Royal Navy's New SOF Speedboat

The Telegraph is discussing the XSR, a new small boat for Royal Navy SOF.

The British-designed vessel travels at almost 100mph, carries a retractable heavy machine gun and would not look out of place in a 007 film.

With a maximum speed of 85 knots (97mph) and carrying a .50 calibre machine gun hidden under the deck, the boat will be able to overhaul “go-fast” drug smuggling boats in the Caribbean and pirate ships off the coast of Somalia.

The vessel is part of a raft of new equipment being shown for the first time at the Defence and Security Exhibition in London.

Hailed as the world’s “most advanced performance and pursuit” vessel the XSR will allow navies to deploy special forces on enemy shores, anti-piracy and smuggling patrols, protecting oil platforms and to intercept unidentified vessels in potential terror attacks.

When the XSR comes within range of an enemy ship the machine gun emerges from the forward hull and is trained on the target using a remote controlled system from the cockpit.

The article goes on to note the cost of around $2.5 million, or £1.5 million. It also notes a larger version that comes with "four bunks, can carry up to 12 additional passengers and has a range of 1,000 nautical miles." That would be impressive.

It is somewhat frustrating to be honest. The US Navy is going to stand up a new Riverine squadron and reuse armored RHIBs, and here we have the British building very impressive small boats that do things like go 100 mph and have endurance up to 1000nm.

I say this because 100mph could be useful in brown water, but something if that fast hits the wrong wave in green water, it will do more than make a splash.

Seapower and Small Wars

Small Wars Journal has an article up today titled Rebooting the Discussion of Air Power and Small Wars by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong. It is an interesting read.

The Navy could use several articles on a Discussion of Sea Power and Small Wars. I'll help any officer with research or collaboration looking to write articles forwarding these types of discussions, and no credit is necessary for the help.

Tamil Tigers Use Small Boat Attacks

Small-craft protection will be critical not only for self-defense but as escort capability for navies wishing to operate near 'hot' coastlines. Providing more evidence of this, Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers attacked two freighters with 'suicide boats' on Wednesday, according to Reuters:

The navy said it fired on three LTTE boats that tried ram the freighters Nimalawa and Ruhuna. Two rebel boats exploded, the third capsized and six Tigers were killed, the navy said.

The ability to swarm combatants and other ships with small boats means that whatever weapon system used to combat them must be able to put out volume fires cheaply without incurring too large a logistics penalty for reconstitution - in other words, full-up VLS rounds are out. As Galrahn and others have said here, crewed small mounts (and regular training) are probably the cheapest and quickest answer to this problem. Dedicated CIWS modes are another. If we have to have electromagnetic weapons, it would be interesting to see if one can be devised that interferes with small, cheap electronic ignitions like those used in compact outboard motors. (File photo of LTTE boat from Sri Lankan MOD via lankalibrary.com)

Observing The M-80 Stiletto OPEVAL

So what did SOUTHCOM do with its Skyship 600 leased from Airship Management Services of Greenwich, Conn.? According to a recent article in Defense Daily (subscription) by Geoff Fein, the airship has been part of a six-week test mission between Florida's southern coast and Cuba as part of the OPEVAL of the M-80 Stiletto to deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in the JIATF South area of operations.

The craft, built by San Diego-based M Ship Co., underwent OPEVAL this past summer. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted the OPEVAL, and it included participation from the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, U.S. Coast Guard, the Army and U.S. Army South (USARSO), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and a representative from Colombia.

In September, SAIC [SAI] prepared a 72-page after action report outlining the findings of the OPEVAL, test objectives, operational issues and recommendations.

The 80-foot long Stiletto, with its unique double M-hull configuration, was developed as a test bed for new systems and technologies, ranging from unmanned surface and aerial systems as well as Augmented Reality Visualization of the Common Operational Picture (ARVCOP), built by Maine-based Technology Systems Inc.

This article is brilliantly written for those like me interested in new technologies like the M-80. The article reads like the story of a platform earning its reputation.

"During operations in the Florida Straits, Stiletto was responsible for the interdiction and apprehension of a suspicious vessel that was identified by the [Coast Guard] as a target of interest," the report said.

Stiletto's speed and ability to keep up with a go-fast boat, even pursuing it into shallow waters, proved critical for mission success, according to the SAIC report.

There is a lot of interesting material here. Essentially the airship ends up being the aviation surveillance piece directing the fast M-80 as a maritime interceptor going after "targets of interest." The article goes on to note "Stiletto's OPEVAL was successful" but "many of the participants, according to the report, believed that ship's impact could have been much more significant if several limiting factors had been mitigated."

"These factors included the fact that Stiletto was restricted to operate in international waters where the weather and sea state conditions were unfavorable; limitations of Stiletto's communications and surveillance systems, including lack of secure chat and data access, problems with voice satellite communications (SATCOMs) when Stiletto was port side, and a commercial-grade radar that was ill-equipped to identify targets of interest; and maintenance problems with Stiletto and its rigid hull inflatable boat (RHIB) among others.," the report stated.

Put another way, the high sea state and weather conditions issue makes the case that these platforms need a mothership for support, either in the form of a well deck or a smart dock. The advantage of this would allow the M-80 to remain sustained in forward theaters, manage weather and sea variables encountered in forward operating environments, and otherwise better sustain crew support, platform repair capacity, and extend operations beyond a land base while putting the ship in the operation zone for a longer duration. In other words, this ship needs a sea base, highlighting once again that sea basing is a strategic concept beyond the tactical capability to land Marines on a beach.

The ship also appears to need better technology for better communications integration, and a new RHIB to for its boarding parties.

Information Dissemination was able to obtain a copy of the 72-page after action report that Geoff Fein discussed in his article. The report is labeled Unclassified / FOUO. I've given some thought about this, and I have decided to post on it while being selective regarding the content. Some will say I shouldn't post any of it, and others would say I should post the whole thing. Here is my contribution to that discussion.

The blogosphere is where ideas are disseminated and shared after being born elsewhere, and I believe this blog is a public place for responsible debate and discussion about maritime issues. I believe the content below contributes to the public knowledge in a number of ways to the industry, academic, strategic, tactical, and political folks who read this blog, and serve a benefit for understanding to the public at large in understanding the challenges of small ships in an emerging 4GW environment. I don't see the content posted below as any more of an information loss than what is found here. Tonight, for the 19th time, someone asked for this PPT presentation for use in a training evolution, serving as a reminder the blog continues to serve a serious purpose for our uniformed men and women of the Navy beyond the simplistic function of your entertainment and my education. I believe the content added below contributes to the discussion without risk. With that said...

The report cites "themes" that emerged in the development of the OPEVAL report.

• The importance of using Stiletto in a more appropriate (littoral) environment
• Deploying on Stiletto was a good experience and most interviewees stated that they would deploy on Stiletto again
• The RHIB requires extensive modifications or replacement
• The deployment in itself was a major success

There is a comment early in the conclusions that I think it worth mentioning, because this is something that comes off very obvious whenever we begin talking about the quality of work observed coming from SOUTHCOM. While this might be specific to the OPEVAL of the Stiletto specifically, I think it reflects something right taking place down in SOUTHCOM bigger than a single OPEVAL, at least in the opinion of this observer.

• Most participants commented on the fact that the OPEVAL was organized, planned and successfully executed in a very short period of time. The following quotation is representative of the feedback received regarding the OPEVAL, “commands were able to throw together three teams from different pots and deploy them in a short time; and everyone got down there, joined together and made one team. This was the success. No one got hurt, and nobody got in trouble.”

When evaluating new platforms, this blog author evaluates from the position of people, ideas, then platform. As such we focus in on the issues regarding people first, the ideas that went into operation, then finally the platform itself.

Based on the reports findings, there were problems with the training process, some of which appear due to equipment failure. The lists below are partial.

• At the start of the deployment, there was only one person with more than two weeks of training with Stiletto (Stiletto civilian technician).
• Typically when training commences, the vessel(s) are prepared; however Stiletto and her RHIB were not ready / available for training when the time came.
• The crew was given three weeks to train prior to the deployment, which included time for team integration training. However Stiletto and RHIB maintenance issues, and heightened sea state, consumed most of the allotted training time.
• The crew did not receive proper or adequate training, and integration training did not occur until they had arrived in Colombia. The 1st official training was toward the end of the deployment to prepare for the DVs visit.
  

The report also gives a lot of credit to the Army personnel by Fort Eustis, noting the "Army has a long history of training high-speed craft crews." Indeed, this was an interesting note in the details. I'll let John or Brad carry this football.

• The Army typically employs small crews, though the Navy might have 20 guys in a crew. In the Army, there are typically only two rates: deck-side rate or engineer; the Navy uses many other rates. On an Army vessel, anything that needs to be done deckside, the deck personnel do it; same for engine side. Army personnel subsequently have a broader spectrum of training, and they are used to working in small crews. There are not as many problems of a crew with six or so; can still get the job done.

This was also an interesting detail, an issue we need to get right as we move ships with small crews into the littoral. Any desk jockey whose experience is sailing the deep blue that gives a LCS CO shit for the handling of a ship in 10 meters of water needs an asskicking. I get the feeling the future desk jockey I'm talking about was somewhere in this process.

• There were multiple reports of uncertainty with regards to whom the team should provide feedback to, and who to turn to for support. As one example it was reported that “there were times we wanted to make tactical recommendations” for Stiletto missions. The team would email one agency and then later learn that the agency was not informing others with OPCON and TACON authority. Additionally others reported that some within a particular agency were not receptive to the feedback the crews were providing.

If this wasn't so common in just about everything new, I'd probably make a deal of it. Truth is, this happens every time you do something for the first time. This is the kind of thing that gets sorted out with ownership of a program. Like I said above, the focus stays on the people.

• During the beginning of the deployment, the sea state was too rough for the quick transit that Stiletto had expected. Another person explained why the rough sea state impacted the crew: “in that environment [Stiletto] can’t go fast without wearing on combat effectiveness.”
• Crew sustainability, due to the rough sea state, was limited. One person explained that, “when Stiletto is at high speed (40+ kts), it is not cutting through the water, it is hitting the water very hard. This is tough on the crew and fatigue was a real killer.” Another person explained the impact constant vibration had on the crew: “vibration and movement of the ship was very rough on the crew. After constant battery, the body gets tired. And once a person gets tired or exhausted, you begin to break into and cut down on endurance - and then it is a down-ward spiral.”
• The crew had an “abnormally high rate” of sea sickness. While some sea sickness is to be expected, the crew members were all maritime veterans and most of them experienced sea sickness during this deployment. One person suggested that employing a simulated horizon device in the galleys may be effective at combating sea sickness in those passengers riding below the bridge.
• The crew reported that they had a contract technician on the boat, who “did everything in the world to keep up with the boat.” Another person explained that the technician did not ride onboard Stiletto during missions, but that he could be reached via cell phone to assist. Additionally once Stiletto docked, the technician provided any “on-the-spot repair services” that were needed. Another individual said that the technician provided guidance on fixing issues, but not actual support.
• Several individuals explained that there must be more discussion about the role of the technician, who acted as an advisor. It was suggested that one area that could be reviewed is how engaged mariners should be in Stiletto maintenance. While there were never any problems during the deployment, there were conflicting viewpoints at certain times.
  

The report goes on to note some injuries occurred during operations of the ship, mostly contributed to rough seas and the RHIB that nobody was happy with.

Just as important are the ideas behind using the Stiletto.

• All explained that while Stiletto was not able to participate in any interdiction opportunities in the Colombian area, if Stiletto was employed in an area with littoral waters - that would be the prime location to be most effective. This was evidenced by Stiletto’s involvement in an interdiction in the Florida Straits. As one individual stated, “two days in the right area is better than 45 days in the wrong environment.” Many individuals suggested new locations to include the Bahamas, Florida Straits, and areas surrounding Cuba, northern Antilles and Puerto Rico. Each of these areas offers a lower sea state, and provides a prime environment for targeting suspected drug traffickers.
• All interviewees explained that Stiletto should not be used as a patrolling vessel; rather Stiletto should be used for response and intelligence queuing only. One person explained that Stiletto should “be used like a sniper rifle or missile” i.e., aimed at a specific target rather than patrolling.
• Several interviewees explained that it would be good to add additional port stops or ports to a future Stiletto deployment. Adding additional stops would require extra logistics support, but many agreed it would be worth it for several reasons including ability to replace/exchange crew members, provide multiple opportunities for crew rest, potential opportunity to work with new partners etc.
• Several interviewees explained that for Stiletto be an effective vessel, she must have ballistic protection and an organic weapons and/or defense capability, or at the very least her current on-board weapons and sensor systems must be expanded. Though these factors have drawbacks such as additional weight and issue of who has authorization to control weapons, it was agreed this is imperative.
• Multiple interviewees agreed that Stiletto must be able to deploy for several days at a time, rather than just for eight hours at a time. In order to be self-sufficient for several days, this would require additional changes such as: berthing, a mess facility, and the ability to refuel at sea which could be facilitated by moving the refueling location from the starboard side to a more accessible location on the vessel.
• All agreed Stiletto’s communication suite must be upgraded to include, at a minimum, more secure SATCOMs, a secure fax, and ideally secure chat. It was imperative to many that Stiletto must have a SIPR terminal if she is to be an effective node in the counter-narcotics environment.
• Many recommended that the radar onboard Stiletto be updated to a “better” radar package; Stiletto must have military grade radar on board, and not one used by commercial fisherman. One person suggested the best method of finding the most appropriate radar is to “take a look at the operational environment and pick the radar that works best in that particular environment.”
• Many agreed that Stiletto should be more light-weight, and a common recommendation was to purchase a new more lightweight RHIB. An additional recommendation was to utilize, in the future, a multi-task crew or for the crew to hold multiple roles in order to reduce the forward footprint

The report cites a recommendation to add a UAV in addition to the radar system, and improve the platform for night operations with a number of recommendations. Since Stiletto was only able to operate in 8 hour intervals, it could be argued the night-ops upgrades were not necessary for this operational test.

The report concentrates on three areas where I've decided not to quote much information. The first is the specific electronics and technology issues the Stiletto faced during its operational test. This is cited throughout the report as a major limitation, particularly during the ships deployment to Columbia. The second aspect is the RHIB. The report has a laundry list of reasons that sums up the RHIB as a "piece of shit that floats" and it was an ongoing problem from the beginning. The third aspect of the report discussed in detail, enough detail I'm hesitant to publish details..., regarding the operations in Columbia. While there is probably some great discussions there, the Navy is still uncomfortable with blogs so I'm going to refrain from posting those details, for now.

Finally, some platform observations:

• The crew covered 6,000 nm while underway on Stiletto.
• When the seas were calm, Stiletto could transit very quickly; they were able to “get somewhere very fast.”
• The range of operations was shorter than expected because Stiletto’s top speed was less than they originally anticipated. A mission typically requires eight hours. However onboard Stiletto in this deployment, it “took two hours to transit out and two hours to RTB, leaving four hours to patrol.” Crew members suggested that four hours to patrol is not enough time on-station to have success.
• Most of the deployment time was spent patrolling with Stiletto 12 miles offshore in an area with 4 ft seas, which reduced Stiletto’s speed advantage.
• Stiletto became a “responsive” asset, due in part to lack of secure data which limited mission planning at sea.
• The Stiletto team reported that they had “RHIB launch/recovery down to a science.” The crew reported that RHIB recoveries always present risk, and they were able to successfully launch and recover the RHIB.
• The team conducted the RHIB launching in 6-8 ft seas, and another in occasional 8-ft seas. They reported that while it is typically too risky to conduct RHIB launch / recoveries in sea states this high, it could be done onboard Stiletto in “life or death” situations.
• There was one particular mission where the Stiletto had a go-fast target; Stiletto was in port and launched. After transiting out and seeing the rough sea state, the Chief made a decision that the water was too rough and to turn back - a decision that the LEDET team supported. At the same time, other COL support and military vessels, including a Midnight Express, turned back as well.
• In regards to the Florida Straits mission: USCG Sector Key West (KW) “got Stiletto for two days to conduct patrols.” During that time, the Army mariners work with four USCG groups, two from D7 TACLET and two from Sector KW. On the second day, another two came from the USCG operations center. In the morning of Day One Stiletto participated in a demo with the evaluation team and other DVs, and in the afternoon it patrolled the area. The morning served as integration training for the mariner crew and USCG members. On Day 2 Stiletto went northwest toward Williams Island, capitalizing on its shallow draft capability; during that time, Stiletto used D7 for law enforcement, not Sector KW. Stiletto was approximately five miles offshore Andros Island when the crew visually spotted a target; they then found it on FLIR (never saw the target using the radar). They chased this vessel in the shallow waters for approximately 15-20 minutes. When the suspect could not lose Stiletto, he then turned north toward Marathon in the open waters. However the waters proved to be too rough for the go-fast. The sea state was approximately 2-3 feet, and Stiletto was moving at 42.4 kts. At this rate and in these conditions, Stiletto was able to apprehend go-fast within two hours. Also involved in the apprehension was Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) aircraft; the aircraft had been flying overhead when it saw the Stiletto chase. After contacting Stiletto and learned it was not training they were watching, CBP assisted with the interdiction. Additional assistance came from Sector KW, OPVAC (USARSO Counter-Drug program) and three USGC members. There was also another go-fast on scene that other USCG officials apprehended. Once concluded, DEA officials said that the individuals apprehended were actually TOIs that had been identified earlier.

Finally we conclude with this.

• Several reasons for the lack of interdiction and counter-drug activities in the Colombian area were given by interviewees. Some suggested that Colombian police and Navy vessels were in the region at the same time, either warding away potential suspects or apprehending them without Stiletto’s assistance. Others suggested that people in Colombia knew Stiletto was in the area because of information leaks. As an example, the crew stated that one could “Google Stiletto and find updated data, pictures etc. The Saturday evening before Stiletto deployed [we] painted the roof a white color; by that Monday, pictures of Stiletto with a white roof were on the internet.” When the crew researched Stiletto, they found deployment dates and port stops listed online. Additionally others suggested that the lack of interdictions may be due to the stealth-like appearance of Stiletto because it attracts a lot of attention. “It was impossible for Cartagena citizens to not know about Stiletto. To pull into port there, you have to pull by all the high rises. We deployed at all hours, day and night; it was too cool looking for people not to know we were there.”

Welcome to 4GW at sea. This last part was one aspect I nearly didn't post, except to add context to the discussion. This is a good example why these platforms would be better suited for operations from a sea base. Stiletto is a stealth ship, but by the testimony of the ships own crew the stealth advantage was impaired in part by the MK 0 eyeball, the bane of stealth for any surface ship at sea.

Photo of the Day: Special Boat Team 22 (SBT-22)

Description: Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen assigned to Special Boat Team 22 (SBT-22) conduct live-fire immediate action drills.

Check out more photos of riverine operations.

Photo Caption: FORT KNOX, Ky. (Aug. 11, 2008) Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen assigned to Special Boat Team 22 (SBT-22) conduct live-fire immediate action drills at the riverine training range at Ft. Knox. SBT-22 operates the special operations craft-riverine and is the only U.S. special operations command dedicated to operating in the riverine environment. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Kathryn Whittenberger/Released)

A Clear Example of Disproportionate Priorities

While the Navy is telling Congress it is time to reset the strategic environment back to the cold war to support leaderships vision of what the Navy needs to be doing, the reality of what the Navy should be doing is summed up all too well by the details of this article from back in May.

Company A, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), is training to operate boats the unit received, May 2.

“I’m pretty excited,” said Cpl. Tomas Montoya, Co. A, 3-187th Inf. Regt. “I never thought I’d have the opportunity to work on boats over here in Iraq.”

“The boats will create new opportunities and capabilities in their operations along the Euphrates River,” said Lt. Col. Andrew Rohling, commander of 3-187th Inf. Regt. “They bring a sense of security, strength and versatility the local populace has not always seen from the water.”

“The boats add invaluable dimensions to the unit’s ability to conduct full-spectrum operations,” said Maj. Curtis Crum, 3rd BCT operations officer. “The boats give the brigade a unique capability that is not typically resident in this type of unit’s arsenal.”

The unit’s predecessors, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, ordered the boats in November 2007 to conduct operations along the Euphrates to deter insurgent activity. The boats were delivered to 3-187th Inf. Regt., in January.

I'm not sure we could find a better example of the disproportionate priorities the US Navy has today than to highlight a photograph of the 101st Airborne Division patrolling Euphrates River.

One might look at this picture and wonder why the Navy couldn't find a Boston whaler to mount a machine gun on and do this mission, or was it because the Navy wouldn't do the mission? It is a serious question, because it highlights the lack of priority the Navy's leadership has in regards to the NECC, not to mention the lack of funding.

The story is a good read. In particular note the attitudes of the guys in 3-187 interviewed. Imagine a world where the Navy's leadership was excited about doing the Navy's job as those Army guys reportedly are. As the Iraqi's take over duty at the dam, one wonders if the Navy will step up and take over for the Army. From what I'm hearing, the answer is "probably not."

The nation has been at war in Iraq for over five years now, a war with a clear Navy riverine mission profile, and yet here we are after five years into the war watching the Army stand up a riverine force for the Euphrates river from an order given in November of 2007, and the unit is already on patrol by May of 2008.

This is a leadership issue, specifically an attitude of leadership issue.

Observing the Offshore "Bonga" Attack

On June 19th, MEND released the following official statement.

"On Thursday, June 19, 2008, at 0045 Hrs, gallant fighters from the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) overran the supposedly fortified Bonga offshore oil fields operated by the Shell Petroleum Development Company.

"The main computerised control room responsible for coordinating the entire crude oil export operations from the fields was our main target. Our detonation engineers could not gain access to blow it up but decided against smoking out the occupants by burning down the facility to avoid loss of life.

"However, our next visit will be different as the facility will not be spared. We, therefore, ask all workers in the Bonga fields to evacuate for their safety as the military cannot protect them.

"In order that the Nigerian military does not pass off this humiliating breach as another 'accident', an American, Captain Jack Stone, from an oil services company, Tidex, has been captured.

"This man was supposed to only be released in exchange for all Niger Delta hostages being held in northern Nigeria by the Nigerian government. Because the criminals in the government and state security want to use this opportunity to make money from ransom, we have decided he will be released in the coming hours.

"The location for today's attack was deliberately chosen to remove any notion that off-shore oil exploration is far from our reach. The oil companies and their collaborators do not have any place to hide in conducting their nefarious activities."

We have been gathering details regarding the attack, and so far this is what we have been able to piece together from the events of June 19th. Most of it comes from a hearing in the Nigerian House of Representatives on June 23rd.

The Navy Patrol Boats stationed in the area had withdrawn from the area the day before to participate in Exercise Sentry, an exercise conducted by the Eastern Naval Command of the Nigerian Navy, The withdrawal of the Navy ships left Shell’s $3.6 billion “Bonga” Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading vessel (FPSO), stationed 120km from shore in 1000 meters of deep water, and responsible for 10% of Nigeria’s Crude Export without security protection. The facility does not have a radar, rather the facility is limited to a CCTV surveillance system.

Moving out after sundown on June 18th, MEND militants aboard three boats made the 120km trip out to Bongo and attacked just before 1:00am. Initially boarding one of the support vessels, the militants were prevented via lockdown procedures from gaining access to the Bonga facility. The attack lasted four hours, and while there was a lot of gunfire, Shell's official statement suggests only 3 workers were injured, suffered by being roughed up by the militants, No deaths or other injuries have been reported. After leaving the FPSO at 5:00am, the militants came across a ship chartered by Chevron on the return trip home, and kidnapped the vessels captain. Captain Jack Stone was released unharmed a few hours later.

MEND has become the focus of security and military efforts of Nigeria, and represents an enormous challenge not only to the Nigerian government, but indeed the impact is global. Due almost entirely to government attention and resources being focused on dealing with MEND, splinter groups are able to operate on the fringes and do their own damage, which can be highlighted by the destruction of the Chevron pipeline on June 20th by what is described as disgruntled youth. As UPI reports, those disgruntled youth just cost you money.

Though Chevron would not say just how much production was lost due to the attack, Nigerian energy officials estimated the losses at over 100,000 barrels per day, a blow that prompted the company to declare force majeure, relieving them of their contractual obligations until the assaulted pipeline can be repaired and secured.

It is no wonder that just a few days later, Saudi Arabia pledged to increase oil production by 200,000 bpd. While reported as a rushed reaction, the move is intended to make up for the loss of the attacks against the Bonga facility and the Nigerian pipeline. The Bonga facility was brought back up this week, but the downtime accounts for an estimated 1,500,000 barrels not drilled to market during the downtime, meaning the surge of oil from Saudi Arabia is really a wash for the first 15 days simply insuring OPEC production is sustained at current levels. In other words, net losses from last weeks incidents in Nigeria alone won't be made up for until at least 15 days after Saudi Arabia increases production. No wonder oil shot up to $140 per barrel today.

As we observe this incident, we can't help but think this is one of the most important military actions at sea since the USS Cole attack in Yemen. Ships are targets of opportunity for pirates and terrorists, but an offshore production facility is a fixed military target representing global political impact for terrorists. MEND is not a classic terrorism organization, rather represents an insurgency and different kind of maritime challenge. Based on eye witness accounts reported through the media, MEND apparently had the firepower necessary to destroy the facility, and yet decided not to in order to avoid the consequences of an international incident.

That last point is key. We are observing what appears to be an interesting 4GW Industry strategy engaged in Nigeria. MEND is executing a very sophisticated political strategy against the Nigerian government using the oil industry as leverage. MEND appears to see the industry as a neutral party, and the signs tend to indicate MEND would like the oil industry to maintain its neutral status. By demonstrating the ability to influence the offshore oil industry, MEND has achieved its political goals of demonstrating the capacity to disrupt oil supply, but has done this leveraging threat alone.

The oil industry strategy on the other hand appears to also desire its neutral status, and to insure both its value to the Nigerian government and maintain a neutral status with MEND, the oil industry is calling for greater community ownership of oil assets, which we read as an invested interest in the oil industry at the community level. In this way we observe the characteristics of a 4GW industry driven strategy in an insurgency environment, but we don't fully understand the distinct nature of this specific insurgency and the oil industry's strategy to fully analyze it. If anyone is aware of such analysis we are very interested.

While we do not see MEND as a problem requiring an international military solution, as we examine the situation from a strategic perspective we observe the Navy is not very well resourced to deal with MEND even if a military solution was called for. To put it into perspective, on Tuesday right before the current cease fire was put into effect, the Nigerian Navy massed 8 riverine boats near a MEND camp in what MEND claims was preparations for an assault. The MEND statement of the incident claimed 'Our fighters headed towards the army position and fired warning shots (for them) to leave or be confronted. As our fighters approached the enemy in over fifty war boats, the eight gun boats turned and fled from the area, thereby averting a clash and maintaining the on-going ceasefire.'' If the claim of over fifty boats is true, and there is no reason why it wouldn't be, for perspective consider if you combined all three US Navy Riverine squadrons that amounts to around 700 sailors and only 36 boats! For even greater perspective, several MEND attack boats have stabilized gun mounts, the US Navy boats do not.

This incident highlights the intelligence capabilities and tactical proficiency of MEND in the region, and the potential for widespread destruction both in the river delta and well offshore is clearly well within their capabilities. If we can observe the naval capabilities developed by MEND to influence and attack at sea, it is a good bet terror organizations are studying the same information and learning from it. While MEND may not have created an international incident due to their own political interests, that is a bad bet in the future, not only in this region but other maritime regions as well.

We already know Al Qaeda is building naval terror cells, you can bet they are looking at the Tamil Tigers and MEND as models to build on. There is absolutely no evidence at all the shipbuilding budget or greater resource budget is even mildly prepared to posture forces against this type of threat. That is a very bad sign, probably one aspect of the global energy calculations being considered by the energy speculators. This was both the wake up call and the learning experience for everyone, next time will not go as well.

Riverine Squadron 3 Deploys to Iraq

Riverine Squadron 3 represents the third riverine unit to deploy to Iraq since last March. It is good to see this capability back in the Navy.

The Navy stopped active-duty inland and coastal patrols after Vietnam. Last year, they reclaimed the mission, taking over river patrols for an overburdened Marine Corps.

On Sunday, about 150 sailors from Riverine Squadron 3 left for Iraq - the third unit to deploy since last March. Jordan left the command Monday in a ceremony at Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base.

Jordan started the group a little more than two years ago with a few dozen sailors and borrowed office space. Thirteen months into the mission, the squadrons have conducted 800 combat operations with more than 200 shoreline sweeps, discovering nearly 100 weapons caches. They have worked with Iraqi forces, with the goal of training them to take over the patrols in western al Anbar province.

Then the article reminds us that the Navy still has some work to do to improve this capability.

The Cold War strategy of warships battling in deep seas needs to be supplemented by a force than can secure harbors, ports and rivers, Tillotson said. “We need to be there,” he said.

Petty Officer 3rd Class David Smith came straight from advanced training into the first squadron. Smith, an engine mechanic, said the new squadron had to come to terms with worn equipment and a new mission.

We like that the Navy has taken a slow approach to reestablishment for riverine. It has to be built, and there should be deployments before major investment to get a feel for what is needed, and desired, to enhance the capability. However, the Navy should start increasing a budget commitment beginning in FY10 or FY11 if the Navy is serious about the riverine capability. Considering both years will likely be tight budgets, the discussion needs to begin now in Congress. Clearly riverine isn't expensive compared to building warships, but in tight budgets even small sums get hard to come by.

We believe the future riverine forces will require integration with the blue water forces, specifically we believe LPD-17 well deck deployment capability will be very important. It is noteworthy Nigeria is of the most strategically important energy sources for the United States, and is also a River Delta. With the insurgency bubbling in that region, which is also the top region in the world regarding piracy, the Navy needs to be looking sooner rather than later for budget investments in riverine forces, because it needs to be available when called upon.

M80 Stiletto Will Get Its Chance

It was selected as one of TIME magazines best inventions of 2006. It fits in a well deck, can support UAVs, claims to have excellent stealth, and is one of the most recognizable small craft in the US arsenal. It is unpopular in many traditional circles inside the Navy, and widely touted in other circles, particularly retired veterans of Vietnam river patrols. It has been claimed capable of performing virtually every brown and green water mission profile, and yet has never been discussed officially as performing any mission profile over the last couple of years.

Luckily, it will soon get its trial by fire, and we will find out what the $6 million M80 Stiletto can really do. This small nugget pops up in the insidedefense.com Defense Alert stack.

DefenseAlert, April 24, 2024 -- An experimental military vessel called "Stiletto" is slated to head toward Colombia next month to help U.S. Southern Command officials there track down drug traffickers, defense officials tell InsideDefense.com.

We see this as a very smart way to use a unique, untested platform. While we believe the hype of the M80 has gone a bit too far since its launch, we are very pleased to see the M80 earn its reputation with this trial on the front lines of operations. Like all unique platforms, maybe we'll see a military channel special this Christmas profiling its deployment? Probably not...

The Navy deserves credit here, it is very wise to send the unique platforms like Sea Fighter (FSF-1) and Stiletto to the front lines of small wars and see what they can do. Gates said it best the other day.

An unconventional era of warfare requires unconventional thinkers.

Given the unpopularity of the M80 Stiletto, not to mention Duncan Hunters Navy, it appears someone inside the Navy got the SECDEF's memo, and is showing a bit of unconventional thinking in a culture best defined for its conventional, traditional resistance to any change.

The 1000-ship What?

In a recent NavyTimes article about the upcoming Maritime Strategy due to be unveiled at the International Seapower Symposium, the article ends with this interesting exchange.

Morgan refused to reveal what the new strategy will include, but he said that international partnerships will be integral to the new plan.

When asked how the concept of the “1,000-ship navy” would play into the new document, Morgan acknowledged that the concept would play a part. However, he said, “We are beginning to distance ourselves from that moniker.”

During an earlier panel discussion at the conference, Atlantic Monthly correspondent and author Robert Kaplan said that the 1,000-ship navy is really the “1,000-ship coast guard” and the concept is separate from the Navy’s other responsibilities, such as “classic power projection” from the sea.

Are you telling me the Big Blue Fleet has nothing in common with little nation navy? Who would have thought? The USCG has been training other small Navies for years, still does, and it has a lot more in common with nations dealing with maritime security issues on its own shore than the US Navy does, at least in modern history anyway. Clearly I think Robert Kaplan is playing the role of Captain Obvious, although I admit I'm a bit disappointed the Navy is willing to move away from a concept still very early in development and basically dump the concept on the coast guard.

TFN isn't a bad idea, it is just underdeveloped and not well resourced in practice. I also disagree the Navy is somehow the wrong service to be engaged, even if the USCG is a better match. At the end of the day, the prohibiting element for the Navy in the Thousand Ship Navy concept appears to me to be the Navy itself.

US Navy Buying Second CB90

Last week it was reported the Navy was purchasing 1 CB 90 as a Riverine Command Boat from Safe Boat for 2.8 million. It appears the Navy already has its hands on one and is looking to purchase the demonstration unit according to the Navy Times.

Navy officials got a good look at the RCB in June during an annual conference on small combatant craft at Little Creek, Va. The Navy wants to buy the demonstrator on display at the show for about $2 million, Wood said. It also has contracted SAFE Boat to build a second boat to specific requirements for about $2.8 million. The first boat is already in Norfolk, Va., Wood said, and the second should be delivered by June.

You can find the original article of the Navy looking at the RCB in June here.

When you look around the Milblogs regarding the announcement last week of the CB90 purchase, it is noteworthy how much praise the Navy got for this purchase. If the platform lives up to the expectations, maybe the Navy will replace the SURCs — now called Riverine Patrol Boats, with more.

One could hope.

CB90 Riverine Command Boat (RCB)

Last month it was reported the NECC was interested in the CB90, this month it appears the Navy has purchased one as a Riverine Command Boat (RCB).

Safe Boats International LLC has received a $2.8 million contract to build a 49-foot Riverine Command Boat (RCB) for the U.S. Navy.

The boat, according to the Port Orchard boat maker, will be used as a command and control platform for the Navy's Riverine force. Sailors on the boat are sealed from nuclear, biological and chemical contamination, a Safe Boat spokesman said.

These boats are fast, rugged, and built for war. The CB90 is a considerable upgrade from the boats the NECC is operating in Iraq, hopefully the US Navy has plans to buy moreCB90s for more than just as a single Riverine Command Boat (RCB).

CB90 for the NECC

Could it be, the CB90 is in the discussion with the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command? The Small Unit Riverine Craft (SURC) the Navy inherited from the Marines appear to be wearing out, so the Navy is in the market for a replacement.

The CB90 (originally a Swedish design) would be a major upgrade, and would probably cost around 3 million US per if built by Safeboat. In my opinion, it is a good investment, one that finally would indicate the Navy is taking the Brown Water Navy role seriously.