sustained, persistent engagement - an engagement that does not require a large land Army in Asia. As Libya has reminded us, persistent use of limited military power cannot defeat weak or failed states, but it can contain them while preventing bad guys from gaining power.

What disappointed me most about the announcement of drawdown of US military forces from Afghanistan was not the Presidents speech, rather much of the incoherent political reaction by various political leaders and pundits. Strategic thinking appears dead in defense policy today, and tactical thinking prevails in the political dialog. Below are a few notes to consider when contemplating what tonight's first step towards drawdown in Afghanistan actually means.

Obama's War

Barack Obama's bold move was to draw down 33,000 US military forces by summer of 2012, which will still leave about ~70,000 US military forces in Afghanistan. By comparison, the Bush administration high mark for total US military forces in Afghanistan was ~35,000, meaning even after this drawdown the United States will still have around twice as many military forces in Afghanistan than at any point during the Bush administration.

Strategic Victory

The political arguments crying foul because President Obama failed to discuss what victory looks like in Afghanistan is perhaps the most incoherent political argument of them all. Not only is it impossible for a single pundit discussing victory to articulate strategic victory in the context of strategic national interests, but they would be all alone even trying to articulate what victory in Afghanistan is because nobody can articulate it coherently. 70% of the defense think tank community is retired US Army, and across the entire right to left spectrum of credible Afghanistan analysis and discussion - every single one of those folks articulate or public articles and papers discussing strategic victory in Afghanistan in the context of avoiding strategic defeat.

The US Army shouldn't have to articulate in public what strategic victory is, and to prove it - they don't, but they do often discuss the danger of strategic defeat. The President of the United States didn't mention strategic victory in his speech and I don't believe for a second he could define it - much less articulate it in a speech. Political pundits who complain about the lack of a discussion regarding victory in Afghanistan cannot themselves articulate what victory is in Afghanistan, so why exactly is this considered a strong political criticism?

Credibility

There is concern that if the United States pulls out of Afghanistan, American credibility is diminished and it suggests somehow that America is in decline. In my opinion, any super power that fights a land war in Asia without a coherent strategic objective that can be articulated to the nations population is the mother of all signs that a nation is on a course of diminished credibility and declining power, and is certainly a bigger sign of serious trouble than a tactical adjustment like troop numbers on any military battlefield could ever be. When you believe that America cannot afford to "lose" a war in Afghanistan of all places, then you are the declinist who lacks confidence in America's position in the world today. Credibility for Afghanistan is primarily a domestic concern by politicians and pundits who believe it is retreating if you walk away from any fight, including fights where victory has limited strategic value. Credibility is not a legitimate battlefield concern.

Taliban Victory

The political argument that suggests the Taliban wins because they outlast us in Afghanistan unless we kill absolutely all of them doesn't make much sense to me. We overthrew the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan with less than a battalion of US forces in 2001, and somehow we now require a dozen brigades to prevent them from taking power? There is no evidence that suggests a small military presence couldn't keep the Taliban out of power, because there is already evidence that suggests it only takes a small military presence to remove the Taliban from power. No matter what the United States does from now until 2012, 2014, or even 2020 - tribal power will still be the dominating political power in Afghanistan. Whether the United States politically exploits unified tribal power or divided tribal power against the Taliban, the Taliban will have serious trouble consolidating power in Afghanistan as long as the US remains engaged. Even if the size of that engagement is far less than a dozen brigades, as long as it is bigger than a single battalion - I like our chances in preventing the enemy from achieving victory.

Let's Talk Strategy For a Change

There will be political criticism that President Obama broke ranks with certain Generals in regards to policy for Afghanistan. This audience is smarter than that, because we all know there are always Generals and Admirals on both sides of every debate. After 9+ years of following the advice of certain prominent Generals, the nation is still at war in Afghanistan. The suggestion that breaking the trend indicates a political mistake by the President is unsupported unless one believes it was always the plan to fight the longest US war in history in Afghanistan.

There are strategic arguments related to the use of military power in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, and even Somalia that have not been articulated as US political policy, and I believe that issue as part of a broader discussion of defense policy is just waiting to jump into the public debate as election season approaches. I strongly believe that many US military leaders would welcome a public defense policy debate, indeed would feel more empowered if they were unleashed in advocating strategic justification arguments on behalf of their service instead of defense budget arguments focused on winning their portion of the administrations budget pie.

For 16 of the last 22 years the United States has been fighting wars on the ground around the world, but over that same period since the cold war the world has changed considerably. The President has a real opportunity to turn the defense budget debate into a public policy and strategy debate that guides difficult spending choices in defense. As we move into election season, I think there would be enormous value to the President to move the defense discussion away from budget and towards policy, because I think he will find his policies are more congruent with the likely direction of a strategic discussion than they will be in a political defense debate framed in the context of government spending priorities.

This analysis doesn't focus in on the fine print of the Presidents speech, rather my take on some of the finer points I witnessed discussed as a result of the speech. Feel free to add your thoughts on the speech or my commentary in the comments below.

With Friends Like These...

I am very concerned about what happened over the weekend in Afghanistan. I am just as concerned by the reactions and poor analysis in most of the media. I am also not convinced the military/diplomatic/political crowd is seeing this clearly, and will be watching very closely what is said and whether they align with what we know.

This post at UNDispatch is very troubling.

This article at the Wall Street Journal supports that account.

This article at Foreign Policy is the best I've read yet.

If our military strategy in Afghanistan is too weak to overcome the activities of a fringe religious figure in Florida, the problem is a lot more serious than a few dead UN folks.

Here is my concern. If our relationship with the Afghanistan population is so fragile that they are always in a state where any offense against Islam can lead to riots and murder, then the population we are fighting to protect in Afghanistan is no different than the same as the people we are fighting against.

I am not sure yet that is true, but if it is we only distinguish a distinction between the culture of the Afghanistan people and the Taliban in order to justify the war.

If you don't read the links, don't comment in this thread.

USMC Unmanned Cargo Demo: Maritime Implications

The Marines’ urgent needs program for unmanned cargo delivery was initiated to reduce the number of convoys and the risk to ground forces from IEDs while speeding resupply to remote forward operating bases in Afghanistan. The Boeing A160 and Kaman K-Max were both contracted for an operational assessment, which if successful, could also provide a number of operational benefits for naval forces. Although K-Max has a higher payload weight, the Hummingbird’s max range, speed, and altitude provide a capability not resident in current Navy rotorcraft, manned or unmanned. Possible operational logistics benefits (ISR/strike potential notwithstanding) of a more permanent naval acquisition program for RW UAS include:

- A160 is faster, cheaper, and significantly longer range than the MH-60s performing VERTREP and other “ash and trash” missions, freeing up the Navy's manned RW force for higher value operations such as ASW, ASUW, AMCM, VBSS over-watch, and air assault.
- With a dwindling afloat logistics force, a det of one or more cargo UAVs greatly expands the reach of every logistics ship in the inventory and all ships with a flight deck. Although the current Afghanistan assessment is designed to work a daily throughput of 6,000 lbs of cargo for about a 50 mile radius, with a range of more than 2000 nm, theoretically one A160 could support afloat logistics runs over 3 million square miles of ocean/land. How many CASREPs have persisted for want of a single small circuit card or widget awaiting the next COD, rotator flight, or scheduled RAS?
- A capability of this sort is absolutely critical to distributed operations in the littorals. Unmanned UAS are ideal for supporting low visibility, long range resupply to remote teams of SOF or USMC personnel well ashore.
- RW UAVs can provide spare parts, dry goods, and ammunition resupply for LCS and green water platforms operating independently in remote areas.

Navy requirements folks should follow this demonstration closely and consider jumping on the RW cargo bandwagon.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

The Special Operations Report

This is a really good article by Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal.

Staff Sgt. Salvatore Giunta

Tuesday is an important day.

At one o'clock today in the East Room of the White House, an Iowa-born soldier will receive the nation's highest decoration for valor in combat. In our nine-year war in Afghanistan and Iraq, this is only the eighth Medal of Honor. Even more rare, the man who has earned it is the first from this war to live to see the president place it around his neck.

The soldier is Army Staff Sgt. Salvatore Giunta. On Oct. 25, 2007, then-Specialist Giunta and his team were on a mountain ridge in Afghanistan's violent Korengal Valley when they were ambushed by the Taliban. He took a bullet stopped by a protective vest as he helped pull one soldier to safety.

Then he went forward to help the sergeant, Joshua Brennan, who had been walking point. Two Taliban were carrying Sgt. Brennan away. Spec. Giunta shot the Taliban and brought Sgt. Brennan back.

Here we are reminded that in war there are few storybook endings: Sgt. Brennan would soon die of his wounds.

One of many accounts of his story. Staff Sgt. Salvatore Giunta has told the press many times that he is not unique - a humble side of his personality no doubt - but the Medal of Honor is unique and being a living medal of honor recipient makes him unique.

As far as I am concerned his story cannot get enough attention.

Sea Based Air Power Is Petraeus Doctrine

Last week the United States Navy quietly surged the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) into the Indian Ocean to beef up American airpower in support of Afghanistan war operations. Joining the USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75), that gives the US Navy two aircraft carriers to support war efforts against the Taliban. Under current US Navy battle doctrine, 24/7 air operations from the sea against targets on land are preferably conducted with two aircraft carriers, often in 12 hour shifts. This approach doubles the availability of tactical strike aircraft from the sea while allowing both carriers to operate for much longer periods of time, pausing only for logistical purposes.

The USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) deployed in May 2010, but due to delays in the refit of the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) last year, it was decided last year that the Truman deployment would be extended two months - an eight month deployment - rather than the typical six month deployment. In theory this would extend the time the Truman would be in the region until late December, and with the Lincoln deploying in September and just arriving on station, two carriers will likely remain involved in Afghanistan operations for at least the next two months. It is unclear if this 'surge' of naval airpower will continue beyond December, but it is certain that there will be additional carrier deployments in a few months that could certainly give the US the option of keeping 2 aircraft carriers operating off Afghanistan again in 2011.

Over the same time period, the FS Charles de Gaulle (R91) will also be supporting operations over Afghanistan, meaning a full quarter of the worlds nuclear aircraft carrier force will be involved in the Afghanistan war effort at the same time by years end.

In hindsight, this should have been an expected development, as it fits the historical pattern for General Petraeus COIN operations. In 2007 the US Navy deployed 2 aircraft carriers in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom to add additional airpower to General Petraeus at that time as well. If you recall, 2007 was the year where US forces went on the offensive becoming the year where the highest number of US casualties were suffered. 2007 is also considered by many to be the turning point of the Iraq war.

It is unclear if we are at such a turning point in Afghanistan, but what is noteworthy is how the US is concentrating a great deal of combat power into the region during a ~45-60 day window before the winter takes hold in Afghanistan. I think it is an interesting and important development, because in the war in land locked Afghanistan the United States is quickly surging airpower from the sea, and in an interesting twist of irony, just off the coast of Pakistan - meaning as an added bonus the US just doubled the number of fixed wing aircraft flying sorties over that nation as well.

Also worth noting is the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) was last reported to also be operating off Pakistan in support of humanitarian operations for flood victims. If we examine naval operations today in the context of the big picture, that means that half of the deployed strike/support groups globally are currently involved in operations either directly or indirectly supporting operations for Operation Enduring Freedom.

I am not sure whether that little operational detail speaks to the priority the US Navy has regarding war operations today, or the extent to which degradation of the US Navy fleet size can stretch the fleet so thin, so easily. The answer is probably both.

* Bloggers Note *

I have linked the Facebook page of both carriers above. If you use Facebook, there is one US Navy unit I would suggest following - the Facebook page of the USS Abraham Lincoln. There is something about this LCDR William Marks guy that is just different - or said another way - he has a way of making everything more interesting. While I observe Facebook pages for Navy ships are most commonly utilized to communicate fleet to family, the Lincoln page is that and more.

Charles de Gaulle Deploying to Afghanstian

According to this source (in French), the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is deploying for 4 months to the Indian Ocean to support operations in Afghanistan. "Agapanthus 10," as the mission is called, was presented at a press briefing of the Ministry of Defense by Admiral Jean-Louis Kerignard.

The carrier battlegroup will consist of the aircraft carrier FS Charles de Gaulle (R91), FS Forbin (D620), FS Tourville (D610), the naval auxiliary vessel FS Meuse (A 607), and the submarine FS Amethyst (S605). The air group on board the aircraft carrier will have 12 upgraded Super Etendard, 10 Rafale, 2 Hawkeyes, and helicopters. The operation is expected to begin in mid October and last until February.

In any context, the contribution of an aircraft carrier in support of operations over Afghanistan is a significant coalition contribution by France. This will be the 5th deployment by the FS Charles de Gaulle (R91) in support of military operations in Afghanistan (the previous four were in 2001/2002, 2004, 2006 and 2007).

The Afghanistan Exaggeration

Robert Farley has identified a remarkable statement by Robert Kaplan in his report on India (PDF).

He or she who sits in Delhi with his back to Muslim Central Asia must still worry about unrest up on the plateaus to the northwest. The United States will draw down its troops one day in Afghanistan, but India will still have to live with the results, and therefore remain intimately engaged. The quickest way to undermine U.S.-India relations is for the United States to withdraw precipitously from Afghanistan. In the process of leaving behind an anarchic and radicalized society, which in and of itself is contrary to India’s interests, such a withdrawal would signal to Indian policy elites that the United States is surely a declining power on which they cannot depend. Detente with China might then seem to be in India’s interest. After all, China wants a stable Afghanistan for trade routes; India, for security. Because of India’s history and geography, an American failure in Afghanistan bodes ill for our bilateral relationship with New Delhi. Put simply, if the United States deserts Afghanistan, it deserts India.

Indeed, India is quietly testing the United States in Afghanistan perhaps to the same intense degree as Israel is very publicly testing the United States in regards to a nuclear Iran. I do not suggest that we should commit so much money and national treasure to Afghanistan merely for the sake of impressing India. But I am suggesting that the deleterious effect on U.S.-India bilateral relations of giving up on Afghanistan should be part of our national debate on the war effort there, for at the moment it is not. The fact is that our ability to influence China will depend greatly on our ability to work with India, and that, in turn, will depend greatly on how we perform in Afghanistan.

The problem I have with this argument is that it suggests that somehow, Afghanistan can be described in the context of a single point of failure in some Grand Strategy for global balance of power for the United States. I see that as artificial inflation regarding the importance of Afghanistan.

India, not the US or any NATO nation, already has more influence in determining the outcome in Afghanistan because India, not the US or any NATO nation, is the largest economic power besides China in the region around Afghanistan (thus has the most to lose in the region).

It is almost treated as an afterthought that Iraq's major trade partners include Syria, Turkey, and Jordan - and btw, the country Iraq has the largest growth in trade with today is Iran, while the second fastest trade growth is with UAE. There is no way stability in Iraq is possible without the cooperation of regional nations around Iraq. The nations surrounding Iraq are invested in the stability in Iraq both politically and economically now - and that is why we can leave with a fairly reasonable degree of confidence that Iraq will mature over time.

The same holds true for Afghanistan. The US military and allies will not eventually 'win' the war in Afghanistan, success in Afghanistan will only be achieved once the nations around Afghanistan - including Iran, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and China - have a sufficiently invested interest in the stability of Afghanistan.

Without that regional investment, the operation is simply a military manhunt with no end in sight. I do not agree that US grand strategy in balancing rising powers is dependent upon our perpetual manhunt in Afghanistan, indeed I would argue that when we exaggerate a small war against a relatively small group of bad guys in Afghanistan and turn that into a major war with significant but artificial global national security ramifications, that does significantly more harm to any US grand strategy that balances rising powers.

Don't misunderstand - I am not calling for a unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan, rather I believe our military strategy there should reflect that:

• Afghanistan is a small war, not a major war. Small wars are best fought with small footprints
• Regional investment in stability in Afghanistan is the only way to achieve stability in Afghanistan
• Failure in Afghanistan isn't when the US fails to achieve stability and peace, rather failure is achieved when stability and peace in Afghanistan allows regional acceptance for control of Afghanistan to be achieved by forces intent on terrorist activities outside of Afghanistan.

Kaplan is wrong if he believes violence in Afghanistan threatens the balance of power between major powers. It is not only possible, but statistically probable that violence in Afghanistan will exist in 2020 and beyond, and that violence will have very limited influence on the strategic policies of India regarding any balance of power issues between major powers like the US and China.

Collin Thomas

On Friday the DoD announced the death of a Navy SEAL who was supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. The public announcement of a Navy SEAL is uncommon enough to note.

Chief Petty Officer (SEAL) Collin Thomas, 33, of Morehead, Ky., died Aug. 18 during a combat operation in eastern Afghanistan. Thomas was assigned to an east coast-based SEAL team.

Virginia's WAVY 10 has a detailed article about Chief Petty Officer Collin Thomas worth reading. This was no ordinary sailor.

"Collin Thomas was a brave American patriot and an incredibly gifted Navy SEAL. His tireless professionalism, inspiring passion for life, and humble demeanor made him a role model for all who knew him. We are deeply saddened by this tremendous loss of a brother in arms," said a senior officer in his command. "Our hearts and prayers go out to the Thomas family during this very difficult time, and we will never forget the ultimate sacrifice that Collin made while protecting our nation and his teammates."

Thomas is survived by his parents Clayton and Paula, who live in Hertford, North Carolina, his sister Meghan of Morehead, Kentucky, and his fiancée Sarah Saunders of Virginia Beach.

The Navy says Thomas was a highly-decorated combat veteran and received numerous awards and citations during his 13-year Navy career, including two Bronze Star Medals with combat "V" distinguishing device; a Purple Heart; a Joint Service Commendation Medal with combat "V" distinguishing device; a Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal; Six Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medals; Two Combat Action Ribbons (Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom); Four Good Conduct Medals; the National Defense Service Medal; Afghanistan Campaign Medal with two campaign stars; Iraq Campaign Medal; Marksmanship medals with "expert" service device for both rifle and pistol, and a multitude of personal, unit, and campaign decorations.

If you don't understand the significance of the medals, citations, and decorations listed in the last paragraph - let’s just say Rambo would be envious. I pray that God comforts the family of this extraordinary man.

What Battle For Hearts and Minds

I spent some of the day going over the figures regarding the damage in Pakistan, and the damage that has taken place over the last several days of the monsoon season is beyond what any single nuclear weapon is capable of. Even more interesting, the areas impacted in Pakistan are the areas that every single think tank that has written a report regarding the Afghanistan war has discussed as being a vital part of the war.

And yet... there is virtually no analysis of what this incredible disaster might mean for the war. It is barely stretching an analogy to suggest God just pissed his Sunday afternoon 6-pack all over Pakistan during Ramadan while the national security experts in the US discussed Secretary Gates future. It could be worse, we could be the foreign policy expertise of the United States stuck in a political rut discussing a mosque in lower Manhattan pretending that is somehow the most important Muslim issue on the same day 20% of the second largest Muslim country in the world is underwater.

On Monday I felt like I was living in the twilight zone. These are the official numbers to date, and take care to note that Sindh is mostly unreported and the worst hit.

Province	Villages Affected	Persons Affected	Area Affected (Acres)	Crop Area Affected (Acres)	Houses Damaged		Persons Died	Persons Injured
					Partially	Fully
Punjab	1,527	1,908,015	2,693,436	1,470,989	43,458	44,752	65	196
Sindh	-	-	-	378,976	-	122,798	8	-
KP	581	1,550,256	-	466,451	68,079	105,214	1,011	968
Balochistan	2548	76,845	4,605	321,651	-	19,619	24	98
FATA	-	-	-	6,500	-	1,432	62	59
Gilgit-Baltistan	195	87,000	-	2,949	-	2,820	183	16
AJ & K	-	-	-	9	4,941	1,416	70	87
G. Total	4,887	3,662,116	2,698,041	2,647,525	119,478	298,051	1,423	1,424

Source: Pakistan Minister of Water and Power

There is a long history of natural disaster playing a significant role in the global security condition, or influencing war, or having a significant and generational impact on nations. When considering the scope and geography of this disaster, it would be difficult to suggest that the monsoon floods of 2010 won't have a huge impact on the security of Pakistan, or a significant impact in influencing the war in Afghanistan, or a huge generational impact on Pakistan.

But the issue appears to be invisible. I don't know what to say - maybe it doesn't matter. I would have thought had we nuked Pakistan someone would have written a war related op-ed to discuss the potential ramifications, but if mother nature drowns 20% of the country doing about the same amount of damage over a significantly larger portion of land - it doesn't seem to be important.

A few thoughts come to mind.

1) There are now 18 US aircraft operating for flood relief efforts in Pakistan. They are competing for hearts and minds against the whole of the Taliban allied political wings who live throughout that region of Pakistan. The DoD has elevated the priority of soft power - specifically disaster relief and humanitarian response - in strategic documents over the last few years. Here we are in direct competition for hearts and minds in the midst of a disaster, with the largest concentration of military forces we have assembled on the planet in the neighboring country - and the best we can do is 18 helicopters a week later to help the X millions of people impacted by the flooding?

Pakistani people know the United States unmanned drone very well thanks to their newspapers and our actions in that country against Al Qaeda and affiliates. Here is a chance to put a positive visible symbol of US power over Pakistan at a time the need far exceeds local capacity - and we can't do it why?

2) Private funds to Pakistan is incredibly low for reasons several media outlets have only begun to speculate. Perhaps no one trusts the current Pakistan government, or perhaps people believe donations will go towards helping fund terrorism? I have no idea, but in the first 10 days after the Haiti earthquake the world was able to raise $1 billion. So far the world has raised almost $305 million for Pakistan flood victims - and $86 million is US. Holy WeDon'tGiveAShit batman!

3) Ahmed Rashid sums up the problem better than I ever could:

Though it has received only moderate attention in the western press, the torrential flooding of large swaths of Pakistan since late July may be the most catastrophic natural disaster to strike the country in half a century. But even greater than the human cost of this devastating event are the security challenges it poses. Coming at a time of widespread unrest, growing Taliban extremism, and increasingly shaky civilian government, the floods could lead to the gravest security crisis the country—and the region—has faced. Unless the international community takes immediate action to provide major emergency aid and support, the country risks turning into what until now has remained only a grim, but remote possibility—a failed state with nuclear weapons.

I don't know what the US government has decided to do about Pakistan. Maybe the option of a full court blitz of soft power into Pakistan was offered and denied. Maybe there was no offer for additional help at all, or perhaps the US believes doing very little is better than doing a lot. Maybe we picked teams and mother natures team looked most appealing. Whatever we have decided to do, the only thing that seems clear to me as a bystander half a world away is that this is the most important battle being fought in the Afghanistan war - if Pakistan matters at all to our Afghanistan war objectives.

We have spent a decade talking about how the enemy has a better communication strategy in Pakistan than we do. If 18 helicopters is the best we can do when 20% of that country is underwater - then either our apathy or inability to be agile in reaction to situations like this explains why. It doesn't make sense for us to fight the war in Afghanistan and not be serious about making a positive American impact on this part of Pakistan - not when we keep noting in strategic reviews how much influence this region has on the Afghanistan war effort. We aren't even trying to win the populations that matter in this war - and in my opinion that represents the best case to date why it is time to pull our troops out of Afghanistan.

Mission Unfinished

"In this age," he said, "I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines."

The quote above was spoken in May of this year, at the United States Naval Institute EAST conference sponsored by JFCOM. The speaker was General James Mattis.

The President had no choice; he absolutely had to accept General McCrystal's resignation. With that said, I am reluctant to praise the Presidents decision today to name General Petraeus as General McCrystal's replacement, and it is far too early to hand out any praise regarding how seriously the President is taking the military - civilian unity of command issues surrounding the Afghanistan war. It is a bizarre world we must live in that some can unequivocally suggest that by firing one General and demoting another General we have somehow made progress for civilian - military relations - even if it may be true.

If we understand the complexities that required General McCrystal to be fired, and General Petraeus to be demoted, at most we can highlight that the administration understands the challenges the nation faces in Afghanistan. That really isn't much to build praise from though.

When I watched the speech given by the President today in the Rose Garden, I heard President Obama's voice - but I also felt like I was hearing Secretary Gates words. For me, and I may be wrong, what I witnessed was the Pentagon leadership dealing with a military specific problem surrounding a Pentagon approved General, and the President merely showed up to deliver the message. General McCrystal may have offered his resignation to President Obama, but I am left with the impression Secretary Gates insured that action and had he been assigned to deal with the issue - would have fired General McCrystal himself. I find it as simplistic as a political sound bite to suggest that today was bold civilian leadership by the President to reign in control of the military, because more likely the civilian was Secretary Gates and action was more akin to the military taking decisive action to clean their own house.

I find it interesting that with the sole exception of General McKiernan, the Obama administration has never held anyone accountable for their actual job performance. However, General McKiernan was fired by Gates, not President Obama, so in effect the political side of the Obama administration has never actually fired anyone in their administration. Adjusting deck chairs on the civilian side of the Afghanistan war will become - in effect - a first for this administration. I have concerns that the Obama administration will be unable to take swift action on the civilian side of the war effort, because grading someone on performance is quite frankly - something the Obama administration has never done. The oil spill is a perfect example of how government under the Obama administration is held unaccountable for performance in crisis.

Maybe I am cynical, but I don't believe Obama intended to fire General McCrystal until Secretary Gates came along and insisted otherwise. All of the benefits to be gained by refusing General McCrystal's resignation were political in nature, while all of the benefits of accepting General McCrystal's resignation favored civilian control in the Pentagon. One of the politically appealing sound bites of the last 24 hours is the phrase that "the war is about more than one man."

Does anyone believe for a minute that the Afghanistan war policy would remain the same if it wasn't for one man - Secretary Gates? The war itself may be about more than one man, but how the war is conducted is primarily because of one man.

I find it very disturbing how little depth our nation has in the bullpen when the President has to demote our most decorated military leader of this generation - General Petraeus - in order to find someone willing and able to execute the existing administration policy for Afghanistan and simultaneously save political face for the Commander in Chief in the midst of a civil - military relations crisis. How effective is the policy itself when the President must borrow the prestige and respect of the nations finest General in order to reclaim civilian control? Color me concerned.

Start the clock, because dealing with the civilian side of the Afghanistan war issue may take some time. On Wednesday the President started something, but the timetable that matters isn't how long it takes for General Petraeus to pick up General McCrystal's fumble and start moving the ball down the field - rather how long it takes for the rest of the command structure - specifically the civilian side but also the CENTCOM replacement - to get sorted out.

The CENTCOM replacement will be interesting to watch, because as a premier military position directly responsible for the way the war is conducted, the list of names will again reveal how short the bullpen of Secretary Gates actually is.

General Petraeus addresses half of the military - civilian equation that General Mattis is quoted discussing above - the easy half. Until the civilian half of that equation is addressed and conforms to the quote by General Mattis - the President has a mission unfinished in Afghanistan - and that mission has always been the hard part; the part his predecessor never got right in Afghanistan.

Obama's Ernest King Moment

On December 20th, 1941, when President Roosevelt called upon Fleet Admiral Ernest King after King's appointment to COMINCH, Admiral King was reported to have said "When they get in trouble they send for the sons-of-bitches”.

We now know who one of that group is - General Petraeus. The next will be the person named to replace General Petraeus at CENTCOM - who I hope is General Mattis...

But suspect could be Admiral Stavridis.

It is Time to Call in General Mattis

As much as I want to discuss some Naval issues in the news, I can't help but write down my thoughts on the McCrystal events that will unfold Wednesday. If you believe, as I do, that the Obama administration will do everything possible to avoid a war with Iran - then the decision President Obama makes on Wednesday will define the legacy of his role as Commander in Chief for his first Presidential term.

There was to be a meeting between General McCrystal and the nations national security leadership on Wednesday anyway - the only difference is that now it will be in person. It would be easy to focus on the politics of Rolling Stones articles. If the President is smart - the focus will be on Afghanistan first.

Before we move forward, lets look back and remember where General McCrystal started. This was how the original McCrystal report laid forth the Afghanistan war.

Although the assessment, which runs more than 20 pages, has not been released, officials familiar with the report have said it represents a hard look at the challenges involved in implementing Obama's strategy for Afghanistan. The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy.

In September of last year, I argued this approach was strategic confusion from the outset.

What? Is the strategic objective to defeat al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and deny them sanctuary or is it to protect the Afghan population, establish good governance, and rebuild the economy? Those are two entirely different strategic objectives, but both become the strategic objective when you add the words "that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign."

Counterinsurgency has become the slipper that fits every foot, when in fact military history suggests there are other military strategies for military engagement in failed states when unity governance cannot be achieved or established by an external state.

The McCrystal strategy depends, almost entirely, on the Afghanistan Army and Police forces being stood up and taking control of security of the country. How is that working out? I hope the President asks the question.

The McCrystal strategy also depends on a strong central government in Afghanistan, because without it the population of the country could legitimately be labeled the insurgent. How many tribes support the central government? How many support the Taliban? How many are partners with the ISAF? I hope these are questions the President asks.

Why is there such a disconnect between the Marines and McCrystal in Afghanistan? I'd like to know, I'm sure other observers would like to get McCrystal's take on that. Again, another question for the President.

The way I see it, Obama has several choices. McCrystal either stays or goes. The existing COIN strategy either stays or goes. I personally think the President should allow McCrystal to retire, and a Marine should be put in charge. I also think it is time to draft a strategy to meet the Presidents objectives of defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary and give up the central government building exercise that has been completely ineffective - and indeed perhaps counterproductive.

The Marines left Iraq to go to Afghanistan. They wanted it - I hope the President gives it to them. I strongly believe that President Obama needs to pick one of two men - Lieutenant General John R. Allen or General James Mattis. No more West Point COINdinistas guys - it is time to pick a Marine.

It is time to call in General James Mattis.

Disfunctional

Of all the things I am learning today surrounding the General McCrystal news, this is perhaps the most shocking to me.

Eric Bates, the magazine’s editor, said during an interview on MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” that McChrystal saw the piece prior to its publication as part of Rolling Stone's standard fact-checking process - and that the general did not object to or dispute any of the reporting.

Asked if McChrystal pushed back on the story, Bates responded: “No, absolutely not.”

“We ran everything by them in the fact checking process as we always do,” the Rolling Stone editor said. “They had a sense of what was coming and it was all on the record and they spent a lot of time with our reporter so I think they knew that they had said it.”

But the end of the article is what I consider a /facepalm moment.

The general issued an apology late Monday soon after the story first appeared online, but Bates suspects McChrystal was surprised by the backlash.

“I don't think we got the sense that it was intentional,” the editor said, pointing out that McChrystal is “known for being very, very frank."

How is it even possible that the architect of our nations 'hearts and minds' COIN strategy for the war in Afghanistan is so tone deaf to media information that he didn't see a backlash coming from his comments in the Rolling Stone article?

If he truly didn't see the backlash from the article coming, then it is no wonder our troops are struggling in Afghanistan.

While it would be the political equivalent of a hail mary pass - and it would also represent the kind of risk taking this administration has never demonstrated in crisis to date - I do hope General Mattis is put in charge of this war. This is a 'call 911' moment for the Afghanistan war, and when the United States calls 911 it is usually the Marines who answer the phone.

More on McCrystal

The Rolling Stone article in PDF format for those who want to get an early read.

General McCrystal will be fired, as he almost certainly should be. That really isn't the problem facing the Obama administration and the country. The problem is that we appear to be losing the war, and now you have an internal distraction the enemy had nothing to do with.

The President made Afghanistan his war when he decided to go with General McCrystal's counterinsurgency strategy and began surging additional troops. I don't want to hear how the President of the United States had no choice regarding Afghanistan and was backed into the corner - because to suggest that is true is to basically say Barack Obama is not qualified to be the leader of the free world. The President has lost his General. Has he lost the General McCrystal counterinsurgency strategy too? Is losing the war not so far behind?

I just wish there was one thing so far during the Obama administration to date I could point to and suggest there is a light at the end of the tunnel, but the lack of direction and focus that is displayed in every emerging challenge this administration has faced to date suggests that a pattern of panic, confusion, chaos, and indecision regarding what to do will become the next phase of the Afghanistan war.

I hope I am wrong, but it is the safe prediction given the pattern of behavior by this Administration to date.

Obama's Speech at West Point About Afghanistan

A transcript of Obama's speech at West Point about Afghanistan. I have added bold what I believe to be the important details of the speech, and the red comments are my initial thoughts.

Good evening. To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our armed services, and to my fellow Americans, I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan, the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusions.

It's an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point, where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security and to represent what is finest about our country.

To address these important issues, it's important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place.

We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station.

Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers on board one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington and killed many more.

As we know, these men belonged to Al Qaeda, a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world's great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban, a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.

A history lesson?

Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against Al Qaeda and those who harbored them, an authorization that continues to this day. The vote in the Senate was 98-0; the vote in the House was 420-1.

For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5, the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies, and the world were acting as one to destroy Al Qaeda's terrorist network and to protect our common security.

Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy -- and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden -- we sent our troops into Afghanistan.

Within a matter of months, Al Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its heels. A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to hope.

At a conference convened by the U.N., a provisional government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security Assistance Force was established to help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.

Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a second war in Iraq. The wrenching debate over the Iraq war is well-known and need not be repeated here. It's enough to say that, for the next six years, the Iraq war drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention, and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world.

If Obama is about to exercise US influence as a NATO power on NATO powers, this could get very interesting. Look, the world is changing, it is shifting East. We know, the Asian powers know it, and Europe knows it. The EU is not a solid enough entity to make massive pol/sci/mil shifts in mass to address the emerging East. The US is. There has been a bargaining chip on the table (US military forces in Europe), one wonders if Obama is thinking about playing some poker here.

Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end. We will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer and all of our troops by the end of 2011. That we are doing so is a testament to the character of the men and women in uniform.

I like that it is said, but I do wonder what 2012 Iraq looks like.

Thanks to their courage, grit and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq to its people.

But while we have achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, Al Qaiea's leadership established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security forces.

Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with Al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating acts of terrorism against the Pakistani people.

Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war.

Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive. And that's why, shortly after taking office, I approved a longstanding request for more troops.

After consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan. I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts.

Since then, we've made progress on some important objectives. High-ranking Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we've stepped up the pressure on Al Qaeda worldwide.

In Pakistan, that nation's army has gone on its largest offensive in years. In Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential election, and although it was marred by fraud, that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan's laws and constitution.

Yet huge challenges remain: Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years, it has moved backwards. There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population.

Our new commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short, the status quo is not sustainable.

As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger. Some of you have fought in Afghanistan. Some of you will deploy there. As your commander-in-chief, I owe you a mission that is clearly defined and worthy of your service.

And that's why, after the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy.

Like every politician since the beginning of time, this President is attempting to explain the complexity of war and the theory and ideas driving policy with stories, because theories and ideas have - since the beginning of history - been fleeting when communicated in politics.

Narratives last longer. They also have a way of being incorrect in hindsight, and politically dangerous when cited later. The more we pretend things change, the more they really don't...

Now, let me be clear: There has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war during this review period. Instead, the review has allowed me to ask the hard questions and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military, and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners.

This is absolutely 100% accurate, and why people who have been crying about the Presidents "delay" are simply uninformed. Look at the historical statistics of casualties for OEF. Which armchair general on Fox News or anywhere else believes for a minute that the President has been wasting time? Whoever that person is; that is the person who I guess thinks we need to move our Army into Afghanistan just in time for winter.

Good strategy Mr. Political Talking Point... lets be like Napoleon and Hitler in Russia? On second thought, by acting now, we have time to prepare for the Spring offensive while the enemy huddles by the fire in their cave. In other words, we use mother nature to get a head start. That is the narrative that isn't mentioned in the political talking points, but I assure you is discussed in the DoD.

And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people and our troops no less.
This review is now complete. And as commander-in-chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.

After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.

The 18 months is clearly a policy requirement. Strategy is derived from policy, therefore the 18 month benchmark is built into the strategy. I think that is responsible, because it allows us to measure progress. It is very symmetrical thinking though, and the enemy has proven to be the bane of symmetrical thinking. 18 months is noteworthy only in that it is half way until the next Presidential election.

I do not make this decision lightly. I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we must exercise restraint in the use of military force and always consider the long-term consequences of our actions.

We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort. And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home.

Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you, a military that, along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens.

As president, I have signed a letter of condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in these wars. I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who deployed. I've visited our courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed. I've traveled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 Americans returning home to their final resting place.

I see firsthand the terrible wages of war. If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow.

I am growing tired of hearing about the difficulties of elected political leaders in times of war. Unless this country is put realistically on a war footing, this is nothing more than typical political dribble. We are spending billions on garbage in - garbage out projects while our men and women in uniform - and their families - are the real folks who sacrifice.

So, no, I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by Al Qadda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak.

This is no idle danger, no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards and Al Qaeda can operate with impunity.

We must keep the pressure on Al Qaeda. And to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.

The President boldly stated the WHY for Afghanistan. Good.

Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear. This is not just America's war. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda's safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and Amman and Bali. The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that Al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them.

These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within Afghanistan. We must deny Al Qaida a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.

We will meet these objectives in three ways. First, we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months.

The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010, the fastest possible pace, so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight. And they will help create the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.

Because this is an international effort, I've asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies. Some have already provided additional troops, and we're confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead.

Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan. And now we must come together to end this war successfully. For what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility; what's at stake is the security of our allies and the common security of the world.

Now, taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.

We'll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul. But it will be clear to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan people -- that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.

Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy so that the government can take advantage of improved security. This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over.

President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance.

We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas such as agriculture that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

The President boldly stated the HOW for Afghanistan. Good.

Now, the people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They've been confronted with occupation by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign Al Qaida fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes.

So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand: America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect, to isolate those who destroy, to strengthen those who build, to hasten the day when our troops will leave, and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner and never your patron.

The President boldly stated the WHAT for Afghanistan. Read ENDS of strategy. Good.

Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. And that's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.

In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who've argued that the struggle against extremism is not their fight and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking accommodation with those who use violence.

But in recent years, as innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism. Public opinion has turned. The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and South Waziristan, and there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy.

In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. And those days are over.

Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.

America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan's democracy and development. We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting. And going forward, the Pakistan people must know: America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan's security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

We finally reach the meat - Pakistan. How does this end? I have no idea, but the road goes through Pakistan, not Afghanistan. As the President is making Pakistan a partner, foreign policy and specifically our diplomatic strategy with Pakistan is more important than the military activities for achieving strategic success.

And I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach. So let me briefly address a few of the more prominent arguments that I've heard and which I take very seriously.

First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam. They argue that it cannot be stabilized and we're better off cutting our losses and rapidly withdrawing. I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history.

Unlike Vietnam, we are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action. Unlike Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency. And most importantly, unlike Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan and remain a target for those same extremists who are plotting along its border.

President Obama just found his "Coalition of the Willing." Welcome to the 21st century where strategic arrangements are not centered solely around security from nuclear destruction.

To abandon this area now and to rely only on efforts against Al Qaeda from a distance would significantly hamper our ability to keep the pressure on Al Qaeda and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland and our allies.

The rationale for the surge is homeland defense. Fight them over there instead of over here. US policy for military action - how to use it and where to use it - has not changed with an election. This is why I continuously highlight how political ideology ultimately determines style, not substance, when it comes to the US strategic statecraft.

Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can't leave Afghanistan in its current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have, but this would simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through and permit a slow deterioration of conditions there. It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security forces and give them the space to take over.

Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a timeframe for our transition to Afghan responsibility. Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort, one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade. I reject this course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests.

Furthermore, the absence of a timeframe for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan.

As president, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests. And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces. I don't have the luxury of committing to just one.

Indeed, I'm mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who, in discussing our national security, said, "Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs."

The presentation here reflects political style of left foreign policy vs right foreign policy. Ultimately, it comes down to how one interprets Roosevelt's and Eisenhower's methods, while the substance of both men is adopted by both sides in political power. I admire the style here.

Over the past several years, we have lost that balance. We failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy. In the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children.

Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce, so we can't simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.

I love that President Obama says these things. I do not know if he understands them, as he has never really taken action or articulated well what these comments mean to him.

All told, by the time I took office, the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan approached a trillion dollars. And going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs openly and honestly. Our new approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military this year, and I'll work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our deficit.

But as we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan responsibility, we must rebuild our strength here at home. Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power. It pays for our military; it underwrites our diplomacy; it taps the potential of our people and allows investment in new industry; and it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we did in the last.

That's why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open- ended: because the nation that I'm most interested in building is our own.

This is where the President is nodding towards Capitol Hill.

Now, let me be clear. None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society and our leadership in the world. And unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve disorderly regions, failed states, diffuse enemies.

So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end wars and prevent conflict, not just how we wage wars. We'll have to be nimble and precise in our use of military power. Where Al Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold -- whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere -- they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships.

This is interesting. Have many thoughts, but will wait a bit before discussing.

And we can't count on military might alone. We have to invest in our homeland security, because we can't capture or kill every violent extremist abroad. We have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks.

We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction. And that's why I've made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them, because every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons. True security will come for those who reject them.

This is about as blunt as President Obama gets when discussing Iran and North Korea. Honestly, I like Obama's style, this is an obvious threat to both without being an obvious direct threat to either.

We'll have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world acting alone. I've spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new partnerships. And we have forged a new beginning between America and the Muslim world, one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict and that promises a future in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human dignity.

And, finally, we must draw on the strength of our values, for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not. That's why we must promote our values by living them at home, which is why I've prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay.

And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human rights and tend for the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the dignity of all peoples. That is who we are; that is the source, the moral source of America's authority.

Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents. We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions -- from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank -- that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings.

We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades, a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress, and advancing frontiers of human liberty.

For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination. Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation's resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours.

What we have fought for, what we continue to fight for is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.

As a country, we're not as young -- and perhaps not as innocent -- as we were when Roosevelt was president. Yet we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom. And now we must summon all of our might and moral suasion to meet the challenges of a new age.

In the end, our security and leadership does not come solely from the strength of our arms. It derives from our people, from the workers and businesses who will rebuild our economy; from the entrepreneurs and researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the teachers that will educate our children and the service of those who work in our communities at home; from the diplomats and Peace Corps volunteers who spread hope abroad; and from the men and women in uniform who are part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made government of the people, by the people, and for the people a reality on this Earth.

More style. American leaders on the left in politics like to take a community approach with plural pronouns that extend beyond our borders. The right likes to take a direct approach with a blunt style that leaves the impression the six shooter is pointed a certain direction. The right sees the left as weak, while the left sees the right as brutish. Blah. The points are generally the same, it is ultimately all style and very little actual substance. War sucks, and when the US Army deploys, they do so with the intent of achieving American policy objectives with a tactical approach that is driven by strategic objectives. How is tactical driven by military strategy, not political ideology.

This vast and diverse citizenry will not always agree on every issue, nor should we. But I also know that we as a country cannot sustain our leadership nor navigate the momentous challenges of our time if we allow ourselves to be split asunder by the same rancor and cynicism and partisanship that has in recent times poisoned our national discourse.

It's easy to forget that, when this war began, we were united, bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. I believe...

I believe with every fiber of my being that we, as Americans, can still come together behind a common purpose, for our values are not simply words written into parchment. They are a creed that calls us together and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, as one people.

America, we are passing through a time of great trial. And the message that we send in the midst of these storms must be clear: that our cause is just, our resolve unwavering. We will go forward with the confidence that right makes might and with the commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world that is more secure, and a future that represents not the deepest of fears but the highest of hopes.

Thank you, God bless you, and God bless the United States of America.

I sense shades of Huntington here. After giving an American history lesson, some of this ignores American history. Partisanship is a good thing in America, always has been. As long as the citizens of the country are responsibly represented by their elected leaders, we do OK. I am not sure whether a surge in Afghanistan can be accurately described as responsible representation, but I also do not have an alternative idea in how to deal with the situation in Afghanistan.

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The DoD also released a new website on Afghanistan and Pakistan Policy. I have a feeling in my gut that says we are at a moment where events that result from this decision will cascade beyond our horizon to form empirical conclusions on the future, and those events will ultimately matter more than the events we are planning for with this surge.

That unknown and unexpected - Black Swan - is my concern. All in all, good for President Obama for taking ownership of the war in Afghanistan. President Bush never did that.