The Fleet in Being Strategy

PACIFIC OCEAN (Jan. 20, 2017) Aircraft from Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 17 conduct flight operations aboard the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). The carrier is currently off the coast of Southern California conducting carrier qualifications. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Bill M. Sanders/Released)

The US Navy has dealt with the fiscal controls of sequestration put in place by Congress and the Obama Administration over the last few years by making a strategic choice that favored new shipbuilding activities over the maintenance of ships and aircraft - among other things. Budgets are zero sum, and Defense News is reporting the consequences of that strategic choice.

The U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet strike fighters are the tip of the spear, embodying most of the fierce striking power of the aircraft carrier strike group. But nearly two-thirds of the fleet’s strike fighters can’t fly — grounded because they’re either undergoing maintenance or simply waiting for parts or their turn in line on the aviation depot backlog.

Overall, more than half the Navy’s aircraft are grounded, most because there isn’t enough money to fix them.

Additionally, there isn’t enough money to fix the fleet’s ships, and the backlog of ships needing work continues to grow. Overhauls — “availabilities” in Navy parlance — are being canceled or deferred, and when ships do come in they need longer to refit. Every carrier overall for at least three years has run long, and some submarines are out of service for prolonged periods, as much as four years or more. One submarine, the Boise, has lost its diving certification and can’t operate pending shipyard work.

Leaders claim that if more money doesn’t become available, five more submarines will be in the same state by the end of this year. 

The article has plenty of details, but the eye popping quote comes after the article cites "$6-8 billion" in immediate needs. There is only one way to describe what this means.

The dire situation of naval aviation is sobering. According to the Navy, 53 percent of all Navy aircraft can’t fly — about 1,700 combat aircraft, patrol, and transport planes and helicopters. Not all are due to budget problems — at any given time, about one-fourth to one-third of aircraft are out of service for regular maintenance. But the 53 percent figure represents about twice the historic norm.

It doesn't matter how many ships are in the US Navy's shipbuilding plan, the unequivocal truth of the situation is - the US Navy today is a hollow force. When the fleet cannot leave port and has been degraded to the point it cannot maintain it's own resources, it is a fleet in being. It was an intentional choice, by both Navy leaders and Congress - they all own the situation as it is today. This has been the strategy of the last several years to insure new construction and new ships. No one, whether a civilian in either political party or an Admiral in the Navy today, can claim they are not accountable. Priorities get funded, and a lot of priorities that have nothing to do with the maintenance of naval power have been funded over the last many years.

Consider for a moment that it is very likely the training squadrons are probably among the squadrons actually getting maintenance funding, which means it is very likely the US Navy couldn't field more than 4, and probably not even 5 aircraft carriers with functioning combat aircraft today in response to a national emergency. I don't know what percent of the F-18s force is grounded, but I bet the percentage of helicopters grounded is much higher, because if there is one thing we can make a safe bet on - it is that naval aviation leaders will have prioritized the F-18s and done only the minimum everywhere else.

Last week the Question of the Week asked whether the US Navy was prepared for combat at sea. My answer to this question would be, "Yes the US Navy is prepared to fight, at least initially, and while the tip of the spear is very sharp - it's the shortest spear the US Navy has represented since the 19th century."

In 2010 I remember listening to fleet leaders who were very concerned that the US Navy was on the verge of being a hollow force, and today in 2017 the US Navy is absolutely hollow. There are entire squadrons of aircraft that cannot fly today, and ships that not only can't get underway - but it is unclear when they next could get underway. When I read articles discussing the size of the US Navy in 2017 I roll my eyes wondering if they have any idea how meaningless the numbers they use actually are. Numbers on paper have nothing in common with reality. The CNO telling any and all who will listen that the state of maintenance in the force has already passed critical levels - that's the reality.

Rep. Forbes’s Congressional Oversight Topics for 2015

In a short piece last month, Rep. Randy Forbes outlined several topics he will explore this coming year as HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Chairman.  He has long showed great interest in UCLASS requirements definition, so it is not surprising to see that issue on his list. Nor is it surprising to see that the sequester’s continued effects on defense readiness and procurement, the overall defense budget’s adequacy for supporting U.S. grand strategy, and the Defense Department's offset strategy initiative are also on his list.

There are a few unanticipated topics, however, that I'm quite happy to see he called out:

We also need to focus on developing new concepts of operation for conducting naval resupply missions in contested maritime environments, conducting joint operations in a communications degraded or denied environment and conducting air operations from austere, dispersed, or degraded airfields. Finally, we need to develop a munitions strategy that focuses on deploying new advanced munitions for land-attack, anti-surface, and mine warfare, and, just as importantly, procuring a healthy stockpile to have in storage ashore and afloat in the region.

ID readers know that the ability to operate effectively under cyber-electromagnetic opposition is one of my own major areas of interest. So are the strategic implications of advanced ordnance producibility and inventory management; the latter aspect is inseparable from combat logistics. These topics, and combat logistics in general, simply do not receive the attention they deserve from the U.S. defense analysis community. Hopefully any hearings Rep. Forbes may be planning to hold them over the coming year will help change that.

Is That Fleet Worth Buying?

The opening statement by Ronald O'Rourke during his October 23, 2024 testimony before the House Armed Services Seapower Subcommittee on the US Navy's FY2014 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan is excellent. The following was his statement regarding the affordability of the 30-Year shipbuilding plan.

In a situation of reduced levels of defense spending, such as what would occur if defense spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act, the affordability challenge posed by the 30-year shipbuilding plan would be intensified. Even then, however, the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would not necessarily become unaffordable.

The Navy estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $16.8 billion in annual funding for new-construction ships, compared to an historic average of $12 billion to $14 billion provided for this purpose. The required increase in average annual funding of $2.8 billion to $4.8 billion per year equates to less than 1% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $19.3 billion in annual funding for new-construction ships, or $2.5 billion per year more than the Navy estimates. This would make the required increase in average annual funding $5.3 billion to $7.3 billion per year, which equates to roughly 1.1% to 1.5% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act.

Some observers, noting the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, have advocated shifting a greater share of the DOD budget to the Navy and Air Force, on the grounds that the Asia-Pacific region is primarily a maritime and aerospace theater for DOD. In discussing the idea of shifting a greater share of the DOD budget to the Navy and Air Force, some of these observers refer to breaking the so-called “one-third, one-third, one-third” division of resources among the three military departments—a shorthand term sometimes used to refer to the more-or-less stable division of resources between the three military departments that existed for the three decades between the end of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War in 1973 and the start of the Iraq War in 2003. In a context of breaking the “one-third, one-third, one-third” allocation with an aim of better aligning defense spending with the strategic rebalancing, shifting 1.5% or less of DOD’s budget into the Navy’s shipbuilding account would appear to be quite feasible.

More broadly, if defense spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act, then fully funding the Department of the Navy’s total budget at the levels shown in the current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) would require increasing the Department of the Navy’s share of the non-Defense-Wide part of the DOD budget to about 41%, compared to about 36% in the FY2014 budget and an average of about 37% for the three-decade period between the Vietnam and Iraq wars. While shifting 4% or 5% of DOD’s budget to the Department of the Navy would be a more ambitious reallocation than shifting 1.5% or less of the DOD budget to the Navy’s shipbuilding account, similarly large reallocations have occurred in the past:

• From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, reflecting a U.S. defense strategy at the time that placed a strong reliance on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, the Department of the Air Force’s share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget increased by several percentage points. The Department of the Air Force’s share averaged about 45% for the 10-year period FY1956-FY1965, and peaked at more than 47% in FY1957-FY1959.
• For the 11-year period FY2003-FY2013, as a consequence of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of the Army’s share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget increased by roughly ten percentage points. The Department of the Army’s share during this period averaged about 39%, and peaked at more than 43% in FY2008. U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during this period reflected the implementation of U.S. national strategy as interpreted by policymakers during those years.

The point here is not to argue whether it would be right or wrong to shift more of the DOD budget to the Navy’s shipbuilding account or to the Department of the Navy’s budget generally. Doing that would require reducing funding for other DOD programs, and policymakers would need to weigh the resulting net impact on overall DOD capabilities. The point, rather, is to note that the allocation of DOD resources is not written in stone, that aligning DOD spending with U.S. strategy in coming years could involve changing the allocation by more than a very marginal amount, and that such a changed allocation could provide the funding needed to implement the current 30-year shipbuilding plan. The alternative of assuming at the outset that there is no potential for making anything more than very marginal shifts in the allocation of DOD resources could unnecessarily constrain options available to policymakers and prevent the allocation of DOD resources from being aligned optimally with U.S. strategy.

As an alternative or supplement to the option of altering the allocation of DOD resources among the military departments, the 30-year shipbuilding plan could also become more affordable by taking actions beyond those now being implemented by DOD to control military personnel pay and benefits and reduce what some observers refer to as DOD’s overhead or back-office costs. Multiple organizations have made recommendations for such actions in recent years. The Defense Business Board, for example, estimated that at least $200 billion of DOD’s enacted budget for FY2010 constituted overhead costs. The board stated that “There has been an explosion of overhead work because the Department has failed to establish adequate controls to keep it in line relative to the size of the warfight,” and that “In order to accomplish that work, the Department has applied ever more personnel to those tasks which has added immensely to costs.” The board stated further that “Whether it’s improving the tooth-to-tail ratio; increasing the ‘bang for the buck’, or converting overhead to combat, Congress and DoD must significantly change their approach,” and that DOD “Must use the numerous world-class business practices and proven business operations that are applicable to DoD’s overhead.”

One potential way to interpret the affordability challenge posed by the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is to view it as an invitation by the Navy for policymakers to consider matters such as the alignment between U.S. strategy and the division of DOD resources among the military departments, and the potential for taking actions beyond those now being implemented by DOD to control military personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs. The Navy’s prepared statement for the September 18 hearing before the full committee on planning for sequestration in FY2014 and the perspectives of the military services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) provides a number of details about reductions in Navy force structure and acquisition programs that could result from constraining DOD’s budget to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act. These potential reductions do not appear to reflect any substantial shift in the allocation of DOD resources among the military departments, or the taking of actions beyond those already being implemented by DOD to control DOD personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs. The fact that the Navy in its prepared statement did not choose to discuss the possibility of a changed allocation of DOD resources among the military departments or additional actions to control DOD personnel pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs does not prevent Congress from considering such possibilities.

Before Congress or the DoD decides whether the US Navy should have additional funding relative to other services to fully fund the US Navy's shipbuilding plan, I think one of the questions that needs to be asked is whether the plan itself is worth fully funding.

The link above takes you to the hearing page, where this testimony by Ronald O'Rourke can be downloaded, but also the prepared statement Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office. In Eric Labs testimony there is quite a bit of detailed analysis regarding the Navy's FY2014 30-Year shipbuilding plan. As I reviewed the shipbuilding plan and the numbers provided by Eric Labs, I found myself unsure if I think the US Navy's shipbuilding plan is worth funding. The Navy has argued for their plan each year even as the Navy has adjusted it on the margins every year. The shipbuilding plan, and more specifically the fleet design of the US Navy, is primarily designed in alignment with the prevailing trends in technology of 21st century military power.

There are no technological changes in warfare that have fundamentally altered naval warfare since World War II, when war of the sea was primarily and decisively won by naval forces that attacked from over and under the sea. If anything, the advancement of technologies like nuclear power for submarines combined with the improved range and precision of guided weapons have increased the capabilities of both submarines and aircraft in naval warfare.

The next war at sea will be fought by naval forces over and under the sea, and by military forces in space and cyberspace. This reality is why, for the most part, most ongoing debates regarding US Navy force structure revolve around what ships will do in the next war at sea.

Based on the analysis in the prepared statement by Eric Labs, the FY2014 budget invests $382 billion over the next 30 years in large deck nuclear powered aircraft carriers, large surface combatants, nuclear powered attack submarines, and nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines - what I describe as the Battle Fleet portion of the US Navy. The US Navy will spend around 76% of the entire SCN budget on ships of the Battle Fleet.

Based on the same analysis by Eric Labs, the FY2014 budget invests around $68 billion over the next 30 years for Littoral Combat Ships, the LHA-6 program (well deck variant), and the LX(R) program intended to replace existing LSDs - the ships that I describe as the Flotilla portion of the US Navy. That breaks down as $16 billion on the current LCS program, $13 billion for the LCS(X) program, $15 billion for the LX(R) program, and $22 billion for the LHA-6 program. In total, the US Navy will spend around 13% of the entire SCN budget on ships of the Flotilla.

Here is the problem I see.

The Battle Fleet of the US Navy is organized for a single function: to defeat, deter, or cooperate with the military forces of another state, and through the organization of Carrier Strike Groups different ships within the Battle Fleet can be organized together towards a strategic object. The Flotilla of the US Navy is organized for two functions: to support the Battle Fleet in its primary function or to deliver Marines or material overseas. No ships of the Flotilla are designed to actually operate within the organization of the Battle Fleet, although individual ships of the Battle Fleet can operate with individual ships of the Flotilla.

The Flotilla of the US Navy today - FFGs, LCS, PCs, JHSVs, MCMs, other single purpose ships, preposition ships, and amphibious ships - has no organization within itself. Yes, amphibious ships are organized with themselves, but they do not organize with other elements of the Flotilla. No one aspect of the Flotilla is designed to work as part of a larger organization with other parts of the Flotilla. Unlike the Battle Fleet in nearly every way, each ship of the Flotilla is designed to perform a specific, single function, and no ship of the Flotilla is designed to operate as part of a larger organization towards a strategic object.

The future Flotilla appears to be nothing more than a resourced restrained new version of the existing Flotilla, suggesting the future US Navy looks exactly like the present US Navy - a navy organized to defeat, deter, and cooperate with military forces of other states, and only capable of achieving strategic objects that are obtainable if performing those functions.


With a US Navy capable of performing a specific strategic function for the nation, and only strategic functions specific to other states; and considering the US Navy exceeds capabilities and capacity of every state the United States might find itself in competition with, the question I ask myself is why should the US Navy shipbuilding budget be fully funded? I don't think there is any question the US Navy is operationally and tactically brilliant, and I think the US Navy fleet is very well designed for naval warfare in the 21st century, but at the end of the day, the strategic value of US seapower is limited when the US Navy is organized for only a small, very specific set of strategic functions.

At a time when 90% of all trade globally is at sea, when the territorial disputes are taking place at sea, when the economic system is dependent upon the resources being retrieved at sea, and when non-state actors have never had greater capacity to threaten US economic and national security interests than they do today, the US Navy is organized around the false belief that superior military power that only functions with or against military forces of other states will somehow insure strategic success for the US in the 21st century.

Until US naval forces are being organized to achieve a broader set of strategic objectives by sea for the nation, I see very little strategic value in investing in the US Navy fleet as designed unless Congress determines the only threats globally worth the resources of the US Navy are those of other states, because under the current plan, the US Navy has almost no resources or flexibility to achieve a broad range of strategic objectives relevant to the age we live in on behalf of the nation.

The House Sequestration Hearing

The service chiefs testified in the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday. The video is not yet available. Written statements are available. This is from Navy Times.

For the Navy, the budget cuts will affect the carrier fleet and its attendant strike group fleets and aircraft squadrons. The Navy will continue to maintain a single deployed carrier strike group presence in the Pacific and one in the Middle East region.

But sending out additional carriers — as the Navy has in recent weeks in response to the Syria crisis — is becoming difficult.

“What do we have to surge? It’s getting less and less, and I’m very concerned about it. Today one carrier strike group, one amphibious-ready group is ready to surge with their organized training equipment. Normally ... we have three,” said Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations.

Greenert did not specifically address Hagel’s suggestion in July that the Navy may have to shrink today’s fleet of 11 carriers to potentially eight, a move that would dramatically and permanently reduce the Navy’s operational tempo and eliminate the need for many of the destroyers, fighter squadrons and other support units typically attached to carrier strike groups.

He said the surface fleet likely will have to fall toward about 255 ships, about 30 less than today’s total fleet and far lower than the 306 that is the Navy’s official target for its shipbuilding program.

Greenert said one of his biggest concerns about the budget cuts is their impact on the Navy’s ability to develop a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic submarines, a key component of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. That program to build new ones, the so-called SSBN(X), may be unaffordable under current budget levels, he said.

One important point not mentioned in the Navy Times article is that it would appear the Navy is putting the mid-life refueling of the USS George Washington (CVN-73) on the table in FY15.

I thought the hearing went well except when the CNO listed his three top priorities as:

1. SSBN(X) Ohio-class replacement
2. Cyber
3. Deploying naval forces

I have some problems with this list, and am confident that over the next week these topics will be discussed on the blog. If Cyber is a more important priority for the CNO when it comes to Navy funding than ships, subs, aircraft, sailors, and airmen... then I have spent the entire year reading the wrong books on seapower.

Same Lyrics, Different Beat

The plan is to create chaos and force political rivals to work together as they struggle to wrap their mind around what is happening. The plan includes ignoring laws and discarding good governance to achieve desired political objectives. The plan is to create as much fear and uncertainty as possible to cloud the judgment of the various parties involved. The hope is that by creating enough chaos everyone eventually gets tired and agrees to concessions.

This is North Korea's plan, right?

Nope. This looks to be Barack Obama's plan with the FY14 defense budget sent to Congress. Now political rivals, no not China and the US, but Republicans and Democrats - must find a way to work together as they struggle to wrap their mind around a budget that ignored - outright - the statutes related to sequestration. The last couple years suggest that's unlikely.

This is the worst possible way to govern, but good governance towards stability that would save the taxpayer money be damned, because political objectives must be met - the primary political objective apparently being to avoid making tough choices. Congress will fight it out, eventually get tired (probably sometime in Q2 next fiscal year), and will concede to concessions.

Don't tell me North Korea is acting irrationally unless you are ready to say the same about the way the President is handling sequestration. North Korea is playing games with the lives of others in the region, but Barack Obama is playing games with the jobs of Americans. Either way, the objective is political instability until everyone is worn out.

Kim Jong Un and Barack Obama are basically executing the same political strategy under different contexts. Worth noting that Kim Jong Un will likely ultimately lose because the world elites are not stupid and refuse to put up with people who create dangerous instability, but Barack Obama will likely ultimately win because American elites choose to act stupid and will put up with a President who creates dangerous instability.

Thinking Americans might want to ask themselves why the President of the United States is executing political strategies and tactics in America targeted at Congress that have everything in common with the political strong arm tactics being used by North Korea today, and whether that political standard is good enough.

Budget Thoughts

I don't really want to get too deep into the budget discussion yet because a memo (PDF) and a PowerPoint (PDF) isn't exactly a plan. I have only a few initial thoughts.

The memo and the PowerPoint were both written with the expectation they would leak to the media. This sets the expectation moving forward that everything will unfold in public.

The CNOs PowerPoint that breaks out State by State impact is written like one would write a highly political document. All indications are the Navy put the document together, but it very much looks like the White House is coordinating everything. Whether this is a good or bad thing is subject to interpretation.

The evil here is not sequestration, it is the Continuing Resolution. Even if OSD canceled the Joint Strike Fighter tomorrow, the Navy could not move money around from that program to any other budget to make up for any specific budget shortfalls, because the Continuing Resolution that is the current budget the Navy is operating under prevents exactly that type of big decision making or movement of money around the budget. The CR is probably written that way so that no politicians pet project gets canceled. The Continuing Resolution is the posterchild of bad governance.

Both political parties own sequestration, but in my opinion Democrats own more of it than Republicans since Democrats have not yet produced a single alternative to sequestration. Sequestration has not happened yet though, so right now Democrats simply own something that may or may not happen.

Both political parties own the Continuing Resolution, but in my opinion Republicans own more of it than Democrats and as of right now it is the current law. While it is true the Senate has not passed a budget in the lifetime of every child that will enter kindergarten this fall, the details of the Continuing Resolution have not been an important issue for Republicans who have been dead set in protecting industry interests over DoD interests. There are opinions out there that the Continuing Resolution is another example of how weak the leadership of Buck McKeon is as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and he has basically thrown the DoD off the boat in support of the House leaders priorities. It was noteworthy Defense News didn't name Buck McKeon to the top 100 individuals in Defense.

Either way, the Continuing Resolution prevents the services from preparing for sequestration because it prevents any significant movement of money inside the budget. The worst case scenario is a year long Continuing Resolution, and if combined with sequestration the damage will be much more significant than just sequestration.

All we can really say with certainty is that the Republican Party has changed over the last four years, and the CR and sequestration have revealed for anyone paying attention that the Republican Party is no longer the political party that represents the DoD as has traditionally been the case in American politics, although with the Continuing Resolution written as is today, the Republicans party is still very much the political party of the defense industry.

Regardless of the partisan politics, it is going to be a very difficult year for defense. A smaller budget for defense is not a bad thing by itself, indeed I believe the DoD budget is too high and taxpayer money is wasted today in defense spending absent strategy. It is my opinion the clear and present danger to the defense of the United States is not less money for defense, but poor governance by elected officials in the management of less money for defense.

As of right now, poor governance by elected officials in the management of less money for defense is exactly what is going on with the Continuing Resolution, and regardless of who folks believe is to blame politically, both political parties own some responsibility and deserve criticism for the way the DoD budget is being managed. It will be interesting to see how things unfold over the next several weeks, because with the White House apparently involved in the response process by the DoD, it could get pretty ugly.... indeed very politically ugly particularly when it becomes time for new political appointments and the administration likely has fewer extremely smart and well respected non-partisan experts carrying their water.

I have a theory that because Bob Work has been Undersecretary of the Navy that both the Obama Administration and the Navy has avoided a lot of public criticism from the greater naval community, which unlike the public think tank communities of the other services (particularly Army) who think tactically and primarily in terms of money/programs, naval thinkers tend to think about big picture strategy and foreign policy and historically have written criticisms that can come off the press with politically damaging blows to the confidence in political leaders (indeed George Bush took several hits from 2005-2008 from the naval centric community that were so devastating they land on John McCain as a second order of effect). Everything I am seeing from Obama's second term appears to be right out of the Jimmy Carter playbook for DoD management, starting with a politico heavy appointment list absent any truly respected defense expertise. History says that kind of poor governance will catch up with the Democratic Party in 2016.

I tend to believe that when Bob Work leaves in May(ish) (and I believe the absence of Hillary Clinton at Department of State will result in a similar effect), not too long after it is going to get ugly as the really smart people start to unload on the Foreign Policy and Defense establishment after holding fire for four years, and I won't be surprised at all if it is through those broadsides that a Republican Party foreign policy is reborn over the next 4 years. It really surprises me the Obama administration doesn't intend to appoint Bob Work to be SECNAV, because usually those guys are pretty smart about keeping the their opponents off guard. It is my opinion the Navy has been living in 4 years of the Bob Work Effect, which has basically provided a buffer effect from the really sharp criticisms from nearly every serious defense person in DC regardless of political affiliation. My sense is the Ray Mabus Effect is simply not going to get it done for the Administration, and in all likelihood neither will the Chuck Hagel Effect or the John Kerry Effect.

Now think about the future of defense - a bunch of politico type appointments with very few highly respected experts or elder statesmen, a year long continuing resolution, sequestration or budget cuts of similar size, and the current partisan political environment. I'm thinking the next four years are going to look and sound like a train wreck in slow motion for the DoD.

And yet I am still glass half full...

The Sense of Congress on Amphibious Ships

Proposed MLP and AFSB option for LSD(X)

Normally when a defense budget is passed, I can't wait to dig through it and highlight all the important details. This time, with no associated appropriations bill (or plan) coming anytime soon, it would be a waste of time to suggest anything in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Act is worth discussing, because it is worthless until the elected folks in Washington, DC get their budget priorities sorted out.

There is one section in the bill that I do want to highlight though. This reads like something inserted by a lobbyist, and it doesn't belong in my opinion.

SEC. 131. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS.

a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1. The Marine Corps is a combat force that leverages maneuver from the sea as a force multiplier allowing for a variety of operational tasks ranging from major combat operations to humanitarian assistance.
2. The Marine Corps is unique in that, while embarked upon naval vessels, they bring all the logistic support necessary for the full range of military operations and, operating ‘‘from the sea’’, they require no third-party host nation permission to conduct military operations.
3. The Navy has a requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships to meet this full range of military operations.
4. Due only to fiscal constraints, that requirement of 38 vessels was reduced to 33 vessels, which adds military risk to future operations.
5. The Navy has been unable to meet even the minimal requirement of 30 operationally available vessels and has submitted a shipbuilding and ship retirement plan to Congress that will reduce the force to 28 vessels.
6. Experience has shown that early engineering and design of naval vessels has significantly reduced the acquisition costs and life-cycle costs of those vessels.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

1. the Department of Defense should carefully evaluate the maritime force structure necessary to execute demand for forces by the commanders of the combatant commands;
2. the Navy should carefully evaluate amphibious lift capabilities to meet current and projected requirements;
3. the Navy should consider prioritization of investment in and procurement of the next generation of amphibious assault ships as a component of the balanced battle force;
4. the next generation amphibious assault ships should maintain survivability protection;
5. operation and maintenance requirements analysis, as well as the potential to leverage a common hull form design, should be considered to reduce total ownership cost and acquisition cost; and
6. maintaining a robust amphibious ship building industrial base is vital for the future of the national security of the United States.

To me this looks a lot like some Marine Corps General and his industry buddies throwing their weight around via Congress to try an influence the Analysis of Alternatives taking place regarding the LSD(X). Congress should not be trying to influence the decision unless they are ready to pony up the big bucks for what they are basically calling for - which to me sounds like more LPD-17s.


From what I understand, LSD(X) will be a design to cost ship. The recurring cost (ship 3 and beyond) is pegged to be about $1.2 billion in the shipbuilding budget. That makes the LPD-17 hull a nonstarter without a significant increase in cash from Congress.

The Marines face several challenges in dealing with amphibious requirements, but two stand out as important challenges that must be addressed. The first challenge is that the lift footprint of the amphibious MEB is growing, and the second challenge is that the MPS squadron only carries about 70% of the MEB's equipment. With limited funding and only one platform in the shipbuilding plan able to address these issues - the LSD(X) - folks are either going to have to get creative to solve these challenges, or accept that the challenges will not be solved.

The LSD(X) is a choice between 4 alternatives.

The first choice is a new build, best possible lift vessel for $1.2 billion recurring. I have no idea what design that would be, but if we are being honest it almost certainly wouldn't be anything similar to a current LSD if it is going to meet the stated requirements.

The second choice is for a LPD-17 mod, best possible for $1.2 billion recurring. I do not believe that is possible, but I'm sure there is a shipbuilding guru who other Marines call "General" willing and ready to convince a gullible politician it is possible. Experts I have spoken to in NAVSEA say it's not possible, and I'll trust their expertise and opinion over any Marine General when it comes to shipbuilding.

The third choice is to use a foreign design brought up to NVR standard at a cost of no more than $1.2 billion recurring with the third ship. The design that is specifically highlighted with this option is the French Mistral class. The ships would be built at a US shipyard. There is not a consensus whether these ships can be built in a US shipyard for $1.2 billion recurring.

The fourth option is to build two ships - a MLP and an AFSB - and use the combination of both ships to replace the single LSD. The idea is for the AFSB vessel to cover both the lift for amphibious groups and carry residual lift for the MPS MEB while MLP serves as a well deck surrogate. What is important to understand here is that the AFSB design would actually be a non-mil spec LPH with a limited hanger capacity, but it gives the option for that vessel to carry forward the helicopters in an ARG while the LHA/LHD operates 20 JSFs. Neither the MLP or AFSB would be a gray hull though, which is a major reason why old school Marine Generals who have been doing amphibious assaults for 30 years (cough!) hate the idea.

When I read Section 131 of the 2013 National Defense Act, what I read as "Sense of Congress" actually represents the traditionalists mindset on amphibious capability and their Gulf coast lobby buddies.

But the bottom line is this. The fourth option is the only option that will actually meet the capacity requirements for amphibious lift and the MPS, but I fully expect the United States Marine Corps to outright reject the very suggestion of any option away from the traditional 3 ship ARG. The third option for a foreign design will be rejected solely because it is a foreign design, even though the logic of that escapes me completely when the ships are being built in US shipyards. A new design is possible but unlikely, and until we see more in-house design expertise in NAVSEA I can't say that is necessarily a bad thing.

So ultimately I fully expect the final choice for the LSD(X) to be a LPD-17 mod that the Navy budget cannot afford, and in the end I suspect the Marine Corps will end up with about 8 LSD(X) because that is all they can afford.

But if it was me, I would go for the MLP + AFSB concept. I believe it carries with it the highest risk, but I also believe it would give the Marine Corps the most flexibility when it comes to operations at sea. In my opinion it is much easier for the USMC to remain a relevant national defense asset when they are operating from more ships than when they are operating from fewer ships, and the MLP + AFSB option puts Marines on well over 40 vessels that deploy frequently, vs less than 30 possible vessels that deploy less frequently when one picks the quality LPD-17 mod option.

The Brand New Approximately 300-Ship Shipbuilding Plan

The Navy has sent Congress the FY13 Shipbuilding plan. It begins with this letter:

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As required by section 231 of title 10, United States Code, I am forwarding the annual long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels. I certify that both the budget for Fiscal Year 2013 and the future-years defense program (FYDP) for Fiscal Years 13-17 provide a sufficient level of funding to procure the naval vessels specified by the plan on the schedule outlined therein.

The plan outlines the naval force structure requirements that are derived in response to the new set of strategic priorities and guidance contained in the recently released Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense; the construction plan necessary to meet these requirements; and the fiscal resources necessary to implement the plan. The plan is affordable within the FYDP but presents a resourcing challenge outside the FYDP largely due to investment requirements associated with the SSBN(X) program.

I look forward to working with you to achieve the requisite investments to safeguard our Nation's maritime strength and endurance.

Ashton Carter

Enclosure 1:
Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2013

cc:
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member

The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces has a hearing tomorrow at 10:00am that will discuss Oversight of U.S. Naval Vessel Acquisition Programs and Force Structure of the Department of the Navy in the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request. I am presuming the FY13 Shipbuilding Plan will be discussed at the hearing, and likely become publicly available from news websites that are not pay wall blocked shortly.

I only have a two thoughts before the hearing, and suspect this topic won't be going away anytime soon.

Thought One

The inherent flexibility of naval people and platforms and assets has been proven again and again. The ability of high-end assets to flex for a number of missions along the spectrum of operations has been a staple of deployments by carrier strike groups and their escorts and their air assets. What has not been proven is the ability of a global navy to use forces that are not dominant or not present overseas to deter challengers, deny regional aggressors, or reassure partners. When you are no longer present in one or two areas of vital national interest with dominant maritime forces, you are at the “tipping point.”

The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake?, CNA, March 1, 2024

Were you aware that the US Navy no longer needs to be present with ships in one or two areas of vital national interest to preserve Naval dominance and deter aggression? If you were unaware of this magic, as I am, then you are in luck - because the "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan actually makes the suggestion that the P-8 is sufficient maritime presence to preserve our vital national interests in places ships can't be due to insufficient numbers. There are, in my opinion, several very strange assumptions and arguments in the US Navy's new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan that argue against the necessity for ships. No, I am not kidding.

Ashton Carter is right on the money - the only parts of this plan worth staking a reputation on is Fiscal Year 2013 and the future-years defense program (FYDP) for Fiscal Years 13-17. It is remarkable that this administration implies any sort of emphasis towards seapower in Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (PDF) and follows up that not-really-a-strategic document with a revised shipbuilding plan that significantly reduces the construction of Navy ships being built from 45 to 31 in the FYDP.

It isn't the Republicans who undermine President Obama's new defense policy; the Obama administration has gone ahead and done that for the Republicans. I have no idea why.

In 2006 the 313-ship shipbuilding plan pushed the bulk of shipbuilding to reach the target of 313 ships to the right so that the Navy would be building at least 9 ships and as many as 13 ships a year starting in FY13 until about FY23. Now that FY13 has arrived, the Navy has developed a new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan that does exactly the same thing claiming exactly the same results in future years as the old plan. The "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan pushes the bulk of shipbuilding into the out years, and now the big ramp up in shipbuilding will now take place beginning in FY18 and go into the middle of next decade.

The Navy is now officially doing the same thing again and again with their shipbuilding plans in the 21st century and expecting everyone to believe the result will be different this time. The new plan - same as the old plan - is to meet a specific number of ships determined by requirement (313 or approximately 300) by loading all of the construction of the ships needed to meet that number in the budget years beyond the FYDP. If the new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan is doing exactly what failed in the old 313-ship shipbuilding plan, then how can the Navy claim to have a plan - or for that matter - how can the Navy claim to have a valid ship requirement that needs a plan if the Navy doesn't have a legitimate plan intended to meet that requirement?

The shipbuilding plans of the US Navy have become a fallacy of the highest order. The surface combatants and submarines the Navy claims it will build in higher numbers in the out years of the new plan are the next generation evolutions of current surface combatants and submarines, and those next-gen surface combatants and submarines will have additional requirements that will result in the platforms being even larger than they are today, and those platforms will each have a higher expected unit cost. Who exactly is supposed to legitimately believe the Navy can execute a plan that builds these larger, more expensive platforms in higher numbers as per the new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan? Congress is supposed to believe that? Do leaders in OPNAV honestly believe this plan can be executed?

This is the Tipping Point that CNA continuously warned everyone that was coming, and right now it is time for the CNO to step up because his Inflection Point moment has arrived. The evolution of the current force structure consisting of big deck aircraft carriers, big surface combatants, and big attack submarines results in each generation getting bigger and bigger as requirements are added to each new class of a vessel type, and as they grow they get more expensive. The big deck aircraft carrier, the big surface combatant, and the big submarine as vessel types have now evolved to the point where the Navy has published consecutive shipbuilding plans that push the construction of these vessels in high enough quantity to sustain force structure target numbers to beyond the FYDP - and only by pushing the construction of those ships in quantity beyond the FYDP can the Navy claim legitimacy for their plans to meet their own stated requirements. The shipbuilding plans themselves now represent a cycle of unrealistic execution of shipbuilding plans.

The Navy must break the cycle while they can, and the only way to do so is to fundamentally reevaluate the design of naval vessels of all types in a way that fields sufficient quantity of naval vessels for both presence and power projection while at the same time fielding sufficient combat capacity necessary to win wars. No class of ship - whether aircraft carrier, surface combatant, submarine, amphibious ship, or Littoral Combat Ship - should be immune to the fundamental reevaluation of force structure. This does not automatically mean there won't be big deck aircraft carriers, big surface combatants, or big submarines in the new force structure, but whether one is talking about existing force structure plans or new force structure plans - there will almost certainly be fewer of those vessels than what the "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan suggests.

This new shipbuilding plan - without a shadow of a doubt in my mind - represents the Navy has passed the Tipping Point. Thursday's hearing is useful for beginning the process of taking names regarding those who are in denial of this blatantly obvious and now officially documented reality. This shipbuilding plan is described as a shipbuilding plan for "approximately 300 ships," and Ashton Carter certifies only the realistic aspect of the plan which is the years represented in the FYDP (which can be examined in earlier released FY13 budget materials). The FYDP represents an average of 7.75 ships per year - more than half of which are small combatants or non-combatants - and using the realistic numbers of the FYDP the math suggests a future fleet of approximately 230 ships is the legitimate future of the Navy if the Navy stays on current course with force structure. That's 70 Navy ships below the stated requirement, and under the new "approximately 300-ship" shipbuilding plan it is a very safe bet that most of those 70 ships that will not be affordable in any future where this plan is followed would represent the surface ships and submarines that make up the combatant power side expected in the "approximately 300-ship" fleet.

Thought Two

Though the formal hierarchy is clear, the relative influence of the civilian leadership of the Pentagon vis--vis its most senior uniformed leaders has varied over time. During the 1990s, some observers were concerned about what they saw as the inappropriate assertiveness of uniformed members of the military on policy issues. By contrast, George W. Bush's first defense secretary, Rumsfeld, was dominant in shaping the president's defense polities and was known for having a directive and demanding leadership style toward military subordinates. Though the relationship varies, a key challenge - ensuring democratically appropriate and strategically effective civil-military relationships in which professional military leaders provide senior civilian policy makers with the best possible expert advice - will remain.

American National Security, By Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., Michael J. Meese, Suzanne C. Nielsen, James Schlesinger, JHU Press, Feb 20, 2024

The first thing that I realized when reading the new FY13 shipbuilding plan is that the Honorable Undersecretary of the Navy Bob Work wrote this plan himself, or at least most of it. Bob Work has a wealth of published reports, and I've read all of them that are public, and because of this I am very familiar with both his writing style and lexicon - both of which come jumping off the page as I read the new shipbuilding plan.

Externally both the folks in OPNAV and the folks in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy praise each other and claim to speak from the same sheet of paper in support of one another, but it is difficult for me to believe that any Admiral in the US Navy actually believes this shipbuilding plan has any legitimacy beyond the FYDP.

I'm not even convinced that Bob Work believes in the legitimacy of this shipbuilding plan beyond the FYDP, and I say that while betting $100 worth of beer at Sine's he wrote the thing himself. I can't explain why the shipbuilding plan is a month late nor why Bob Work wrote the shipbuilding plan himself. Is it unusual or common for a top level civilian in the Navy to personally write this document? I don't know.

Someone please explain to me how professional military leaders in the Navy can provide senior civilian policy makers in Congress with the best possible expert advice on this shipbuilding plan without either being critical of the plan, or being dishonest to Congress about the legitimacy of the plan beyond the FYDP. Is either the Honorable Sean Stackley or Vice Admiral Blake really naive enough to legitimately believe this is a realistic shipbuilding plan for approximately 300 ships of the types outlined in the plan?

I sincerely hope not. The hearing in the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces on Thursday has the potential to be a fascinating circus. Beware the clowns.

A 2012 DoD Definition of Redundancy

Happy New Year! I am not up on current events, so expect my posting over the next very many days to be of stuff that is not always fresh (as in current events), but fresh as in something I finally read. With a hat tip to Pete Speer for emailing me this article, lets start the 2012 conversation already!

So I'm reading this article by Bill Sweetman and Paul McLeary from Aviation Week dated Jan 6, 2012, and it starts off informative enough, but I have highlighted for the audience in bold where the discussion becomes something that is really enlightening, I think...

“We have run out of money, so now we must think,” remarked U.S. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Philip Breedlove during a presentation on the emerging Air/Sea Battle concept in July. It’s becoming a common saying. The military is not in its current predicament by accident. Poor performance—programs years or decades behind schedule, costing too much to acquire and costing far too much to operate—has helped drive almost every military in the world to make pious sounds about “doing more with less” while doing exactly the opposite.

For the first time in a decade, the Pentagon is going to have to budget, rather than just spend. This not only means some programs will have to be removed from the procurement ledger, but new weapons programs will have to cap development—and perhaps more importantly, sustainment costs—significantly.

At the Credit Suisse/Aviation Week 2011 Aerospace and Defense Conference in New York in December, Shay Assad, the Pentagon’s director of defense pricing and acquisition policy, tried to assuage some fears defense contractors have vocalized about their potential profits now that the Pentagon is going on a diet. Assad said the Pentagon is making an effort to use the promise of profitability “to motivate contractors to reduce their cost structures.” To track this effort the Defense Contract Management Agency is adding more than 350 experts in cost estimating: If costs can be more accurately predicted up front, everyone will enter an agreement with the same realistic expectations.

Wow! Where the hell is the pride in ones work? WHAT THE *^%*! That folks, is an issue of military integrity, and it highlights that the Pentagon is unable to do this work effectively themselves. Why? I think civilian and uniform leadership needs to answer that question, and I for one would love to hear the answer.

So the Pentagon apparently can't do this part of their job, but no worries, they will now go hire 350 private sector experts. The DoD might as well have hung a huge banner outside their building that reads...

"We suck at our jobs, so we're hiring others to do it for us!"

And yes, this is a military integrity issue. Why can't you do your job effectively? What prevents you from doing your job accurately? Did you or did you not get trained to do you job... at taxpayers expense? 350 private sector experts, all of which will be 100K+ jobs if they are actually "experts", means we need to spend at least $35 million to hire private sector experts to do the jobs of public sector employees that apparently can't do the jobs they were hired and trained to do. It's 2012, and money is tight. The nation can no longer afford ineffective civilian and military leadership doing contracting for the Defense Department.

This is, unquestionably, a leadership issue and one that raises serious questions about the integrity of the military. Accountability? Prove it. Based on everything in testimony and media reporting lately, the entire concept of 'accounting' in any context fled the DoD long ago.

....

By the way.... hey Bill, Paul, why the picture of the DDG-1000 with the article? Looks like an editorial mistake to me, because you highlighted a picture of one of the few good programs while discussing the problems other programs are having. Not cool boys, you guys are much smarter than that, unless the cheap shot at the Navy was intentional.

The Wednesday Quote

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said something interesting on Wednesday. From the transcript of his speech.

But in all seriousness, Ash’s experience and his strategic vision will be invaluable in this time, in particular, of fiscal challenge and as our military faces a turning point after a decade of war. As my Deputy, Ash serves as the Department’s Chief Management Officer, and is taking the lead on looking at wasteful spending, eliminating inefficiency, and finding ways to reduce costs while maintaining the finest military force on the face of the earth. He is also guiding the Department’s ongoing assessment of our current and future strategic needs, which will shape the kind of force we absolutely have to have for the challenges of today and the threats of tomorrow.

This is no easy challenge, as those of you that have worked in the Pentagon understand. There are a number of areas that you have to look at, and every area has implications in terms of the impact on national security. To be able to look at each of those areas, to look at the weapons systems, to look at the force structure, to look at the areas for efficiencies, to look at all of the various elements that are here, to be able to analyze them in terms of impact, understand those impacts, is absolutely essential if we’re to do the best possible job on behalf of the American people to be able to meet our fiscal responsibility, and yet also meet our responsibility to national security.

As a nation and as a Department, the challenges we face are absolutely enormous. But we also have great opportunity, and every challenge represents an important opportunity for the future - an opportunity to forge a better force for the future and an opportunity to modernize and strengthen our military. Ash’s experience, his intuition, and his ability to institute change will be essential to seizing these opportunities as we move the Department of Defense into the future.

I was under the impression Michèle Flournoy was leading "the Department’s ongoing assessment of our current and future strategic needs" but maybe not?

Thoughts?

The Commercial Argument

ADM Willard has his own set of talking points in the context of budget cuts, and they appear to make other arguments seem feeble in comparison.

“We feel strongly that the decisions that we make should be strategy-driven, so how do you think of our global commitments - strategically - and where the priorities ought to be placed?” said Willard, in an interview Monday at the Scripps Institute of Oceanography in San Diego during a short visit to the region. “I think Secretary Panetta is like-minded in this. He is reviewing this within the Washington environment. We are going to have those discussions.

“And in that debate, I think the Asia-Pacific region does very well, because of the economic importance that is obvious throughout the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. interest in the region very strong,” he said.

“I can’t imagine...the Asia-Pacific region wouldn’t hold high marks in terms of any global strategic view of where U.S. interests reside,” he added.

Some $5.3 trillion of commerce transits the waters of the South China region alone, and “1.2 (trillion) of that is U.S. annual trade,” Willard said. “This is the center of gravity for the global economy right now, and PACOM is there to protect it.”

The defense budget debate is ultimately about fixing our governments finances to get the economy moving. Nice to see a military leader talking apples and apples in this discussion.

Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts: The Verdict

Thanks to all those posting and voting in the Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts thread. A number of interesting recommendations ranging from reductions in strategic weapons systems to bayonets were discussed. Discerning any sort of consensus from the breadth of input there was difficult, but I’ll highlight a few themes:

1) Recommendations to pare back the LCS program or cut the class altogether received the most votes (again, this exercise was not intended to be a reliable survey; just an estimation of sentiment from the readers of this blog). Chuck Hill’s comments on an LCS alternative gained the most votes:

“Stop the LCS program at the 24 ships currently built, contracted or optioned--enough Boghammer-destroyers to meet any need.

Build a common hull for the remaining 31 LCS and 25 Coast Guard Offshore Patrol Cutters, Incorporate provision for at least one MH-60R and two UAS, a 5" Mk45 for NSFS, a towed array, and space for containerized mission modules.

Build down to price $250M each and incorporate diesel electric drive for fuel economy and long range; will also permit use of energy hungry weapons in the future."

Some of the LCS commentary overlapped in the Coast Guard realm, with El
Sid commenting , “$750m for a coastguard cutter is just getting ridiculous, the
USCG might be better off looking at something like the Floreal or BAM classes,
or the SIMSS concept recently discussed over at TD ."

2) Cancelling at least some some part of the F-35 program was also a popular choice. Cutting the A and C models has been previously mentioned on this blog by Rob Farley and me. The utility of the STOVL version to multiply the number of sea-based fixed-wing striking platforms using LHA/LHD ships seems to be a compelling argument.

3) Reductions in General/Flag officer staffs seem to be a perennial theme in these sorts of discussions. These reductions are already in progress, to a certain extent. Another factor to keep in mind is that service, combatant commander, and component staff sizes are somewhat determined from external requirements driven from political appointees and Congress. In my estimation, if cuts start at the top with OSD, other staff reductions will flow naturally.

Honorable mentions in the polling included reducing army airborne forces and other active duty combat brigades (and military bands); scaling back BMD, especially those forces in support of European allies; reforming DOD’s byzantine and inefficient procurement system, cutting or de-alerting SSBNs; and eliminating the “wars” (however one chooses to define and count those).

Decreases in existing and planned CVNs seemed to be a point of contention (no surprise there). Also controversial, but prescient, was this comment by “Nothing Much”:

“I think folks might be avoiding the elephant in the room... Defense can, if we let it, become a retirement and social services agency. American civilians will, in the near future, begin to experience a series of cuts in government services while their overall taxes will go up. There is no escaping this. If the military is going to remain a warfighting service it will have to track cuts to medical care, retirement, and other social services as those same services decline in the general American population. That's going to be rougher than any weapons program cut. However, it must be done.”

I did not by any means capture all of the thoughtful ideas in the above, and I encourage those interested to skim through the 100+ comments to find more insightful opinions.

Of course, the larger question in this debate is what percentage of impending federal budget cuts should fall on DOD? Commenter “J” noted historical budget trends when posting that “When defense gets anything less than 6% of GDP, they can pound sand and go squeeze savings out of the other 94%.” Once that strategic question is answered, the allocation of cuts within DOD among the services can be fairly decided.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts - update

There is still time to make your voice heard on the Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts post. So far, many thoughtful and interesting comments have been posted, with no shortage of discussion on specific platforms and programs. LCS and F-35 seem to be the hot topics. What about non-platform specific cuts? Are there some naval or military missions or capabilities that should be divested by DOD or can be filled in some other way? ‏ The “polling” will close on Sunday (or so) and I’ll post a compilation of the recommendations and how they fared sometime next week. (Please post on the original thread rather than replying to this one).

And really… can’t the “ditch the bands” idea get a few more votes?

Crowdsourcing Smart Defense Cuts

It’s inevitable that the Department of Defense (among other government agencies) will take significant funding cuts over at least the next few years. Therefore, thinking and discourse on maximizing joint capabilities while reducing cost to taxpayers is the order of the day.

Ideally, smart budget cuts should be connected to strategic security guidance, but history, especially recent history, has demonstrated that it is unlikely that sort of guidance will be provided. So we can expect decisions to be made in terms of many other factors, such as politics, personalities, and one would hope, an assessment of capabilities required to meet future warfighting needs. For example, in the latest edition of Proceedings, CAPT Tony Heimer (USN-retired), presents some compelling arguments for cutting the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) (USNI membership required), an offshoot of the MPF (Future) concept. CAPT Heimer notes that the Improved Navy Lighterage System can support the ship to shore logistics mission, while cutting the MLP program will result in an acquisition savings of $1.5 billion and total lifetime ownership cost of up to $6 billion.

Now it’s time for our readers to weigh in and give the thousands of others who read this blog, including many defense policy makers, their ideas. In the comments below, posters are invited to briefly identify which defense program, unit, mission, personnel specialty, etc. should be shed and why. If known, post the approximate amount of money that would be saved in cutting this particular budget item. Other readers should show their support to these ideas by “liking” the posted idea. In a few days, I’ll summarize the top rated recommended cuts, giving credit to the initial posters. Yes, this methodology is as scientific as Dancing With the Stars, but the results should also be interesting. Have at it.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

ALT POM Early Decommission Plans

Here come the cuts. Details from AOL Defense reporter Carlo Munoz.

Washington: Just as the Navy is planning to take on a larger strategic role in regional hot spots around the world, the service is considering massive fleet reductions -- including a two-year delay on its new aircraft carrier -- as part of its upcoming budget plan.

The Navy may cut nine cruisers and three amphibious ships as part of its soon-to-be released budget blueprint covering the next five fiscal years, sources say.

The Navy plans to deactivate four cruisers from the fleet in fiscal year 2013, with another five cruisers coming out of the fleet the next year, according to a preliminary version of the spending plan. The three amphibious landing ships will be deactivated along with the five cruisers.

He goes on to note the potential early retirement of USS George Washington (CVN 73) and shifting of aircraft construction to 7 years instead of 5 years. Very smart folks I have spoken to have noted that a shift to 7 year construction cycles for big deck aircraft carriers will result in either paying up to 25% more for aircraft carriers than we would under 5 year cycles, or loss of that capacity in industry. When you extend the time out on any construction project, you raise costs. Clearly this an accountants idea spawned from an accountant, not one from an engineer.

Getting back to the cruisers and amphibious ships, I thought I'd offer some additional details.

The FY13 ships are:

USS Normandy (CG-60)
USS Anzio (CG-68)
USS Vicksburg (CG-69)
USS Cape St. George (CG-71)

The FY14 ships are:

USS Princeton (CG-59)
USS Cowpens (CG-63)
USS Gettysburg (CG-64)
USS Chosin (CG-65)
USS Hué City (CG-66)

USS Whidbey Island (LSD-41)
USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43)
USS Tortuga (LSD-46)

You might look at this news and think - well, these are just plans, so it's nothing to concern us right now. Wrong. These are part of alternative plans now, and that has maintenance ramifications.

Title 10: 2244a. Equipment scheduled for retirement or disposal: limitation on expenditures for modifications

(a) Prohibition.— Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Secretary of a military department may not carry out a modification of an aircraft, weapon, vessel, or other item of equipment that the Secretary plans to retire or otherwise dispose of within five years after the date on which the modification, if carried out, would be completed.

(b) Exceptions.—

(1) Exception for below-threshold modifications.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a modification for which the cost is less than $100,000.

(2) Exception for transfer of reusable items of value.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a modification in a case in which—

(A) the reusable items of value, as determined by the Secretary, installed on the item of equipment as part of such modification will, upon the retirement or disposal of the item to be modified, be removed from such item of equipment, refurbished, and installed on another item of equipment; and

(B) the cost of such modification (including the cost of the removal and refurbishment of reusable items of value under subparagraph (A)) is less than $1,000,000.

(3) Exception for safety modifications.— The prohibition in subsection (a) does not apply to a safety modification.

(c) Waiver Authority.— The Secretary concerned may waive the prohibition in subsection (a) in the case of any modification otherwise subject to that subsection if the Secretary determines that carrying out the modification is in the national security interest of the United States. Whenever the Secretary issues such a waiver, the Secretary shall notify the congressional defense committees in writing.

USS George Washington (CVN 73) will likely get a waiver. Somehow I doubt these other ships will, which means several COs will not be getting that maintenance for a few months, or may be retiring their ships early. The Navy will retire oldest first to keep new construction, which is how the US Navy has handled every force reduction in their history.

One more thought. I look at this list and notice a few things. First, BMD capable and ships capable of BMD upgrades are on this cruiser list. The list basically cuts the one non-BMD cruiser at Pearl; cuts half the number of cruisers everywhere but San Diego; and only cuts two at San Diego. Randomly. The first cruisers to get modernization are not on the list, but they are also not BMD capable (the Block 2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, CG-52 through CG-58).

Just think it is interesting that of the 22 Cruisers, the Navy will keep the eight that cannot get BMD upgrades and only 5 Cruisers that can or already are BMD compatible. I don't see how this approach squares with the BMD requirement that is currently driving surface vessel construction plans.

Opportunity vs Catastrophe

To abuse a pun.... quite Frankly, Hoffman is making a lot of sense to me.

Only in Washington, D.C., could some of the cuts that are being contemplated — less than one percent between 2011 and 2012 — be called an “age of austerity,” said Frank G. Hoffman, director of the National Defense University Press.

Outside the Beltway, where people are living with 14 percent unemployment, this alarmist rhetoric would be laughable, he said. The facts are the facts, he added. “We are outspending the rest of the world on defense. We are outspending any combination of rivals by a factor of three. … We don’t need to spend more than we spent during the Cold War. I don’t see those threats out there,” he said. “We have to be honest about that.”

Even the worst-case scenario, which would call for defense budget reductions of 8-10 percent over the next decade, would be reasonable, he said. That is only half of what was trimmed in previous post-war military builddowns, he said.

While national security is a sacrosanct concern, it cannot be denied that it is contributing to the rising debt, Hoffman noted. “We borrow $200 billion a year for defense,” he said. “The idea that defense is immaterial to the deficit is something we have to be honest about. … Two trillion of our debt went into defense,” he said. “We are not in a crisis, we are not in an age of austerity.” What the nation is presented with is a “wonderful opportunity for strategic readjustment.”

Ok that pun was pretty horrible, but Frank can set me straight in person.

As I've been watching the defense budget battle unfold since early August, I note two distinct groups. There are those who see reduction in defense spending as an impending catastrophe, and those who see reduction in defense spending as an opportunity. That distinction is important, because I tend to find those who see an impending catastrophe have little or nothing to contribute to the strategic readjustment conversation, and those who see reduction in defense as an opportunity are almost entirely focused on the strategic readjustment part of the discussion. The impending catastrophe group is currently getting the most headlines, but the opportunity crowd is currently providing the more intelligent contributions worth consideration.

The impending catastrophe crowd producing scare material concerns me. For example, I have serious concerns regarding the House Armed Services Committee's recent reports on defense spending. When all they focus on is the impending catastrophe of cutting defense spending, the HASC gives the impression that are either ignoring or oblivious to the opportunities that are unique to their term at this time and place of their career now. Our leaders are theoretically elected to embrace opportunity when it is available, not ignore it.

Making difficult, important decisions that really matter and really makes a difference - that's hard work. I'm honestly skeptical if Congress is capable of that kind of hard work.

Jobs + Jobs - Jobs + Jobs - Jobs = Jobs - Jobs or Jobs + Jobs, Maybe

Loren Thompson is making sense with this.

An especially troubling aspect of the present situation is that the cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act to reduce deficits could grow bigger if the president’s jobs bill passes, because the special committee would need to find additional savings to cover the price-tag for its package of tax changes and targeted spending. So in the current environment where legislators are trying to cut deficits and stimulate the economy at the same time, the government could end up destroying many thousands of good jobs to create lots of not-so-good jobs in areas like construction. What kind of a tradeoff is that?

He goes on.

So let’s do the math. The number of jobs created by defense spending varies depending on the nature of the activity and how much each job pays, but it’s a safe bet that at least one direct job is created for every $200,000 in spending. Thus, the $100 billion in annual military spending cuts that might be spawned by deficit-control legislation potentially accounts for 500,000 direct jobs. But that’s just the beginning, because numerous additional jobs are created in retail, construction, education and other pursuits as defense workers spend their income. Analysts argue endlessly about what this economic multiplier effect might be, however a very conservative guess would be that each direct job leads to the creation of at least one indirect job (the real number is probably over twice that). So even a restrained analysis suggests that $100 billion in defense cuts will wipe out a million jobs.

This finding corresponds loosely with the fact that the U.S. gross domestic product of $15 trillion currently sustains about 140 million jobs. But you can find plenty of research outside the defense sector supporting the notion that each job resulting directly from government spending produces additional indirect employment. For instance, an analysis by Reid Cherlin in the September 11 issue of New York magazine estimated that if the Federal Highway Administration spent a billion dollars on repaving roads, that would create 9,536 construction jobs, 4,324 jobs in supporting industries, and 13,962 “induced” jobs — meaning jobs unrelated to the roadwork that nonetheless were made possible by the spending of people engaged in it. In other words, roughly half of the jobs created were indirect, a result of the economic multiplier effect from federal spending.

Since defense workers in both the public and private sectors usually make more money than people employed in the construction trades, their spending probably has a stronger impact on the rest of the economy. That is especially true of those engaged in developing and producing military technology, since U.S. combat systems are high-tech products that contribute positively to the balance of trade (America is the largest exporter of weapons in the world). As I noted in a recent commentary for Forbes, it appears the military accounts for over a tenth of all domestic manufacturing.

Loren Thompson doesn't suggest it, but defense advocates on Capitol Hill would be very wise to have the CBO score the impact of defense cuts to the job market. If the President's priority is truly jobs as he claims, then cutting defense is counterproductive towards that objective. I tend to think the better reason for cutting defense is as part of the solution to solving the national debt crisis and cutting government spending across the board, and not a jobs issue, but because the Budget Control Act of 2011 doesn't actually cut government spending (rather it pays for government spending at current levels of debt) - I don't see how defense budget cuts are really solving any of the economic problems the nation is facing right now, nor how the absence of a foreign policy discussion by the Obama administration is going to miraculously create a viable strategy in the DoD for the 21st century.

I will add this... the economic modifier for shipbuilding scores higher than most manufacturing industries in the US today. The reason is simple - most of the supply chain for shipbuilding is in the United States, while much of the supply chain for aircraft and automobiles is not, and that detail is often ignored when discussing economic modifiers for various manufacturing sectors. This is particularly true of automobiles where the direct economic spending impacts are high, but that high direct spending ends up overseas for parts.

Shipbuilding is always a good government investment when it comes to jobs, which is why I strongly believe the Obama administration really screwed up their stimulus spending choices. They should have invested in shipbuilding, starting with heavy investments early on with the US Coast Guard (Icebreakers and Cutters) and building up towards bigger investments in the Navy - specifically T-AKEs and Virginia class submarines, although LPD-17s would be useful and the MSC ships that made up the Sea Base would have been optimal from an economic stimulus point of view. What a fantastic failure of a missed opportunity considering that government spending would have contributed more to GDP and had far greater direct/indirect/induced spending impacts towards positive economic activity than the low-wage earning projects favored instead.

I for one would be very interested to see how the CBO scores the job loss of the $350 billion in defense cuts already made vs the job creation found in the Presidents $447 billion job plan, but I also hope the CBO looks at impacts of additional defense cuts including the Budget Control Act of 2011 automatic trigger cuts. Defense spending jobs typically mean higher wages but also favor higher education. Are we really about to replace those with lots of low wage earning jobs that require little education and call it progress? What are the probable comparative impacts on tax revenue when we trade lots of high income skilled labor jobs for a higher number of low income non-skilled labor jobs? It's a rhetorical question, unless you're CBO, but I think we all know the answer...

Something tells me the damage to jobs due to defense cuts is going to be a lot higher than people realize, and spell very bad news for the economy next year. Note to future political leaders, cut defense in the first year, not the last year, of your elected term - because it's about to suck being an incumbent.

The Four Panetta Priorities

At yesterday's DoD press conference, Secretary Panetta had the following comments on the budget.

Let me also, if I can, give you a quick update on the defense budget and where that stands at this point. As you know, the department has been undergoing a strategy-driven process to prepare to implement the more than 450 billion (dollars) in savings that it will be required to do over the next 10 years as a result of the debt limit agreement.

This review is still ongoing. No decisions have been made. But, I am committed to making these decisions based on the best advice that I receive from the service secretaries and from the service chiefs as well as the combatant commanders.

And I’ve made clear that I will be guided by the following principles: number one, that we must maintain the very best military in the world, a force capable of deterring conflict, projecting power and winning wars. We have been through a decade of war. And the result of that has been almost a doubling of the defense budget during that period.

Now I have to take on the responsibility of exercising fiscal responsibility based on doing our part to confront the deficit.

And I think this can be done by shaping -- using this as an opportunity to shape the very best defense we can for this country as we approach the next 10 years so that it -- we can effectively take on the challenges and threats in the world that we face.

Secondly, we must avoid a hollow force, and maintain a military that will always be ready, agile, deployable and capable.

Thirdly, we must take a balanced approach, and look at all areas of the budget for potential savings -- efficiencies that trim duplication and bureaucratic overhead, to improving competition, contracting procedures, management and the operations in investment programs, to tightening and reforming personnel costs and areas, to developing what will be a smaller, more agile and more flexible force for the future.

Finally, we cannot break faith with our men and women in uniform. A volunteer force is central to a strong military and is central to our future.

Achieving these savings will be very hard. This is not going to be an easy process. These involve tough decisions and tough trade- offs. While we will continue to focus on reducing overhead and duplication, make no mistake: These reductions will force us to take on greater risk in our mission to protect the country in time of war and in the face of growing security challenges.

My goal is to try to make sure that these risks are acceptable by making sure that we maintain a strong defense and preserve our ability to protect our core national security interests

Even as we take on our share of the country’s efforts to achieve fiscal discipline, we still face the potentially devastating mechanism known as sequester. So I’ve tried to make clear over the past month the roughly $1 trillion in cuts that would be forced by sequester would seriously weaken our military, and it would really make us unable to protect this nation from a range of security threats that we face. Since the cuts would have to be applied in equal percentages to every project area, we just simply could not avoid hollowing out the force. That will be the ultimate result if sequester goes into effect.

And the sequester will not only impact our military strength, I think it will impact our economic strength as well. Cancellation of weapon systems, construction projects, research activity would seriously cripple our industrial base, which would be unacceptable not only to me as Secretary of Defense but to our ability to be able to maintain the best defense system for the world.

While this budget environment presents some difficult choices for our armed forces, I believe that if we can avoid further cuts, we have a real opportunity here to set some priorities and make some hard choices needed to build a stronger force for the future and to keep faith with our men and women in uniform.

General Amos - Leading the Way For Seapower

The following memo dated September 12, 2024 is from General Amos to Secretary of Defense Panetta. A copy of the original letter can be found here as a Google Doc.

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Secretary Panetta, as we explore ways across the Department to adjust to a new period of considerable fiscal austerity, there emerges a clear imperative that our Nation retain a credible means of mitigating risk while we draw down the capabilities and capacities of our forces. Our Nation faces an uncertain future; we cannot predict where and when events may occur that might call us to respond to protect our citizens and our interests. There have always been times when events have compelled the United States to become involved, even when such involvement wasn't desired; there is little doubt that we will have do this again in the future. Complicating matters is the fact that since the 1990s, our nation has significantly reduced the number and size of our bases and stations around the world.

We are a maritime nation. Like so much of the world, we rely on the maritime commons for the exchange of commerce and ideas. Many depend on us to maintain freedom of movement on those commons; we continue to take that responsibility seriously. Your naval forces are the solution set to fulfilling our global maritime responsibilities.

Naval forces are not reliant on host nation support or permission; in the conduct of operations, they step lightly on our allies and host countries. With the increasing concentration of the world's population close to a coastline, the ability to operate simultaneously on the sea, ashore, and in the air, and to move seamlessly between these three domains represents the unique value of amphibious forces. Operating as a team, amphibious forces provide operational reach and agility, they "buy time" and decision space for our national leaders in time of crisis. They bolster diplomatic initiatives by means of their credible forward presence. Amphibious forces also provide the Nation with assured access for the joint force in a major contingency operation. Modem amphibious operations, like the TF-58 assault that seized Kandahar airport 450 miles inland in 2001 shortly after the 9/ 11 attacks, seek to avoid enemy strengths by exploiting gaps and weaknesses.

When the Nation pays the 'sticker price' for its Marines, it buys the ability to remain forward deployed and forward engaged to assure our partners, reinforce alliances, and build partner capacity. For 7.8% of the total DoD budget, our Nation gains the ability to respond to unexpected crises, from humanitarian disaster relief efforts, to non-combatant evacuation operations, to conduct counter-piracy operations, raids or strikes. That same force can quickly be reinforced to assure access anywhere in the world in the event of a major contingency; it can be dialed up or down like a rheostat to be relevant across the range of military operations. No other force possesses the flexibility to provide these capabilities and yet sustain itself logistically for significant periods of time, at a time and place of its choosing.

"Expeditionary" is not a bumper sticker to us, or a concept, it is a "state of conditioning" that Marines work hard to maintain. Given its mission to be the expeditionary force in readiness, a tiered readiness concept is not compatible with the Marine Corps' missions because its nondeployed units are often called upon to respond to unanticipated and varied crises on a moment's notice.

The Marine Corps fills a unique lane in the capability range of America's armed forces. A Middleweight Force, we are lighter than the Army, and heavier than SOF. The Corps is not a second land army. The Army is purpose-built for land campaigns and carries a heavier punch when it arrives, whereas the Marine Corps is an expeditionary force focused on coming from the sea with integrated aviation and logistics capabilities. The Marine Corps maintains the ability to contribute to land campaigns by leveraging or rapidly aggregating its capabilities and capacities. Similarly, Marine Corps and SOF roles are complementary, rather than redundant. Special Operation Forces contribute to the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts of the Combatant Commanders in numerous and specialized ways, but they are not a substitute for conventional forces with a broader range of capability and sustainability.

The Marine Corps was specifically directed by the 82nd Congress as the force intended to be "the most ready when the Nation is least ready." This expectation exists because of the costly lessons our nation learned during the Korean War when a lack of preparedness in the beginning stages of the conflict very nearly resulted in defeat. Because our Nation cannot afford to hold the entire joint force at such a high state of readiness, it has chosen to keep the Marines ready, and has often used them to plug the gaps during international crises, to respond when no other options were available.

Anecdotally, the American people believe that when a crisis emerges - Marines will be present and will "invariably tum in a performance that is dramatically and decisively successful - not most of the time, but always." They possess a heart-felt belief that the Marine Corps is good for the young men and women of our country. In their view, the Marines are extraordinarily adept at converting "un-oriented youths into proud, self-reliant stable citizens - citizens into whose hands the nation's affairs may be safely entrusted." An investment in the Marine Corps continues to be an investment in the character of the young people of our country.

Finally, in an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world, we must continue to provide the protection our Nation needs and to preserve our ability to do what we must as the world's only credible remaining super power. As we face inevitable difficult resource decisions, I believe that we must also consider how we can best mitigate the inherent risk of a reduced defense capacity...like an affordable insurance policy, Marine Corps and the Navy's amphibious forces, represent a very efficient and effective hedge against the Nation's most likely risks.

James F. Amos

I think this letter is fantastic, and might be the best case for Seapower made this year by someone in uniform. This letter is effective because it states the case for the Marine Corps by covering every base. When I read this letter I see two primary themes; value in the always austere Marine Corps and purpose of the ready Marine Corps.

Value in the Marine Corps

I think it's great how General Amos highlights the tremendous value of the Marine Corps in this letter. The letter makes a solid case that I believe the Marine Corps should do more often and with a great deal of pride - emphasize the Marine Corps as a valuable contributing service that has always been on an austere budget. OSD - which is made up almost entirely of joint staffs who combined as a joint fighting force is probably about as combat effective as the Libyan Rebel Army - has a budget about 1.5x the size of the Marine Corps, and outside their black budget the biggest thing they probably buy is a SAN farm. OK, maybe I'm exaggerating an analogy... a little, but most folks don't realize how much bang the nation gets for the buck with the Marine Corps today.

There is a growing perception in the public that somehow the Marine Corps is as messed up in acquisition as the rest of DoD, but I greatly admire the way the Marine Corps historically made acquisition choices. Today, after more than 5 decades, the Marines are still buying and flying the UH-1 Huey which was first introduced in 1959. After more than 4 decades, the Marines are still buying and flying an evolved version of the AH-1 Cobra which was first introduced in 1967. Next year the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) is going to be 40 years old, with no known replacement in sight. The CH-46 was first flown in 1964 - 47 years ago - and are still deploying the helicopter in Afghanistan and to sea. The AV-8 goes back to 1969, over 40 years ago, and yet today that's the VSTOL aircraft of the Marine Corps. Finally, the CH-53, which is being upgraded yet again to a new variant, has been in service for the USMC since 1966 - 45 years.

Think for a moment about these six major programs of the USMC; UH-1s, AH-1s, AAVs, CH-46s, AV-8s, and CH-53s; and look at what the Marines have done as the always austere force. Half (3) of the programs are currently undergoing modernization and will continue to operate for the Marine Corps well into the future - UH-1s, AH-1s, and CH-53s. These aircraft have histories well over 4 decades with at least a couple more decades of service in their future. There is no greater example of evolutionary approach to acquisition and getting the best value for investment than how the Marines continue to favor functional over revolutionary with these Vietnam era legends that still form the backbone of the vertical lift force in the Marine Corps in the 21st century.

But with the AAV, AV-8 and CH-46; all of which will serve more than half a century, the Marine Corps decided to evolve into the 21st century with intent to enhance those capabilities. Lets look at each of them one at a time.

The AAV was to be replaced by the EFV. In order to be an amphibious force, Marines have to get to shore with vehicles in order to move from the beach to their objective on land. The Marine Corps can do this today with LCUs or LCACs, but both ship-to-shore connectors require large amphibious ships which the Navy doesn't like to build. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps have an agreed requirement today for 38 amphibious ships, but both services also agreed to work with a fiscally restrained requirement of 33 amphibious ships. However, when the USS Cleveland (LPD 7) is retired later this month, there will only 28 amphibious ships - 5 less than the agreed to total. Furthermore, the Navy has told the Marine Corps they won't take their ships closer than 25nm of the shore because of threats in the 21st century littoral environment. That means it will take the 11 knot (on a good day) LCUs over 2 hours to get from ship to shore with Marines and equipment - which is plenty of time for the enemy to prepare to defend the beach. LCACs are better, but they can't carry as much as LCUs, so it takes more LCACs to deliver the same force or the LCACs have to make more trips in order to fully deliver a Marine Corps unit intact.

That means you have to have an Amphibious Assault Vehicle that can organically deploy from the ship to deliver Marine Corps combat power in a vehicle that can immediately move to an objective. Under the 25nm requirement imposed by the Navy on the Marine Corps, a company of Marines is expected to deploy by AAV which does a bit over 8 knots on a good day. That would mean that in an AAV, Marines can reliably expect to make it from ship-to-shore in a small box getting rocked by the seas somewhere between 2.5-4 hours, during which time the entire company of Marines would get sea sick and barf their breakfast, and once reaching the beach the Marines would then be expected to roll in with their limited combat power and no armor AAV and kick ass at top combat effectiveness. That meant the AAV replacement needed to be fast at sea, carry decent combat power, have better armor protection than the AAV, and meet a new requirement for IEDs. The result of those requirements is what today is called the EFV, which meets all of these requirements and more, but at somewhere near $16 million each to the only military service that has ever fully operated on a austere budget - the EFV became too expensive. The EFV is canceled, and no replacement has been found, yet.

The CH-46 replacement is a little different. The CH-46 is a medium lift helicopter and the backbone of the Marine Corps ship-to-shore air capability. The Marine Corps medium lift platform is expected to lift small vehicles, a decent number of Marines, and provide logistical support to Marines well inshore once Marines go ashore. The replacement chosen for CH-46 is the MV-22, which has a storied history that doesn't need to be relived in this space, but needless to say the MV-22 has had and is still jumping hurdles although after a few years of combat experience in Afghanistan - Marines seem to genuinely love the MV-22. The big capability upgrades the USMC was looking for with MV-22 were speed and range which allows the Navy to operate well offshore while Marines are rapidly moved to targets from greater range - including objectives well inland from the beach. Despite being a dumpster fire early in the programs development, the MV-22 is a huge success today and is only getting better with incremental improvements - and given the track record of the Marine Corps when it comes to incremental improvements - we can expect the MV-22 to evolve and get better and better for the next many decades. It is noteworthy that as recently as yesterday, the Senate Appropriations Committee fully funded the MV-22 in the FY12 mark - which in this budget climate is a major sign of the support the Marines must have for the MV-22 and the political support the Senate has for the MV-22.

Finally there is the F-35B. The Marines do need to replace the now dead line of AV-8Bs and I do agree with the Marine Corps that they need a VSTOL aircraft, even if I would like to see them experiment with larger UAVs on their big deck amphibious ships. Even on the global market, the choices for a VSTOL combat aircraft are slim - and today nothing comes close to matching the AV-8B as a VSTOL combat aircraft. In my opinion, the biggest problem for the F-35B is that it is a compromised design simply by being part of the dumpster fire we call the Joint Strike Fighter program. With that said, if* the Joint Strike Fighter ever does finally work in all three versions (* that is an enormous, ugly, and nearly unbelievable if), the same international flavored, compromised design for purposes of similarity to F-35A and F-35C of the F-35B does still have potential to be a huge success. It isn't that I am betting on the F-35B per se, rather that the Marine Corps has a track record of being a good bet to get the very most out of their platforms.

My main point is that the Marine Corps has a long history of being a great value for investment as well as getting the most value out of their investments - both in people and stuff. The reasons the Marine Corps went about upgrading towards the EFV, MV-22, and F-35B were valid reasons that can be articulated thus justified, and the Marines articulate and justify those reasons 100x better than I do. The ability to publicly state validity in program justification is very rare in the DoD these days, so for me anyway, it is hard for me to associate the legitimate perception of DoD waste with the Marine Corps even though they have three programs that do fit the description well - and in the case of the EFV - well enough to cancel the program.

Even as a point in time assessment though, I don't believe the value of the Marine Corps is diminished in any way with the acquisition problems represented by these three programs that upgrade three major core capabilities of the Marine Corps. After nearly half a century of evolution practices with the same equipment, the Marine Corps does have a legitimate case that they do need to evolve with new capabilities found in new equipment.

Purpose of the Marine Corps

The memo states out loud - We are a maritime nation - and immediately, but in this case briefly, discusses why the United States is a maritime nation. The memo makes the case why maritime forces are the legitimate solution to global, complicated problems. I truly believe this is an argument the maritime services can win right now if they were trying, but this is the first evidence I have seen that a uniformed leader in any of the maritime services is publicly making the case for seapower.

Unlike the Army and the Air Force, maritime forces are the one conventional military force in the DoD that also acts as an extension and force multiplier for all levels diplomacy. Whether it is humanitarian assistance and disaster response in peacetime or deterrence, escalation control, or non-combat evacuations in periods of contention; as a forward deployed always present force the maritime services provide political leaders with a comprehensive list of options for diplomatic action to various levels of crisis. The USN/USMC team has become particularly proficient in that regard with their medical diplomacy / soft power functions now fully integrated into ship rotations which allows the United States government to exercise national influence with maritime forces leveraging useful cooperation with allies towards providing access to immunization and other services to regions that otherwise lack access to or funding for such things. This type of soft power groundwork that builds goodwill in peacetime lays the foundation for advancing US interests in a specific region at a later time if necessary.

General Amos describes the Marine Corps as a Middleweight Force that is lighter than the Army but heavier than SOF. Amos describes the Marine Corps in the context of contributing to the Army or complimentary to SOF, but also makes the Marines case for the broader range of capabilities that the Marines provide in the service of our nations many missions and interests. The unique capability of the Marine Corps to logistically sustain a conventional military force for a range of operations as a first responder to an emergency is emphasized several times, something the Navy would also be wise to emphasize as well. Sustained forward presence allows maritime forces to be agile for operations during the early moments of crisis, and is a capability unique to seapower. The Marines have long described themselves as the nations 911 force, and while that slogan isn't used specifically in this letter, that message is outlined very well in detail.

Finally, the second to last paragraph of the letter is a brilliantly articulated, concise paragraph where the purpose of the Marine Corps as a national function translates into a benefit for American society. I spent some time yesterday reading about Dakota Meyer, the first living Marine since Vietnam to be awarded the Medal of Honor. This picture at the Small Wars Journal, where the now retired Marine Sgt is drinking a beer with the President is really a fantastic photograph. The article listed with the picture at the SWJ has a paragraph that says:

Because of Meyer’s humble example, children all across America will know that “no matter who you are or where you come from, you can do great things as a citizen and a member of the American family,” the president said.

When I first started writing this blog, some of my old veteran readers might recall that I used the third person plural a lot in posts. At that time I had the great pleasure of working side by side everyday with a retired Chief Petty Officer First Class and retired Sargent of the Marine Corps, both of whom were major contributors behind the scenes to the content in those early days. As a now former small business owner, I really can't stress enough the value of employment one finds in successful military veterans. My business is IT, and in my experience I found that the discipline and work ethic both men had as a product of their military service insured that no matter how complicated the problem or how stressful the crisis of the moment, both were reliable and had the necessary dedication to completion of the task at hand to always get the job done. Reliability is a value in business, and I find it is one of the most common work related attributes of successful military veterans in the private sector.

That second to last paragraph rings with a lot of truth to me, a civilian, because I have seen it in retired Marines I have worked with and have worked for me. As someone who works in a field with a lot of people of the younger generations, I think General Amos is spot on to emphasize the personal values that military service passes on to young people - because it is self-evident in the private sector when comparing civilian workers of similar age but very different backgrounds. As the military downsizes and a large number of people in military service transition to the civilian workforce, I think the emphasis of the values argument does nothing but help those coming from military service as they go out looking for a new career, but also helps educate those in the private sector regarding what to look for that distinguishes a retired member of the military from someone of similar age without that experience. In many ways that second to last paragraph is a small but clever way to associate the Marine Corps with the base of support for all military services - the American people.

This letter is a breath of fresh air, and represents the first real argument by any uniformed member of the military services of the purpose and value of a military service during the defense budget debate that really started with the Budget Control Act of August 2nd. I can't help but read this letter and wonder why Ray Mabus, Bob Work, or Admiral Roughead isn't out saying these same things. Ray Mabus is still out promoting green energy, which would be great if he was Secretary of Energy. Bob Work's only real public discussion recently described this budget period as "an exciting time" - which is a remarkably neutral statement given the context of the moment. After 10 years of war and at a time when ~50 OMB accountants are deciding the division budget for the next 10 years of national defense strategy with their add machine, it seems to me this is the time the military services should be making their case to the American people regarding their value to the nation - and how each service will contribute to the national defense of the nation. It is frustrating to watch the Navy avoid doing this necessary public argument with excuses like it's too early, but next year these people will avoid making that case with the excuse it's too late.

Wouldn't it be great if Admiral Roughead - who as a lame duck CNO can go out and say whatever he wants at this critical moment and not have to worry about career consequence - would go out an advocate the value of Seapower? What the CNO is not doing right now shines bright in stark contrast to what the SECDEF did when he was lame duck.

What do we make of the Navy leadership's apparent public surrender to unfolding current budget events in the context of General Amos's letter? The Navy's silence looks like quiet compliance to the process of 50 accountants writing the next decade of national security strategy for the DoD. Until this letter by General Amos, nobody in defense had made a cost/value defense for defense since the Budget Control Act was passed - nobody. Silent consent to the process gives the impression the nation has a super bloated Navy that can presumably absorb the budget cuts without any problem, after all, nobody in the Navy has actually publicly said at any point that budget cuts represent a problem.

The Marine Corps is always on an austere budget and doesn't have as much budget flexibility without taking a deep cut. I think that explains why a private letter to the SECDEF from General Amos gets out in the public - a clever way for the General to make the case for his Marines. Refreshing. Who would have thought it would be this hard for defense to make a public defense of defense? I have a theory...

In many ways, I believe this budget crisis for the DoD is going to distinguish the leaders from the managers. It is clear to me which description applies to General Amos.