Iran's Escalating Shadow Wars

Weapons seized at sea 15 July. (Photo Credit - Gulf Daily News Online)

Beyond a hint of teargas in the air around Juffair and some additional off-limits areas for Sailors, the February 2011 Pearl Roundabout uprisings weren't terribly disruptive to the U.S. Navy's FIFTH Fleet, headquartered in Manama, Bahrain. However, recent indications that Iran has increased support to Bahraini Shia resistance elements show potential to put U.S. and U.K naval presence in the Kingdom at risk. Last week, a bombing outside a girls school near the predominantly Shia village of Sitra killed two policemen and wounded six other people.

Prior to this bombing, several likely related weapons seizures occurred:

• 28 December 2024 - A shipment containing 38 blocks of C4 explosives and grenades was interdicted at sea. Additional material was found in a warehouse Al Qurayyah the next day. 
• 15 March 2024 - Two Bahraini men were detained by Saudi Arabia for smuggling high explosives across the Gulf causeway from Bahrain, ostensibly for employment in the KSA. 
• 6 June 2024 - IED components including C4, commercial detonators, advanced circuitry, chemicals, and mobile phones were seized from a warehouse near Manama. 
• 15 July 2024 - Bahrain's coast guard seized an inbound vessel that had just linked up with another vessel outside of territorial waters containing 44 kg of C4, eight Kalashnikov assault rifles, 32 Kalashnikov magazines, ammunition, and detonators. One of the two suspects detained onboard admitted to receiving firearms and IED manufacturing training in Iran in August 2013 at an Iranian Revolutionary Guards' camp.

Up until recently, insurgent explosive devices in Bahrain consisted of smallish homemade black powder pipe bombs sometimes augmented with gas cylinders or gasoline containers.  The introduction of C4 high explosives and numerous recent smuggling actions represent an escalation in Iranian lethal aid to Shia resistance elements. Bahrain's interior ministry reported that there were similarities between the explosives and components seized in the Gulf with those used by Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iranian surrogate paramilitary group active in Iraq (which by the way, was responsible for the deaths of a number of American servicemembers during the height of the Iraq War).

Proxy warfare is Iran's favored method of expanding its influence across the Middle East. Shia militias in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria have benefited from lethal and non-lethal support generally smuggled in by the IRGC via air or ocean transport. Iran's primary unconventional warfare arm is the IRGC-Quds Force, very roughly equivalent to U.S. Army Special Forces.

As I discussed  here in 2013 and as evidenced in some of the seizures above, Iran continues to support its armed surrogates via the sea. As sanctions against Treasury Department designated terrorist entities are lifted, the nuclear deal with Iran will inevitably increase this nefarious activity. Even the National Security Advisor has admitted as much: “We should expect that some portion of that money would go to the Iranian military and could potentially be used for the kinds of bad behavior that we’ve seen in the region up until now,” Susan Rice said during a recent CNN interview of the up to $150 billion that will flow into regime coffers.

Specifically, the Vienna agreement lifts sanctions on a number of suspect organizations including Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and South Shipping Line Iran, along with dozens of other global transportation entities, many of which are probably front companies for IRGC smuggling activities.  Regardless of any details contained in the agreement, it is very unlikely that the IRGC-QF will change its bellicose behavior unless the Ayatollah's regime itself changes.

Make no mistake, many of the human rights grievances expressed by Bahrain's Shia population leading up to the "14 February Revolution" of 2011 were legitimate, and deserve attention by Bahrain's Sunni rulers. But Iran's meddling in the conflict is troublesome, and increases the likelihood of sectarian violence spilling over to the American footprint in Bahrain. Given these developments, it would be wise if the US enhanced counter-UW efforts in the region. Intelligence sharing and interagency cooperation are key to disrupting the flow of lethal aid on the sea, air, and land.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Soccer, the Suez, and Irregular Sea Denial

I'm back from a little vacation in the Sahel...

Sea denial might be described as the obverse of sea control, where a weaker force is able to achieve an operational objective at sea by thwarting a superior fleet, even if only for a short duration.  History is rife with examples of irregular conflicts ashore threatening freedom of navigation. Straits, channels, and other narrows are particulary lucrative targets for insurgents striving to deny the sea to conventionally-stronger opponents.

On the low end of the scale, irregular forces or angry populations have attempted to blockade or disrupt port traffic with various levels of success.  These mostly unorganized efforts tend to fizzle out or be crushed by overwhelming force when maritime law enforcement or navies get involved.  The Indian Coast Guard had to intervene in 2011 when local fishermen distraught over the recent destruction of their houses parked fishing trawlers at the mouth of Goa’s major port used to export iron ore.  In the United States, Occupy protestors temporarily forced the closure of the port of Seattle in 2011, then the following year, longshoremen strikes closed Southern California ports for over a week, sending shockwaves through global supply chains. 

Egyptian security forces keep watch as protesters burn tires in Port Said,
east of Cairo, Egypt, March 9, 2013. (MSNBC)

Earlier this year, fallout from soccer violence (amplified by Arab Spring reverberations) threatened the Suez Canal. Media reporting indicates a variety of tactics were used by approximately 2,000 protestors to disrupt shipping near Port Said. Rioters tried to block car ferries from crossing, lit tires on the piers on fire to prevent ships from mooring, and set supply boats adrift in an attempt to block the channel.  Egyptian naval forces were deployed to ensure this vital shipping channel remained open.  Although unsuccessful, these efforts indicate the potential for localized unrest to impede global commerce afloat. 



14 March 2013- A Bahraini anti-government demonstrator was set on fire
when a shot fired by riot police hit the gasoline bomb he was holding.

The introduction of modern weapons into irregular conflicts amplifies the seriousness of these threats. Guerrilla fighters have laid mines (Tamil Tigers) and terrorists bombed oil export terminals (AQAP/AQI).   During the 2006 Lebanon war, Hezbollah attacked navy and merchant shipping with advanced ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles. 

Of potentially more relevance and importance to the U.S. Navy is the ongoing low-level insurgency in the island kingdom of Bahrain. The home of COMFIFTHFLT, base to forward-deployed American and British mine-sweepers, USN/USCG patrol vessels, and USS Ponce is potentially vulnerable to disruption should this conflict spill over from attacks on exclusively on Bahraini government forces to the US Naval presence. Some observers have accused Iran of meddling in this revolution, which is largely based along Sunni/Shia fault lines. It wouldn’t be a stretch for malign Iranian actors to someday prod their proxies into disrupting allied naval operations or supply insurgents with more lethal and effective weapons as they have done in Syria, Yemen, and the Levant.
 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency. 

Thought of the Day

In many ways, the role Russia is playing in Syria today is very similar to the role the US played in Bahrain last year. In many ways, the role Iran is playing in Syria today is not unlike the role Saudi Arabia played in Bahrain last year, just less overt.

Thud

This is the transcript of the President's speech yesterday about the Middle East and North Africa.

I thought the speech was too long and poorly crammed two different issues into one speech, and the speech never really found a way to link the different issues effectively.

The Arab Spring is a unique event, and the White House needs to be smarter and understand that it is a big enough event that it doesn't need to tie into Israel and Palestine. Had these two issues been treated separately, the President would have resonated with more people on each issue. Instead I believe the message intended got lost.

The President tried to spread it around too much, and my sense by the reactions I have read by those in the Middle East and North Africa, this speech hit with a resounding thud of 'ho-hum' to many target audiences while leaving the President exposed politically on Israel.

I find some of the Israel related political criticism by the Presidents political opponents very legitimate, and I believe that criticism could have been avoided. It is hard to be Presidential in credibility when the President issues hollow warnings of possible UN sanctions to government leaders in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria regarding the killing and imprisonment of their own civilians when the only real substantial action advised to Middle Eastern nations by the President was his instruction to Israel to concede land for peace.

Threatening governments with possible UN sanctions that may not even be attainable politically is hardly the stuff of a bully pulpit by the President of the United States in the defense of people seeking freedom and liberty from tyrannical regimes, and yet that was the substance of the speech to the Middle Eastern government leaders dealing with the Arab Spring by killing or rounding up their own people. I was underwhelmed.

There were so many mixed messages in the President's speech that it is difficult to believe the message communicated was the same message delivered. What exactly is the message to the Middle East when on one hand the President asks Arabs to quit blaming Israel for their problems, and on the other hand the President tells Israel the path towards peace with a neighbor that rejects the existence of Israel as a starting point is land concessions of major population centers?

Everyone knows Israel must make concessions for peace, but if the policy of the United States in addressing the issue doesn't begin with the concession by Palestine for 2-state, peaceful mutual existence with Israel as a starting point - then any US policy related to Palestine and Israel is going nowhere.

While I think the part of the speech that focused on Egypt and Tunisia was very well done, I'm not sure the rest of the speech did much to forward American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East or North Africa, nor did much to build American credibility with the various folks engaged in the Arab Spring movements throughout the Middle East. I wouldn't call the speech a strike out, but with that speech the President never made it to first base.