US EUCOM and the Arctic

I have been an absent contributor for a while.  Sadly, this post does not change that, although I am working on a few posts to be up in a few weeks.  In the meantime, this is a brief podcast from an interview of a few weeks back where I discuss US European Command's cooperative efforts in the Arctic.

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U.S. Coast Guard. Nor should they be construed as official or reflecting the views of the U.S. European Command, or the Department of Defense.

SSNs for Canada - Potentially a Bargain

CBC News is reporting that the Harper Government is at least pondering the idea of cutting their losses with the Victoria class submarines and replacing them with nuclear submarines. The Victoria class submarines have been plagued with problems since being acquired from the UK, and despite being described as the "military bargain of the century" when purchased for $750 million in 1998, they have become anything but.

The submarines are currently all out of service, with HMCS Victoria the soonest to potentially return to service by late next year. The article describes the issues.

One of the subs, HMCS Chicoutimi, has been in active service of the Royal Canadian Navy exactly two days in the 13 years since it was purchased from the Brits.

The Chicoutimi caught fire on its maiden voyage from the U.K. to Canada, killing one sailor and injuring a number of others.

It has been in the repair shop ever since, and isn’t expected back in service for at least another two years and $400 million more in repairs and retrofits.

The article goes on:

The other three would remain out of service until at least 2013. One may not be out of the repair shop until 2016.

By that time, the submarines will have cost taxpayers an estimated $3 billion, almost enough to have bought all new subs in the first place.

But the real problem is that by the time the whole fleet is in active service for the first time in 2016, the submarines will already be almost 30 years old with only perhaps 10 years of life left in them.

High-ranking sources tell CBC News the government is actively considering cutting its losses on the dud subs, and mothballing some if not all of them.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay is hinting they might be replaced with nuclear submarines that could patrol under the Arctic ice, something the existing diesel-electric subs cannot do.

I'm not sure how the costs break out over a single budget year, but based on the article it sounds like Canada has already spent $1 billion and will spend $2 billion more by 2016, which suggests costs that average around $500 million over the next 4 years. That's a lot of money just to get 10 years out of four SSKs.

If we do the math, basically the Harper government is faced with the very real problem. The repair costs will earn Canada 4 Victoria class SSKs that are already old for an investment cost of at least $75 million annually per submarine, and at the same time India is leasing the significantly more capable and new Russian SSN K-152 Nurpa for $900 million over 10 years - $90 million annually.

Something tells me Rep. Joe Courtney (Conn) could come up with a few ideas here - just saying. What would it cost to refuel and refit a Los Angeles class submarine for a second time to add 15 or so more years to the submarine? In 2005 the cost was slightly over $200 million, so even if we estimate the total refit per submarine to be around $350 million (serious modernization), Canada would only be spending $1.4 billion for four SSNs with a service life of 15 years vs $2 billion for four SSKs with a service life of 10 years. Another big advantage for Canada would be they could use the rest of the money to put their sailors through existing US Navy submarine training schools and use existing US contractor services for upkeep, both of which would allow Canada to save a bunch of money.

The cost difference for the hardware would be $25 million per sub per year for SSNs vs $75 million per sub per year for SSKs. While it is true the operational, maintenance, and personnel costs will be higher for SSNs than it would be for SSKs, there are likely enough cost savings to be gained through existing US infrastructure that it's hard to believe the SSNs would be so much more expensive as to make it a bad deal.

I'm just floating this idea, but really trying to highlight that leasing Los Angeles class SSNs would likely be cost neutral (or perhaps even cost saving) for the Harper government given the big problems Canada is facing with the Victoria class.

I don't know if the US Navy even has four 688s that they would be willing to sell to Canada (although in a time of short term budget cuts impacting the Navy, now is the time to talk about this type of thing). I also don't know if the US and Canada can work out a realistic agreement that would give Canada the ability to utilize US Navy infrastructure for training and other services related to 688s. I do know that going down the road of supporting foreign SSNs would be good for either/both Electric Boat and Newport News, because when one looks at the trends they are having in Australia with their submarine industry - a deal with SSNs with Canada now would go a long way towards getting process and framework for this type of high end military deals in place so when our next very close ally comes along - we have a system and experience in place to support such agreements.

Coast Guard as a Means of National Power

I received many great comments and e-mails, in response to my post a few weeks ago looking for thoughts as to ways the USCG was a national instrument of power and how best to articulate that value to the public.  A standard method at looking at the various elements of national power is to group them in one of four general areas, Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic.  This is the DIME model (as one commenter pointed out, there is a body of opinion that DIME is an outdated model in that other kinds of power elements may also be found.  I recognize this perspective, but personally prefer DIME, so I will use it here).

The thoughts on "how" were generally similar to my own:

The USCG is able to project US power and influence through when, where and over whom it exercises law enforcement jurisdiction, those with whom it works, trains, exercises, deploys, and when it is able to respond to a contingency, especially when already deployed.

All of this works well within the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which is a great expression of how the efforts of the three sea services should fit together.

Across the USCG's 11 missions, I find six, Drug interdiction, Living marine resources, Defense readiness, Migrant interdiction, Ice operations, and Other law enforcement, that regularly fit within my definition.  My list is somewhat flexible as there are certainly times when the other five missions (Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Aids to navigation, Search and rescue, Marine safety, and Marine environmental protection) can also be flexed.  I am attempting to parse out missions that regularly reflect elements of power, rather than simply may appear on an international stage.  Feel free to fire away in comments.


The USCG's work in these six missions won't always be an exercise of power, but, looking at the elements of DIME, many of the activities undertaken in these missions do fit in at least one of the elements of power.


I will build on some of the specifics in my next several posts.

The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard. Nor should they be construed as official or reflecting the views of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense.

Study Material

Several different posts have gone up in topic areas of interest. As I am still working out my posting (and overall) schedule, I am going to link to them by general topic here. Read at your leisure if interested., and comment, please. I will get back to these items as I am able over the next several posts.

Piracy

Courtesy of GCaptain.com, the International Sailing Federation (ISAF) has some strong advice (Here):

"Do not sail in the western Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden. ISAF robustly endorses this position. It considers that sailing in these waters is highly irresponsible"

Arctic Policy

EagleSpeak discusses the USCG Commandant's recent testimony on Capitol Hill regarding USCG Arctic preparedness. A quote,:

"Our current Arctic capabilities are very limited. We have only one operational ice breaker. We do not have any coastal or shoreside infrastructure."

Then there is this port visit press release from the two days later, where the only mention of the state of the USCG icebreaker fleet is:

"The nation’s largest ice breaker, Coast Guard Cutter Healy"

From Dark Roasted Blend, some photos of the Russian Icebreaker fleet in action

Cutter Fleet

Chuck Hill over at CGBlog.org, discusses an item that I have followed closely, the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program.

CGBlog also discusses how strategic communication (or lack thereof) can impact the future cutter fleet. This well-written piece also ponders how could USN and USCG fleet construction efforts be better coordinated (this overall discussion is also relevant to Arctic policy)

Maritime Interdiction

Chuck Hill also discusses how the Israeli Navy applied lessons learned in a high profile interdiction effort.

Please take a look at these links. We'll discuss these and other topics in the near future.


The views expressed herein are those of the blogger and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Commandant or of the U. S. Coast Guard.