When "I" or "We" Speak Clearly, and When "We" Don't

The following slides are from Document One - Maritime Strategy Presentation (for the Secretary of the Navy, 4, November 1982) that can be found in Newport Paper #33 U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (2008) (PDF).

If you take these slides and compare them to the second document in Newport Paper #33, The Maritime Strategy of 1984, you can almost match up everything in these slides to a section in the Maritime Strategy.

With history I enjoy the luxury of hindsight. As I was reading these slides, and various other documents associated with the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s,  I noted this particular maritime strategy was only tested once while the cold war was still hot - in the Persian Gulf in dealing with Iran in 1987-1988.

And ironically, everything the Navy discussed ahead of time was executed. The Maritime Strategy discussed protecting sea lines of communication for oil, and that happened. The maritime strategy of 1984 specifically discussed the Army having an essential role in the littorals, and it was US Army special forces aviation that was deployed to the Persian Gulf - off US Navy ships - to deal with Iran. For a maritime strategy written before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Navy was thinking about maritime strategy in a remarkably Joint context. It was also a global context.

The focus was clearly the Soviet Union, but the scope of strategy was global and while the maritime strategy was incredibly detailed on the main issues, it included general information related to all contingencies, and it was very specific in how it prioritized theaters, what responsibilities in each theater were, and how the Navy was going to execute political policy with naval power regionally within a global context. There wasn't room for buzzwords, because this was a serious strategy by serious people intended to be seriously executed by the United States Navy.

The US Navy is about to either finish or has already finished the rewrite of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which is in my opinion perhaps the least influential maritime strategy of any nation with a coastline in the 21st century. If you want to read a serious maritime strategy in the 21st century - read the English translation of virtually every nation in the Pacific that has written a maritime strategy over the last decade. I have admittedly not read them all, but I have had the brief on many of those documents, and serious people tend to speak seriously when they have something important to say.

The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower has almost nothing in common with today's US Navy, an organization that is being stretched to the limits to meet COCOM demands; a US Navy that is deployed for war in the Middle East; a US Navy that has been deployed again and again to conduct some form of combat operations throughout the rest of the Middle East and Africa since the day the maritime strategy was signed; and a US Navy that is involved in a major pivot to the Pacific specifically for the purposes of reassuring allies during the uncertainty associated with the rise of China, who hasn't exactly been making friendly relations with neighbors when it comes to maritime territories.

Explain why we need italics to emphasize statements like Seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow? The US Navy doesn't build a thing in the world, it insures access so that others build upon the peaceful prosperity the US Navy enables.

So here is my question. As it is completely impossible to develop anything similar to the first 12 slides shown above from the original Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, does anyone believe it will be possible to produce slides similar to that with the rewrite of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower? Here is what I think... if one can rewrite the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower based on the first 12 slides updated to the modern maritime challenges and environment the US Navy operates in today, the 13th and 14th slides become very easy to write, and the whole thing will actually sound like a strategy when it is done.

Except one thing... there is one challenge I am unsure anyone in the military can do well in the age of PowerPoint and groupthink, and it may in fact doom the effort of a rewrite the strategy regardless of content.

The Unclassified Maritime Strategy of 1986 - the Fifth document in Newport Paper #33 - which is really a collection of articles by the CNO, Commandant, and Secretary of the Navy; are written in first person singular and plural. I have read the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (PDF) many times, and there is something that always bugged me - for the most part; it is sometimes difficult to tell who exactly "we" is in that document. One thing that is clear as day though, "we" represented a lot of people and was not consistent. Depending upon what was being said, "we" might be the Navy, "we" might be America, and "we" might be some military or political entity that remains undefined. I linked the document, so go back and read about what "we" were saying - and maybe like me you might ask yourself who the hell "we" are.

The point is, "we" was a product of groupthink and committee that lacked clear definition, rather than the "we" that carries with it a personal touch. In 1986, "we" were Admiral James Watkins, General P.X. Kelley, and Secretary John Lehman, Jr., and the reader easily understood when "we" meant a service, because the word "I" was used intentionally in the articles when talking about what a person thought.

In 2007 "we" didn't sound anything like General Conway, Admiral Roughead, or Admiral Allen. In 2013 or 2014, or whenever this new rewrite of the Maritime Strategy comes about, my hope is that who is talking and what "we" are saying is clear to the reader - and if "we" can't produce something similar to those 12 slides highlighted above, then maybe "we" don't actually have anything important to say.

The Growth and the Leap Ahead

 I like this slide, but I keep thinking this slide needs to be associated with a slide that details what kind of ships the US Navy is buying through the years.

In FY2012 numbers, the FY14 budget is around $150 billion, which can be compared with the green number.

The Naval Strike Warfare Center ("Strike U") is probably the most important major initiative in the 1980s, because in 1983 it is legitimate to say naval aviation was terrible at actually hitting targets. Following the embarrassment in Lebanon, strike warfare in naval aviation reoriented itself much in the same way Top Gun reoriented intercept.

This increase in naval aviation strike efficiency combined with the addition of long range cruise missiles on both ships and submarines had an effect that was greater than the naval buildup in the 1980s, it increased the lethality at range of each platform. By 1989 not only was the US Navy fielding 14 CV/CVNs, 4 Battleships, over 100 cruisers and destroyers, and 99 submarines; but each ship was increasingly more capable. The ultimate effect of the naval buildup of the 1980s wasn't simply the expanded growth of the fleet, but in every category of naval power the force was extending the gap separating the capability of US naval power and naval power throughout the rest of the world.

It is simplistic to focus on the raw numbers of fleet size when looking at the 1980s when measuring naval power of the United States relative to the world. It is more important to focus on the elements within each community that increased capabilities relative to the world. Technology was only a small part of the story, the increased emphasis on quality training for the all-volunteer force was at least as important as technology was in extending the gap between what US naval forces were capable of and what competitors were capable of.

Three Theaters Shape Context

There was one area of the CNA study related to the 1970s that I found lacking, and that was how the political uses of of United States naval power in the Mediterranean Sea shaped opinions inside the US Navy and how the US Navy viewed the world outside of the Korean and Vietnam wars. It is very easy to get sucked into the Korean War followed by the Vietnam War and note how carrier aviation and naval support of Marines in both conflicts shaped the perspective of naval leaders, but I would argue you can only reconcile naval strategy in the cold war leading into the 1980s by studying the three major theaters and what they represented.

The Atlantic

Once upon a time the nuclear threat was the dominant military discussion in the DoD. As someone whose only up close and personal experience with the cold war was watching Pink Floyd at Brandenburg Gate in July of 1990 at 14 years old... clearly I struggle to relate to the time period and threat of nuclear war. I read about it, I study it, I know the stories, but I simply cannot relate.

Naval power in the Atlantic for nearly the entirety of the cold war was about maintaining a balance of power for nuclear war. The expected use of tactical nuclear weapons and the various kinds of nuclear weapons revealed during this period speaks to how virtually all strategic planning in the North Atlantic was probably unrealistic, because if nuclear war broke out there would be no supply from the US to Europe, the US would be too busy picking up the pieces of a nuclear strike. The primary mission was really the only mission that mattered - keeping track of Soviet ballistic missile submarines. I have no sense for how effective the US may or may not have been in actually protecting the US from that threat, but the all nuclear powered submarine force of today is a direct product of developing the deterrence regime underwater necessary to protect the United States from nuclear attack.

That Hymen Rickover experimented with nuclear power on aircraft carriers and surface combatants was part of the innovation process, and like all true innovation some of it didn't quite work out. Ultimately nuclear power worked for aircraft carriers and submarines, but not so much for everything else. The Atlantic theater throughout the cold war is primarily about strategic deterrence where the US Navy was heavily engaged in a sea control and sea denial campaign against the Soviet Union, specifically the US Navy tracked and monitored Soviet submarines.

The Pacific

The Korean War and the Vietnam War confirm what has been said of naval power since the cold war, command of the global commons has for the most part been conceded to the US Navy since 1945. In both wars the US Navy basically operated as they pleased off shore feeding aircraft into the theater of war operations, and at no point were aircraft carriers ever considered under legitimate threat.

Consider how completely different the experiences of Vietnam were for Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Holloway, both CNOs - back to back even. Admiral Zumwalt fought a violent green and brown water war attempting to control inland waterways and littorals with an Army of sailors, while Admiral Holloway and the rest of big Navy sailed around Yankee Station and Dixie Station where ships sailed as they pleased rarely encountering a legitimate threat. The burden of danger for big Navy was entirely on the shoulders of airmen flying sorties in support of the war, a burden of danger sailors in big Navy never faced.

The Navy has been organized for projecting power in uncontested seas in the Pacific since 1945. The question facing navy planners today, indeed the reason for Air Sea Battle, is to ask difficult questions of whether the US Navy that has been organized around aircraft carriers since 1945 is prepared for an emerging maritime environment where the seas are contested. Beyond tailing a submarine every now and then, the US Navy has not needed sea control capabilities in the Pacific for almost 70 years. That inexperience suggests to me it is hard to believe the US Navy is very good at sea control today.

The Mediterranean Sea

To me, everything about who the US Navy is today can be found in studying the political use of naval power in the Mediterranean Sea since 1945.

• In April 1946 the US supported Turkey to deter the USSR. We sent a battleship.
• In July 1946 the US Navy operated in the Adriatic Sea to deter Yugoslavia and Italy from hostilities.
• In September 1946 the US Navy deployed to Greece in support of the Greek government, and continued that support for Greece at sea through 1949 to deter Soviet influence.
• In May 1956 US naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med in support of Jordon to deter Egypt.
• In October-November 1956 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med in support of Israel, France, and the U.K. and to deter Soviet meddling.
• In April 1957 naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in support of Jordon and to deter Egypt.
• In May 1958 naval forces deployed off the shores of Lebanon in support of Lebanese politics, trying to deter Egypt.
• In August of 1958 naval forces deployed to support Jordon and deter the Soviets.
• In April 1963 naval forces against deployed to support Jordon, but this time to deter Egypt.
• In June 1967 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med to deter the Soviet Union from engaging in the regional conflict.
• In September 1970 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med to coerce Syria and deter Soviet influence, while supporting Jordon.
• In October 1973 naval forces against deployed to the Eastern Med to deter the Soviet Union from engaging in the regional conflict.

The United States maintained between two and four aircraft carriers at all times in the Mediterranean Sea throughout the entirety of the cold war. The 6th Fleets job was to protect Europe's southern flank but project American power into North Africa and the Middle East.

Strategically, the United States Navy enjoyed freedom to maneuver in the Mediterranean Sea, because there were very few ways to see how the Russians would attack the US without getting nuked. This gave the US Navy in the Mediterranean Sea tremendous flexibility to engage with partners and deter aggression throughout the region.

If one did not believe that interests in the Mediterranean Sea justified nuclear war, and it is clear that neither the US nor Russia ever believed that,  then influence in the Mediterranean Sea was determined almost entirely by naval presence and the threat of credible combat power. All indications are the Soviets accepted the balance and understood that naval presence was the essential piece to influence and power in the region, but the Soviet Union fell apart before the ships that would provide vital naval presence were built.

I note this because it would appear the Russians remember well the lessons of the cold war. It was recently reported the Russians are sending their aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean Sea in support of Syria. Hard to see a scenario where the US gets involved in Syria when the Russians are cruising a large deck aircraft carrier with escorts off the Syrian coast. The Russian carrier deployment schedule for later in 2013 is a vivid reminder of how influential presence can be in supporting allies or how armed suasion can influence competitors.

It seems to me that the CNA study could have done a better job focusing on the three primary theaters in the 1970s, particularly operations in the Mediterranean Sea, but simply how each theater was different but each theater shaped the context by which naval leaders were looking at the world. In my opinion this was something Admiral Holloway did very well in his book Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation, using personal stories to explain how the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters shaped his views. Another excellent book that covers much of this is The Political Uses of Sea Power by Professor Edward Luttwak. His follow up Strategy and History, Collected Essays, Volume 2 is easily one of my favorite book of all time.

Each theater contributed towards the strategic deterrence, naval presence, power projection, and sea control strategic framework that was developed at the time. It is noteworthy that as the Navy moved into the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s as the Navy became less involved in the historic naval strategic missions in the Mediterranean and Atlantic theaters, the Navy also put less emphasis in strategy on the traditional naval missions associated with those theaters.

1970s: Evolution

Slides from Strategic Concepts of the US Navy under CNO Holloway.

Over the course of his career as a flag officer, Holloway consolidated the air wing into one multi-purpose model and consolidated aircraft carriers to the big deck, removing the smaller carriers from the fleet as a cost saving effort. CNO Holloway is why the United States Navy has one type of aircraft carrier today, CVNs, and was who began the process of making all carrier air wings of standard configuration. This consolidation of CVNs and CVWs has given naval aviation remarkable efficiency and has saved the Navy a lot of money in a post cold war world.

Nothing can be said here that isn't said better in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John Hattendorf (2007) (PDF)

There are plenty more slides available in The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts and U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents that add significant detail to the ones I have cherry picked.

It is noteworthy The Future of U.S. Sea Power influenced the Carter administration, not aligned when written but influential over time. This upward push towards attempting to influence administration thinking was tried with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, and wasn't anywhere near as successful.

Note also how The Future of US Sea Power favors quality platforms over quantity. That's pretty much the story of US Navy fleet design through today. But something has changed from then and now. I am not sure the US Navy today thinks in terms of offensive ops/systems and defensive ops/systems anymore in force design. I think part of that is because seas today are not contested, and haven't been for many decades. I think another part of that is that the Navy looks at information capabilities as an important offensive function in the 21st century, and it counts ISR as an offensive function.

Remembering a Time When CNO's Championed Maritime Strategy...

When I designed the logo for Information Dissemination, the graphic above was my inspiration. Many probably could have guessed that. Originally, I tried to write Sea Control, Naval Presence, and Projection of Power on the arrows in the Information Dissemination logo. It was ugly, and in the end I went a different direction. For those who don't know, this graphic was first produced (or at least the only place I have ever seen it) in Missions of the U.S. Navy written by Stansfield Turner in the Mar-Apr 1974 edition of the Naval War College Review (PDF). Missions of the U.S. Navy is my favorite article published by the Naval War College Review during the cold war, and if you have never read it I highly encourage you to do so.

It is so good in fact that you can download it in three different places on the Naval War College website. The link above is a copy of the original full Mar-Apr 1974 edition of the Naval War College Review. It was reprinted in full again in the Winter 1998 edition of the Naval War College Review (PDF). Finally, even though the link is broken in the Newport Papers section of their website, John Hattendor's brilliant assembly of 1970s publications in Newport Paper #30 related to the work of Peter Swartz can be downloaded by direct link: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, Selected Documents (PDF).

But before Stansfield Turner wrote Missions of the U.S. Navy in 1974, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt became CNO in 1970 and went right to work, and within three months he had personally been heavily involved in producing the first of 5 major documents we will look at: Project SIXTY.

Whenever I study naval history of a time period, as I did with this particular Capstone Strategies examination when putting together the content for this month, I always start with people first. The 1970s, to me, is about 5 very strong leaders who came from the greatest generation. All five had a unique style of leadership, were well spoken in public, were leaders both in thought and deed within their own communities in the Navy, and what makes them completely foreign to naval leaders today - they competed with each other publicly - respectful of one another in disagreement - to the benefit of the Navy. None of them were afraid to speak their mind, and that did bring controversy, but it was always personal controversy as opposed to the kind of controversy that was detrimental to the Navy as an organization.

I am speaking specifically about Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, Admiral James Holloway, Admiral Thomas Hayward, and Admiral Hyman Rickover. The most remarkable thing to me though is that Zumwalt, Holloway, and Hayward were CNOs, leading from the front with the best ideas of the day.

These were hugely influential debates and discussions often framed in competition with one another in public even though they were complimentary capabilities of naval power. CNO Elmo Zumwalt is the champion of naval presence and sea control. His Vice CNO - who also became the next CNO - James Holloway is the champion of power projection. Hymen Rickover is the champion of strategic deterrence in his role as nuclear power czar. Stansfield Turner is President of the Naval War College and ties Sea Control, Naval Presence, Strategic Deterrence, and Power Projection together in a strategic concept that aligns policy with strategy with tactics.

At the end of the decade, at the end of CNO Holloway's time as CNO, the Navy has built up a collection of study groups engaged in the development of Sea Plan 2000 and various other force structure studies. These groups have people you may have heard of, Captain John McCain, a young Marine LT named Bing West, oh and there was this 32 year old Navy consultant, LCDR in the Navy Reserve, or Corporation President - however you'd like to describe him - named John Lehman designing the future force structure of the Navy. These activities were being developed with Admiral Hayward, who subsequently followed Holloway as CNO in July 1978.

CNO Hayward organized the concepts of CNO Zumwalt and CNO Holloway, the efforts of ADM Rickover, and the conceptual framework of VADM Turner, then rebranded those ideas with a new typology for the Navy a strategic document called The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979), which was described at the time as the "Fundamental principles of naval strategy." That document formed the strategic foundation for the concept of maritime supremacy evolving the strategy of the US Navy towards the 1980s 600-ship force goal.

Three very smart, very stubborn CNOs publicly arguing and writing about strategy, plus Rickover which is a redundant way of saying smart and stubborn, plus Stansfield Turner - also a very smart and stubborn leader in his own right; all competing the best and brightest strategic concepts in their own words; all doing so publicly and privately; all competing the priority of Sea Control and Power Projection in defensive and offensive force postures against one another; all while linking policy to strategy to doctrine and tactics...

All three CNOs led the debates and discussion publicly and privately on the most important strategic issues of their era. The Navy benefited greatly from it.

Lets compare then and now. CNO Greenert is championing the issue of electronic warfare today, CNO Roughead championed what was new in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower - namely maritime security and humanitarian response/disaster recovery, while Admiral Mullen was the champion of Maritime Domain Awareness.

Hmm.

Insert facepalm

The Opportunties of Yesterday and Tomorrow

 The following slides come from The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, December 2011 pages 19-20.

This slide describing the 1970s might as well be describing today. Build up and rely more on alliances and partners? Check. Accept less than victory in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Check. Avoid "another Iraq" or "another Afghanistan?" Check. Deter and plan against North Korean attack on South Korea? Check. Maintain Arab-Israeli Middle East peace while balancing our support for Israel and key Arab states? Check. Ensure western access to oil? Check.

Noteworthy the US role regarding stability in the Gulf is different today. Stability at sea? Check. Stability in the Gulf states? Hmm. Constraining the influence of radical extremists in the Middle East and Africa? Lets be honest, we are not doing very well in that regard. Prevent spillover into Latin America? The convergence threat between radical extremist groups and narcotics traffickers is an issue SOUTHCOM is monitoring every day. The leaders of Greece and Turkey are dealing with so many internal problems today they don't really have time to worry too much about the other right now.

Equivalent shares among the services (“1/3-1/3-1/3”). Sad to say, but that's the only defense strategy the United States military has derived from evolving national security policy over the last 4 decades. The socialist model for redistribution of resources conquered the Pentagon long before the Communists fell in the cold war. When your national defense strategy is based on a fraction, of course you are going to accept less than victory in war. One might even observe that when defense strategy starts with a fraction, the result might end with a fraction - for example a nation might do strategically questionable things like fight a land war in Asia in pursuit of questionable strategic objectives for over 2/5s of the last half century.

And yet, in the 1970s, when the nation was struggling with economic issues related to energy costs and other factors, while the Soviet Navy was increasing in capability and strength, while the military was suffering a post-Vietnam decline in both force and resource allocation, and despite little interest in naval power at the higher levels of defense as the focus shifted towards the Red Army in Europe scenario of war planning...

The Navy developed a few new toys.

Nimitz class aircraft carriers, Ohio class ballistic missile submarines, AEGIS surface combatants, F-18s, H-60s, the Trident missile, the Tomahwak cruise missile, VLS, LCAC...

In other words, despite major funding cuts by Congress - a process of cutting defense that was done much smarter than today's Congress that leverages sequestration - the US Navy developed the capabilities that remain - 3 decades later - the foundation of American seapower.

Here is what is even more interesting. If the President can actually step up (very unclear) and get Congress to manage defense more responsibly (just as unclear), the list one might create based on current plans for the decade 2011-2020 will look something like this:

MLP, AFSB, LSD(X), SSBN(X), Virginia class SSN, UCLASS, EMALS, AMDR, Ford-class CVNs, DDG-1000s, LCS-1s, LCS-2s, DDG-51s, LPD-17s, LHA(X), LH(X), F-18E/F, F-35B, F-35C, EA-18G.

With a miracle... and by that I mean somehow government leaders fix the sequestration mess we are in, the Navy may also field Rail Guns, LDUUVs, and Lasers, but honestly none of that is not likely to happen this decade. I have hopes the LCS MIW mission module works out well enough it would get included on the list, but time will tell.

That's really not a bad decade if you think about it. Sequestration obviously makes the current plan the list above is based upon very uncertain. What is certain is that with 7 years of the decade remaining, things can still get better or worse, and my glass is half full.

First Four Thoughts

I recommend taking a look at all 33 slides in this document, but these four in particular stood out to me.

 The 1970 list above doesn't count China, and as such 8 of the top 10 nation defense spenders in 1970 were treaty allies of the United States. In 1980, only 4 of the top 10 defense spenders were treaty allies. In 1990 and 2000 six of the top 10 nations are treaty allies of the US, but by 2010 the number is back down to 5.

Noteworthy, 2010 is the only year listed above where 2 of the top 10 national defense spenders in the world aren't facing off against each other in a power struggle. In 1970, 1980, and 1990 above the US and Soviet Union could be suggested to be in such a struggle, and in 2000 China and Taiwan were. In 2010 the closest to anything like that is Japan and China, and it would be a stretch to call their relationship in 2010 or even 2013 a cold war.

 What will that chart look like in 2020? I wonder where the EU block will rank relative to rising nations. I also wonder if Japan will still pace China, because I won't be surprised if they do, even though nobody sees that possibility in June of 2013.

The US Navy hasn't claimed to need more than 375 ships since the end of the cold war, but never dipped below the stated requirement for total ships until until Admiral Clark revised the total force requirement up in 2002. Ironically, it was under CNO Admiral Clark's watch the Navy dipped below 300 ships, and to this day the Navy still lacks a credible plan to actually get back to 300 ships.

Worth noting, over the last 4 decades, the only time the Navy fleet has increased significantly, and by that I mean by more than 10 ships to the total force number, it involved a political partnership between DoD and Navy civilian leaders. Until the day the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy are speaking about increasing ship force totals together, there is no reason to believe the number of Navy ships will go up. That is basically what history tells us. Over the last four decades, it appears the CNO has very little influence on whether the fleet size increases, the CNO only decides how it increases, or more commonly... decreases.

I found this slide to be one of the most interesting in the entire series, because it demonstrates in decent detail why 2001-2010 is the worst decade in US naval history. How many times have you heard someone in the Navy decry the decade of the 1990s? Play with the numbers between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010, and explain to me how the post-cold war decline was managed worse than the first decade of the 21st century, at a time the nation was at war.

What is the most remarkable thing about this slide is that it notes how much efficiency was gained within the Navy's various communities, and yet how badly the Navy was also managed. The entire air wing was consolidated around the F-18 platform, Navy RW was consolidated around the H-60 platform. Every new submarine funded in the decade was a Virginia class. The Navy funded the second pair of Littoral Combat Ships and all 3 DDG-1000s with the SCN budget for decade 2001-2010, and the rest of the surface combatants built were the efficient cost DDG-51s. Noteworthy, the first two of each LCS design was not funded with the SCN, but is counted in the chart above anyway.

This slide reveals how even though the Navy was achieving remarkable efficiency within the various communities of the Navy, and even though the budget for the 2001-2010 decade was significantly higher than 1991-2000 decade, the Navy ultimately built fewer ships in the 2001-2010 decade than the 1991-2000 decade. To add insult to injury, factor in the Balisle report on surface force readiness that declined significantly over the decade.

The decade 2001-2010 featured six first in class designs: Ford class nuclear powered aircraft carriers, Zumwalt class destroyers, San Antonio class Landing Platform Dock, Freedom class Littoral Combat Ships, Independence class Littoral Combat Ships, and Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ship.

The Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ships were the only programs to stay on cost and schedule. The success stories of 2001-2010, like the Arleigh Burke class multi-year procurement and the Virginia class submarine program plan, were products of the previous decade.