Five Points

The National Security Discussion has entered a political phase as the election approaches, and both parties are attempting to make political points about National Security in the context of a policy discussion that appeals to their respective voter bases. The lack of detail distorts these discussions almost as much as the absence of context, and very few politicians know how to educate voters with their public speech talking points - particularly in the context of national security. Below are 5 7points of thought I believe are important to keep in mind while observing the political rhetoric related to National Security for the duration of the election season.

1) A bigger Army is not necessarily a better Army. The same theory of overwhelming force used in the 1991 Gulf War was remarkably effective the last decade of the 20th century, but the United States had evolved beyond that theory of warfare by 2001 when it took ~1/1000 the number of troops to overwhelm Afghanistan and 1/5 as many troops just 12 years later to defeat the entire organized Iraqi military in 2003. Over the last two decades the Joint Force of the US military has rediscovered that it takes fewer military personnel to be lethal and effectively destroy an enemy in war, but it takes significantly more resources to stabilize territory towards peace. This isn't some new theory of war, but the disparity gap between the resources necessary to kill and destroy with conventional military power and to stabilize the territory of a defeated enemy after using such power has expanded considerably over historical norms, and this gap has yet to be rationally demonstrated in a US Army force structure policy plan. The bottom line is this - to defeat enemies of the United States, a larger Army is not needed - indeed the US Army could afford to shrink in terms of manpower quite a bit and actually become a far more lethal military service. With that said, if the US Army will be called upon to occupy territory outside the United States after fighting the next war, a larger US Army is indeed needed. The future is hard to predict, but circumstances that will require occupational Armies can be predicted, and it is time to start discussing those circumstances in theory to forward a legitimate discussion for the Army regarding what we - as a superpower - want the US Army to be capable of doing, thus be.

2) The Pivot to Asia is not about shifting military power to Asia as many falsely describe it, rather the Pivot to Asia is actually about the modernization of military infrastructure capabilities in the vast Pacific region. Despite what very vocal critics like Thomas Barnett claim in various articles, there is no evidence at all of any significant military shift outside the CONUS to the Pacific region, unless those critics are now somehow suggesting that the replacement of minesweepers and old frigates with the Littoral Combat Ship is a major military power shift, or replacing existing older aircraft with new aircraft is a surge. The strategic pivot can be described as a move away from concentration of force towards geographical distribution of force, but the increases to the Pacific region represent little more than an expansion of infrastructure, not an increase in total force. I tend to think the Pivot to Asia is one of the most hollow, hyped political Foreign Policy slogans we have seen since the cold war, because there simply isn't anything specific one can point to from the DoD that suggests a significant increase in capabilities - as every migration of military force to the region is simply a replacement for a retiring infrastructure or system. To quote another slogan, where is the beef? The lack of specific details regarding the Pivot to Asia is intentional, because the power in the policy is only truly increased via political diplomatic rhetoric - not substance represented in force. In many ways, because the policy is rhetoric and not substance, the Pivot to Asia is evidence of effective Strategic Communications - which makes the Pivot to Asia more about diplomatic shifts rather than military shifts. It surprises me folks like Thomas Barnett have failed to recognize the distinction between rhetoric and reality when it comes to this over hyped political policy, but at some point during this election my sense is folks will reset Pivot to Asia in a more diplomatic context.

3) The Pivot towards Persia in 2012 is the most under reported major military buildups in modern media history, which is ironic considering the amount of hype in the media regarding Iran every day. The media has gone out of their way not to cover with any real attention the significant US and European military forces operating in the Persian Gulf region. The US Navy is now forward operating between 50-66% of all deployed aircraft carriers in the Gulf region. The US Navy is currently operating 66% of all US Navy minesweepers in the Persian Gulf. The US Air Force is now continuously rotating several of the most advanced aircraft squadrons in their inventory, including the F-22, to the Persian Gulf region. Nearly the entire training, workup, and deployment routine of every single East Coast Aircraft Carrier, Cruiser, Destroyer, Submarine, and Amphibious Ship is specifically tailored towards operating around the Middle East. Nearly all of the major defense budget adjustment increases for FY12 to date for the Air Force, Navy and SOCOM involve increasing capabilities or sustaining infrastructure in the USCENTCOM AOR. At the same time, the Europeans are reducing deployments to the Pacific and Western Hemisphere to focus naval forces for deployment to the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East regions. Despite the rhetoric that suggests there are numerous National Security issues facing the United States, there is only one national security question facing voters in 2012, and it is who they want their President to be during the hot and likely costly, bloody war between Israel and Iran that every measurable indicator one can use observing military force movements by European countries and the United States suggests is coming very soon.

And because predictions sure to go wrong can be entertaining thought exercises for bloggers, I'd wager a high quality Belgium wheat beer pint that if Israel attacks Iran before the election, with a 2 day margin of error I would say the date is October 13th.

4) The single most important element of United States national power related to National Security in need of increasing in both size and capability lies not in the Department of Defense, nor in the Department of State, but in the US Coast Guard. China is fighting a cold war in the South China Sea using their civilian agency maritime security forces backed by the implied support of military power. Unless the US intends to get asymmetrical in dealing with these tough diplomatic issues - which is sure to create unnecessary tension in the region; the appropriate symmetrical response would be to increase the presence of the US Coast Guard around the world to engage and assist towards the quality improvement of the regional maritime security forces. Whether one looks at Africa, South America (including the US coast), or Asia - the national security solution to most state diplomatic challenges and nearly all non-state security challenges facing the global economy lies at sea, but these are not solely a naval centric challenge. If we really believe the 21st century is going to be a maritime century - and I believe this 100% - the first step is to increase the size of the Coast Guard, and that starts with doubling the size of the large, deployable National Security Cutter fleet that can be sent forward to engage with civilian agencies globally and help improve the capabilities of our partners in Africa, Asia, and South America. I am not opposed to reducing the budget of the DoD, but it only makes sense as long as the civilian agencies needed for peacetime maintenance are funded to increase their capabilities to actually maintain the peace - and that beings with expanding the US Coast Guard. The peacetime Global Fleet Station of the 21st century might be a US Navy amphibious ship in certain situations, but it should also be the National Security Cutter. The maintenance of peace is a manpower intensive, thankless security role that ALSO belongs to the civilian security agencies, not solely the DoD. It is past time the US government forwards national security of this country by recognizing this reality, and balances the reduction of DoD capabilities with an increase in US Coast Guard capabilities for the offshore engagement role the US Coast Guard has a long history of performing. This needs to start now - not later - because while today's challenges might be piracy and illegal oil bunkering off Africa, territory disputes in the Pacific region, the global narcotics trade that is creating significant challenges off our own southern border, or the polar regions of this planet - there are several regions that are going to get more competitive sooner than later, and the offshore economy is expanding at a pace far greater than maritime security forces globally are adapting. While Mitt Romney wants to reconstitute the US Army by 100,000 and grow the US Navy, President Obama would be wise to counter by expanding the US Coast Guard - because the lesson of 10 years of war has taught us that if the objective is peace, the nation needs strong civilian security capabilities. It is time to apply the lessons of the last war towards the future being shaped.

5) It is often suggested that the US needs to help foster some sort of alliance in the Pacific similar to NATO, but it is my hope that long before that rhetoric is explored towards some reality the US gets more deeply engaged and serious with South America. In a global economy, the Monroe Doctrine doesn't work for us anymore for the same reason the Monroe Doctrine with Chinese characteristics is failing China in the Pacific - there are too many interconnected economic relationships in today's global economy for security interests to be conceded by great powers. China, among others, is coming to South America as we speak, indeed I fully expect China's first carrier deployment to be to South America in early spring of 2016 - namely Brazil, not the Middle East as is commonly speculated. Brazil, India, China, and Russia are all poised for difficult, but productive decades ahead. The rise of the BRIC nations combined with an impending era defined by energy and resources - including water - of the next two decades will change the national security landscape globally. Unfortunately, every Powerpoint I have seen produced by the DoD fails to reflect what that change means to force posture, and ignores the key role South America is going to play regarding the national security landscape of the mid-term future. The time is now to start thinking about the BI in BRIC, and what they truly mean to national security for the United States in the 21st century.

System D at Sea

At its core, Seapower involves the defense of economies - large and small. But not all markets work the way we might assume. Journalist Robert Neuwirth describes the $10 trillion globalized black market economy as System D. The concept is worth examining from a maritime perspective, if not for its size and rate of growth alone. The first point to understand is that there is a thin gray line between the informal System D economy and criminal activities. System D maritime businesses include local fishing, oil bunkering (especially in West Africa), and unregistered vessels moving goods and people to undeveloped ports. System D also includes some forms of smuggling at sea, but not obvious maritime crime such as illicit trafficking in narcotics, weapons, or piracy. Perhaps the way one defines System D depends on the scale of the activity. For example, illegal fishing is a 23.5 billion dollar global industry. Clearly, not all of this economic activity is “lost” especially to the persons profiting from it and fishermen selling their catches in local markets.

For an interesting example of System D in action, watch the “River kids” risking their lives trying to make a living in Amazonia. The first two minutes will give you the idea, but the entire story is worth watching.


Budding entrepreneurs or pirates in the making?

Why is it important for naval professionals to understand System D? First World Sailors might view these activities as unusual, but the fact is, paying customs fees, registering motor vessels, licensed and regulated fishing, and other rule of law issues we take for granted are anomalies for most of the world's population.

Modern navies operate around System D whether or not they realize it. MCAST Sailors or Coast Guardsmen working to develop nascent navies must understand that in many cases their counterparts are underpaid by their governments and feed their families by their activities in the shadow economy. They may even use government owned (and even US tax-payer funded…) naval vessels to support their System D businesses. In addition to patrolling coasts and rivers, small craft may be used to catch fish, smuggle goods, or provide private security. Moreover, practically every US Sailor making a port call abroad has participated in System D buying goods from street vendors; some of whom sell licit locally-produced merchandise, while others hawk pirated or counterfeit knock-offs.

In his book, Stealth of Nations: The Global Rise of the Informal Economy, Neuwirth argues that instead of attempting the impossible - to close down these informal economies - that the developed world should co-opt them. Rather than judging the débrouillards making their livings by First World standards, we should realize that the informal economy on the world's waterways is vibrant, necessary, and not going away any time soon.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Brazilian Naval Ambitions

My latest at WPR concerns the mismatch between Brazilian naval ambitions and resources:

In the first decade of the 20th century, Brazil attempted to stake out a space for itself as a major Western Hemisphere naval power, ordering a pair of dreadnought battleships from British yards in 1906. Dubbed Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo, these ships were as capable as any then in operation among the world’s navies, and indeed outgunned early British, German and American contemporaries. The acquisition of the two ships -- as well as the planned purchase of a third -- set off a naval race in the Southern Cone, with Chile and Argentina soon following suit. Unfortunately, the battleships were startlingly expensive, virtually bankrupting the Brazilian government. Brazil’s pursuit of regional naval hegemony ended when the poorly paid and brutalized sailors (.pdf) that made up the battleships’ crews turned their guns on Rio de Janeiro. After the revolt was quelled, the main guns of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo were disabled, and the ships were allowed to decay over the next 40 years of intermittent service. Brazil’s first effort to declare itself a maritime power ended in expensive rust.

The Brazil-China Carrier Bit

Last week, Galrahn mentioned this Kai Thaler IPRIS article on the potential cooperation between China and Brazil on carrier operations training. The article includes a discussion of what China is getting out of the deal, and also briefly summarizes China's case for acquiring an aircraft carrier. Thaler's speculation on the Brazilian side is a little bit more interesting; he suggests that Brazil may want the general prestige associated with helping to train the military of a nascent superpower, but may also want concrete Chinese support for a permanent Brazilian spot on the UN Security Council, and assistance on a nuclear submarine program.

The first two make sense, but I'm uncertain about the last. While China might be limited in its potential naval aviation training partners, it seems likely that Brazil has multiple options for collaboration on nuclear submarines. Brazil has a good defense relationship with France, and Russia has proven more than willing to share technology associated with nuclear submarines (and even to lease boats). France and Russia are legally limited in their ability to transfer nuclear technology to non-nuclear states, but China suffers under the same handicap. Why, given these options, Brazil would focus on cooperation with a relatively inexperienced operator of nuclear submarines is unclear to me. I suppose it would have helped if Thaler had detailed the sources of what he calls "speculation" that China might assist Brazil with SSN technology and expertise.

The Brazil-China Aircraft Carrier Connection

The Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) has released a new report: Using BRIC to build at sea: The Brazil-China aircraft carrier agreement and shifting naval power.

Download in English here.

Brazil Goes with the Rafale

It looks as if Brazil has decided on the Rafale.

Brazil opened talks with Dassault Aviation SA and France to buy 36 Rafale fighter jets, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said, pointing to broader military cooperation with the French as a key factor in the choice.

Lula said talks started largely because France is offering access to the plane’s technology. The contract would be worth as much as 5 billion euros ($7.2 billion), an official at the French president’s office said on condition of anonymity. French President Nicolas Sarkozy said France plans to buy 10 military transport planes from Empresa Brasileira Aeronautica SA.

The arrangement will also allow Brazil to build the Rafale on license, and apparently even to have export rights. The possibility of Brazil purchasing F/A-18s had been mentioned, but the article suggests that Boeing was not approached for a bid. The article doesn't specifically indicate that some of the Rafales will be capable of operating from NAe Sao Paulo, but given that the Brazilians are completing an upgrade, it's probably a safe bet.

More broadly, I suspect that there's a bit of concern in Washington that Brazil seems to be seeking extra-hemispheric defense partners. Brazil has purchased from non-US suppliers before, of course, but given the increasing dominance of the US in global arms sales, it's almost surprising when alternative options are pursued. As with every defense procurement decision, the political issues are difficult to separate from the strictly military considerations.

Brazil Considers Buying Super Hornets

While this is being touted as an expansion of the Brazilian Air Force, it could also be an upgrade for the Brazilian aircraft carrier NAe São Paulo (A12), at least in theory. Very interesting development (PDF) for the Super Hornet either way.

The Government of Brazil has requested proposals from several foreign suppliers, including the United States, to provide the next generation fighter for the Brazilian Air Force. In this “FX-2” competition, the Government of Brazil has yet to select the United States Navy-Boeing proposal. This notification is being made in advance of receipt of a letter of request so that, in the event that the US Navy-Boeing proposal is selected, the United States might move as quickly as possible to implement the sale. If the Government of Brazil selects the U.S. Navy-Boeing proposal, the Government of Brazil will request a possible sale of 28 F/A-18E Super Hornet Aircraft, eight F/A-18F Super Hornet Aircraft, 72 F414-GE-400 installed engines, four F414-GE-400 spare engines, 36 AN/APG-79 Radar Systems, 36 M61A2 20mm Gun Systems, 36 AN/ALR-67(V) three Radar Warning Receivers, 144 LAU-127 Launchers, 44 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS), 28 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), 28 AIM-9M SIDEWINDER Missiles, 60 GBU-31/32 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), 36 AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW), 10 AGM-88B HARM Missiles, and 36 AN/ASQ-228 (V2) Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) Pods. Also included are 36 AN/ALQ-214 Radio Frequency Countermeasures. 40 AN/ALE-47 Electronic Warfare Countermeasures Systems, 112 AN/ALE-50 Towed Decoys, Joint Mission Planning System, support equipment, spare and repair parts, personnel training and training equipment, ferry and tanker support, flight test, software support, publications and technical documents, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.

I am not aware of a Super Hornet ever making an arrested landing or catapult shot off a Clemenceau class aircraft carrier, but I imagine it could be done. Anyone know for sure?

More on Varyag + news from Brazil

I've actually had these photos for a few days, but have been too busy to post them. They've been posted in other places already, but I thought I could offer some of my thoughts. Here are the photos (The final one is a rough blueprint of Varyag):





The first thing I noticed was that there are 3 large cranes around Varyag, which means a lot of resources could be devoted to do the intended work. We also see some scaffolding around the island, which should allow workers to access the flight deck and do their work. The entire right side of the flight deck seem to be open. That's where the VLS for shipwreck missiles used to be located. Looks like a lot of work is going to be done there. One of the past theories is that an engine could lowered through there to provide for its propulsion. I guess we will just have to wait and see what they intend to do with it. In the first picture, you can see a circled block there. A lot of people are speculating that it could be a catapult, I think its dimensions don't seem to fit that theory. Again, another thing to watch out for. The other interesting thing is that the huge containers on the flight deck of the Varyag from the move have all been removed now. Maybe all of that stuff have already been installed. If that's the case, then they really have been working pretty fast on it.

That's about all from Varyag front, I'm sure we will get more photos soon.

The other news that came out recently is the visit by the Brazilian President Lula to Beijing this past week. A bunch of deals were signed, but the big news actually came from an interview with Nelson Jobim, the Minister of defense for Brazil. You can see the interview in Portuguese here. The part that interested me translated as follows (using Google translate):

Defense @ Net - A range of military approaches to China. Como o Senhor vê essa aproximações com a China no âmbito do Ministério da Defesa? How do you see this approach with China under the Ministry of Defense?
The rapprochement with China is more directed toward the Navy. They (the Chinese) want the Navy of Brazil is the point of connection for the creation of the Chinese Navy. China has no navy. Also we will bring Chinese official here. Of course they have to learn Portuguese. They will stage the aircraft carrier São Paulo. The Chinese are acquiring aircraft carriers to project power in the region, a situation completely different from ours. I am going to China from September or October.

I think the important part is that Jobim is going to China this fall to basically finalize a deal that will allow Chinese naval pilots to train from Sao Paulo. You can see a little bit about the Sao Paulo aircraft carrier in its Wikipedia Page. I think it's kind of interesting that they chose Sao Paulo, because it's basically the only aircraft carrier with catapult and not serving for a country that current has military embargo on China. US will obviously not let PLAN train on its carriers and French navy probably will not either due to the embargo. I guess it shows that China is looking to build a CATOBAR carrier pretty soon. Otherwise, there really isn't any need to train on Sao Paulo right now. On the other hand, it's kind of curious that China is also planning to use NITKA training center, because that's probably preparing pilots for STOBAR carrier. Obviously, PLAN would be able to do more realistic training on Sao Paulo, but it would only have limited training schedule on Sao Paulo compared to NITKA. So, it looks like PLAN is just covering all the basis with its plans. On the whole, my guess is that Varyag will probably not equip any catapult, but the home built carriers will.

The other interesting part is that PLAN actually told Brazil that its building multiple carriers for power projection. We also heard a while back where a PLAN officer joked with USN about splitting power in Pacific Ocean (and I think there are definitely elements in PLAN that thinks this way). Also a couple of years ago, I remember reading Admiral Keating saying that PLAN officials were very forward about their intention to build aircraft carrier in private conversations (this was at a time when China was still sort of denying their aircraft carrier ambitions). I think this kind of conversation really contrasts with Chinese government's official statements. It seems like PLAN officers are more relaxed and transparent with their intention in private conversations through military exchanges than their civilian bosses are willing to be. In the past couple of years, I've seen many politicians and military personnel complaining about lack of reciprocal invitations from PLA after they had been fairly transparent toward visiting PLA delegation. I really think that PLA is still learning how to be more open with their intentions and such. And it is clear that contacts with other countries are helping them to build trust and understanding the importance of transparency. We are seeing PLA becoming more transparent recently (with its white paper and the 60th anniversary review). Only positive military engagements can direct PLA to become more transparent and reduce likelihood of a conflict.

Observing Brazil's Submarine Construction Issues

This is an interesting side effect of the global economic crisis.

Brazil’s plan to build five submarines in cooperation with France may be jeopardized as the global financial crisis undercuts access to credit, Folha de Sao Paulo said, citing unidentified navy officials.

Brazil is seeking 8.5 billion reais ($3.6 billion) for the project announced last year to build one nuclear-powered and four diesel-powered submarines, the newspaper reported.

It is interesting that Brazil is starting their naval modernization underwater, but not surprising. Brazil is a rising economy, and a potential great power later in this century (so some say). Most people don't know that Brazil in 2008 actually had a larger economy by GDP than Canada, India, Australia, and South Korea... ranking #10 in total GDP globally.

The model of building the submarine forces up first is essentially right out of the playbook of other rising economic powers as they began building naval forces. China and India are both good examples, but even with all of the economic trouble Russia has had since the cold war, Russia never gave up their submarine industry.

The nuclear submarine is being developed primarily for national prestige purposes, although the most cited reason by political officials is to protect offshore oil discoveries. Regardless, Brazil is the only country in the southern hemisphere to be developing a nuclear submarine, and there is a lot of water in the southern hemisphere...

and in the opinion of some, a lot of untapped energy.

Medical Diplomacy Buzz... From SOUTHCOM

Speaking of hospital ships and medical diplomacy, Admiral Jim Stavridis brings up the topic in his first post on the USSOUTHCOM Commander's Blog. Apparently Brazil has hospital ships too, but their ships operate on the Amazon.

The Brazilian Navy boasts an innovative and well-developed program of small hospital ships, which ply the river. With shallow drafts, they can move up the hundreds of tributary rivers and provide medical care to the people in the interior of the vast Amazon region. We in the US could learn a great deal about such operations, and one of the reasons for my visit was to do so.

We hope to not only learn from our Brazilian friends, but also ultimately exchange doctors and other medical personnel between their hospital ships and our own, which operate primarily through the Caribbean and Central America. At this moment, Brazilian doctors are embarked on USS KEARSARGE, an amphibious ship on a humanitarian assistance/medical training mission currently in the region. In November, some of our doctors will reciprocate and go aboard their hospital ships. Our host and the Naval Commander on the river, Vice Admiral Pedro Fava, was gracious and helpful throughout the visit.

In war torn areas, the first thing that breaks down is the transportation system due to checkpoints and infrastructure damage. Often in those places, waterways are the best means of transportation. The US Navy has so much work to do already to improve the riverine capability that this could be the cart before the horse, but a comprehensive approach to riverine warfare would include medical care capabilities.

And there is no question this would expand the soft power tool kit.

No Skyhawks on Washington

The latest news from Brazil is that there will be no A-4s operating off the GW. The article from Robert Godoy was the first in this mornings CLIPs.

The Navy Command is taking between seven and 11 ships to Unitas 2008 - five escort units, one submarine and one patrol ship. The Air Force is also taking part, with a maritime surveillance squadron and, maybe, precision attack airplanes.

The aircraft carrier A12 Sao Paulo will not take part in the exercise. In for an overhaul and modernization since 2005, when it was damaged by a small fire, the flagship of the squadron was expected to return to sea this month. It will not. The expectation is that this will happen sometime this year still, "after the tests necessary following a long period of maintenance." The A-1 Skyhawk fighter jets on the A12 - of the 23 acquired second-hand in Kuwait at the end of the 1990s, only two are in a condition to be used - will not operate on the George Washington. Yesterday, in Buenos Aires, Argentine Defense Minister Nilda Garre said that navy fighter jets of will carry out landing and take-off tests on the CVN73.

It is good to see more news coverage of the GWs visit. Brazil is the future of this hemisphere, and we need to get very comfortable working with them, doing it is as often as possible. It is also both entertaining and interesting to observe the Brazilians, particularly as they discuss the GW.

Yesterday I was reading an article where the premise was Brazil should buy the Kitty Hawk if India doesn't, nevermind Brazil probably can't afford it, certainly doesn't have the money to operate it or buy enough aircraft to use it. None of that seems to matter though, ahh to be a dreamer though.

Will A-4Skyhawks Fly Off the GW?

We observed on Monday that the USS George Washington (CVN 73) and two Navy escorts are visiting Rio de Janeiro to exercise with Brazil and Argentina in UNITAS XLIX. The Brazil Naval Blog suggested that four ships were visiting, and we were curious what the fourth ship was. Luckily, the Brazil Naval Blog comes through on cue, and highlights the fourth vessel as the USCGC Northland (WMEC-904).

After reading the Partnership of Americas 2008 fact sheet, we noticed something that didn't register at the time but might be something to watch for.

During the in-port and underway phases of exercise UNITAS Atlantic, we will work with Brazil and Argentina (and other navies that may accept Brazil’s invitation to participate).

We will train together in multi-warfare exercises designed to increase coalition skills of all navies involved. The carrier and air wing’s participation will accomplish several things:

1. Allow us to integrate with officers and sailors from our Brazilian sister ship, Sao Paulo, and naval aviation squadron VF-1.
2. Build relationships by giving pilots, landing signal officers, air traffic controllers and fighter controllers from Brazil, Argentina, and the U.S. opportunities to train together.

The Sao Paulo was placed in dry dock on January 14th and pulled out of dry dock on March 27th, only a few weeks ago. While it is possible the Sao Paulo will be participating in the UNITAS exercise, I keep thinking I read something about the Sao Paulo being out of service until later this year undergoing repairs.

We believe this means it is very possible that Brazilian A-4 Skyhawks will be flying off the deck of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) over the next few weeks. If true, that should produce some interesting photography, because unless someone is aware of something we are not, I believe this would be the first time the A-4 Skyhawk operated off a Nimitz class aircraft carrier.

Foreign aircraft flying off US aircraft carriers may be a theme over the next few months, we still expect the French to fly off the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) in July.

George Washington Goes To Rio

The Brazil Naval Blog has photography up of the USS George Washington (CVN 73) pulling into Rio de Janeiro harbor. The George Washington (CVN 73) is currently participating in the Partnership of the Americas (POA 2008) deployment as the ship travels to Japan. Other ships participating include the USS Farragut (DDG 99) and USS Kauffman (FFG 59).

As I was looking over the Partnership of Americas 2008 (POA) homepage I came across this podcast (WMV 3:30), which is a short discussion by Rear Adm. Phil Cullom on the GW mission for POA 2008. It is actually well done, a bit of internet outreach that probably hasn't been very successful. Why? The POA 2008 link from the USS George Washington (CVN 73) homepage is broken. The link is supposed to redirect you to either the Carrier Strike Group page or the POA factsheet page for the CSG. Either way, navigation is a bit complicated, but we really like the content of the factsheet as it explains what the Strike Group will be doing over the next two weeks.

In mid-April we will conduct flight operations with Brazilian naval and air force units for combined air defense and strike training. We will test our interoperability and learn from each others’ capabilities and experience.

During the in-port and underway phases of exercise UNITAS Atlantic, we will work with Brazil and Argentina (and other navies that may accept Brazil’s invitation to participate). We will train together in multi-warfare exercises designed to increase coalition skills of all navies involved. The carrier and air wing’s participation will accomplish several things:

1. Allow us to integrate with officers and sailors from our Brazilian sister ship, Sao Paulo, and naval aviation squadron VF-1.
2. Build relationships by giving pilots, landing signal officers, air traffic controllers and fighter controllers from Brazil, Argentina, and the U.S. opportunities to train together.
3. Provide a unique opportunity for air, sea, and subsurface participants to train in an integrated 3-dimensional maritime exercise: above, on, and below the sea.
4. And, build coalition working relationships across a robust composite warfare command structure. This will include introduction of a strike warfare commander……..and the process by which naval aircraft support all warfare areas, from surveillance to dropping bombs.

The Brazil Navy Blog indicates there are 4 US ships, 3 escorts for the USS George Washington (CVN 73). While we know of two of them (linked above), it is unclear what the fourth ship might be. It would be nice to know which ships of the Brazilian and Argentinian Navies are participating, as all we really know is Argentina will be exercising with 3 ships and a submarine. Not much detail there.

We really like the information being put out by SOUTHCOM here, and the GW CSG in trying to communicate its mission with the American people, but that broken link needs to be fixed. Luckily, part of the service encouraged for use is an email address at the bottom of the fact sheet, which we used send a tip to fix the link and also encouraged better links from the SOUTHCOM PAO 2007 page.

It strikes us that this is an excellent topic for a blogger roundtable. The Navy did not run a blogger roundtable for its African Partnership Station that we are aware of, and someone deserves a swift kick in the rear for not having a blogger roundtable regarding that Sea Base off Liberia, that is damn near unforgivable IMO. This on the other hand is another opportunity for outreach, and with the Navy finding no media attention, why not try untraditional methods?

Navy headlines tend to focus on the Middle East, Western Pacific, or force structure news and rarely spend time discussing "all that other good stuff" the Navy does everywhere else, despite the fact that other stuff represents a bulk of US Navy activity worldwide. These other mission sets like POA, and exercises including UNITAS XLIX in that context, are opportunities to the highlight the global nature of the Navy working in cooperation with friendly nations. There is an interesting discussion regarding the maritime strategy waiting to happen in regards to these exercises, and there are far fewer OPSEC issues associated with those mission sets and cooperative exercises.

Some questions worth asking for example. Why has interest in UNITAS been dropping over the last few years, 3 nations marks an all time low for participation? What can the US Navy do to regain interest among South American navies to participate in UNITAS? What are the primary challenges of the Navy in regards to South America? What is the role of the US Navy in South America? I want to know how the Navy explains the value of US naval operations to the US public in regards to forward deployed, sustained regional forces to South America.

Those questions are easier to answer for places like Africa, where very few of the coastal nations have Navies, but most nations in South America have operational Navies. I'd wager good money very few Americans understand the Navy's role in South America, or why it matters to them.

More French Nuclear Sales

It has been a busy month for the nuclear salesmen of France. On January 15th France signed a deal with UAE for cooperation in building civilian nuclear power. On January 25th it was reported France signed a civilian nuclear power agreement with India similar to the one the US signed back in 2006. Then today, it is announced France wants to help Brazil build a nuclear submarine.

Brazil is discussing with France the purchase of a $600 million Scorpene class submarine as part of an intended military alliance, a government official and a media report said on Monday.

Brazil is looking to France not only for submarine technology but to renew part of its jet fighter and helicopter fleet, he said.

"The idea is to discuss a strategic defense alliance with France," Ramos said. "The important part is technology transfer.

"He is not going to sign any deal yet on this trip."

The Scorpene deal would involve payments over 20 years at a rate of 2.4 percent, Folha de S.Paulo newspaper said. It put the price of the submarine at $600 million.

The Brazilian government, which wants to build the submarine in Brazil, is spending more than 1 billion reais ($560 million) to complete a nuclear reactor for it by 2015, the spokesman said.

The Brazil Naval blog notes there are four aspects of defense cooperation under study; submarines, Rafale, Cougar helicopters, and military exercises and cooperation.

The nuclear submarine aspect is clearly the biggest net gain for Brazil, a major boost in naval capability over any regional South American neighbors, and the best defensive weapon for the offshore oil fields recently discovered. It is hard to see any of this as anything other than a good thing for both Brazil and France.

4th Fleet Focus: Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick

It started with the Monroe Doctrine, but it was the timeless phrase President Theodore Roosevelt that nicely summarized Americas foreign policy towards South America... or was supposed to anyway. In reality, American foreign policy towards South America is complicated and can be legitimately argued as non-existent, at least the public coherent and explained policy anyway. It was around 1950 the American foreign policy attention span waned in South America, and arguably it continues to be poorly defined.

Ironically, it was 1950 when the US Navy folded the 4th fleet into the US 2nd fleet in Norfolk. Is that a coincidence? Perhaps, but the Great White Fleet started its journey by going to South America first, and that wasn't an accident. Today South America doesn't look anything like the South America of the Monroe Doctrine, President Theodore Roosevelt, or 1950. Today, South America is an emerging economic market the US needs to get engaged with diplomatically, and this little bit of news reflects that reality.

U.S. 4th Fleet, which hunted submarines in the South Atlantic during World War II until it was dissolved almost six decades ago, is on its way back.

The new 4th Fleet would cover a similar area, with plans to operate from Naval Station Mayport, Fla., and oversee operations in Central and South America. The commander of Naval Forces Southern Command would also be the head of 4th Fleet, Navy officials said.

The fleet would not own any ships. Instead, it would operate in the same way Navy forces do in the Persian Gulf region. In U.S. Central Command, one admiral serves as head of both Naval Forces Central Command and 5th Fleet. Therefore, the dual-hatted admiral in charge of 4th Fleet and NavSouth would be under the commander of Southern Command.

And when will the 4th Fleet stand up?

The decision to stand up the fleet, Navy officials said, is within the scope of the chief of naval operations, as changing ship home ports are. But a final go-ahead is still a ways off, though sources say the Navy’s leadership is actively working the issue and strongly in favor of the idea.

A final decision will not come until the Navy has briefed military and congressional leaders.

Sounds like we are still a few years off. We are not sure what to make of this, and expect, like AFRICOM, there is more to this story than what the early press stories reveal. Our initial reaction to this bit of news was sarcasm. Is this an inside move to create more staff positions? The thought crossed our mind, but it is more likely there is some good logic here.

There are regional players that can no longer be ignored. Brazil, for example, shouldn't be ignored. Brazil in 20 years could very easily be what India or China is today, a rising economic and military power. Brazil has a lot of problems to overcome to realize that potential, but the potential most certainly exists and the US is wise not to ignore it, and would be very wise to get engaged with Brazil on the level sooner rather than later.

Another regional player is Venezuela. Huge Chavez may be the darling of western socialists, but his military moves, particularly in regards to building paramilitary forces and questionable policies with assault rifles is troubling. Should Venezuela actually follow through and put 9 AIP submarines in the Caribbean Sea that would be a valid national security concern for a 4th fleet.

It is hard to tell exactly what the reasons are for this move, as it is still early in the process. Regardless, there has been a lot of attention given to South America, between Global Fleet Stations, hospital ship deployments, humanitarian missions, and Partnership deployments the Navy has certainly remained engaged without a numbered fleet.

Final thought: While we threw a bit of snark at this announcement as a first reaction, the best snark is here. It is an old entry, but reddog's comment is a classic!

Nice Photo of a Tupi Class Sub

I get asked by email or comments sometimes about sources. Well, I don't really like passing on private sources, but I love highlighting public sources where you can find excellent Naval information. One of my favorite sources from South America that is somewhat off the radar is the Brazil Naval Blog.

Yes, it is in Portuguese and I doubt they will be producing an English version anytime soon, but I've found the Google Translator works well enough to sort of follow the discussion. If you find yourself looking for above average Navy information regarding Brazil, check with these guys, they know their stuff.

Pictured is a Tupi class SSK on display during a recent open house at one of their Naval bases. Click the picture to find more photos from the open house.

Brazil and the Nuclear Submarine

Brazil, one of the fastest rising economies in South America, a model for Green Earth types looking to get off the oil dependency, has discovered a large field of oil off shore. Supposedly, as a result of this discovery Brazil will be building a nuclear submarine.

Well, sortof. Actually Brazil has been working on a nuclear submarine since 1979, and while they have mastered many of the components they haven't yet developed a domestic submarine reactor. The latest news about the Brazilian nuclear submarine though actually includes figures. From the AP.

Brazil has been talking about building a nuclear submarine for decades, but the project got a boost in July when President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva announced $540 million in funding for uranium enrichment and the sub program.

Jobim said earlier this month that he wants to come up with an outline within three months to build a submarine for about $1.2 billion, the Agencia Estado news service reported.

Well, sort of. According to Admiral Julio Soares de Moura Neto, it is actually a billion over 8 years, with $130 million the first year. The goal is to have an 11 MW reactor built and ready to go by 2015, with a nuclear submarine in the water by 2020.

This project is being sold as a project of national pride. Brazil already has the former French aircraft carrier Foch, but a nuclear submarine would put the nation in unique company. In alot of the commentary I have read, many believe the only thing that will stop Brazil from building the submarine is in fact the US.

It leaves a lot of questions without answers though. The Type 209s are badly in need of modernization, and in 2006 it was announced that Brazil had paid $1.8 billion for upgrading the five existing Type 209s and purchasing a Type 214, although no one over at the Brazil Naval blog seems to know anything about that. Is the money being spent to build the nuclear submarine the same money that would be allocated to modernize the Type 209s and buy the new Type 214?

The question matters, because while it may be national pride on the line for a nuclear submarine, Brazil doesn't need a nuclear submarine to guard an oil field off its coast.

Brazil Navy Bicentenary Celebration

The Brazilian Navy celebrated its bicentenary celebration this past weekend and the Brazilian Naval Blog has photo's. Looking at the pictures, that looks a lot like the USS Philippine Sea (CG 58). Not sure though, hard to find a complete list of ships that attended the parades.

Either way that is a pretty interesting blog I've been watching the last several months, they have come up with some interesting tidbits in South American naval affairs you won't find in other place, and that blog also has a good community adding comments, usually to other links related to South American naval affairs. It isn't in English, but you can translate using google if you need to and follow just about any conversation.

6th Fleet Focus: 1000 Ship Navy, From Rhetoric to Response

Standing NATO Maritime Group ONE (SNMG 1) has deployed for its circumnavigation of Africa. Consisting of the Flagship USS Normandy (CG 60) the group also includes, HNLMS Evertsen (F805), HMCS Toronto (FFH 333), NRP Alvares Cabral (F331), HDMS Olfert Fischer (F355), and FGS Spessart (A1442). This is going to be an interesting deployment to watch, not only for its efforts later next month in Somalia, but also in its efforts over the coming weeks in the Gulf of Guinea.

This blog has covered the various US Navy activities in the Gulf of Guinea region, starting with the donation of the Automatic Identification System to Sao Tome and Principe ($18 million maritime radar system) to the SeaBee construction for the Sao Tome and Principe Coast Guard to the excellent work frigates like the USS Kaufman (FFG 59) and USS Doyle (FFG 39) as they prepare the way for the USS Fort McHenry Global Fleet Stations deployment.

Back on June 25th Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the current president of Liberia, wrote an OP-ED that ran on the popular allafrica.com news site titled Africa: Africom Can Help Governments Willing to Help Themselves. In the OP-ED, she makes the case for US engagement to Africa.

Since the announcement of the creation of Africom, a new unified American combatant command responsible for Africa, there has been much skepticism over its intent and what it will be able to achieve on the continent. Africom should be seen for what it is: recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relations.

The Africom charter specifies that the new command will focus on conflict prevention, rather than intervention. It will work with African states and regional organizations, such as the African Union and Ecowas, in coordination with other donor countries, to improve security capabilities and promote military professionalization and accountable governance.

In July the Congressional Research Office updated its report on "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa" where it outlines how the United States got to the point of creating AFRICOM. One of the most interesting aspects of AFRICOM most people are not aware of is where the political support comes from. As it turns out, the key politician that has been pushing for the creation of AFRICOM is Senator Russ Feingold. On January 10th, 2007 he used his time on the Senate Floor to outline his expectations for AFRICOM, which turns out, is very much in line with what the Global Fleet Station and the other deployments listed above are.

We have to be strategic and forward-thinking as we create this ne diverse and complex. We have a number of security-related concerns there, ranging from terrorist organizations and safe havens to large-scale corruption, regional conflicts, and the disruption of global energy markets. Continuing to establishing firm and productive military-to-military relations with a number of African nations is also critical.w organization, though. Because we are making such a profound change to our posture on the continent, we need to ensure that the new organization will contribute to, not define, the U.S. Government's overall strategy and objectives for the continent. We also need to make sure that the U.S. military's activities and involvement on the continent do not overshadow, skew, or otherwise hinder our Government's other key objectives.

It is clear that challenges in Africa are

But we have learned that the way to address the underlying causes of the security challenges throughout the continent is not generally through military power. In fact, the best way to address the full range of security-related concerns in Africa is to focus on the underlying conditions that plague governments and societies throughout the continent. Security threats and instability stem from corruption, absence of human rights, poverty, disease, lagging economies, and joblessness. Weak governments are incapable of addressing the dynamics that often contribute to lawlessness or violence, and are often left without any capacity to help defeat trans-national threats.

Bi-partisanship in Washington DC is mostly dead, but through a military effort in a mission other than war there is a chance for bipartisan support to AFRICOM if the DOD is successful early in its "missions other than war" focus. That won't be easy, piracy is an enormous problem in Africa, and local forces simply do not have the capabilities to deal with the problem. Engaging with local maritime forces will be a big part of improving the security situation.

It is still unclear if Nigeria will be exercising with SNMG1 as it approaches the Gulf of Guinea, but the Nigerian Navy deployed NNS Aradu (F89) and NNS Nwamba (???) for the time period SNMG 1 will be in the area. The Nigerian Navy deployment appears to include stops in Monrovia, Liberia and Dakar, Senegal before proceeding to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil for its bicentennial of Joaquin Marques Lisbon, the Marquis of Tamandaré on September 8th.

The NNS Aradu (F89) is a Meko 360 class warship that is returning to sea after a long absence. What does it say for the security of the Gulf of Guinea that the most powerful warship of all the regional nations is returning to sea for the first time in over 12 years? The NNS Nwamba on the other hand has been active since it was acquired. It is the former USCGC Firebush (WLB393), one of four coast guard cutters turned over to Nigeria in 2003 and commissioned into the Nigerian Navy in June of 2004. In 2005, the vessel proved it still has it, despite being 59 years old at the time when it traveled to the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar.

For those who are interested, the other three Cat class ships the US gave Nigeria are the NSS Ologbo, NSS Obula and NSS Kyama. If you have read this far, your probably wondering "why all the detail, what's your point? My point is this.

In 2005 the US Navy sent a single ship to the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar, the USS Saipan (LHA 2), a major diplomatic blunder in my opinion. Personally, I thought it nothing short of embarrassing. This type of blunder can't be made again, and an opportunity is approaching to insure this type of nonsense doesn't happen again. On the east coast of Africa, a natural regional partner in maritime security is emerging with India, and the US appears fully engaged.

The same is also true of the wast coast of Africa, where another natural regional maritime partner is emerging. Just like on the eest coast, the west coast partner is not an African nation, rather South American, and the US can ill afford not to be fully engaged with an emerging Brazil. As blogger Gallant of the Brazil Naval blog (English Link) points out, the SNMG 1 deployment to east Africa should be commonplace for the Brazilian Navy, but it isn't yet for a number of complicated reasons. That doesn't mean Brazil won't be engaged in the Gulf of Guinea region in the future, and the US needs to be ready when Brazil is ready by bringing Brazil into its 1000 Ship Navy model for the region sooner rather than later.

Pulling into Rio de Janeiro to celebrate Brazil's bicentennial in early September with a large Task Force would be a good place to start, hopefully the Bush administration isn't sleeping on South America and will realize such a deployment is anything but a bad investment for an east coast Strike Group at sea on training.