My recent post on how
to counter Chinese anti-shipping capabilities between the First and Second
Island Chains was heavily influenced by CAPT William Toti’s seminal
article in last June’s Naval Institute Proceedings
on the need to tackle anti-submarine warfare from a theater-wide,
threat-tailored, combined arms campaign construct. If you haven’t read his
article (which is outside the paywall), do so. It is a foundational work.
Toti observes that the
dramatic sensor advantages that allowed the U.S. Navy to thoroughly dominate
Soviet submarines throughout much of the Cold War no longer hold. Our ability
to detect and attack an approaching adversary submarine before it can shoot
first is uncertain at best. Yet, as Toti points out, “real ASW is not about
detecting the submarine, it’s not about killing the submarine, it’s about defeating
the submarine.”[i]
The ability to win a close-in “knife fight” against a submarine, while
important, represents just one of many opportunities to prevent the submarine
from executing an effective attack. The submarine in wartime must, after all,
have a safe haven in port for resupply, must break out of port, must transit
through marginal seas or the open ocean to its patrol station, must be cued
into patrol stations or intercept positions from which it would have the
greatest opportunity for encountering prey, must detect and correctly classify
a target (or receive targeting-quality cues from external surveillance and
reconnaissance assets), must approach the target to weapons release range, and
must land a blow with its weapon salvo. Most conceivable adversaries of the
U.S. have the added geographical challenge of pushing their submarines through
chokepoints such as straits in order to access the open ocean or return to port
from patrol. Toti observes that there are exploitable vulnerabilities in each of
these steps that can deny the submarine a chance to attack effectively and
perhaps even lead to the submarine’s own destruction. Toti also notes that if a
potential adversary’s leaders became convinced that the U.S. would be able to
defang any submarine offensive, they might opt not to employ their
submarines—or go to war—in the first place.
In rereading Toti’s
article the other week, it occurred to me that there are remarkable parallels
between what he suggests could be done to wage a wartime theater anti-submarine
campaign and what could be done to wage a campaign to defeat an adversary’s
wartime use of theater-range conventionally-armed ballistic and cruise
missiles. His recounting of the Navy’s “full-spectrum ASW” doctrine provides an
excellent model for tying together a combined arms “full-spectrum anti-theater
missile campaign” concept along the lines of what Deputy
Secretary of Defense Bob Work dubbed “raid breaker” earlier this year.[ii]
Just as ASW doesn’t
depend entirely on destroying the submarine, theater missile defense doesn’t
depend entirely on destroying the inbound theater missile. With this in mind,
we see that each of Toti’s “ten threads of full-spectrum ASW” has an
anti-theater missile analogue:
Full
Spectrum ASW
|
Full
Spectrum Anti-Theater Missile Warfare
|
Defeat
submarines in port
|
Suppress
missile-armed mobile platforms’ basing and logistical support infrastructure
|
Defeat
the submarines’ shore-based command and control capability
|
Defeat
the systems-of-systems that missile-armed mobile platforms rely upon to
attack effectively
|
Defeat
submarines near port, in denied areas
|
Defeat
missile-armed mobile platforms as they break out of bases/garrisons towards
their firing positions
|
Defeat
submarines in choke points
|
Defeat
missile-armed air and naval platforms in choke points
|
Defeat
submarines in open ocean
|
Defeat
missile-armed mobile platforms in their patrol or firing areas
|
Draw
enemy submarines into ASW “kill boxes,” to a time and place of our choosing
|
Induce
missile-armed mobile platforms to fire at false targets and perhaps expose
themselves to attack
|
Mask
our forces from submarine detection or classification
|
Mask
our forces from the adversary’s local reconnaissance and targeting efforts
|
Defeat
the submarine in close battle
|
Defeat
missile-armed air and naval platforms in close battle
|
Defeat
the incoming torpedo
|
Defeat
the inbound missile
|
Create
conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ submarines
|
Create
conditions where an adversary chooses not to employ theater missiles
|
Let’s go through the
anti-theater missile “threads” in turn. As we proceed, note that I implicitly
discard the option of engaging in war-opening preemptive attacks against an
adversary’s theater missile forces. With the exception of certain types of
electronic or cyber operations, I work under the assumption that most of the
below types of attacks would only be authorized by a U.S. President after a war
has already started.
Suppress
Missile-Armed Mobile Platforms’ Basing and Logistical Support Infrastructure
Theater missile-firing
platforms include aircraft, submarines, naval surface combatants, and
Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL). All of these platforms require logistical
support including rearmament, refueling (with the exception of SSNs, of
course), replenishment of stores, corrective maintenance, and damage repair. In
war, the bases in which they normally reside, receive servicing, and operate
from can be attacked (assuming authorization from political leadership, which
I’ll discuss in more detail below).
Nevertheless, not all
of these platforms need to always return to a permanently-fixed base for all
forms of servicing. For example, many missile-firing platforms can operate from
and be serviced to some extent in austere locations such as seaports, airports,
“satellite” airbases or ad hoc
airstrips, or relocatable logistical depots. Some missile-firing platforms can
have fuel, stores, repair parts, and even certain types of munitions brought to
them in the field: replenishment ships can resupply surface combatants and
sometimes submarines at sea, trucks or transport aircraft can resupply strike
aircraft at austere airbases/airstrips, and trucks can resupply TEL units. All
of these means for logistical support in the “field” can be directly attacked given
sufficient intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance to know when and where
to strike. Moreover, the depots and other fixed infrastructure that logistics
forces inevitably pull from can also be identified and attacked. There’s an
important caveat, though: the heavy wartime demands on U.S. strike-capable
platforms and the finite size of their guided munitions inventories suggests
that (politically authorized) targeting lists would have to be prioritized
based on a particular logistical asset’s or site’s importance in the
adversary’s combat logistics chain, plus the operational and tactical
difficulties/risks in attacking that target.
This leads to a key
point: an intelligent adversary could employ many forms of deception and
concealment to heavily complicate U.S. and allied targeting efforts against a
logistical asset/site or the missile-armed platforms it was servicing.
Nevertheless, many forms of concealment would require that the adversary reduce
its missile forces’ operational tempos somewhat in order to reduce the risk of
detection, classification, and attack. This might relieve some pressure on friendly
air and missile defenses by suppressing the frequency and sizes of missile
raids on the margins; this can have a significant effect on a given defense’s
probability of annihilating a raid. In turn, this suppression might provide
friendly forces increased temporary localized margins of operational freedom in
a theater—not to mention possibly alleviate some margin of pressure on allied
populations and their governments (and by extension on U.S political leaders).
Attacking an
adversary’s theater missile forces’ bases along with much of their supporting
logistical infrastructure would require strikes against the adversary’s home
soil. U.S. political leaders would undoubtedly weigh the escalatory risks of
such strikes against the consequences of allowing the adversary to enjoy
operational sanctuary for its missile forces. Some critics suggest these
escalatory risks would—and should—bar the U.S. from ever attacking a
nuclear-armed adversary’s soil. Such critiques however do not recognize the
high probability that if the adversary valued certain political objectives
highly enough to opt for major war, those objectives would force
him to commit the escalatory precedent of conventionally striking a treaty
ally’s territory—and perhaps also sovereign U.S. territories—first. This is of
immense strategic significance. For one thing, an adversary’s conventional
first strike against U.S. or allied territories would almost certainly ignite
the popular passions of the victims’ citizens.
The pressure on a U.S. President to retaliate in scope if not in kind
would be intense. For another, the adversary’s first strike would allow the
U.S. and its ally to invoke unassailable legal as well as moral justification
for retaliation. These factors would not offset the nuclear risks of
non-nuclear retaliation, but it should be noted that there is an enormous
difference between selectively striking conventional forces that might carry theater nuclear weapons and
striking distinct nuclear forces. In many cases, the bases and logistical
infrastructure supporting conventional forces are distinct from those used by
nuclear forces. For example, China’s theater nuclear forces (in the form of its
DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile force) are distinct (and often
geographically segregated) from its conventionally-armed short-range ballistic
missile and long-range cruise missile forces.
None of this is meant
to minimize questions of escalation risk facing a U.S. President, but they most
certainly do not present a “checkmating” barrier that prevents operations to
deny the adversary’s theater missile forces sanctuary. It bears observing that potential adversaries wouldn’t be investing
heavily in integrated territorial air defenses, base hardening, and deception
and concealment technologies to protect their conventional theater missile
forces if they didn’t accept the reality that those forces might be attacked in
war.[iii]
Defeat
the systems-of-systems that missile-armed mobile platforms rely upon to attack
effectively
I’ve previously written
about these
kinds
of
operations
at length. Suffice to say, an adversary must be able to either provide correct
targeting-quality tactical pictures to its firing units or be able to cue those
“shooters” into positions from which they can use their own sensors to build local
targeting pictures. The U.S. and its allies can use deception and concealment
to prevent the adversary from being able to effectively attack protected mobile
forces. This can also be done to some extent for fixed bases and military or
civil infrastructure, as deception and concealment can be used to make
unimportant sites look important and vice versa. Deception and concealment
might additionally be used to induce the adversary to waste precious weapons
(and expose firing platforms) in attacks against false or low-value targets.
The U.S. might additionally attack the adversary’s surveillance and
reconnaissance assets, precision navigation and time systems that allow the
construction of an accurate situational picture, command and control sites
where firing decisions are made, and data relay pathways that form the
“backbone” of the entire apparatus. These attacks can be physical, but in many
cases it might be more effective as well as carry less escalation risk to use
electronic or (as technically plausible) cyber attacks. Nor do these attacks
need to have permanent effects (though that would certainly be the ideal), as friendly
forces could greatly capitalize on even temporary localized degradation of the
adversary’s surveillance-reconnaissance-targeting infrastructure.
This “thread” would not
prevent an adversary from using its conventionally-armed theater missiles in
terror bombardment campaign against an American ally’s cities. Even so, history
suggests such a campaign would be far more likely to further ignite the ally’s
popular passions and deepen its resolve to prevail—and retaliate—than it would
to than it would to coerce the ally into submission. In other words, it would
be a strategically self-defeating move by the adversary.
Defeat
missile-armed mobile platforms as they break out of bases/garrisons towards
their firing positions
As Toti observes, this
“thread” would largely occur within “denied” areas such as the adversary’s own
soil, any friendly or neutral territories occupied by the adversary’s forces,
the airspace above or adjacent to these territories, or the waterspace
adjoining these territories. This would accordingly complicate offensive
anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface combatant, and anti-TEL operations.
Nevertheless, friendly submarines could lurk offshore to intercept the adversary’s
submarines and surface combatants. Offensive sweeps by theater-range fighters
might be used when and where feasible to attack the adversary’s outbound
aircraft. Standoff strike aircraft cued by penetrating scouts might be used to
attack the adversary’s surface combatants. If adequate air superiority is
present, maritime patrol aircraft might be used to search for and attack
adversary submarines. Special forces might be used to cue attacks using
penetrating aircraft or long-range guided munitions against TELs (though if the
First Gulf War is any indication, probably without a great deal of success).
Destroying missile-firing platforms would of course be ideal, but the real goal
of this “thread” would be to make breakout more time-consuming and
resource-intensive than it might otherwise be for the adversary. This might
result in further suppression of his operational tempo. It might also prevent
him from seizing or maintaining the operational initiative.
Defeat
missile-armed air and naval platforms in choke points
I covered this with
respect to aircraft and submarines last
week;
the threats facing an adversary’s surface combatants would be even steeper.
This forms part of the argument for deploying land-based anti-ship missiles
alongside straits. Land-based surveillance assets bordering a strait can also
cue anti-ship strikes by friendly aircraft operating from more distant bases.
Similarly, these surveillance assets can provide other friendly forces with
tactically-actionable indications and warning of a strike aircraft raid
transiting through a choke point towards its targets or back to its airbases.
Lastly, defensive minefields could be laid as geographically practical to
complicate transits by the adversary’s surface combatants or submarines.
Defeat
missile-armed mobile platforms in their patrol or firing areas
I also covered this
with respect to aircraft and submarines last
week.
In the absence of persistent tactical air cover, an adversary’s surface
combatants would not be able to hold out for long against U.S or allied
anti-ship onslaughts.
TELs present the
hardest target to engage in the adversary’s firing areas, bar none. They not
only can hide within the broad expanse (and defense-in-depth) of the
adversary’s territory, but can also blend into their surroundings on par with the
quietest submarines at sea. They can shift quickly and frequently between
prepared firing positions, or can hunker down heavily camouflaged for
protracted periods. There is no existing or technically-plausible weapon system
that could offer a high kill probability against TEL units that were smartly
employing deception and concealment. Nor is there an existing or technically-plausible
strike aircraft that could persistently perform TEL hunts deep within a capable
adversary’s airspace unless the adversary’s territorial air defenses had been
comprehensively rolled back. This does not mean that TEL hunting, if the
tactical environment allows it, would be fruitless. The situation-dependent use of U.S. aircraft to hunt TELs using cheap
weapons with low kill probabilities would still put TEL units on the defensive,
which in turn might contribute to suppressing TEL firing rates and salvo sizes.
The most effective
means of defeating ground-launched missile forces is to physically occupy the
territory they are operating within. This is a principle that has been proven
time and time again, from the allies’ Second World War efforts to defeat the
German V-1 and V-2 bombardment campaign, to the Israelis’ efforts to break up
Hezbollah and Hamas rocket bombardment campaigns over the past decade. It’s also
the most costly in treasure and blood, as it requires the use of sizable ground
forces. This is plausible and probably necessary if the adversary is operating
TELs on the overrun soil of a U.S. ally; liberation of the ally’s territory
would normally be a U.S. war objective in any case. It may also be plausible,
albeit possibly far more costly, if a relatively small adversary country is
operating TELs on its own soil. It is not plausible at all, whether militarily
or politically, against TELs operated on the soil of a regional or great power.
However, if a regional or great power is operating TELs relatively close to its
border or coastal areas, and especially if those areas are somewhat
geographically isolated, it might be plausible to dispatch special forces on
brief raids aimed at destroying them directly, flushing them for attack by
other friendly forces, or temporarily suppressing them by inducing them to go
into hiding. Expeditionary forces might also be used to raid a regional power’s
TELs in these kinds of areas; this would not be possible politically or
militarily against a great power.
Induce
missile-armed mobile platforms to fire at false targets and perhaps expose
themselves to attack
I’ve written about this
one extensively
in the past as well. Every theater missile wasted is one less in the
adversary’s finite inventory, with concomitant
impacts on his campaign plans. This is especially true if a wasted missile
cannot be readily replaced off the production line during wartime.
Similarly, an adversary
platform or grouping that is seduced into attacking false targets will be
incapable of attacking valid targets elsewhere at the same time. U.S. and
allied forces can obviously exploit this operationally. At maximum, a
submarine, surface combatant, or aircraft that shoots a theater missile gives
away its general presence and sometimes even its approximate position. False
targets might thus be used to set up reactive intercepts against the attackers,
or perhaps even to lure them into prepared ambushes. It isn’t a stretch to
imagine the kinds of enduring (and exploitable) psychological effects that
might be imposed upon previously-overconfident adversary crews that wasted
ordnance against decoys—or managed to survive an ambush.
Mask
our forces from the adversary’s local reconnaissance and targeting efforts
This is another
“thread” I’ve
covered
previously
elsewhere.
It is just as crucial to the use of false target tactics in the previous
“thread” as it is to defending actual U.S. and allied forces from attack. The
adversary must not be allowed to properly classify, let alone detect if at all
practical, actual U.S. and allied forces until it is too late to matter. Toti
hits the nail on the head in his piece when he notes “…it is about increasing
the fog of war by making the real targets look like anything but a real target”
and that it “must be a continuous process.”[iv]
Defeat
missile-armed air and naval platforms in close battle
This is
self-explanatory: destroy them or induce them to retreat before they can shoot
at friendly forces. This demands either long-range weaponry that can be fired
from the “inner zone” against the adversary’s inbound missile-armed platforms
or the placement of persistent outer layer defenses in the adversary’s path. The
latter is almost always preferable as the adversary can easily field strike
missiles that outrange any weapon the defender might fire from the inner zone.
As its title makes clear,
this “thread” is not applicable to TELs.
Defeat the inbound
missile
This is also self-explanatory. Missile defense sensors, kinetic
weapons, and electronic warfare systems all factor here. So does damage
recoverability (e.g. use of redundant systems, rapid repair of damaged runways,
hardening of a base’s critical infrastructure, shipboard damage control, etc).
No single measure offers a panacea: some combination of active and passive
measures is necessary to maximize defensive effectiveness.
A subtle variation of
this “thread” involves the dispersal of forces not just to enhance their
survivability, but also to force the adversary into an inventory management
dilemma. The adversary could concentrate strikes over a specific period of time
against a small number of force dispersal sites in order to overwhelm the
missile defense systems protecting those sites, but that would leave the U.S.
and allied forces positioned in other dispersal sites free to operate. The
adversary could alternatively strike the maximum number of dispersal sites
possible within a specific time period, but that would result in relatively few
missiles attacking any single site—and thereby greatly simplify the jobs of
each site’s missile defense systems. Also recall that theater missiles are not
easily produced, especially in war. This means every missile fired would reduce
the number available to the adversary for the duration of the conflict. As
such, the adversary would probably have some threshold limit to the number of
missiles he’d be willing to use in a concentrated or “spread” attack. U.S. and
allied forces could adapt to capitalize on whichever attack type the adversary
selected, and by doing so defeat the adversary’s theater missiles at the
operational level of war.
Create conditions where
an adversary chooses not to employ theater missiles
Full-spectrum
anti-theater missile warfare signifies denying the adversary conventional
escalation dominance in a crisis or war. The cumulative effect of convincing an
opportunistic potential adversary that each of its “threads” are
combat-credible—and that U.S. political leaders would be willing to deny the
potential adversary’s forces operational sanctuary on their own soil if the
adversary struck first—will generally be successful conventional deterrence.
The ideal state of deterrence
would obviously be prevention of war outright, and Cold War-era theories
regarding how this can be achieved between two competing nuclear-armed powers remain applicable. But even if a conventional war did erupt,
the credibility of full-spectrum anti-theater missile warfare might help induce
an adversary with modest political objectives to keep the conflict limited to a
brief localized clash along a land border or at sea involving only the
shortest-range missiles in both sides’ inventories. While tragic and hardly
desirable, it would still be vastly preferable to a ruinous general war.
[i]
CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.”
Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6,
June 2014, 39.
[ii] I
define “theater missile” to include short and medium range ballistic and cruise
missiles that can strike targets on land or at sea.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author
and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official
positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do
not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any
U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.
[i]
CAPT William J. Toti, USN (Retired). “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.”
Naval Institute Proceedings 140, No. 6,
June 2014, 39.
[ii] I
define “theater missile” to include short and medium range ballistic and cruise
missiles that can strike targets on land or at sea.
