What could an allegorical fence in the English countryside possibly have to do with a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier? If you’ll indulge me, I’ll explain.
I’ve
written before that while there’s no one right way to think through and argue the complex
questions in a policy debate,
there is at least one wrong way. A famed parable written by early 20th Century
English theologian G.K. Chesterton makes the same case, only far more
eloquently:
“In the matter of
reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and
simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox.
There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say for the
sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more
modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, "I don't see the use
of this; let us clear it away." To which the more intelligent type of
reformer will do well to answer: "If you don't see the use of it, I
certainly won't let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you
can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to
destroy it."
This paradox rests on
the most elementary common sense. The gate or fence did not grow there.
It was not set up by somnambulists who built it in their sleep. It is
highly improbable that it was put there by escaped lunatics who were for some
reason loose in the street. Some person had some reason for thinking it would
be a good thing for somebody. And until we know what the reason was, we
really cannot judge whether the reason was reasonable.
It is extremely
probable that we have overlooked some whole aspect of the question, if
something set up by human beings like ourselves seems to be entirely
meaningless and mysterious. There are reformers who get over this difficulty by
assuming that all their fathers were fools; but if that be so, we can only say
that folly appears to be a hereditary disease. But the truth is that nobody has
any business to destroy a social institution until he has really seen it as an
historical institution. If he knows how it arose, and what purposes it was
supposed to serve, he may really be able to say that they were bad purposes, or
that they have since become bad purposes, or that they are purposes which are
no longer served. But if he simply stares at the thing as a senseless
monstrosity that has somehow sprung up in his path, it is he and not the
traditionalist who is suffering from an illusion.
Like
Chesterton’s fence, the large-deck carrier did not just spontaneously
materialize. It is the product of a century of human efforts that incrementally
evolved and were evolved by the field of naval warfare. Every change in carrier
design, air wing configuration, maritime aviation doctrine and operating
concepts, and so on can be traced to one or more strategic, operational,
tactical, organizational, or political purposes. Not all of these purposes were
wise or enduring, but that’s where the methodology Chesterton proposed in his
parable fits in.
If
one seeks to reduce or remove the large-deck carrier from Navy force structure,
one must articulate the purposes the carrier was designed to serve, judge
whether any of those purposes remain relevant, and lastly propose some
alternative (be it a new platform or a family of platforms) that fulfills the
purposes judged to remain relevant—or otherwise acknowledge the consequent
decline in the Joint force’s capacity and capabilities. I summarized the first
two steps in my series on the large-deck carrier last fall. As for the third, I would suggest that any alternative to
the large-deck nuclear-powered carrier must at minimum pass each of the
following five tests:
- Can the alternative perform both power projection and sea control tasks? Carriers are commonly thought of as platforms for hurling land-attack strikes at an adversary. This overlooks the fact that in major war they more typically have served to enable maritime forces to seize and sustain temporary localized sea control for specific operational purposes, one of which can be land-attack strike.
- Does the alternative enable the timely and persistent employment of large tactical aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, over maritime areas far from friendly defensible airbases on land? An aircraft carrier’s ability to operate in relative proximity to objective maritime areas promotes faster responses and longer on-station persistence than may be possible from in-theater airbases. This is especially the case if the airbases nearest to such areas lie well within the adversary's offensive striking reach. Furthermore, a tactical aircraft must be relatively large if is to carry heavy payloads and fly long distances at a medium to high subsonic speed or otherwise remain aloft for long periods of time. Only a large-deck carrier can launch and recover these kinds of aircraft at sea. Particularly important are Airborne Early Warning aircraft with large-aperture radars, which I have previously noted serve as the keystone of sea control. Long-range/long-endurance fighters are similarly valuable to sea control, as they can enable interdiction of “archers” well before the latter can launch their “arrows” at defended aircraft and ships. A large-deck carrier can enable sizable proactive or responsive screening support to surface forces, and a dispersed multi-carrier battleforce can enable persistent screening support in mass of such forces.
- Can the alternative achieve a high sustained strategic speed as well as protracted operational endurance? The nuclear-powered large-deck carrier can move between (or within) theaters faster than any other surface platform—and never requires refueling to do so. Only the air wing’s fuel and ammunition, plus the crew’s food and stores, require replenishment. And the carrier’s vast storage space allows it to operate for long periods of time between replenishments.
- How extensible is the alternative to incorporating new aircraft and shipboard systems? The large-deck carrier’s size and facilities have proven highly capable over the decades of operating each successive generation of aircraft. Similarly, the carrier’s size—and the availability of vast electrical power from its nuclear reactors—have allowed it to take on each successive generation of shipboard warfare systems.
- Would the alternative be able to take on an increasing share of the joint force’s strike tasks in a major modern protracted conflict as long-range missile inventories are depleted? History tells us that guided munitions will be expended in war at a rate well in excess of what peacetime planners expect. Long-range missiles are central to modern warfare, but their inventories will eventually be outstripped by demand in a protracted fight. This simple fact would not change if the budgetary resources used for large-deck carriers were instead reallocated towards long-range missile procurement; in a protracted war, these missiles would eventually run out. This phenomenon is not unique to naval forces or U.S. forces for that matter; adversaries will face the same constraints. A naval force will need a platform capable of delivering numerous and relatively wartime-producible weapons over long distances at opportune moments during a protracted maritime conflict. A large-deck carrier with a smartly configured and armed air wing can fulfill that role. If anything, longer-range missiles and other joint combined arms will be best used to open up temporary localized holes in an adversary’s defenses that can be exploited by reusable aircraft carrying more plentiful and readily wartime-producible shorter-range weapons. And let’s not forget that carrier aircraft can be reloaded each time they return to their ship, whereas shipboard launchers can only be reloaded upon retirement from the immediate combat area.
It
is insufficient to simply declare the large-deck carrier is undesirable because
it is expensive, or that it is obsolete because it can be threatened. Neither
the carrier’s relative expense nor its exposure to dangerous wartime threats is
particularly new in any event. If one is to advocate replacement of the large-deck
carrier with something else, that something else must be able to assume the
still-relevant purposes served by the large-deck carrier using ways that are
superior to those of the large-deck carrier. The parable of Chesterton’s fence
applies.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author
and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official
positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do
not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any
U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.