CBO On Ballistic Missile Defense

On Wednesday Matthew S. Goldberg, CBO’s Acting Assistant Director of the National Security Division, testified before the House Budget Committee regarding the long-term implications of the fiscal year 2010 budget submission for the Department of Defense (DoD). The statement released with his testimony is here (PDF), and below is the CBO cost projections of the ballistic missile defense decision.

DoD’s Plans to Change Ground-Based Missile Defense Systems. In April 2009 the Secretary of Defense announced plans to freeze the current number of ground-based interceptors in Alaska as part of the ground-based midcourse missile defense system that is intended to defend the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks from North Korea or Iran. The plan would continue funding for research and development to improve the nation’s ability to defend against long-range ballistic missiles. DoD also announced plans to upgrade six Navy Aegis warships to perform the ballistic missile defense mission at a total cost of $200 million. Moreover, on September 17, 2009, President Obama announced his cancellation of the previous Administration’s plans to field a high-resolution tracking radar in the Czech Republic and to deploy 10 ground-based interceptor missiles in permanent silos in Poland. In its place, the President proposed a four-phase plan. Phase One would rely on Block IA of the SM-3 missile, which would be deployed on existing Aegis warships. Phase One also would base an AN/TPY-2 radar in Europe to provide early detection and tracking of ballistic missiles if launched toward the United States. Phase Two would entail both sea- and land-based deployment of a more capable Block IB version of the SM-3 missile; Phases Three and Four would involve Block IIA and Block IIB missiles that are still under development. (Each block represents a major upgrade in capability from its predecessor.)

In a report published in February 2009, CBO discussed three alternatives to the previous Administration’s plans for ballistic-missile defense in Europe. Two of the three are similar to the current Administration’s revised plans. One alternative would use SM-3 missiles deployed on Aegis warships operating at three locations around Europe, supported by two forward-based tracking radar stations; another alternative would rely on land-based SM-3 missiles operating from mobile launchers located at two U.S. bases in Europe (Ramstein Air Base in Germany and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey), supported by two transportable radar units. The Administration’s new plan blends elements of these two options and encompasses both sea- and land-based deployment of SM-3 missiles.

For a sea-based concept, maintaining continuous coverage in three locations would require a total of nine ships (for each ship deployed, another would be undergoing maintenance and a third would be in use for training). CBO viewed the fiscal year 2010 request for $200 million to convert six warships as a first installment in pursuing an approach of upgrading existing warships (or proposed warships that would have been built to perform other missions) to provide missile defense. That approach would reduce costs relative to procuring new ships but would forgo the possibility of deploying those ships to other locations in the world where they could perform other missions. Alternatively, if new ships are needed, an option would be to adapt littoral combat ships for the missile defense mission with a specially developed Aegis module consisting of a version of the AN/SPY-1 radar and vertical launch system cells; CBO has estimated those ships would cost $650 million each.

In January 2009 (on the basis of the 2009 FYDP), CBO projected that total investment costs for missile defense would be at least $10 billion per year, peaking at $17 billion in 2018; unbudgeted costs could add another $4 billion annually. The Secretary announced in April 2009 that the ABL program would be limited to a single aircraft, that no additional ground-based interceptors would be deployed in Alaska, and that the Multiple Kill Vehicle program would be terminated. With those and other changes, the 2010 request for the Missile Defense Agency would be $1.4 billion smaller than the amount provided in 2009. Incorporating those changes, CBO now projects that total investment costs for missile defense would average about $8 billion annually through 2028, peaking at about $10 billion in 2014. The total savings, averaging $2 billion per year, include the specific savings from restructuring the ABL program as described above.

Emelie Rutherford at Defense Daily (subscription only) has an article on the hearing, and picks up more details.

"So that's six out of what may ultimately be, in CBO's estimation, nine ships to do the mission," Goldberg said. "That's the lowest-cost way to do the mission...to take existing ships and convert them. The problem then is that you have nine ships dedicated to this mission, (they) can't do something else. That's the tradeoff."

Goldberg said if the Pentagon were to build nine new ships dedicated to the BMD mission, either DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers or Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) could be used.

Nine new DDG-51s could cost $19 billion. Taking nine LCSs and adding AN/SPY-1 radars and vertical launch-system cells would cost much less--approximately $9 billion, he said.

The Obama administration's new missile-defense plan brings some savings. Eliminating the previously planned radar in the Czech Republic and ground-based missile interceptors in Poland saves a total of $1.5 billion, Goldberg said. Yet he added the "biggest element that you put back in is the cost of your ships," which CBO estimates could run as high as $19 billion.

I have no feeling at all what the Obama administration is thinking about in regards to the next step with BMD, or if there even is a next step. I generally see the decisions made in ballistic missile defense so far as a step forward towards flexibility and better cost certainty, not to mention a transition towards functional systems instead of investment in futuristic systems. I also don't see any evidence more funding is coming to support the new ideas, but it is still early. It is interesting to see the CBO highlight the decisions so far have accounted for $2 billion in savings annually from FY11-FY28, roughly $36 billion.

Here is part of the story. Nine new DDG-51s could cost $19 billion, as CBO says, but the question is whether nine new DDG-51s can meet the obligations of the proposed plan. This is the plan as listed on the White House website:

• Phase One (in the 2011 timeframe) - Deploy current and proven missile defense systems available in the next two years, including the sea-based Aegis Weapon System, the SM-3 interceptor (Block IA), and sensors such as the forward-based Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system (AN/TPY-2), to address regional ballistic missile threats to Europe and our deployed personnel and their families;
• Phase Two (in the 2015 timeframe) - After appropriate testing, deploy a more capable version of the SM-3 interceptor (Block IB) in both sea- and land-based configurations, and more advanced sensors, to expand the defended area against short- and medium-range missile threats;
• Phase Three (in the 2018 timeframe) - After development and testing are complete, deploy the more advanced SM-3 Block IIA variant currently under development, to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missile threats; and
• Phase Four (in the 2020 timeframe) - After development and testing are complete, deploy the SM-3 Block IIB to help better cope with medium- and intermediate-range missiles and the potential future ICBM threat to the United States.

I do not believe that DDG-51s can meet the same capability requirements by 2020, so I think the Navy is going to need a new ship to do that. It comes down to power, for both radar and processing. There are several issues in play here.

The SM-3 is 21-inches in diameter and stands just over 21 feet tall, meaning it will only work on MK41 SL (Strike Length) VLS cells which is about 25 ft tall.. This brings up something interesting, because the brochures of the General Dynamics version of the Littoral Combat Ship Multi-Mission Combatant (PDF) was reported by DID to be outfitted with Strike Length VLS, while the Lockheed Martin version of the Littoral Combat Ship Multi-Mission Combatant (PDF) only comes with Tactical Length VLS, which are about 18.5 ft tall. The LCS option also requires reliance on external radar systems, as both LCS MMC versions use the SPY-F radar, unable to track ballistic missiles successfully for intercept.

I also wonder what CBO means by LCS AEGIS module, because that sounds like it can be swapped in and out. Somehow, I don't think that is what they meant. I think they meant AEGIS version of the LCS, or the LCS MMC.

The SM-3 Block IIB is brand new, so how can the CBO predict costs of something that doesn't exist? Suggesting cost savings on an non-existent defense system is the kind of math one can only find in government (businesses that do it go out of business). It is like giving me a quote for Cinderella's necklace or Snow Whites bracelet. The SM-3 Block IIB may be where the DoD replaces the unitary warhead with the Multiple Kill Vehicle warhead, which is great, but how the SM-3 Block IIB manages the potential future ICBM threat to the United States is a huge question mark. Up until now everyone has been saying that any interceptor the US Navy uses to intercept ICBMs will be too tall and/or wide for the MK41. The KEI, for example, was reportedly 40 inches in diameter and almost 39 feet in length.

What has changed to make the SM-3 of any known type capable of ICBM intercept? My guess, nothing. The only thing I can think of is the SM-3 Block IIB might be specific for working in the MK57, which can give the missile greater diameter and support the additional height/weight of a MKV warhead. Other than that, the Navy is going to need a new launcher to support a SM-3 IIB in 2020 capable of meeting the same capability projected for the GBI, which although unproven, was expected to reach IOC by 2015.

So what do we know? We know CBO expects the new ballistic missile defense program to save an average of $2 billion annually for the next 18 budget cycles. We know the two options examined include an option for nine new DDG-51s for AEGIS BMD at an estimated cost of $19 billion, and a LCS MMC option estimated at 9 hulls approaching $9 billion. With savings of up to $36 billion by FY 2028, there would still be cost savings, but whether capability is the same requires quite a bit of religion.

With $36 billion the Navy could set BMD for the next 40 years with political support. It could help pay for the CG(X) and new BMD radars that have been looked at. The money could be used to help upgrade the DDG-1000/CVN-21 X-Band radar systems (same radar on both ships) to integrate into the existing AEGIS BMD network. The money could be used to develop a baseline hull for both CG(X) and DDG(X) ships that streamline future BMD ship costs across the fleet. There is a lot that could be done with that kind of money.

What shouldn't be done is investment into more DDG-51s after FY 2015, if not sooner. If the Navy is going to build new ships for BMD, get ships with the new radars and enough power to do the complex calculations for BMD in real-time. I don't think the DDG-1000 hull is the answer, and I don't believe nuclear power is necessarily a requirement (although may be desirable), but both may be options worth looking at and learning from.

While I would like to see more information before making a judgment call, I think the idea of using a modified LCS MMC hull for BMD intercept is not a bad idea at all. For a long time the 21st century plan for Navy BMD was to get radar systems on capital ships, like aircraft carriers and cruisers, and use a bunch of smaller ships as distributed shooters to give greater protection over larger areas from ballistic missiles. The idea is still sound, but it only works if you get the radar side of the equation right first, and that has meant CG(X) for several years now.

A Less Efficient Conventional Propulsion System?

Can someone tell me what this means? From the Government Accountability Office report (PDF) comparing conventional and nuclear propulsion for the CG(X).

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require that the Navy (1) before finalizing Phase 2 of the Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces Analysis of Alternatives, include present value analysis, alternative fuel scenarios, and analysis on the effect that a less efficient conventional propulsion system has on the cost estimates and (2) include present value analysis and alternative fuel scenarios in any future analyses of the trade-off between conventional and nuclear propulsion.

What am I missing here? What is the purpose of comparing a less efficient conventional propulsion system? The report described the ships compared as:

In the CG(X) Analysis of Alternatives, the Navy identified six ship design concepts. These concepts include developing new designs as well as making modifications to previous hulls. For example, two concepts are based upon making modifications to the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer and another concept is based upon making modifications to the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. The ship design concepts vary in both capability, including the sensitivity of the radar and number of missile cells, and propulsion system. The variability is based on whether the concept uses a previous hull or is a new design. The Navy analyzed two new cruiser design concepts, one with a conventional propulsion system and one with a nuclear propulsion system. Both included the most sensitive radar and highest number of missile cells of all the concepts.

Are we led to believe the new conventional cruiser supposedly used a highly efficient propulsion system, and instead it should use a 'less efficient' propulsion system instead? If two of the concepts are based on the DDG-1000, and one is based on the DDG-51, why would the report recommend using a less efficient propulsion system than what already exists on these existing platforms?

This report reads like Greek to me (because it intentionally gives few details), so I ask the audience for assistance in translation.

Cruisers, Destroyers, and Questions...

Emelie Rutherford has a story out for Defense Daily (subscription only) titled Young: Study If DDG-1000 Hull Is Right For Future Cruiser discussing some comments made by John Young regarding the DDG-1000. This article is just loaded with good information, way too much to quote. Here are the key points listed broken down by category:

Destroyer Programs:

• The Navy had not crafted requirements spelling out the need for more than 64 DDG-51s
• The Navy estimates the new-production DDG-51s would be $2 billion hulls.
• * DefenseNews reports Young said DDG-1000 will "be a $2.5 billion hull"
• DDG-1001 and DDG-1002 will be a fixed-price incentive contract, which suggests some cost certainty for taxpayers (and BIW seems OK with this).
• Plans for future-surface combatant have gone nowhere

CG(X) Program:

• The CG(X) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is completed.
• Requirements work done by the Navy as part of an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the CG(X) cruiser shows that future ship having features of the DDG-1000 hull.
• CG(X) AoA showed the cruiser costing $6 billion.
• Studies have looked at the LPD-17 hull for the CG(X), because of the need for a ship with enough hull size, displacement, and power to accommodate the CG(X) radar.

It looks to me like the recent deal between the Pentagon, Navy, and industry to truncate the buy of DDG-1000s at three ships and build more DDG-51s is nothing more than a 2 year shipbuilding plan to stabilize shipbuilding for a few years, also known as buy time to make a decision. I'm not sure how stable this plan is for Mississippi though, at first glance, of the 3 DDG-1000s and 3 DDG-51s, 4 of those ships are being built at Bath Iron Works.

That raises the question, what don't we know about what will be built in Mississippi? Why would Gene Taylor (D-MS) celebrate this deal if his district does not appear to be getting more work? There has to be more to this, because even though LPD-17 is continuing, that work would be shared with Avondale. I also don't see a National Security Frigate option.

I think this LPD-17 hull version of the CG(X) is in play. There have been rumors of CG(X) being built in two versions, is that what is developing here? One version based on the LPD-17 hull built in Mississippi and one version based on the DDG-1000 hull built at Bath Iron Works?

Gates is punting the CG(X) issue to the QDR, which means the Navy has until the QDR to make the case that it should lead ballistic missile defense. The only way a $6 billion CG(X), or potentially 2 versions of the CG(X) will ever be built is if the Navy makes the case that naval ballistic missile defense is the best investment in the near term (what would amount to 13 years of shipbuildnig for the entire CG(X) program) than any alternative solutions over that period. With ballistic missile defense funding, a short build for $6 billion CG(X) LPD-17 hull versions and a larger build of DDG-1000 hull versions of CG(X) are a lot more affordable. I for one don't think the Navy understands strategic communications well enough to sell this, even though I think that argument is more easily made with the American people than you may assume.

If the Navy is looking at 2 versions of CG(X), the part of the whole mess that makes the least sense to me is restarting the DDG-51. Either the Navy does not need a CG(X) and builds more DDG-51s, or the Navy needs a CG(X) and doesn't build more DDG-51s. The grand plan as outlined by Gates calls for three DDG-51s, which will run at least $2 billion each to restart.

Why not just build a 4th DDG-1000 instead of a 3rd DDG-51? The 4 DDG-1000s can replace the 4 Iowa's and the naval gunfire support requirement is met.

Will there be more than the 3 proposed DDG-51s? If the answer is no, and the current requirement for DDG-51s is 64, build the 4th DDG-1000 instead of the 3rd DDG-51.

If the answer is yes, how many and under what requirement? Furthermore, why? How does the Navy justify the DDG-51 class serving until 2060 and beyond? How in the world will that system remain relevant over the first half of the 21st century when there is very little margin for growth left?

Are there any new ship designs planned? The lack of alternative designs for surface combatants looks to be part of the problem Congress has to deal with.

I look forward to seeing what the Navy intends to build in FY2012, because right now we have no idea what surface combatant shipbuilding looks like after FY2011.

Analysis of the Navy's FY 2010 Surface Combatant Options

In Chris Cavas's article the other day, he notes the Navy's FY10 30-year budget to include four major surface combatants: DDG-1000, DDG-51 Flight III, Future Surface Combatant, and CG(X).

These are my observations regarding what I think is going on.

It is important to remember the Navy has not received a top line budget figure (that we know of) from the new administration, so the FY 2010 30-year shipbuilding plan Chris Cavas is discussing in his Defense News article is a bookmark, nothing more than a Christmas list reflecting what the Navy would do if money existed for all items. I don't think it is inaccurate to suggest there appears to be a strategy behind the plan, but that strategy appears to me to be political.

When the Navy announced USS Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001) as the name of the second Zumwalt class, it left no doubt the Navy intends to build this ship. There is no chance in hell the Navy will dishonor him by not building this ship, regardless of the costs. I also don't believe the Navy is too concerned with the result of FY 2009 that partially funds DDG-1002, but I do not believe we will see DDG-1002 named until either late 2010 or sometime in 2011, nor do I believe we will ever see the ship built at all.

The Navy will build the first two DDG-1000s, regardless of cost, but will hold the money for DDG-1002 as long as possible as a safety net. While the Zumwalt class has no cost growth, and has a very mature design relative to when naval warships usually begin construction, there does appear to be a lot of concern the ship will be more expensive than estimated. This means the Navy will hold the funds for DDG-1002 and use them if necessary to complete the first two Zumwalts if cost growth occurs. The Navy intends to fight any additional funding for more Zumwalts.

In my opinion, building 2 is the right decision, and not building any more than two is also the right decision. No matter how hard I try to like this ship, it is a disaster of requirements planning and had no business ever being designed the way it was anyway. It is intellectually insulting to watch the Navy spend huge amounts of money for a 14,500 ton stealth hull, then design the vessel for optimal operations in a littoral environment which is also the most populated part of the sea, and then decide to make the main weapon system of this stealth littoral (star)ship Zumwalt the loudest naval gun developed since World War II. In my opinion, this is the kind of contradictory nonsense we see everywhere in the results of the SC-21 development process.

The LCS is another perfect example of these contradicting capabilities. Why in the world would someone think any ship should be emphasized for speed and space, when the result of filling space is to add weight that reduces the speed. We look very stupid to the rest of the world when the primary capabilities of our "21st century" warship designs are in direct contradiction of one another. I want to believe the Navy is smart enough not to buy into what is being sold here.

The final piece of the SC-21 program is the CG(X), what Chris Cavas notes is a 22,000 ton nuclear powered ballistic missile defense juggernaut. The Navy apparently intends to build 8 hulls, one every three years beginning in 2017. This ship makes no sense though, and appears to be included in the FY 2010 budget as a major budget distraction. Do the math, even assuming the Navy uses the LPD-17 hull and minimizes requirement creep to the minimum, with nuclear power this ship will run on average around 5 billion dollars per ship, roughly 1/2 the cost of a Ford class aircraft carrier.

It doesn't make any sense though, because ballistic missile defense requires more than one ship, a tracker and a shooter. Why in the world would the Navy build a 22,000 ton hull to be both tracker and shooter in one platform? If the Navy is serious about ballistic missile defense, and they appear to be serious enough about BMD to cancel major shipbuilding programs and inject a healthy dose of uncertainty into the shipbuilding sector, they will take a distributed network approach to shooters and trackers. The only reason the Navy would put a 22,000 ton nuclear powered BMD ship into the budget is to make a political point regarding the high cost of nuclear power, and to insure there is an easy target for the budget axe. Clearly the Navy has no intention to ever build this ship, which means its addition to the shipbuilding budget is for political purposes, not strategic purposes.

I believe Admiral Roughead is doing everything he can to kill all of SC-21, and after reading Gene Taylors announcement on Thursday I believe that includes the LCS. We have all seen this movie before, it was just last year out of nowhere members of the House came along and began questioning the DDG-1000 due to cost in the shipbuilding budget, and on Thursday Gene Taylor did it again, this time attacking the Littoral Combat Ship. He has an excellent case to make, lets review the history of this program.

• The first LCS, LCS-1 was funded in FY05 and was delivered September 18th, 2008.
• The second LCS, LCS-2 launched April 26th, 2008, and has yet to conduct sea trials yet.
• The third LCS, LCS-3 was canceled by the Navy in Apirl of 2007 after cost overruns.
• The fourth LCS, LCS-4 was canceled by the Navy in November of 2007 after cost overruns.
• The fifth and sixth LCS were canceled by the Navy in March 2007 so funds could be used to cover other program costs.
• The seventh LCS, LCS-5 ended up having its funds rescinded by Congress in September of 2008 as part of the FY09 defense appropriations act.
• The eighth and ninth LCS funded in the FY09 defense appropriations act are to be combined with any LCS purchased this year as part of a contract for 5 ships.

If the Navy buys no LCS in FY 2010, Congress can just rescind the funding from FY 2009, and five years later the Navy ends up with two single class LCS technology demonstrators, just like they end up with two DDG-1000 technology demonstrators. In other words, SC-21 goes down in history as the modern ABCD, but instead of a squadron of evolution or the "white squadron" we end up with the fleet of revolution, what I'd call the "black eye squadron" which ironically went full circle in its revolutionary approach only to slap the Navy in the face.

So if we are stopping the DDG-1000 at two ships, and the CG(X) has been gold plated to the point it will never be built in a period of tight budgets, and Gene Taylor is beginning a new crusade against a broken LCS ship concept... what will the Navy build?

In FY 2010 the Navy hopes to fund at least one DDG-51, and regardless of what John Young says the Navy most likely intends to build it exactly as Admiral McCullough told Congress, a Flight IIA design with AEGIS BMD additions, or what I am calling DDG-51 Flight III. The Navy would then build 2 of these Flight III ships in FY 2011. These three hulls would act as a cost certain bridge towards a Future Surface Combatant that may or may not be available by FY 2012. If it isn't ready, then the Navy will build more Flight III ships to fill the time delay.

Look, I know lots of people think the Navy intends to gold plate a DDG-51 Flight III, and yes John Young would like to see AMDR added, but I don't see that being where the Navy goes. Gates has made clear that 75% solutions are just fine, and no matter how you look at it, brand new DDG-51 Flight IIIs with SPY-1 and AEGIS BMD are the very best ships being built today anywhere in the world. SC-21 has made us look stupid, but we have such a lead over competitors our fallback position is still more advanced than anything being built by any competitors, so the Navy is smart to make use of our situation to get back on the right track.

In the meantime we do what must be done to move towards a future surface combatant, what I like to call CLG-9. Yes, it will be an evolved Burke hull, and from what I understand the Burke can evolve up to ~11,600 tons, and was originally going to be something like that back in the early 90s before the Navy decided otherwise, and went with what we call Flight IIA instead. The design has a ton of room for growth, the designs have been verified for exactly that for more than a decade, and it is not a terrible thing we are only now looking into options. I have no idea what it will be, and quite honestly, if it can be built well at a reasonable cost in good numbers I don't know that I care about the specific details, just as long as the intent is to evolve technology instead of revolutionize.

There are 18 FSCs in the budget, and I believe the Navy will be quite content when the CG(X) gets the budget axe and the money gets shifted for more than 18 FSCs. Either way the FSC allows the Navy to move forward at an evolutionary pace while fixing whatever processes helped develop the ridiculous, inconsistent, constantly contradictory requirements that resulted in the DDG-1000 and LCS platforms, and turned US Navy surface combatant development into the punchline of a really bad joke.

You thought FY 2009 was fun watching the DDG-1000 go down, FY 2010 is beginning to look from this section of the cheap seats to be an even wilder ride. BYOB.

The Navy's New Battleship Budget Plan

Yesterday I encouraged everyone to read the Chris Cavas article, a gold mine of public information that in one news article, can summarize virtually everything wrong with Navy shipbuilding. The John Young memo that has been leaked to the press has been getting a lot of attention, and now that we have reviewed the specific details of the memo, lets look at what we have learned. I should also mention that I have seen the FY 2010 30-year shipbuilding plan, so I will try to put into a generic context what the Navy is asking the Obama administration to approve as that administrations first shipbuilding plan, but we will come back and examine the specific platforms in more detail later.

Last week I posted on a new Heritage Foundation shipbuilding plan, and I decided it was better to let the comments handle it. Contributor Michael H. won comment of the day with his "Hey, Heritage Foundation! 1985 called and wants its force structure back!" comment. Very Funny.

I honestly thought the Heritage Foundation plan was a joke of a suggestion, but apparently I'm the one who is out of touch, and Heritage appears plugged right in.

Hidden in plain sight within Chris Cavas's article is the fact the Navy's FY10 budget plan will include 4 of the largest, most modern, most capable, most expensive battleships in the entire world. In FY 2010 alone, the Navy will be seeking money to complete the purchase of the third DDG-1000, a ship the Navy doesn't even want, and also seek both R&D and SCN funding for a brand new DDG-51 Flight III ship to be purchased in FY 2010, which the Navy does want.

The new plan will also include the previously mentioned Future Surface Combatant (FSC), also known as either DDG-51 Flight IV (or block 4) or CGL-9, that the Navy would begin purchasing in FY 2012. There are a total of 18 Future Surface Combatants in the Navy's 30 year plan. Finally, the FY 2010 shipbuilding plan includes an 8 ship class of 22,000 ton nuclear powered ballistic missile defense cruisers scheduled starting in 2017 to be built every 3 years over a period of 24 years, what some are calling the CG(X) or the CGN-42 class.

I will discuss each ship in detail in later discussions, but before going any further, can we just admire the state of shipbuilding for a second?

The first Navy budget under the Barack Obama administration, pending approval, is currently scheduled to include a new shipbuilding program of 4 of the largest, most expensive battleships in the world, and not only are none of these four specific classes currently under construction, but none of them have a completed design yet, including the Flight III for FY10 unless the Navy has already decided it will have the SPY-1 radar (which counters recent news reports). We'll cover every angle of that discussion in more detail in the future.

Of all the different ships in the Navy's FY10 shipbuilding budget, there are actually only 3 mature ship designs: the Virginia class submarine, the San Antonio class amphibious ship, and the Lewis and Clark dry cargo ship. The Ford class aircraft carrier is a new design, the America class LHA is a new design, the Independence class LCS is a new design, the Freedom class LCS is a new design, the Zumwalt class destroyer is a new design, the yet to be named JHSV is a new design, the DDG-51 Flight III for FY 2010-2011 is pending decisions prior to final design, the Future Surface Combatant will likely be a major evolution design of DDG-51 or DDG-1000, and the proposed 22,000 ton nuclear powered BMD cruiser is completely new.

You know all those Maritime Pre-Positioning ships discussed on whitehouse.gov? That includes new designs too.

This reflects the inability of naval leadership to set requirements. This reflects a long standing policy where accountability has not been a priority. This reflects an industry without enough oversight. This reflects weak political leadership willing to ignore deception and deceit. Let me explain that last point.

John Young should be hauled up in front of Congress and fired. Look, John Young was absolutely right to force the Navy to go through a requirements study process, but the rest of the memo should be raising serious questions in Congress.

The very intent of the memo, which comes from the top acquisition official in the Department of Defense, is a signed specific instruction to the Navy to intentionally 'pad' the budget of the DDG-1000 program with money from a completely new program with the specific intent to avoid a breach of Nunn-McCurdy. The net effect is, in its first year of construction the DDG-1000 could now potentially go over budget by several hundred million dollars and still not trigger a breach of Nunn-McCurdy, even though without this budget deception the program would be 89% over budget already, which amounts to several critical breaches of Nunn-McCurdy.

With the leak of this memo, all of our Congressmen and Senators must now intentionally look the other way, with both eyes shut and index fingers jammed into their ears, and ignore that the top DoD financial officer is intentionally padding the books to circumvent the law. How can anyone suggest a Senator or Congressman is serious about Defense Acquisition Reform when this kind of slight of hand, now in plain view for all to see, is going on from the top acquisition officer in Department of Defense?

Why would John Young do such a thing? When I read the memo, I admit being too caught up in the studies finally demanding we follow a requirements process that I completely missed why the Nunn-McCurdy breach matters. You see, John Young knows if there is a Nunn-McCurdy breach, it will require someone in the Navy to explain to Congress why the DDG-1000 platform is worth $6 billion a copy at a time when most of the SCN money is yet to be appropriated, and everybody but John Young is trying to kill the program.

John Young isn't protecting the Navy, and he most certainly isn't protecting the taxpayer, he is protecting his own reputation, because as one of the fathers of the DDG-1000 program he loses face if the DDG-1000 gets canceled on his watch as Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L. Thanks for protecting the taxpayers money Nero, in the meantime Rome is clearly burning.

Let no one suggest the Barack Obama administration will be soft on defense, because when the administrations first Navy budget could potentially include a new shipbuilding plan with FOUR of the most powerful surface combatants ever built in human history, it appears absolutely clear to me that the Obama Navy with John Young's pen signing checks with taxpayer money is prepared to defend every square inch of the oceans the US Navy sails from a potential future threat by China, not to mention invasion from outer space.

DDG 1000 Program Way Ahead

John Young has been sending out several memos lately, but it was a memo dated January 26th, 2009 titled "DDG 1000 Program Way Ahead" that set the Navy community on fire today. Geoff Fein of Defense Daily (subscription only) includes several details of the memo in his article, while Chris Cavas's article in Defense News is a fountain of youth of information that really expands the memo in a dozen directions. It will take a few posts on the blog to cover the various angles Chris Cavas packed into that article. If you read Chris Cavas's article please keep to the pace of the blog and don't get ahead of the discussion, details matter and I have more than he offered in that article, and that article is loaded with good information. We'll get to it, but first lets stick to the memo.

The 6 page John Young memo is rich in content so this will not be a short analysis. I apologize to novice Navy observers whom this analysis is not intended, but hopefully I keep it simple enough you can follow what is going on. It is also important to note this memo is marked "Pre-decisional" indicating things are subject to change. I think the memo will be reflected in FY10, because quite frankly while this is an advisory memo to the Navy, it is also marching orders with an implied threat that not following the advice will lead to more work for the Navy in FY10, and FY10 planning is already cut short on time with the top-down defense review being performed by the new administration.

According to the John Young memo, in FY10 the Navy will build 1 DDG-51 followed by 2 DDG-51s in FY11, all three expected to be DDG-51 Flight IIA models. These account for the only three DDG-51s Congress has currently authorized, and these 3 new ships will be included in the Selective Acquisition Reports for 2008 resulting in a new plan to build 65 DDG-51s total.

Starting in FY12, the Navy will begin buying a brand new surface combatant in a program being called "Future Surface Combatant" (FSC). The John Young memo covered by both news articles above is specific to how to treat this new Future Surface Combatant in the FY10 budget, and describes some clever maneuvering that is about a hell of a lot more than costs (which are confusing) although costs will certainly be what the media thinks is important. In the end, cost is actually the most expected and least interesting part of John Young's memo in my opinion.

DDG-1000

The DDG-1000 is facing a Nunn-McCurdy threshold as a result of being truncated at three ships. Essentially, while the program remains the only surface combatant in the Navy shipbuilding budget on cost and schedule, potentially a model program for costing and design maturity (an amazing quark of the moment not widely known), reducing the number of DDG-1000 hulls purchased from 7 ships to 3 ships means all the R&D costs now have to be equally divided among only 3 ships. All numbers below are in millions.

This adjusts the approved Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) from $3,154.790 to $5,963.567 per ship and the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) from $2,323.470 to 2,941.167 per ship. Essentially, PAUC is the average cost of a DDG-1000 when adding in R&D, while APUC is the average unit cost which goes up due to fewer hulls and loss of cost savings by building more ships. The PAUC increase results in the DDG-1000 costing 89.03% more, while the APUC increase results in the DDG-1000 costing 26.58% more. All of these cost increases are a direct result of truncating the program at three ships, even though the actual cost of the two DDG-1000 paid for (and one partially paid for) hasn't actually changed. By truncating the ship number from 7 to 3 and being unable to spread out those R&D costs or generate cost savings with more ships, the DDG-1000 has a Nunn-McCurdy breach with both APUC and PAUC, which is triggered when a program goes 15% over cost.

In order to avoid a Nunn-McCurdy breach threshold for DDG-1000, John Young is advising the Navy to put the new FSC program in with the DDG-1000 program. You can see the results by clicking the image of Table 2 of the memo above. As you can see, by adding the 6 FSCs with the 3 DDG-1000s, the PAUC of the 9 ships reduces from the $5,963.567 per unit to $3,403.756 per unit while the APUC changes from $2,941.167 per unit to $2,396.286 per unit (all figures in millions). While this still represents a cost increase for the DDG-1000 program, the PAUC increase is only 7.89% and the APUC increase is only 3.13%. The net effect of the FSC being a placeholder in the DDG-1000 budget prevents a Nunn-McCurdy breach for DDG-1000, and allows the Navy to move forward without all of the Congressional problems for the Navy and the new administration a Nunn-McCurdy breach comes with. The memo requires the Navy to provide revisions to the DDG-1000 acquisition strategy to describe the procurement strategy for the FY09 DDG-1000 that was only partially paid for.

New DDG-51 Flight IIAs

The Navy told Congress on in the July 31 House Armed Services Committee hearing that instead of building 7 DDG-1000s, the Navy planned to truncate the DDG-1000 line at 2 or 3 ships, and begin building DDG-51 Flight IIA baselines instead. Congress authorized only 3 more DDG-51s beginning in FY10 pending further review of the change, and ended up partially paying for a third DDG-1000 in FY2009.

The memo comes with strings attached regarding the three new DDG-51 ships. First, the Navy must update the DDG 51 acquisition strategy and submit it to USD(AT&L) for approval to describe the procurement strategy for the FY10 and FY11 DDG 51 ships. Second, a Program Decision Memorandum III directs the Navy with OSD office of Programs, Analysis and Evaluation and AT&L to assess the cost, schedule, and feasibility of outfitting the three FY10 and FY11 DDGs with required power generation and cooling capacity to support backfit of air and missile defense radar (AMDR) enhanced BMD capability. That study must be complete by March 1st, 2009.

The AMDR backfit study is a major element of this memo. The study will require the Navy to give an exact figure how much the real costs of a new DDG-51 Flight IIA with BMD will be, a figure no one has ever been able to accurately produce to date, and because this study must be completed by March 1st, 2009, it means the figure will be known before the Navy goes up to Capitol Hill, and btw Congress will know the exact cost too.

I believe that cost for AMDR backfit is going to surprise a hell of a lot of people. While I could be wrong, I believe John Young has decided to expose a hidden Navy cost secret regarding new DDG-51s and AEGIS BMD. Anyone who wants to comment on this issue needs to be very careful, because when I read "required power generation and cooling capacity" it reads to me like there is some classified information that needs not be leaked out in this blogs comments. We all know radar systems for BMD draw a hell of lot of power, and we also know that BMD on the Flight IIAs doesn't exist today. We will just leave it at that.

Future Surface Combatant

On July 31, the Navy told the House Armed Services Committee that the Navy intended to replace the 4 remaining DDG-1000s with 8 DDG-51 Flight IIA copies, no upgrades except the addition of BMD. I noted that signaled a retreat from the littorals, and the plans leaked in this memo confirm the retreat has a new shipbuilding strategy. The John Young memo represents the first public press regarding a new surface combatant program the Navy has been working on, suggesting that sometime since July the Navy decided against 8 new DDG-51 Flight IIA copies (with BMD) and instead decided to begin studies of a new warship perhaps based on an evolved DDG-51 design or the DDG-1000 hull form. The John Young memo outlines several requirements for the Future Surface Combatant.

The memo states the Navy will build 1 FSC in FY12, 2 FSCs in FY13, 1 FSC in FY14, and 2 FSCs in FY15 for a total of 6 between FY12-FY15. The expected average cost of the FSC is estimated at $2,148.433 million per unit, only slightly more than the average unit cost of the 3 additional DDG-51s but considerably less than the average of the three DDG-1000s.

According to the memo, the Joint Staff is requested to consider tasking the Navy to provide to the Joint Staff for validation a Capabilities Development Document (CDD) or Capabilities Production Document (CPD), as appropriate, for the Future Surface Combatant. The CDD or CPD should be ready for validation by the Joint Staff not later than September 30,2009.

Additionally, a technical and capabilities-based study comparing the feasibility and multi-mission capabilities of the DDG 51 and the DDG 1000 needs to be conducted to determine the appropriate baseline for the FSC. The study should conclude and a decision should be made prior to any future decision on any new radar system development that might be envisioned for the FSC. The timeline for the radar development places the FSC baseline decision in the mid-FY 2010 timeframe. The FSC CDD or CPD defines the requirements for the FSC for this study. The FSC Baseline Study must be concluded by December 30,2009.

I see the baseline study as a major part of this memo, because it means that by December 30, 2024 the Navy must conduct a study that compares the DDG-1000 and the DDG-51 side by side without bias towards a radar system that would eventually be put on either platform. That means the Navy is being forced to conduct a platform comparison requirements study that did not happen (that anyone is aware of or has been shown) when the Navy decided to truncate the DDG-1000 in favor of the DDG-51, and despite all the "common hull" speak everyone heard at SNA, expect the DDG-51 design used in the comparison to be an evolved Flight III version because it will have to be in order to reasonably be compared to DDG-1000. I will expand on this in a later post.

The memo states the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan should reflect that FSC requires study and should not conclude an outcome. That it needs to be in the 30-year shipbuilding plan is the signal that there are more FSCs in the 30 year plan beyond the 6 discussed in the memo through FY15, another key point that I will expand with details in a later post.

Finally, once the decision on exact capabilities for the FSC ships is determined, then adjustments will be made to funding, quantities, and budget representation, as needed. Any required Nunn-McCurdy actions will be taken at the time the FSC decision is finalized. In other words, all John Young is doing is delaying the Nunn-McCurdy breach by one year to give the Navy all of 2009 to study major surface combatant acquisition, making the FY11 budget (the first real Obama budget) the point where the Navy moves ahead on major surface combatants.

People can read this however they want, I have many more thoughts I'll write down as I dig into many details not contained in this analysis specific to the John Young memo, but I get a sense this is in part John Young signaling the new administration that he is capable of acquisition reform. Regardless of what one might think about the man or the plan, this has reset the Navy to square one in shipbuilding, allowing the new administration a clean slate to work with starting in FY12, the first year the FSC would begin being purchased.

It also immediately resets all of the requirements planning and forces the Navy to go through a justification process before deciding how to spend tens of billions of SCN funds. I give John Young a lot of credit here, he has represented the new administration very well by following through on a campaign promise to grab the reigns of the Navy acquisition system, under the threat of Nunn-McCurdy on DDG-1000 no less, forcing the Navy to go back and meet the requirements planning process for major surface combatant shipbuilding. Its a small step, and it looks like a Washington budget maneuver without all the study requirements and fine print, but with all the fine print it becomes a smart step in the right direction towards fixing out of control shipbuilding requirements which have led to major cost problems.

Report: More Amphibious Ships in New Shipbuilding Plan

The amphibious ship is the dreadnought of the modern era at sea, at least when looked at from the perspective of prestige globally and how virtually every major naval power is adding amphibious ships to its list of capabilities. Some have called the emerging 21st century era the Expeditionary era. While I don't think expeditionary warfare must mean amphibious warfare, the flexibility of amphibious ships in tackling modern maritime requirements is unmatched by other platforms, which is why I share the General's pause for optimism.

From Key To Future Seabasing Efforts Conway: Marines Need Amphibious Ships, Prepositioning Vessels by Zachary M. Peterson, Inside the Navy (subscription).

“There’s a new Navy shipbuilding program out there that I don’t think has been made public yet, so I won’t talk about it,” Conway told reporters Jan. 23 at a breakfast in Washington. “It gives me pause for optimism on the subject of amphibs.”

The commandant may have been referring to yet-to-be-released ship force structure numbers anticipated to include a higher number of amphibious ships. The numbers are expected in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard’s Naval Operations Concept, which was supposed to be released last year but has been held up due to the inclusion of the force structure numbers.

Marine and industry sources tell Inside the Navy an amphibious fleet larger than 33 vessels is expected in the document.

This move would put the future force structure of the US Navy into alignment with maritime strategy in my opinion, but it also means something has to give. If we give to amphibious ships, we take from somewhere else.

The most likely scenario is we reduce the number of nuclear aircraft carriers to at least 10, potentially fewer. The next most likely scenario is fewer submarines, which accepts risk at the high end of war. While submarines are smarter platforms for the future Navy than DDG-51s, more DDG-51s will win that debate.

We will have 62 DDG-51s for almost 2 more decades, the difference between 62 and 70 DDG-51s is purely an industrial consideration to the shipyards, not strategic to the Navy, so in keeping shipyards working it is not necessarily a bad thing. CG(X) is the most important ship in development, and someone in the Navy needs to be saying this as often as possible. We know it won't be built on the DDG-1000 hull, and we know it will probably use many technologies developed with DDG-1000. We also know CG(X) will be the centerpiece of the Navy's ballistic missile defense priority as we move into the 21st century. The more CG(X) is discussed, the better in my view.

The least likely scenario is the LCS buy is reduced from 55, although that would be where I would start cutting current plans. While the LCS is not a wasted effort, the platform has capabilities worth replacing the mine ships with even at a cost of $550 million. However, it doesn't solve many existing littoral warfare challenges even if others claim it does. We are still missing that small combatant, what I think should be ~600 tons and cost $100 million, a ship built to do the dirty work in the littoral.

Regardless, more amphibious ships is a great start. Using the Seapower 21 analogy from last night, the Navy has decided big surface combatants were a bad idea, and has gone with more amphibious ships (which can be big motherships) instead. This move is perfectly aligned with maritime strategy, and news worth being optimistic about in my opinion.

The New Shipbuilding Plan For Surface Combatants

Make no mistake, despite all the ink spilled over the DDG-1000 and Littoral Combat Ship, the most important surface combatant program is by far the CG(X). Intended to replace the 22 remaining Ticonderoga class cruisers currently active in service, the current CG(X) program of record calls for 19 replacements. Whether the Navy was going to reuse the DDG-1000 hull or not, this contract award was going to happen. Press Release:

Alion Science and Technology, an employee-owned technology solutions company, announced that it has been awarded a contract to support the Navy in managing the design and acquisition of the Navy’s next generation Guided Missile Cruiser, CG(X). The award, a delivery order under the NAVSEA SeaPort Enhanced (SeaPort-e) contract, has a potential value of $127.8 million over five years. The base year value is approximately $18.6 million.

CG(X) will be a highly capable major surface combatant tailored for joint air and missile defense and joint air control operations providing airspace dominance and protection to Joint forces operating in the Seabase. CG(X) will replace the U.S.S. Ticonderoga, CG 47 class AEGIS cruisers and improve the Fleet’s air and missile defense capabilities against advancing threats, particularly ballistic missiles.

According to an article by Zachary M. Peterson from September, the Navy submitted the first part of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to OSD that included a radar sensitivity analysis, number of missiles the ship will carry, and the various hull forms that will meet the requirements. The article went on to discuss when to expect to see the first CG(X) built.

“We don’t see [CG(X)] commencing within the current [budget plans through FY-15],” McCullough said last week. “It’s got to do with technology development of both the radars and propulsion; and to get the risk to moderate or below we don’t see how we can bring all those things together within” POM-10.

Interesting it mentions through FY-15, because as we look at the bigger picture, that would imply the shipbuilding plan that comes with POM-10 is going to have a different look for surface combatants.

A new InsideTheNavy article by Jason Sherman dated October 20th describes some of the considerations for the DDG-51 surface combatant construction. The title of the article, Navy Eyes Legal Step to Quash Competition For New Destroyers, certainly raises more questions regarding the industry favoritism issue I've been hearing quietly from a number of people, but as I'm seeing something else develop here. The article says:

The Navy’s fiscal year 2010 to 2015 investment plan, prepared this summer, includes funds to buy eight Arleigh Burke-class DDG-51s. The service plans to award six to General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works shipyard and two to Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s Ingalls yard as part of a new strategy to modernize the destroyer fleet in light of the decision to truncate the next-generation DDG-1000 program at three ships, according to internal Navy budget documents.

Normal acquisition regulations would require competing the new DDG-51 work, worth more than $16 billion.

However, the Navy’s general counsel, Frank Jimenez, has advised Navy Secretary Donald Winter of a legal device -- a “public interest determination and finding” -- that, if used, would permit the service to side-step normal acquisition rules and hand General Dynamics approximately 75 percent of the DDG-51 workload.

The article goes on to say a DDG-51 will be built at BIW in FY10, FY11, FY12, FY13, FY14, and FY15. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding’s Ingalls yard would build a DDG-51 in FY-11 and FY-13, which according to last years 5 year shipbuilding plan, would be the years the CG(X) would have previously been built. Sounds like favoritism for BIW right? Well, favoritism is the wrong word, this looks to me like the Navy taking control of surface combatant shipbuilding to insure the yards have ebough work as the Navy adjusts the current plan of record.

That is because Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding is going to find new work as well. The recently passed FY09 budget includes funding for two more LPD-17s to be funded in FY10 that will be built by NGSS, although those could be built at Avondale. Under the new plan, Ingalls would also get one LHA(R) in FY-11 and a second LHA(R) in FY-15. So how does this work out?

Well, the current DDG-1000 plan calls for either BIW or Ingalls to build at least %25 of each ship. Under this model, 4 of the ships would almost certainly have been built at BIW and 3 at Ingalls. So for the DDG-1000 plan, if in fact three ships get built (uh, we'll see), if BIWs builds two of the ships BIW will get about 58% while Ingalls will get about 42% of the DDG-1000 work.

That leaves the labor hours issue for the probably never to be built four ships DDG-1003 through DDG-1006. Ronald O'Rourke has done the labor hour math in this report (PDF).

Procuring roughly 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s through FY2013 would provide roughly as many shipyard labor hours as procuring ships 3 through 7 in the 7-ship DDG-1000 program of record.

Assigning 5.1 to 5.7 of those 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s to a shipyard would provide that shipyard with roughly as many shipyard labor hours as it would receive it were the primary yard for building ships 3, 5, and 7 in the 7-ship DDG-1000 program of record.

Assigning 4.2 to 4.6 of those 9.3 to 10.3 Flight IIA DDG-51s to a shipyard would provide that shipyard with roughly as many shipyard labor hours as it would receive it were the primary yard for building ships 4 and 6 in the 7-ship DDG-1000 program of record.

Applying the DDG-51 model as laid out in Jason Sherman's article, if the Navy builds 6 of the DDG-51s at BIW, then BIW is actually getting more work under the new plan than they would under the DDG-1000 plan. While Ingalls, building only 2 DDG-51s, would fall short between 2.2 and 2.6 DDG-51s, they will have the option of building 2 more LPD-17s and the guarentee of building 2 more LHA(R)s.

So what is the Navy wanting to do? The following best guess is based on some of the surface combatant changes announced.

In FY10 the Navy is looking to buy 1 SSN, 1 DDG-51, 3 LCS, 2 LPD-17s, 2 T-AKEs, and 1 JHSV.
In FY11 the Navy is looking to buy 2 SSN, 2 DDG-51, 3 LCS, 1 LHA(R), 1 MLP, and 1 JHSV
In FY12 the Navy is lookign to buy 2 SSN, 1 DDG-51, 4 LCS, 1 MLP, 1 JHSV, and 1 CVN'
In FY13 the Navy is looking to buy 2 SSN, 2 DDG-51, 6 LCS, 1 LMSR, and 1 JHSV
In FY14 the Navy is looking to buy 2 SSN, 1 DDG-51, 6 LCS, 1 MLP, and 1 JHSV
In FY15 the Navy is looking to buy 2 SSN, 1 DDG-51, 6 LCS, 1 LHA(R), 2 LMSR, and 1 JHSV

The current program of record includes a JCC(X) that would be built in FY12, but there has been no mention of that ship for a long time. With 2 LPD-17s funded for FY10, it is possible the LPD-17 line stays open and the JCC(X) could be build in FY12 based on that hull design, but that is just an observation. The current plan of record would call for 66 ships (1 being the JCC(X)), while the plan above would be 66 ships, and is missing the JCC(X).

Put another way, all this noise results in the addition of a single ship, IF the JCC(X) is still built in FY-12. All the while the DDG-51s will be more expensive, the LPD-17s will be more expensive, the LHA(R)s will be more expensive, and the LCS has become more expensive. Welcome to the shape of shipbuilding for the US Navy.

It May Sound Like Comedy, But It Shows Good Judgment

Chris Cavas probably had some fun writing this article, because it is one of those things he knows readers just shake their head after reading. The bulk of the article is discussing the current conference named "The Road to CG(X)". The conference is described as:

This conference will address the requirements and challenges associated with designing and building the Navy’s next-generation, multi-mission surface combatant. The CG(X) will leverage technologies proven by engineering development models for DDG 1000, and CG(X) will add capabilities for sea-based ballistic missile defense systems and higher power advanced sensors. Due to the need to provide high levels of power for sensors and weapons and target delivery, the CG(X) will require very highly capable electric power system. The conference will explore the issues involved with integrating these multiple advanced capabilities into the design and construction of modern warships while accommodating affordability and acquisition process imperatives. The conference will consider technical risk, cost and schedule mitigation approaches to support the CG(X) acquisition plan in line with the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.

Sounds awesome! We have high hopes for the CG(X), and can't wait to see what the Navy is thinking regarding the cruiser replacement program. However, as Chris Cavas is reporting, one topic off the agenda is... the CG(X).

Acknowledging that the Navy’s next-generation cruiser program is a “fairly controversial topic,” the service’s top shipbuilder warned attendees at an engineering conference not to expect too many details.

“We’re still in the early stages of development,” Vice Adm. Paul Sullivan, head of Naval Sea Systems Command, told a Crystal City, Va., audience Monday. “We’re not ready yet,” he said, “to discuss details” of the new cruiser, known as CG(X).

Sullivan provided the keynote address at the opening of a two-day conference sponsored by the American Society of Naval Engineers. The topic of the conference: “The Road to CG(X).”

Although the cruiser program “represents the very heart of the future surface Navy,” Sullivan repeatedly mentioned items that would not be discussed at the conference, including details of the super-secret Analysis of Alternatives for the ship, or discussions of the cruiser’s hull form, radar or missiles.

What!?! These guys should be pissed! The article goes on to highlight some comments by Ronald O'Rourke who weighs in a bit with his personal (not as a CRS employee, rather as a professional researcher and among our favorites) opinions regarding what this means. Essentially, Ron believes this is a sign the Navy has decided to wait for the next administration, and won't comment on new programs until then. While it is certainly comedy to hold a conference on the CG(X) and not discuss the CG(X), if we are thinking critically about this, we think waiting for the next administration before discussing details of the CG(X) is the right thing for the Navy to do.

There are a couple of different ways to clear the white board on shipbuilding, a process the Navy needs to do to build its credibility, and unless you want to go down the same route as the Air Force, and send some folks packing, the best way is to simply do nothing and wait for the next administration. With the CG(X) program specifically, this is a wise move. For best results, the DDG-1000 would get canned this fiscal year as well, allowing the Navy a much whiter board to work with for shipbuilding. That may or may not happen, but as long as we are thinking critically, we think it would help more than it would hurt.

There are two points here. First, the DDG-1000 and LCS represents the current direction of the Navy, and about the only aspect of the current shipbuilding budget that can be seriously adjusted to meet the requirements of the new maritime strategy. Fact of the matter is, if the House wins the current debate, and we hope they do, the Navy will be in position to buy a big mothership and small surface combatant to execute the maritime strategy over the next 3 decades. We have advocated this position from a strategic view of maritime strategy on the blog many times. Probably won't happen, but that doesn't mean it shouldn't.

For the CG(X) though, this program will happen no matter what else happens in shipbuilding, and no matter who is elected president. All that is yet to be decided are the details, several of which can swing in a number of directions depending upon who is elected the next president. Neither candidate has been asked, nor has weighed in (nor is likely to) regarding the fleet strategy for the future, so by saying nothing the Navy can claim under the next administration that they were part of the process for establishing the systems requirements... after all, with issues like ballistic missile defense focus, nuclear power, and hull form part of that discussion the next administration will probably have a say on the subject. The CG(X) represents a critical replacement program for current cruisers, and is about the only aspect of the shipbuilding budget over the next two decades that will not be cut.

While it is probably unpopular for the Navy to play the stall card regarding the CG(X) program, we think it makes a lot of sense. Introducing the program in the last few months of a lame duck presidency could potentially damage the long term viability of any decisions made regarding the CG(X) program. From our point of view, it is much smarter to wait and let the new administration weigh in to insure the CG(X) gets the political support it needs regarding the specific metrics that will define the platform.