The Use of the Marines in Europe for Deterrence

Marine COL William Nemeth has an intriguing article in this month’s Proceedings about how the Marines could contribute to deterring Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Nemeth suggests the existing Black Sea Rotational Force could be expanded to a “full battalion combat team” he dubs “Rotational Force Europe” that could be deployed anywhere in Eastern Europe as needed. This combined arms force would consist of a reinforced infantry battalion with supporting combined arms attachments such as a reconnaissance platoon, light armored vehicle platoon/company, tank platoon, amphibious assault vehicle platoon, artillery battery, aviation combat element, and logistics combat element. I’m not going to do the approximate manpower counts for each of these components, but I’ll wager that their collective size would be more than double the Black Sea Rotational Force’s recent size.

Using Robert Rubel’s hierarchy of presence as a reference, my instinct is that Rotational Force Europe’s inherent capabilities when deployed as a aggregated group would fall somewhere between a tripwire force and a force capable of delaying/disrupting a notional Russian ground offensive (at least for a short time). If it functioned as part of a larger NATO standing forward combined arms conventional deterrent, the likelihood of bogging down a Russian thrust would probably be even greater.

But Nemeth also talks about splitting this Rotational Force Europe up into reinforced companies for deployment in widely-separated locations from the Baltics to Romania to even Georgia. He notes that the additional equipment needed to reinforce these companies could be pulled from the Marines’ prepositioned stockpiles in Norway, with augmentation personnel flown in from the U.S. All this is fine for peacetime engagement, training, and showing the flag. In a crisis, though, it seems to me that these companies would still be nothing more than tripwires. That’s okay as long as we’re honest about how a tripwire gambit must be structured in order to be effective. First, the tripwire must be placed in a location where an aggressor’s conventional forces cannot avoid coming into direct contact with it. Second, it must be latently backed by larger and heavier combat-credible forces positioned further back in the theater that can immediately provide it with combined arms support, begin deploying forward to reinforce it, and begin inflicting countervailing damage on the aggressor. Third, it must be able to latently back the host nation’s constabulary forces responding to an aggressor’s “salami tactic” incursions; the constabularies in turn must be able to provide physical security support for the tripwire’s emplacements and lines of communication/maneuver. Lastly, it must be accepted that losses in the tripwire force will likely be horrendous. That’s the price of being on the frontline at the beginning of a major war.

Nemeth goes into commendable detail regarding the air and naval assets that would be needed to support his Rotational Force Europe. It’s worth noting that he calls for there to be a standing presence in theater of two to three amphibious warships to perform transport, force insertion, or afloat staging base tasks. Given that the amphibious fleet is already overtaxed, something would almost certainly have to give in terms of presence in other theaters in order to restore that kind of presence in 6^th Fleet. The same is true for his call for a standing presence of two to four additional DDGs on top of the four now permanently deployed in Rota, Spain, plus four to five Littoral Combat Ships. He also calls for a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to be assigned to 6^th Fleet at all times; it is not clear whether this is the same as the amphibious warships he listed for transport or an additional set of such ships carrying their own Marines. While I don't disagree with him in terms of the need to reestablish a more sizable standing U.S. Navy forward presence in the European theater, note that CS-21R all but declares our existing force structure is insufficient to do so and also achieve all the other prioritized strategic tasks in other theaters assigned by our political leadership. CS-21R makes clear the burden for naval presence in Europe therefore falls on our NATO allies' fleets.

COL Nemeth briefly discusses how a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) might be used to quickly reinforce Europe in the event of a conflict with Russia. He suggests that a standing MEB headquarters element should be attached to European Command to plan for and command the flying-in of Marines from the U.S. to marry up with the prepositioned equipment stockpiles in Norway, and then deploy where needed in northeastern Europe—including the Baltics. He also implies that equipment could be prepositioned on NATO’s Black Sea members’ territories for contingencies in that portion of the theater. While I strongly agree with the use of a MEB for these purposes, I would point out that any use of the Baltic or Black Seas for transporting the MEB’s units towards frontal areas would be risky as a crisis peaked and nearly impossible if it had to occur after a war had already started. Russian sea denial capabilities in those waters will be too dense, at least during a conventional conflict’s first few weeks. This means gear must be prepositioned closer to where it might actually be needed. Norway is probably fine for Scandinavian operations. Prepositioning in Poland is probably necessary for operations in that country or the Baltics. Prepositioning in Romania and possibly also Bulgaria is unquestionably necessary for operations in those countries. Nemeth suggests that Rotational Force Europe might be used to enable the MEB’s theater entry and then movement to action; this could be a very important role for the former that deserves further analysis.

To make Rotational Force Europe, standing 6^th Fleet presence by a MEU, and the contingency MEB possible, Nemeth asserts that the Corps will have to stop rotationally deploying East Coast Marine units to augment Marine forces in Japan. While this is contrary to the Defense Department’s strategic prioritization of East Asia, it does make sense given the comparatively far higher military tensions with Russia than China at present. It also offers further evidence that our Navy-Marine Corps team is undersized (and budget levels being what they are, underprepared) for the strategic tasks it is assigned.

All in all, Nemeth has laid out an excellent and provocative article. Future analysis ought to look at how his ideas might pair up with Terrence Kelly’s ideas on how army forces (both U.S. and allied) ought to be used for conventional deterrence in Poland and the Baltics. More attention also needs to be paid with respect to how air and naval forces (whether U.S. or allied) ought to be used, especially in support of U.S. and allied ground forces fighting on the continent. And of course, the means for protecting the flow of reinforcements and logistical support into Europe and then onward towards frontal areas still requires much focused thought.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not reflect the official positions of Systems Planning and Analysis, and to the author’s knowledge do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Department of Defense, any U.S. armed service, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Navy is Thinking Outside the Box on LX(R)

Found this from January 16, 2013. Very interesting.

The Navy is interested in concepts for improving future amphibious ship affordability while still retaining warship capabilities. One approach towards this goal might be to use commercial design and build practice for as much of the ship as possible, and apply military standards only where necessary to achieve specific performance requirements. The Navy would like Industry perspectives on potential benefits and challenges to implementing such a concept. Specifically, the Navy requests information on:

o The feasibility and cost of building a Navy ship to commercial standards (as opposed to military standards), classed by ABS to Steel Vessel Rules (www.eagle.org), with the following capacities:

o 20,000 ft2 (1,860 m2) vehicle stowage space, with access to both well and weather decks, and with at least 13.5 ft (4.1 m) clear overhead

o Well deck capable of embarking either two Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) or one Landing Craft Utility (LCU)

o Troop berthing for 400

o 20,000 ft3 (570m3) magazine capable of stowing all types of USMC ammunition

o NAVAIR certified flight deck with two land/launch spots for MH-53E or MV-22 aircraft

o The feasibility and cost of imposing the following additional design requirements on the above concept:

o US Navy crew (approximately 350), with Navy standard damage control lockers & equipment

o US Navy combatant damaged stability standards

o Longitudinal bending moment dictated by Navy rather than being derived from seaway loads or ABS rules

o Grade A shock qualified emergency take-home auxiliary propulsion system

o Grade A shock qualified command and control spaces for government furnished electronic systems

o Segregated Grade A shock qualified Navy standard electrical, cooling water, and other distributive systems to service take-home auxiliary propulsion and other vital systems.

For the purpose of this RFI, assume that half of distributive system loads are to vital systems.

o US Navy firefighting systems

o The practicality of implementing a mixed commercial and military standards ship by designating certain compartments as reserved for military standard equipment, with the shipbuilder free to outfit all other compartments in the most cost effective manner that satisfies ABS Steel Vessel Rules.

o Labor and material breakdowns for any ship costs estimates.

o Explanations for how specific potential future amphibious ship requirements would affect costs.

o Contractual, specification, or other issues that might impact a mixed commercial and military standards ship program.

o Other ideas or suggestions for future amphibious ship affordability such as acquisition strategies, innovative total ship solutions, technology advancements, or design and construction concepts/methodologies.

It is desirable that data be received with unlimited rights to the Government.

Nevertheless, we recognize that proprietary data may be included with the information provided. If so, clearly mark such proprietary information and clearly separate it from the unrestricted information as an addendum.

I've highlighted the pieces I think are highly relevant here. The money for LX(R) is not going to change. It is $1.3 billion. If your budget is finite, as it is for this program, how can the Navy maneuver within a fixed budget?

Well, if I am reading this solicitation for information correctly, one way would be to trade some of the survivability of the ship for more survivability on shore. By that I mean it looks like someone is looking into what it might mean if some areas of the ship were built to a commercial (I read as below NVR) specification as a way of saving money and using those savings to add more options to the capability of the vessel in support of LX(R) features that help meet more aspects of the requirements stated by all parties.

This is a clever solicitation designed to encourage clever ideas.

The Sense of Congress on Amphibious Ships

Proposed MLP and AFSB option for LSD(X)

Normally when a defense budget is passed, I can't wait to dig through it and highlight all the important details. This time, with no associated appropriations bill (or plan) coming anytime soon, it would be a waste of time to suggest anything in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Act is worth discussing, because it is worthless until the elected folks in Washington, DC get their budget priorities sorted out.

There is one section in the bill that I do want to highlight though. This reads like something inserted by a lobbyist, and it doesn't belong in my opinion.

SEC. 131. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS.

a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1. The Marine Corps is a combat force that leverages maneuver from the sea as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
2. The Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon naval vessels, they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations and, operating ‘‘from the sea’’, they require no third-party host nation permission to conduct military operations.
3. The Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet this full range of military operations.
4. Due only to fiscal constraints, that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels, which adds military risk to future operations.
5. The Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 30 operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to Congress that will reduce the force to 28 vessels.
6. Experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

1. the Department of Defense should carefully evaluate the maritime force structure necessary to execute demand for forces by the commanders of the combatant commands;
2. the Navy should carefully evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet current and projected requirements;
3. the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and procurement of the next generation of amphibious assault ships as a component of the balanced battle force;
4. the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection;
5. operation and maintenance requirements analysis, as well as the potential to leverage a common hull form design, should be considered to reduce total ownership cost and acquisition cost; and
6. maintaining a robust amphibious ship building industrial base is vital for the future of the national security of the United States.

To me this looks a lot like some Marine Corps General and his industry buddies throwing their weight around via Congress to try an influence the Analysis of Alternatives taking place regarding the LSD(X). Congress should not be trying to influence the decision unless they are ready to pony up the big bucks for what they are basically calling for - which to me sounds like more LPD-17s.


From what I understand, LSD(X) will be a design to cost ship. The recurring cost (ship 3 and beyond) is pegged to be about $1.2 billion in the shipbuilding budget. That makes the LPD-17 hull a nonstarter without a significant increase in cash from Congress.

The Marines face several challenges in dealing with amphibious requirements, but two stand out as important challenges that must be addressed. The first challenge is that the lift footprint of the amphibious MEB is growing, and the second challenge is that the MPS squadron only carries about 70% of the MEB's equipment. With limited funding and only one platform in the shipbuilding plan able to address these issues - the LSD(X) - folks are either going to have to get creative to solve these challenges, or accept that the challenges will not be solved.

The LSD(X) is a choice between 4 alternatives.

The first choice is a new build, best possible lift vessel for $1.2 billion recurring. I have no idea what design that would be, but if we are being honest it almost certainly wouldn't be anything similar to a current LSD if it is going to meet the stated requirements.

The second choice is for a LPD-17 mod, best possible for $1.2 billion recurring. I do not believe that is possible, but I'm sure there is a shipbuilding guru who other Marines call "General" willing and ready to convince a gullible politician it is possible. Experts I have spoken to in NAVSEA say it's not possible, and I'll trust their expertise and opinion over any Marine General when it comes to shipbuilding.

The third choice is to use a foreign design brought up to NVR standard at a cost of no more than $1.2 billion recurring with the third ship. The design that is specifically highlighted with this option is the French Mistral class. The ships would be built at a US shipyard. There is not a consensus whether these ships can be built in a US shipyard for $1.2 billion recurring.

The fourth option is to build two ships - a MLP and an AFSB - and use the combination of both ships to replace the single LSD. The idea is for the AFSB vessel to cover both the lift for amphibious groups and carry residual lift for the MPS MEB while MLP serves as a well deck surrogate. What is important to understand here is that the AFSB design would actually be a non-mil spec LPH with a limited hanger capacity, but it gives the option for that vessel to carry forward the helicopters in an ARG while the LHA/LHD operates 20 JSFs. Neither the MLP or AFSB would be a gray hull though, which is a major reason why old school Marine Generals who have been doing amphibious assaults for 30 years (cough!) hate the idea.

When I read Section 131 of the 2013 National Defense Act, what I read as "Sense of Congress" actually represents the traditionalists mindset on amphibious capability and their Gulf coast lobby buddies.

But the bottom line is this. The fourth option is the only option that will actually meet the capacity requirements for amphibious lift and the MPS, but I fully expect the United States Marine Corps to outright reject the very suggestion of any option away from the traditional 3 ship ARG. The third option for a foreign design will be rejected solely because it is a foreign design, even though the logic of that escapes me completely when the ships are being built in US shipyards. A new design is possible but unlikely, and until we see more in-house design expertise in NAVSEA I can't say that is necessarily a bad thing.

So ultimately I fully expect the final choice for the LSD(X) to be a LPD-17 mod that the Navy budget cannot afford, and in the end I suspect the Marine Corps will end up with about 8 LSD(X) because that is all they can afford.

But if it was me, I would go for the MLP + AFSB concept. I believe it carries with it the highest risk, but I also believe it would give the Marine Corps the most flexibility when it comes to operations at sea. In my opinion it is much easier for the USMC to remain a relevant national defense asset when they are operating from more ships than when they are operating from fewer ships, and the MLP + AFSB option puts Marines on well over 40 vessels that deploy frequently, vs less than 30 possible vessels that deploy less frequently when one picks the quality LPD-17 mod option.

The Politics of Fleet Constitution

I went back and reviewed the Navy Readiness Posture hearing in the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness back on March 22, 2012. The hearing was held 2 days after I wrote this blog post.

The panel included Vice Admiral William Burke, Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, and Vice Admiral David Architzel. I have a few thoughts.

It should be noted that nobody, not Congress and not the Navy, wants to keep USS Port Royal (CG 73). Considering that the current CNO classified INSURV reports several years ago, the condition of the USS Port Royal (CG 73) has been previously concealed to Congress and the American taxpayer.

All discussions apparently focus on the remaining three FY13 cruisers and to some extent, the three FY14 cruisers also set for early retirement.

Rep. Forbes and the Navy both cited different estimates for the modernization and maintenance of the cruisers scheduled for decommissioning in the March 22 hearing, but in the hearing Admiral Burke does a great job of highlighting how the numbers are actually the same - from different point of views. Rep. Forbes cites an estimate of $592 million in FY 13 and $859 million in FY 14 to modernize the cruisers, while the Navy claims the estimate of savings for early retirement of the cruisers is over $4 billion. It looks like they are both right, and both sides are making interesting arguments.

Vice Admiral Burke and Vice Admiral McCoy's arguments are very smart. Basically what they are saying is that it will cost about $4.1 billion to modernize, maintain, and operate the cruisers through the FYDP (next 5 budget years), and the Navy number includes manpower, training, and equipment costs like the helicopters while the numbers used by Rep Forbes estimates only part of the bill for keeping the cruisers. The concern the Navy has is that just because Congress finds money for modernization and keeping the cruiser hulls, the Navy won't get the additional funding for maintenance and operations of the cruisers in the out years and thus down the road the Navy won't have the extra funding to properly maintain the ships that Congress spent just enough money to save and modernize. That partial support of the early retirement cruisers would force the Navy to maintain the cruisers at the expense of other ships in the out years, which the Navy does not want to do.

The hearing was very interesting to me to listen to the second time because this time I noted that from the opening testimony - the discussion was focused on the cruisers, which I think has been the plan from the beginning. Lets take a step back and observe objectively what is happening.

A few years ago the Obama administration drew up a new strategy for National Ballistic Missile Defense that centered on the Navy's AEGIS BMD capability. A lot of noise was made of this major change, but in terms of shipbuilding, maintenance, and modernization of naval forces capable of fielding ballistic missile defense - no plan has changed since that announcement and no additional funding for ships from the administration ever went to the Navy to take on that rather important strategic role. I think that is important, because it highlights the strategy the Navy has come up with to find more money from Congress during the tight FY13 budget season.

The Navy has put 7 cruisers up for early retirement. Keep in mind that all 7 cruisers put up for early retirement in FY13 and FY14 are capable of being modernized for ballistic missile defense (Port Royal already has BMD capability, but Port Royal is apparently a lemon). I think that is pretty remarkable, because the US Navy actually has 7 cruisers not capable of being upgraded to BMD - the baseline 3 Ticonderoga class cruisers CG 52-58 which do not have the proper radar for AEGIS BMD. In other words, despite being given a new national strategic mission in ballistic missile defense, the US Navy has put up 7 surface combatants capable of performing the BMD mission up for early retirement when in fact the Navy has 7 surface combatants not capable of performing that BMD mission. Why would the Navy do this?

It is fairly obvious to this observer that the Navy put these cruisers on the chopping block precisely because they expected Congress to swoop in and save the 6 cruisers the Navy wants to save, and allow the Navy to dump the amphibious ships and no one will care. Cruisers are shiny toys that represent power projection, and these specific cruisers have a significant future ahead of them if the money was to be found and made available for the US Navy to keep them. To big Navy, amphibious ships are dull and boring, and all they do is all the hard, unsexy stuff.

I believe it is fairly obvious Congress is doing exactly what the Navy and the Obama administration wants them to do - saving the 6 cruisers and allowing the Navy to retire USS Port Royal (CG 73), and in fact the House Republicans are saving the cruisers in exactly the way the Navy and Obama administration (by that I mean SECNAV and CNO) wants them to do it - by making it an issue the House Republicans feel ownership of and thus are able to find funding for when budgets everywhere are tight. The Obama administration is basically using Rep. Forbes and Rep. McKeon to find money and pay for the administrations ballistic missile defense policy that is otherwise neglected and unfunded by the administration. It is part of a political game, and the Republicans seem perfectly willing to be played like a political fiddle in this political game.

Meanwhile big Navy is getting exactly what they want out the game. When it came time to make budget adjustments to the FY13 FYDP, to pay for more surface combatants the Navy is moving amphibious ships to the right, and by putting up the cruisers for early decommissioning the Navy insures Congress will save them, and discard the amphibious ships (which are listed, and nobody is talking about). Whether the issue is new shipbuilding or early retirements, big Navy has framed the argument perfectly in a way that Congress focuses on saving the surface combatants while the amphibious force suffers. Meanwhile, it is the amphibious ships that are making record length deployments being further worn out, while the replacements for the ships being worn out faster are being pushed further and further to the right in the shipbuilding plan.

Apparently Congress doesn't think the short dwell time of amphibious ship sailors is a big deal, so why should the CNO care? Congress is trying to draw a line in the sand on the early retirement of the cruisers, which is exactly what the Navy and the Obama administration wants Congress to do. In my opinion, Congress needs to think for themselves and not get sucked into the political game they are being manhandled in. If the House Republicans were playing this smart politically, they would target the LSDs for saving and save USS Cowpens (CG-63) - which is the cruiser in the best condition of those listed, and let the Obama administration hang themselves with their political shenanigans. If Congress doesn't save the cruisers, it is the Obama administration that has to answer questions why they are now neglecting their own ballistic missile defense strategy. Nobody cares of course, except Congress - which is why it is a solid plan by the Obama administration.

Make no mistake, the Obama administration not only expects the House Republicans to save the cruisers, they are in full support of it - because Congress saving the cruisers is actually the Obama administrations plan. By the time the voting comes around, I fully expect broad bi-partisan support to save the cruisers, but I do not believe there would be bi-partisan support to save the amphibious ships. Why? Because that isn't the administrations plan.

The administration doesn't care how the cruisers are saved when there is no money to pay for them, because if they did they wouldn't have given that problem to the House Republicans to figure out.

I find it all fascinating. I also truly believe that if the Congress doesn't save the cruisers set for early retirement in the FY13 budget, those three cruisers set for early retirement in FY14 will suddenly find the money to survive early retirement. The Navy is only gambling as many as six cruisers because it is a safe bet that some of them will be saved. I still wonder to myself what the number of cruisers is the Navy expects to get back from Congress - in a worse case scenario - and if that number can be achieved while saving the amphibious ships.

If Congress wants to draw a line in the sand on early retirements, I hope they draw that line around the amphibious ships. The Navy will find a way to fund their major surface combatant force - and the FY13 budget itself is proof they always do. Come hell or high water, before a single cut is made to surface combatants in either shipbuilding or early retirement, observe that first the amphibious ships will be thrown overboard by big Navy until and only if/when Congress says otherwise.

The Makin Island Deployment - Another Reminder the US Needs More Amphibs

The Makin Island ARG consisting the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8), the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18), and amphibious dock landing ship USS Pear Harbor (LSD 52) departed San Diego with Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 5 and the 11th MEU on Tuesday. The deployment has generate a bit of news in the media with articles at DoDBuzz, Marine Times, the San Diego Union Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. Of the various articles, the Los Angeles Times has this right - pirates should be concerned.

While ARG deployments in the Pacific are old hat for the Navy and Marine Corps, it is becoming increasingly rare to see an ARG deployed from either coast to spend any significant amount of time anywhere other than operating under CENTCOM command in the 5th fleet. I have heard many suggestions that the Makin Island ARG has been working overtime during deployment preparations training for activities specific to activities one might find around Somalia and Yemen - like piracy. If I was a pirate warlord, my advice is to take the best deal you can for ransom as soon as possible, and start looking for a new job with less associated risk.

All I'm saying is that I have noticed the US is giving the Horn of Africa a lot of attention lately, and if we are ever going to see a shift in US policy towards piracy, that policy change will arrive in the form of an ARG that added extra training specific to the piracy issue - and a new ARG just deployed to that region following rumors of intense anti-piracy training.

But while we are talking about Amphibious Ready Groups and CENTCOM, I want to point out that Makin Island hasn't done anything yet, and the real amphibious ready group story is the unfolding record breaking deployment of the Bataan ARG. If you recall, as a response to unfolding events in Libya, the Bataan ARG deployed a few weeks early on March 23, 2024 - 207 days ago (nearly 8 months ago). Lets just say she isn't coming home for Christmas, and if she isn't home by Valentines Day (a legitimate possibility) - the ships will break all records for deployment length since World War II.

Tipping Point much?

Seriously, keeping up with folks on LHD5 has been one of my most enjoyable blog related activities in 2011, and while that deployment has been very challenging for the families, I will pass on that the morale on The 5 is still very high. There are some special folks on those ships, and it's a good thing too because a deployment that will exceed 10 months like that Bataan ARG requires nothing less to be successful.

For the record, Bataan ARG represents a visible data point regarding the need for more amphibious ships. When amphibious ship deployments start breaking modern deployment length records - which WILL happen with Bataan - that means the Navy has not built enough amphibious ships. Politicians in Washington have held many hearings on the topic of dwell time for the Army, but right about now I'm thinking the Navy and Marine Corps folks who have been on ship for over a year in training and deployment are probably wondering who the hell their dwell time advocate is in Washington DC. At what point will Congress get the message that without more amphibious ships - which consistently has by percentage the highest number of days at sea annually of any surface vessel type - the nations leaders are asking way too much of the smaller, always desired but usually-overlooked-by-big-Navy amphibious force. 10 months is a long time for a battalion of Marines at sea, but because they are Marines - no one will ever hear a single complaint about it.

That doesn't mean it isn't a real problem.

The maintenance bill at the end of these very long ARG deployments isn't going to be small. Remember, Kearsarge ARG was at sea for 8+ months and now Bataan ARG will be at sea for 10+ months. I think these are important issues to keep in mind as Makin Island ARG heads to sea.

Rethinking Amphibious Assault

For USNI subscription members only (behind the paywall), this article by Noel Williams titled The Next Wave: Assault Operations for a New Era is a really interesting read. Here is a sample:

Perhaps the most promising technology area is unmanned systems. In the 2020s and beyond there will simply be no reason to place 20 Marines in a steel box and drive them through mined waters to land on an area-denied beach. An unmanned breacher vehicle (UBV), or family of unmanned systems, could clear and mark the assault lanes ahead of any manned surface movement. These UBVs could be launched from surface, subsurface, or airborne delivery means—overtly or covertly. UBVs could be given large magnetic and acoustic signatures to trigger influence mines and could be equipped with cameras, remote gun systems, plows, cutters, and/or line charges to clear beach obstacles. Additionally, it would be possible to transition the UBV to convoy reconnaissance and clearing missions once manned vehicles are ashore.

Introducing an unmanned system breaks the tyranny of the hybrid vehicle that we have found to be so costly and that inevitably results in compromises in both operating domains—afloat and ashore. Since current plans call for landing existing manned breacher vehicles roughly 30 minutes after the first amphibious tractor landing, the time frame requiring a vehicle that transitions seamlessly from sea to shore is roughly 30 minutes. If the joint force is able to achieve beach superiority for this brief period, there is no need for a hybrid vehicle at all. Introducing an unmanned initial assault wave completely eliminates the requirement.

Unmanned systems can provide improved operational capability and enhanced force-protection at significantly reduced cost. Unmanned breachers allow the introduction of ground-fighting vehicles to shore via surface-effect and displacement connectors. By thus avoiding the requirement for a hybrid vehicle, the Marine Corps can focus its limited resources on producing a new fighting vehicle optimized for operations ashore.

This combination of unmanned systems for the initial surface wave and non-hybrid wheeled fighting vehicles for ashore provides a real opportunity to lighten the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), while drawing a clear distinction between Marine Corps and heavy Army units. Additional savings might be realized by participating in a joint venture with the Army to produce a next-generation fighting vehicle (a Stryker successor) with riverine capability. The latest generation of light armored vehicle, or its commercially available equivalent, would provide operational flexibility, training, maintenance, sustainment, and affordability benefits. Determining the actual material solution should be facilitated by additional wargaming and analysis based on threat and operational-concept considerations.

If the USMC did something like this - going unmanned with their breach vehicle from the sea - that would have a trickle down impact on several things including the MPC (Marine Personnel Carrier) requirements, because the MPC would become more important as the primary mover of Marines. There are a lot of things you can do when you remove the EFV/AAAV role and replace that with an unmanned system, but it is also obvious it adds additional impacts to other areas of the USMC ground vehicle force that would require additional study.

I like this idea a lot, but need more time to consider the degree to which it impacts other things.

Whither the Flexible Force

From here.

The Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), along with the embarked 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), departed San Diego Sept. 29 to begin a MEU certification exercise (CERTEX) in preparation for an upcoming deployment.

Led by Commander, Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 5, the Makin Island ARG consists of the Navy's newest amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island (LHD 8), the amphibious-transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18), and the dock-landing ship USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52).

"The success of this final stage of pre-deployment training will prove that we are now deployable worldwide in support of a wide-range of missions," said Capt. Humberto Quintanilla, PHIBRON 5 commander.

"It will take extensive Blue-Green team efforts, from all the Navy and Marine Corps ranks, to make this event a success," said Quintanilla. "I am confident that our combat skills honed during previous ARG-MEU integrated training events will deliver the levels of expertise and operational art required to master the unforeseen and blind missions that will be thrown at us during CERTEX. It's time to line up and snap the ball."

Quintanilla said the CERTEX is expected to include the evaluation of multiple evolutions, including small boat raids; visit, board, search, and seizure training; helicopter and mechanized amphibious raids; mass casualty responses; and a non-combatant evacuation operation.

"The certification exercise is a validation of ARG-MEU capabilities by observers who will evaluate both our ability to conduct missions under real time conditions and variables beyond our control. The end product will be a finely tuned combat force ready to deploy," said Col. Michael R. Hudson, 11th MEU's commanding officer.

Hudson said the outcome of the exercise will be captured in a report and presented to the commanding general of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. If the 11th MEU's performance meets the standard, it will be certified to deploy.

"This exercise solidifies best practices and is the capstone event for the MEU before we deploy," said Hudson. "The certification process ensures that the 11th MEU will have the most up-to-date training to support the commanders we will work for overseas."

The Makin Island ARG is scheduled for a routine deployment later this year.

Commissioned in 2009, Makin Island is the Navy's newest amphibious assault ship capable of utilizing surface and air assets to move Marine forces ashore. The ship is named in honor of the daring World War II raid carried out by Marine Raider Companies A and B, Second Raider Battalion, on Japanese held Makin Island Aug. 17-18, 1942. LHD 8 is the second ship to bear the name "USS Makin Island."

I continue to watch the USS Makin Island (LHD 8) as it prepares for deployment, and I hope others are paying attention too. What looks on paper to be a normal deployment for another MEU/ARG team is, in fact, one of the troubling signs of the times for both the Navy and Marines and needs to be observed carefully for what it actually is.

On March 23, 2024 the USS Bataan (LHD 5), USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), and USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) deployed early in support of operations off Libya. Arriving in the Mediterranean Sea the ARG relieved the Kearsarge ARG off Libya on April 27th. It has already been 6 months and it is unclear when the Makin Island ARG will be deploying, but clearly they are not ready yet. It is starting to look like the Bataan ARG will be deployed at least 9 months, potentially longer.

The Kearsarge ARG, which was relieved by Bataan ARG, consisted of the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), USS Ponce (LPD 15), and USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) had been deployed 9 months from August 27, 2024 - May 16, 2011.

Bataan ARG will almost certainly be second 9-month ARG deployment in a row.

Other than the picture in the top right, you might otherwise be unaware that on September 30, 2024 USS Cleveland (LPD 7) was decommissioned, leaving the Navy with only 28 amphibious ships. The agreement between the Navy and Marine Corps is a floor of 33 amphibious ships, with the requirement actually set at 38 - meaning we are now 10 amphibious ships below requirement and already seeing the results.

A few points.

When the Navy talks about 'strategy' in the context of force structure planning, at what point do naval officers note the high demand for amphibious ships and what are they doing about the current shortage? Is it time to start asking better questions, for example, whether the LSD(X) program should be about replacing existing LSDs or if the LSD(X) program should be about adding additional hulls to the nations amphibious force to compliment existing amphibious ships rather than replacing them?

Is it time to look at the LCS program for what it is - a short run of a couple dozen ships intended to kickstart a lessons learning process in unmanned technology networks and instead of building more, the Navy should be moving money towards building capacity in larger, much more flexible amphibious ships which have greater space and significantly more options for providing mothership capacity to the US Navy force?

There is a maintenance bill for two east coast LHDs at the end of these 9+ month deployments. Are those maintenance bills properly funded? Is the professional development of sailors and officers, including promotions, aligned properly to account for the extraordinary efforts made by the people who have done more here than others have been expected to do in similar circumstances?

USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) was commissioned on December 15, 2007. The ship and crew participated in UNITAS Gold in April 2009 and PANAMAX 2009 in September 2009. The ship and crew was on deployment from January 18, 2024 - August 15, 2024 in support of operations from the Haiti earthquake to anti-piracy operations off Somalia. The ship and crew departed again on March 23, 2024 and is unlikely to return home until December of 2011. In the ships first 48 months since commissioning, the ship will have been on at least 20 months of deployments and major international exercises. It is hard to imagine the ship is going to be in good condition after being pushed this hard, and any sailors who have been on that ship since the ship was commissioned almost certainly have a stressed family situation to prove it. No other ship in the US Navy has even close to as much time on deployment or deployment training than USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), it's not even close - even for forward deployed ships.

In case you were wondering, the experts of the San Antonio class LPDs are all on one ship - USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19), because it is the ship of that class that has done the most in the least amount of time, and done so at the operational tempo of deployment vs the shoreline.

The amphibious fleet of the US is in high demand because they are the most flexible ships in the US arsenal, but is seen as and is given a low priority by leaders in the US Navy with the total amphibious force now 15% below clearly articulated bare minimum size and 25% below stated requirement size. For whatever reason, both Congress and the DoD are watching the Avondale shipyard that builds amphibious ships go out of business due to lack of work.

What is the plan to address these problems, because all indications are there is no plan.

Mistrals Represent Politics and Industry, Not Military Power

By now everyone has likely heard that Russia and France have finalized the deal for the Mistral class amphibious ships. If you want to know more, I highly recommend this remarkably thorough article at Defense Industry Daily that covers just about every angle possible from the industry perspective.

As I have mentioned in the past, this deal is not a threat to US interests and the only threat that might exist to US allies is the possibility the ships could be used in a territorial dispute with Japan. With all due respect to Russia, in a territorial dispute involving conventional military power between Russia and Japan, the spirit of Admiral Togo Heihachiro will prevail in that fight every single time. The Mistrals won't be used in that way, or they will not survive. I suspect when the Mistrals are finally making a deployment, they will be used in much the same way everyone else uses large amphibious ships these days - acting as a command node for conducting soft power diplomacy missions and helping address 3rd world problems from offshore.

The deal between Russia and France is about politics and industry, and really isn't so much about military power like some politicians would like you to believe. I find myself in strong agreement with this Stratfor analysis.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov are visiting Paris to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other French government officials on June 20-21. The visit quickly follows the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and France for two French Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, worth $1.7 billion, that France has agreed to sell to Russia with the full technology transfer Moscow demanded. The ships would be built in France and delivered in 2014 and 2015, with the potential for another two to be built in Russian shipyards under French supervision.

The Russian officials’ visit is a chance to very publicly emphasize the Mistral deal, a boon for the Kremlin which wants to signal to the rest of Europe that it has a strong security relationship with France (part of its ongoing campaign to unsettle the Central Europeans and make them doubt the commitment of their West European NATO allies). It is also an opportunity to discuss several other deals the two countries are working on, covering energy, military and space technology cooperation. For France, building close ties with Russia is about ensuring that the evolving Berlin-Moscow relationship does not leave Paris unable to affect security issues on the continent.

The issue I intend to watch closely is how much Russian shipbuilder OSK will ultimately contribute and learn from the French in construction of these ships, and whether it is even possible to get a base of subcontractors stable enough to support construction of large navy vessels in Russia. All indications are if any new Mistrals are built in Russia, they would be built by the recently announced new STX shipyard being built in St. Petersburg.

The Russian shipbuilding industry can really only build two types of naval vessels - submarines and small frigates/corvettes. Exports of these types of ships to various nations sustained the industry through the really bad years following the cold war, but export orders for Russian naval vessels are drying up as most of the world is expanding domestic shipbuilding markets. Is the Mistral a program that can truly kickstart the Russian shipbuilding industry towards better quality and production techniques in the 21st century, or is this a gamble unlikely to pay off? I tend to believe it will ultimately be a small step in the right direction, and not the leap Russian political leaders hope.

NECC Tests With Amphibious Ship

Building on the post yesterday, the Navy is starting to test the concept of integrating Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) with Amphibious ships, in this case Riverine.

Tuesday, the Navy tested the ability to dock and secure the RCB and the smaller riverine patrol boat in the well deck of the anchored dock landing ship Oak Hill during a proof-of-concept test held at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay.

Riverine force leaders gave the demonstration a thumbs-up. If senior Navy leaders agree, the riverine force could find itself with a new post-Iraq war mission set outside the green-water arena for which it is designed, and the Navy with yet another capability for the flexible and heavily deployed amphibious force.

“I think we had a successful test today,” said Capt. Chris Halton, commander of Riverine Group 1, during a high-speed ride on an RCB from Oak Hill back to Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, where the ship and Halton’s parent command, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, are based. “We showed that one, we can do it, and two, we’ve got some stuff to work on. But the bottom line is, I think our concept is sound.”

I highly recommend reading the entire article as it covers the challenges. This was a first step in testing, and there will be lessons to learn as the article makes clear.

There are several reasons why this type of integration is important. First, once integrated it will become part of the capability requirement for future Riverine equipment. That's important, because right now Riverine mostly uses some very old equipment. Second, once the offload and onload procedures are worked out, a culture of innovations that comes from actually using these forces from an amphibious ship will begin.

I suspect we will see creativity not only from the NECC side, but also from the Amphib side with the amphibious ship COs. One thing I've noticed being around the Navy for the past several years is that amphibious ship COs tend to take more risk than their cruiser and destroyer cousins, but that's probably a product of the promotion system that tends to trend heavily towards cruiser and destroyer captains vs SWOs of amphibious ships.

It may also have to do with some amphibious ship COs being aviators instead of SWOs, and looking for ways to stand out against the backdrop of Carrier officers in the aviator community. This isn't scientific by any means, just an impression I get based on observation.

I think the Navy will find tremendous value in the integration of NECC and amphibious ships, and I actually prefer this approach to building specialized ships for NECC. However, I also think there is an opportunity for the JHSV to be used in support of Naval Special Warfare assets.

Those of you familiar with leesea in the comments may know he has quite a background in both NECC and amphibious ships, and he has been pointing out for years how the JHSV, while not perfect, has the utility to provide the NECC with an afloat offshore staging base capable of fast response and logistical support. I think leesea will ultimately be proven correct on this once the JHSV and NECC get teamed up.

The key distinction between the JHSV and the MLP or amphibious ships (or LCS for that matter) is that the JSHV is designed with capacity in mind, where these other platforms considered in the context of modularity are designed with capability in mind. Capability minded design approaches end up leading to trade offs and sacrifices that ultimately reduce flexibility and add cost, but I will agree there are positives in the capabilities built into the design spec (sea state operational parameters and survivability are often cited examples). As the Navy ventures further down the road into modular vessels, I believe it is going to be important for NAVSEA to think about modular platforms in the context of capacity during initial design rather than capability, a subtle but important change early in new vessel concept design and development.

After all, the CVN is a great example where the Navy has long designed the platform with capacity in mind, instead of capability. That approach has been a winning design methodology, and if you look at the evolution of aircraft carriers you will note that the evolutions comes from systems capabilities added to improve upon the base large capacity platform which over time, gives the Navy the best of both capacity and capability on a Navy ship.

I am very excited to see the Navy testing Navy Expeditionary Combat Command integration with the surface fleet, and I truly believe good things will come from this. We will all know the Navy is really making progress with these concepts when we start seeing Marines involved and integrating into this mix of capabilities, although I also believe there is a real opportunity to get a Navy SOF RW unit up and running in support of these integrated capabilities as something like a Navy version of the Army's 160 SOAR (A), or put in a Navy context - the Top Gun of the RW side of aviation.

(this post was updated because the author screwed it up)

Sea Denial in Libya

With little more than 1960’s-era technology, Gadaffi’s forces have effectively disrupted the use of a key port to the opposition and their NATO allies. Misrata represents the rebels’ primary strong hold in Western Libya and holds a strategic position in relation to Tripoli. With regime forces solidly lodged in the airport and roads feeding out of the city blocked, Misrata’s SPOD provides the only point of access for humanitarian relief shipping, refugee and casualty outflow, and resupply of munitions and rebel fighters from Benghazi.

On 14 and 15 April, multiple salvos of rockets targeted the Nakl al Theqeel road leading to the port. On 26 April, several Grad rockets hit the port forcing an International Organisation for Migration ship, Red Star I, to remain offshore. The same ship was delayed leaving by additional attacks until 28 April when she evacuated 1,000 migrant workers and 25 wounded.

Gadaffi’s indirect fire, consisting of Grad multiple launched rockets and probably some amount of mobile artillery, is extremely difficult to counter. Mobile launchers can be rapidly relocated, concealed by terrain (urban or otherwise), and hidden among the population. Counter-battery - from the sea or air - is difficult given these circumstances.

Outside of a full blown ground assault, the best counter to this threat is multiple lines of armed ISR. The first US Predator strike in Libya appears to have been focused on this target set. If we are still involved in this operation several months from now (if not sooner), I’d expect to see more armed Preds shifted from Iraq as the drawdown there continues.

The lessons learned here aren’t new. First, sea denial (or A2AD for you CSBA folks), doesn’t require high end ASCMs or ASBMs. Low tech/low cost options such as IDF, mines, or swarming FIAC can be equally effective in denying the use of a port. These threats can't be taken lightly. We should remember that during Desert Storm, we were merely a CEP away from a major disaster involving USS Tarawa and a pier full of ammunition at Al-Jubail.

Secondly, our amphibious lift and expeditionary forces are as relevant as ever. The strategic flexibility to land and sustain forces where the enemy isn’t using tools like JLOTS is just as important as the ability to engage the enemy. Coincidentally, AFRICOM's annual North African JLOTS Exercise, AFRICAN LION, is underway. (and for you conspiracy theorist, this exercise has been scheduled for some time and isn’t a dress rehearsal).

Finally, the demand for persistent, armed ISR will continue to grow and the Navy should invest heavily in this area to complement our strike capabilities.

UPDATE: This war could get a lot more naval, very quickly. Here is the best open source reporting I've seen on the mine layers. If the regime were to similiarly close Benghazi's port with mines, that could be all she wrote for the opposition.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

General Ham Nods Towards the Marines

Libya is the most predictable real world wargame ever observed in real time. There is no way General Ham would say this unless it has been discussed with the President and Secretary of Defense.

The use of an international ground force is a possible plan to bolster the Libyan rebels, Ham said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

Asked whether the U.S. would provide troops, Ham said, "I suspect there might be some consideration of that. My personal view at this point would be that that's probably not the ideal circumstance, again for the regional reaction that having American boots on the ground would entail."

President Barack Obama has said repeatedly there will be no U.S. troops on the ground in Libya, although there are reports of small CIA teams in the country.

Pressed by Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., about the situation in Libya, Ham agreed that a stalemate "is now more likely" since NATO took command.

I stand by the analysis I wrote on March 22nd, as virtually everything I said then has come about. The only thing I have not seen yet that I kind of expected to see by now is the US media asking questions like, "where the hell is Cameron or Sarkozy?" It is a true lack of respect for Europe how almost everyone interviewed on cable TV describes the European military capabilities as the punchline of a joke.

I honestly would have expected the US to be pushing the media to ask questions about the European efforts for success in Libya as a way to deflect the attention away from the questions asking about what the US is or is not doing. I'm not sure why the Obama administration isn't doing that yet, but maybe it's not time yet.

If things continue to go to hell, and if tough questions don't start getting asked of Cameron or Sarkozy, Obama will take political criticism (unfairly btw). The rebels are a rag tag group of untrained, unprofessional, uneducated dudes with guns that have no chance of defeating military forces of Gaddafi. Without troops on the ground, NATO airpower will continue to be ineffective.

I am OK with that, but I am probably in the minority. As much as I hope the United States continues to do no more than what we are currently doing, I doubt Obama will keep the US on the sidelines if things continue to deteriorate.

For the record, the Bataan ARG is about 10 days out if they have been cruising at 12 knots. As I have written previously this may move towards a Marine amphibious raid scenario, because right now amphibious raids (quick shore assault, attack, and withdraw) are the precise military capability necessary to deal with the specific problems we see in places like Misrata.

And yes, I'll say it, the EFV sure would be useful in the type of amphibious raid scenario we see in Libya where we do not want under any circumstances to have US Marines on land for longer than a single day at a time. The ability to rapidly move a Marine Rifle Company to shore from sea at sunset, roll into the city, blow up enemy equipment in an urban environment (hiding by a hospital, for example), hit a FARP, attack another couple targets, then pull back out to sea before daylight... EFV sure would be useful. I am not convinced the AAVs can do that, and if you send M1A1s and LAVs, you are staying longer than a single night because you can't get them on and off the shore fast enough.

Operation Tomodachi: Following USS Tortuga (LSD 46)

This story continues to interest me. USS Tortuga Loads Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Vehicles By Task Force 76 Public Affairs.

Sailors aboard USS Tortuga (LSD 46) and soldiers from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Northern Army loaded vehicles and trailers pierside in Tomakomai Ko, March 15, in support of earthquake and tsunami relief efforts.

Tortuga’s crew loaded 13 jeeps, 10 utility trailers, six water trailers and three humvees via crane onto the flight deck and additional equipment via landing craft into the well deck, totaling 90 vehicles and 300 JGSDF soldiers.

"This is an extraordinary opportunity for us. Seeing these vehicles on our ship really demonstrates the bonds between the U.S. and Japan," said Cmdr. Adrian Ragland, commanding officer of Tortuga.

Tortuga’s visit to Tomakomai Ko, though brief, marks the first time a Navy ship has ever pulled into the port. After the ships brief stay, Tortuga will offload the equipment in Ominato, which will be used to transfer supplies, personnel and water to areas affected by the earthquake and tsunami in northern Honshu in support of Operation Tomodachi.

US amphibious ships have conducted exercises for years with the men and material of other nations embarked on our ships, but I am curious... is this the first time it has been done during a real operation? I really don't know, I keep thinking it has happened in other humanitarian operations before, but I am not sure.

Can anyone educate us?

Bold Alligator 2012 (BA 12)

Admiral Harvey is suggesting folks read up on their history.

FM COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA//N00//
TO ALFLTFORCOM

BT

UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICERS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND COMMAND MASTER CHIEFS FROM ADM HARVEY

SECINFO/-/-//MSGID/GENADMIN/COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA/N00/MAR//SUBJ/AMPHIBIOUS AND EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS READING PROGRAM//GENTEXT/REMARKS/

1. A LARGE-SCALE OPERATION TO EXERCISE THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS' ABILITY TO CONDUCT PROMPT AND SUSTAINED AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA, A FUNDAMENTAL CORE COMPETENCY FOR US, HAS NOT OCCURRED IN THE LAST TEN YEARS BECAUSE OF OUR FOCUS ON OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS CORE COMPETENCY NOR THE FACT THAT THIS COMPETENCY IS AND ALWAYS WILL BE A UNIQUE CAPABILITY DELIVERED BY THE NAVY/MARINE CORPS TEAM.

2. TO THAT END, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT EXERCISE BOLD ALLIGATOR SERVE AS OUR PRIMARY OPERATIONAL ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE FOR THIS YEAR TO CULMINATE IN BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 (BA 12), WHICH WILL BE THE LARGEST PAGE 02 RUCBCLF0050 UNCLAS PERSONAL FOR COMMANDERS, COMMANDING OFFICE AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISE CONDUCTED BY THE FLEET IN THE LAST TEN YEARS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS EXERCISE IS TO REVISIT NAVY/MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES AND REINVIGORATE OUR CULTURE OF CONDUCTING COMBINED NAVY/MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS FROM THE SEA. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT BA 12 WILL BE A MAJOR FLEET EXERCISE, NOT SIMPLY ANOTHER ARG/MEU EVENT.

3. AS WE BEGIN PLANNING FOR BA 12, IT IS APPARENT TO ME THAT OUR COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE, WHICH CERTAINLY INCLUDES MY KNOWLEDGE, OF AMPHIBIOUS EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS HAS ERODED OVER TIME. TO ENSURE I AM FULLY READY FOR BA 12, I HAVE ESTABLISHED A PERSONAL READING PROGRAM THAT I ENCOURAGE YOU TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AS WELL FOR YOUR OWN BENEFIT AND THAT OF YOUR UNIT. THIS READING LIST IS VOLUNTARY, AND WILL NOT BE MADE MANDATORY, BUT I TRULY BELIEVE IT CAN FORM THE BASIS OF A STRONG PROFESSIONAL READING PROGRAM, REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL OF YOUR PARTICIPATION IN BA 12. MY READING PROGRAM CONTAINS FOUR BOOKS THAT CAN BE READ WITHIN A YEAR WITH ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDED READINGS FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC AREAS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, TO INCLUDE DOCTRINE AND TACTICS.

3.A. CORE LIST: CURRENT DOCTRINE AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN A MODERN ENVIRONMENT

3.A.1. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-02 (JP 3-02) AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (10 AUG 2024) JP 3-02 IS THE CURRENT DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. THIS DOCTRINE PROVIDES THE FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR READING SUBSEQUENT BOOKS ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND THEIR HISTORY. READERS SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

3.A.1.A. ASK YOURSELF HOW YOUR UNIT, COMMAND OR SPECIALTY FITS INTO THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MARITIME INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS? HOW WOULD AN AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE TIE INTO A CARRIER STRIKE GROUP AND EXECUTE COMPOSITE WARFARE?
3.A.1.B. READ WITH AN EYE TOWARDS HOW THIS DOCTRINE FITS IN WITH OVERALL JFMCC/FLEET DOCTRINE AS CONTAINED IN JP 3-32 COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS AND NWP 3-32 MARITIME OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR.

3.A.2. THE 1982 FALKLANDS CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA FEATURED AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY A MODERN MARITIME FORCE UNDER A SIGNIFICANT THREAT FROM CONVENTIONAL AIR-DELIVERED ORDNANCE WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE AOA. WHILE TECHNOLOGY HAS ADVANCED SINCE 1982, MANY OF THE WARFIGHTING ISSUES WE FACE TODAY ARE SIMILIAR IN NATURE TO WHAT THE UK FORCES FACED WHILE PROJECTING FORCES ASHORE AT THE END OF A LONG AND COMPLEX LOGISTICAL PIPELINE IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. BELOW ARE MEMOIRS BY THE THREE CRITICAL UK MARITIME COMMANDERS IN THIS CONFLICT - READ THESE THREE BOOKS AND COMPARE THE PERSPECTIVES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM EACH. ADDITIONALLY, READ WITH AN EYE TOWARDS HOW A U.S. MARITIME FORCE WOULD ORGANIZE AND OPERATE AGAINST AN UPDATED THREAT THAT WAS AS RELATIVELY DANGEROUS TO OUR FORCE AS THE ARGENTINEANS WERE TO THE BRITISH IN 1982.

3.A.2.A. WOODWARD, SANDY. ONE HUNDRED DAYS: THE MEMOIRS OF THE FALKLANDS BATTLE GROUP COMMANDER.
3.A.2.B. CLAPP, MICHAEL, AND SOUTHBY-TAYLOUR, EWEN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT FALKLANDS: THE BATTLE OF SAN CARLOS WATER
3.A.2.C. THOMPSON, JULIAN. NO PICNIC: 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE IN THE FALKLANDS.

3.B. SECONDARY SELECTIONS: THE FOLLOWING GROUPS OF BOOKS WILL BROADEN READERS UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AREAS.

3.B.1. DIVERSE AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONS: WWII ACTUALLY SAW THE DEVELOPMENT OF THREE GENERAL MODELS FOR U.S. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE U.S. MARINES AND NAVY IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC; THE U.S. ARMY AND NAVY IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC; AND THE ALLIED COALITION IN EUROPE. OUR CURRENT DOCTRINE DERIVES MAINLY FROM THE USMC-USN CAMPAIGNS IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC. HOWEVER, THE U.S. ARMY CONDUCTED MORE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN WWII THAN DID THE MARINES. TOGETHER WITH THE NAVY, THE ARMY DEVELOPED APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES IN THEIR THEATERS THAT ARE NOT CAPTURED IN CURRENT DOCTRINE, BUT ARE CERTAINLY WORTH REVIEWING CLOSELY AND CONSIDERING, IN UPDATED FORM, THEIR APPLICABILITY TODAY. THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE A GOOD BACKGROUND OF THESE UNIQUE APPROACHES TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS:

3.B.1.A. ISELY, JETER A., AND PHILIP A. CROWL. THE U.S. MARINES AND AMPHIBIOUS WAR: ITS THEORY, AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE PACIFIC.
3.B.1.B. YUNG, CHRISTOPHER D. GATORS OF NEPTUNE: NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS PLANNING FOR THE NORMANDY INVASION.
3.B.1.C. BARBEY, DANIEL E., VICE ADMIRAL USN (RET). MACARTHURS AMPHIBIOUS NAVY: SEVENTH AMPHIBIOUS FORCE OPERATIONS, 1943-1945.

3.B.2. THE FOLLOWING TWO BOOKS PROVIDE BASIC LEVEL DESCRIPTIONS OF AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS IN THE DIFFERENT THEATERS IN WWII.

3.B.2.A. ROTTMAN, GORDON L. U.S. WORLD WAR II AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS: MEDITERRANEAN & EUROPEAN THEATERS.
3.B.2.B. ROTTMAN, GORDON L. U.S. WORLD WAR II AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS: ARMY & MARINE CORPS, PACIFIC THEATER.

3.B.3. ANALYZING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, USING BROAD SETS OF CASE STUDIES TO DERIVE THEIR CONCLUSIONS.

3.B.3.A. EVANS, MICHAEL. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: THE PROJECTION OF SEA POWER ASHORE.
3.B.3.B. GATCHEL, THEODORE L. AT THE WATER'S EDGE: DEFENDING AGAINST THE MODERN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT.
3.B.3.C. GATCHEL, THEODORE L. EAGLES AND ALLIGATORS; AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS THAT HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCES DURING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS (NAVAL WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 1-97).

3.B.4. OVERVIEW HISTORIES. THE FOLLOWING BOOKS PROVIDE BROAD HISTORIES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT.

3.B.4.A. MESSINA, BARRY P. DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. JOINT AND AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE, 1898-1945. (CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, SEPT 1994).
3.B.4.B. BARTLETT, MERRILL L. ASSAULT FROM THE SEA: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE.
3.B.4.C. ALEXANDER, JOSEPH H., AND MERRILL L. BARTLETT. SEA SOLDIERS IN THE COLD WAR: AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, 1945-1991.

4. UNDERSTANDING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS HISTORY, DOCTRINE, AND TACTICS IS IMPORTANT TO ALL OF US - NOT JUST TO THOSE SERVING IN AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS OR THOSE IN THE SURFACE FORCE. EFFECTIVELY EXECUTING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS INVOLVES OUR ENTIRE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS TEAM. OVER THE COMING YEAR, I ENCOURAGE YOU TO READ, TO THINK ABOUT WHAT YOU READ AND THEN TO APPLY WHAT YOU'VE LEARNED TO THE TASK AT HAND AS WE PREPARE FOR AND EXECUTE BA 12.

5. ADMIRAL J. C. HARVEY JR., COMMANDER, U.S. FLEET FORCES COMMAND
SENDS.//

I have included links to all of the selections I was able to locate online.

I ordered a few of the selections here to jump start myself into the reading program. I think there might be an opportunity to take a historical view of amphibious assault in the online space in conjunction with the efforts being taken inside the services. Maybe the Small Wars Journal or ChicagoBoyz have some ideas on how social media might engage this conversation leading towards Bold Alligator 2012.

If anyone has any suggestions, leave a comment. In the meantime, plenty of good material here to read.