The House Sequestration Hearing

The service chiefs testified in the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday. The video is not yet available. Written statements are available. This is from Navy Times.

For the Navy, the budget cuts will affect the carrier fleet and its attendant strike group fleets and aircraft squadrons. The Navy will continue to maintain a single deployed carrier strike group presence in the Pacific and one in the Middle East region.

But sending out additional carriers — as the Navy has in recent weeks in response to the Syria crisis — is becoming difficult.

“What do we have to surge? It’s getting less and less, and I’m very concerned about it. Today one carrier strike group, one amphibious-ready group is ready to surge with their organized training equipment. Normally ... we have three,” said Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations.

Greenert did not specifically address Hagel’s suggestion in July that the Navy may have to shrink today’s fleet of 11 carriers to potentially eight, a move that would dramatically and permanently reduce the Navy’s operational tempo and eliminate the need for many of the destroyers, fighter squadrons and other support units typically attached to carrier strike groups.

He said the surface fleet likely will have to fall toward about 255 ships, about 30 less than today’s total fleet and far lower than the 306 that is the Navy’s official target for its shipbuilding program.

Greenert said one of his biggest concerns about the budget cuts is their impact on the Navy’s ability to develop a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic submarines, a key component of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. That program to build new ones, the so-called SSBN(X), may be unaffordable under current budget levels, he said.

One important point not mentioned in the Navy Times article is that it would appear the Navy is putting the mid-life refueling of the USS George Washington (CVN-73) on the table in FY15.

I thought the hearing went well except when the CNO listed his three top priorities as:

1. SSBN(X) Ohio-class replacement
2. Cyber
3. Deploying naval forces

I have some problems with this list, and am confident that over the next week these topics will be discussed on the blog. If Cyber is a more important priority for the CNO when it comes to Navy funding than ships, subs, aircraft, sailors, and airmen... then I have spent the entire year reading the wrong books on seapower.

CNO Hints Towards the (New?) Future of Carrier Launched Naval Aviation

Contrary to a recent suggestion regarding the decline of influence by the US Naval Institute and the organizations flagship product Proceedings magainze, Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert has penned an article in Proceedings magazine this month that is already getting a lot of attention. Payloads over Platforms: Charting a New Course is a really important article, indeed there are several aspects of the article that jumped off the page the first, second, and every other time I've read the article.

In general I have been less than impressed with the analysis of the Proceedings article to date, indeed I think most people who have publicly commented either missed the point, or failed to connect the dots. The whole article is important, not just the pieces that made headlines, and I believe it really informs us on modern ideas being circulated inside the Navy - many of which are very smart.

Please, if you have not done so, go read the entire article before reading any further. Once you have read the article, come back and read what I'm saying, then go back and read the article to see if I have this right. I'm not certain I am reading it correctly, but I think I am.

Ready? OK...

First, I have to address something. This kind of industry shrilling by think tank people who I thought were credible analysts needs to stop. The suggestion through fear by Mackenzie Eaglen that the end of manned military aviation will occur if any aspect of the Joint Strike Fighter program is changed by the Navy is either the definition of jumping the shark, or perhaps more appropriately the act of 'credibility hara-kiri.' If the defense analyst community continues to promote political fear in lockstep support of industry and policy failures instead of legitimate ideas for the DoD to deal with programs and policies that have gotten way out of control (too big to fail, a meme that applies to both the JSF and Afghanistan), then the defense analyst community is damaging their credentials beyond the ability of those folks to ever effectively lead the defense establishment in the future, and a new source of expertise needs to be sought after.

The fine line between think tank analyst and defense industry lobbyist is being blurred today by a lot of folks who were once thought of as highly credible, and I absolutely include folks at CNAS in the same category as Heritage Foundation and AEI. There is a lot of self-licking Ice Cream cone BS coming out of DC today, and that article in AOL Defense pissed me off with it's new extreme in hyperbole.

Second, Phil Ewing got it right, TWICE, but failed to connect the dots. Did the CNO just take a big swipe at the F-35? You bet the CNO did. The CNO absolutely made clear that the cost of stealth and exactly what the capability advantage of stealth is has forced the Navy to evaluate with clear eyes how to use stealth in naval aviation in the future, but the stealth issue is bigger than just the F-35C - it also must be applied to unmanned carrier aviation as well.

The CNO starts out by stating clearly that the Navy needs "to move from ‘luxury-car’ platforms—with their built-in capabilities—toward dependable ‘trucks’ that can handle a changing payload selection." Because the use of the word "truck" has historically only been applied to ships in the context of modularity or swapping out equipment on ships, it is assumed he is speaking only about ships when he mentions trucks. That would be a bad assumption, because I think he is talking about naval aviation as well.

If you recall, Bob Work sent out a memo on July 7, 2024 to Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley, Vice Chief Of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert and assistant Marine Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford to form a team to develop three alternative tactical aviation force structures, respectively representing cost savings of $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the future years defense plan. Ultimately, Work expects to determine “the best-value alternative, factoring in both cost and capability. The purpose of the study was to determine whether the Navy and Marines could operate fewer than the 40 squadrons of JSFs currently planned and to look at the possibility of accelerating development of unmanned alternative systems."

Everybody knows the costs of the Joint Strike Fighter has grown too high for the Navy to afford the future carrier air wing, indeed there is no future for unmanned carrier aviation unless the Navy reorganizes current plans of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and existing Unmanned Carrier Launched Systems programs in an effort to find more money. That memo last year was the study of plans to determine what the options are. We have never seen the results of that memo, although my impression is the CNO just hinted what they might be.

What I believe the CNO is basically saying is that the F-18E/F works effectively as a manned truck, if new weapons are brought online to support the aircraft's ability to strike at long range - which is the cover story that Captain Hernandez ran out to Phil Ewing after his original post. Like I said, Phil Ewing got it right, twice!

What the CNO is also saying is that the stealthy UCAS-D is too expensive, and that unmanned carrier launched aviation doesn't need to be stealthy, rather it needs to be capable of endurance/range and high payloads. This has been coming awhile, because one of the worst kept secrets is how many problems there are with UCAS-D. UCAS-D weighs way too much, costs too much, has less than desired endurance, and has a limited payload capacity in favor of its stealth profile. My bet is the Navy isn't going down that road long term, although the Navy will use UCAS-D as a technology demonstrator.

But the CNO emphasized stealth was important? You bet he did, and how he discusses the importance of stealth in that Proceedings article reminded me of a concept I heard discussed with regards to the future of unmanned naval aviation at a recent USNI conference where the Joint Strike Fighter will still play an important role in future naval aviation that includes unmanned systems.

Basically, the Navy would field carrier launched aviation platform "trucks" that carried a variety of long range missiles forward, and escorting these large flying trucks - trucks which would include F-18E/F manned fighters and unmanned carrier launched medium payload delivery vehicles - would be stealthy F-35Cs that basically functioned as forward observers that helped targeting for the payload trucks that could operate at stand off distances. By taking that approach, fewer F-35Cs would be needed, because the internal strike payload of the F-35C is no longer as important relative to the payload capacity of the overall strike package - which would be offloaded to manned F-18E/Fs and medium capacity carrier launched UAVs.

So that is basically where I think this is going. The Navy is going to address the very real concerns about the future carrier air wing in FY14, and they will restructure the various programs. The F-35C program will likely be restructured in the same way it was last time, by reducing the number of squadrons fielded per carrier. Last time the F-35C was reduced to 2 squadrons per carrier, this time it will likely be reduced to 1 squadron per carrier. With F-35C IOC currently scheduled for FY14, but expected to be delayed, the purchase of fewer F-35Cs and the delayed IOC will mean more F-18E/Fs will need to be purchased. This comes just in time too, because the production line for F-18E/F only goes through FY14, so more F-18E/Fs will keep that production line open longer.

The rest of the savings, which will be either $5 billion, $7.5 billion and $10 billion across the FYDP will decide the details of the F-35C and F-18E/F program changes, and also determine to what degree unmanned carrier aviation will play in the future Carrier Air Wing by 2020 and beyond. I believe it is a very good bet that unmanned carrier launched aviation will find funding, that the F-35C purchase will be reduced, and that the F-18E/F production line will stay open beyond FY14 - but the details of what unmanned carrier launched aviation will look like by 2020 is still very much unclear.

It is also important to recognize that under the CNO's emerging vision of payloads instead of platforms, platforms like the F-35C still have a primary role, but that role is changing. In part, the F-35C is still a very necessary stealth capability that will perform the always important intercept function - although the payloads for intercept will be carried at stand-off range. F-35C will also function in the forward observer role - again in support of weapons held at safer, stand-off distances. These roles for the F-35C would be vital to the tactical and operational level execution of air superiority and combat air support by carrier aviation well into future decades, which means that while the total number of F-35Cs might be fewer in the future Carrier Air Wing, it's existence in the future Carrier Air Wing becomes even more vital than it is today - particularly if the unmanned "truck" options materialize as legitimate. In many ways, I could see these changes seen as a mixed result for Lockheed Martin, on one side the F-35C is purchased in lower quantity but on the other side the platform becomes the most critical piece of the puzzle, something the platform is not under current plans.

In the end, all I believe can be said with any certainty is that based on the CNO's Proceedings article and the fiscal reality of naval aviation heading into the next two very, very tight budget years, the UCAS-D is the least likely full production approach for the future of unmanned carrier aviation.

What is Air-Sea Battle?

Vice Admiral Allen G. Myers was a late scratch from the program, but as they say - the show must go on. Today's guest speaker is Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations. Below are his opening remarks at the Brookings Institution Air-Sea Battle Doctrine on May 16, 2012.  The entire Brookings Institution event can be viewed at this link.

What is Air-Sea Battle?

Thank you very much, General Schwartz. Ladies and gentlemen, you saw this morning an anecdote of the importance of Air-Sea Battle. General Schwartz was attempting to communicate with all of you and you saw something came up to try to eliminate that. We worked together; I gave a little head nod, we went in there, a little cyber control of the EM spectrum, and things worked out.

So I don’t know how much better we can explain how this works. General Schwartz gave us a nice description of the history and really the mandate of the compelling need for Air-Sea Battle.

I’d like to talk just a little bit about why we think it’s important, what it can do for us, how we think it can be a good enabler and an enhancer for threats to access, and what our efforts will be to implement this concept. Also, what’s been going on so far and what are we going to do here in the future?

We think there’s a good strategic operational, tactical, and institutional value for Air-Sea Battle. The anti-access area denial is not the only challenge to naval and air forces, but it’s probably the defining challenge today and as we view it in the near future.

Strategically, Air-Sea Battle can help us deter adversaries, reassure our partners and allies by demonstrating the ability to honor our security commitments and to be able to act worldwide for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It’s a spectrum of values.

It’s not about a particular country, as General Schwartz indicated. Anti-access area denial is proliferating. The Arctic is opening is an example. Climate changes take place around the world and we have to get where we need to get in order to act, to provide the effects that we’re asked to do.

Operationally, Air-Sea Battle provides us the ways and means to assure access. Some argue that look, we’re not going to fight those kinds of wars anymore in the future, but it’s not always a big war scenario. It might merely be a contingency. And it’s not always about conflict.

There are some natural or nature born or originated anti-access area denial that are a growing concern; earthquakes, the far north, fires on the West Coast, if you remember that. We had to get in there and it wasn’t easy to find those sources. And a nuclear disaster that about a year plus ago we had to figure out how to get to the source of this problem. And we were being denied that.

US Navy Photo

Institutionally, the integration between the Air Force and the Navy staffs is a great opportunity. We need to gain efficiencies, build appropriate redundancy where it makes sense, and the means by which it will preclude an advisory from finding the one way to develop a solution to preclude or to enable them to provide that anti-access and area denial.

Now the how. The Air-Sea Battle leverages the enduring U.S. advantages that we know well, especially in our two services; the initiatives and skill of our sailors and our airmen, the value that we have under the sea, the ability under the sea, the stealth, the global reach, the cyber capability, and the advantage we have in our networks and networking capabilities.

The central idea here, ladies and gentlemen, is a tightly coordinated operation across warfare domains. Air supporting land in the Cold War, General Schwartz mentioned it and Pete mentioned it in the opening, that was there and some of that is in our current plans. It’s maritime supporting the land, which took place in World War II, it took place in the Korea conflict, in the West Coast operations, and in amphibious operations.

Electronic warfare supporting air in suppressing air defenses took place in Libya, jamming. These examples, though, either were put together in the past sort of ad hoc or they were included as part of a particular operational plan; not really part of the concept of operations. And it’s really taken what we have and adjusting is what we did in the past.

What we’d like to do is make this cross-domain operation more an assumption for the future. We’ll build the concept of operations so that as we organize, as we train, as we equip and do operations in the future we’ll think about electronic warfare defeating radars to protect surface and air operations.

We’ll talk about submarines defeating air defenses, maybe kinetically and maybe non-kinetically, cyber attack against command and control needs to enable air and surface operations or stealth global strike on an anti-air warfare destroyer to enable air ops. There’s a whole panoply of it. The idea is to broaden the aperture in these and make that the standard approach as we think about the concepts of the future.

To do this we’re going to need real time coordination across these domains. We do this now, as threats improve, tighter coordination will be needed in the future. One example is we’ve got to be faster thinking about anything from an anti ship cruise missile, the faster coordination of electronic warfare kill, a non-kinetic kill.

Today our maritime component commander and our air component commander, sometimes they come together at the headquarters, at the task force headquarters. We need to think about that and see if there isn’t a faster way to do that.

I’m taken back to my own personal experience in 2005. I’m working with General Deptula who’s the Air Combatant Commander on the maritime combatant commander. We’re doing an operation and I’ve got a submarine out there who’s saying ‘hey, I’m detecting a radar out here through my periscope and my ESM mask that it’s over the horizon. I vaguely have this acoustic contact and I know that it’s a threat out there. So how do I get this to the JFACC and then get this back to the air task in order to get it out there?’ It takes too long.

So we worked through -- we need to get people on the same net, and General Schwartz mentioned that earlier in that exercise; to getting that faster turnaround, get inside that loop. That’s the future. That’s what we need to think about. Cross domain coordination requires a new approach. Our links need to be similar or minimally compatible.

Our F-22, F-35, our F-18 Hornets, our RA 2-Ds, navy integrated fire control counter air, NIFC-CA, and our ships; right now some of these links are different. We need to look at coordinating that. Communications between submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles or unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft need to improve. Unmanned aerial vehicle based comms and links can be the gateways to bridge the domains and we need to get there. We need to have a visibility of the operations that are taking place in the EM spectrum.

Now on operational planning on our cross-domain actions are going to have to be more centralized. Command and control today, as I mentioned, you’ve got the JFMCC, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, the JFACC, the Air Component Commander, the Land Component Commander, and they’re in a structure of domains to deal with the problem.

US Navy Photo

In the future we need to look at should we be looking at missions, should we be looking at strike, at cyber, as something that crosses these domains in a command and control operation. And I say yes we do and our folks are. Air-sea battle provides that means to do that.

It’s providing -- it’s building cross-domain capability to improve our effects change and gives us more options. We can use an Air Force AWACS or an E-2 with cooperative engagement and share the tracks, what a concept, with our Aegis, with our Hornet, with the F22, with the Raptor, and other TAC air to engage. And it adds the redundancy, in some cases, to be more efficient and we can eliminate eventually some of that duplication as we work through this.

Air-sea battle uses integrated forces for what we like to think as three main lines of effort. It’s integrated operations across domains to complete, as I said, our kill chain, but it’s also Air-Sea Battle lines of effort to break the adversary’s kill or effects chain. We want to disrupt the C4ISR piece of it; decision superiority.

It may be good enough alone if they can’t communicate or if something is causing an effect, if some signal is causing a nuclear disaster -- our reactor to operate, how do we go in there and shut that down if the place is empty. How do we get into that information superiority area? Defeat of weapons launch, get to the archer, or defeat the weapon kinetically to defeat the arrow. And so looking at those three lines of effort, kind of summarizes how we approach that.

Now what we’re doing to implement Air-Sea Battle. We’ve got more than 200 initiatives that our respective teams getting together with the Marine Corps and with the Army put out there. A third of them are non-material, from policy to the concept of operations in componency that I mentioned earlier, data link, protocols, information sharing, and the majority of these are in progress.

We’ve stood up the Air-Sea Battle office last November with Army representation and Marine Corps representation, and of course, our respective services. We’ve championed initiatives out there. We’re pursuing more exercises that -- you’ve seen an example that General Schwartz -- how do we get more of that? What training opportunities are we not investing in that we really should?

We’ve weighed in on the investments. Where can we -- why should I be buying this if the Air Force is buying it? Well, maybe we should buy it together. Maybe we should let them operate, or the Army, or the Marine Corps. Where does this make sense?

We’re pursuing the relevant scenarios that may be -- that we may be using sooner than we think. Homeland defense, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, support of civil affairs in the homeland, natural disasters, just some I mentioned earlier. And we’re investing in Pres Bud 11, we’ve invested, Pres Bud 12 we’ve invested, particularly anti- submarine warfare, electronic warfare, air and missile defense, and information sharing.

Our Pres Bud 13, the one on the Hill today, sustains these investments and really provides more resilient C4ISR investments. We have accepted less capacity in some cases, in order to enhance capability to get better capability out there.

Going forward, we will jointly evaluate naval and air investments together through the office, looking at the long range bomber, the data links, like I said, looking for the common or the compatible data links; looking at SSN capability and capacity, looking at tankers, anti surface weapons, surface to surface delivered or air to surface delivered. What’s the best way? Cyber, electronic warfare, including electronic attack.

So Air-Sea Battle is a framework for us to organized, to train, and equip our efforts. We will continue to refine it and we’ll continue to apply it. And at this national security inflection point, that the defense strategic guidance has laid out for us, it’s essential that we have an effective and an efficient way ahead. We think this is one means to get that. Thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions.

Navigation Plan

Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert has updated his blog with what is being called the “Navigation Plan," a follow-on document to his previous guidance titled “Sailing Directions.” It is a very interesting read, and can be described as the CNO's perspective looking at the Navy's Five-Year Defense Plan.

The document reminded me a lot of the once famous (and now cursed) Seapower 21 document released by Admiral Vern Clark, except this document isn't being touted as strategic while that one was. Everything listed in the Navigation Plan, which is specific to taking a budget perspective, is an existing program within the FYDP - indeed this document doesn't even mention AMDR or the DDG-51 Flight III it is so focused on existing programs within the FYDP.

With one exception... What is this Large Displacement UUV mentioned in the document, and where can I find more information? Sea-Air-Space I hope.

BZ to the CNO, this document is well done.

Meet the New Boss, Already Different than the Old Boss

CNO Greenert has issued what he is calling Sailing Directions, or what is also being described as the CNO's Tenets. This is the PDF, but I have posted in full.

Mission

Our core responsibilities Deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, win our Nation’s wars. Employ the global reach and persistent presence of forward-stationed and rotational forces to secure the Nation from direct attack, assure Joint operational access and retain global freedom of action. With global partners, protect the maritime freedom that is the basis for global prosperity. Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of allies and international partners to enhance global security.

Vision

Navy’s contribution and characteristics over the next 10-15 years The U.S. Navy will remain critical to our national security and our economic prosperity.

• The Navy will continue to be at the front line of our nation’s efforts in war and peace with a proud heritage of success in battle on, above, and below the sea.
• The Navy will continue protecting the interconnected systems of trade, information, and security that underpin American prosperity.

Operating forward across the globe, the Navy will provide the nation offshore options to win today and advance our interests in an era of uncertainty.

• We will deliver credible capability for deterrence, sea control, and power projection to deter or contain conflict and fight and win wars.
• As ground forces draw down in the Middle East, the Navy will continue to deter aggression and reassure our partners - we will have the watch.

Ready Sailors and Civilians will remain the source of the Navy’s warfighting capability.

• Our people will be diverse in experience, background and ideas; personally and professionally ready; and proficient in the operation of their weapons and systems.
• Our Sailors and Civilians will continue a two-century tradition of warfighting excellence, adaptation, and resilience.
• Our character and our actions will remain guided by our commitment to the nation and to each other as part of one Navy team.

We will address economic change by being effective and efficient. We will innovate to:

• Use new technologies and operating concepts to sharpen our warfighting advantage against evolving threats.
• Operate forward at strategic maritime crossroads.
• Sustain our fleet capability through effective maintenance, timely modernization, and sustained production of proven ships and aircraft.
• Provide our Sailors confidence in their equipment and in their own skills.

Over the next 10 to 15 years, the Navy will evolve and remain the preeminent maritime force.

• The reach and effectiveness of ships and aircraft will be greatly expanded through new and updated weapons, unmanned systems, sensors, and increased power.
• The Air-Sea Battle concept will be implemented to sustain U.S. freedom of action and Joint Assured Access.
• Unmanned systems in the air and water will employ greater autonomy and be fully integrated with their manned counterparts.
• The Navy will continue to dominate the undersea domain using a network of sensors and platforms - with expanded reach and persistence from unmanned autonomous systems.
• Cyberspace will be operationalized with capabilities that span the electromagnetic spectrum - providing superior awareness and control when and where we need it.

Our forces will operate forward in new and flexible ways with access to strategic maritime crossroads.

• Our posture will be focused and improved using a combination of rotational deployments, forward bases, temporary and austere facilities and partner nation ports.
• Our forward presence will build on and strengthen our partnerships and alliances where sea lanes, resources, and vital U.S. interests intersect.

Tenets

The key considerations we should apply to every decision

Warfighting First: Be ready to fight and win today, while building the ability to win tomorrow

Operate Forward: Provide offshore options to deter, influence and win in an era of uncertainty

Be Ready: Harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our diverse force to be ready to fight and responsibly employ our resources

Guiding Principles

The starting point for developing and executing our plans

• Our primary mission is warfighting. All our efforts to improve capabilities, develop people, and structure our organizations should be grounded in this fundamental responsibility.
• People are the Navy’s foundation. We have a professional and moral obligation to uphold a covenant with Sailors, Civilians and their families * to ably lead, equip, train and motivate.
• Our approach should be Joint and combined when possible. However, we own the sea, and must also be able to operate independently when necessary.
• Our primary Joint partner is the U.S. Marine Corps. We must continue to evolve how we will operate and fight as expeditionary warfare partners.
• At sea and ashore, we must be ready to part with Navy roles, programs and traditions if they are not integral to our future vision or a core element of our mission.
• We must ensure today’s force is ready for its assigned missions.
• Maintaining ships and aircraft to their expected service lives is an essential contribution to fleet capacity.
• Our Navy Ethos defines us and describes the standard for character and behavior.
• We must clearly and directly communicate our intent and expectations both within and outside the Navy.
• I believe in the “Charge of Command.” We will train and empower our leaders with authorities commensurate with their responsibilities.

Solid. Concise. Easily communicated. Easily disseminated.

The real value of this work is that it can be easily communicated and easily understood by the audience because it leverages the art of simplicity and concise language. It concentrates on what is important, and doesn't try to inflate what isn't for purposes of platitudes.

You know what's missing? All the incoherent buzzword bingo bullshit of programmatic, technical rubbish that usually makes leadership guidance look and feel like a quasi resume of accomplishment or justification for actions in resourcing programs. You know what is also missing? Empty head nods towards The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

The signal I get from this is a back to basics approach, which from a moment of time analysis from this outside view - looks to be exactly what the US Navy needs right now.

I compare this guidance by CNO Greenert to last years 15 page scatter-shot CNO Guidance (PDF) released at around the same time last year by CNO Roughead. My impression, there is a new boss who appears focused on talking about what matters, and not giving lip service to what doesn't.

Refreshing.

CNO At The Surface Navy Association

My final report from SNA concerns last night's banquet speech given by the CNO. A couple of quick thoughts before I get to his remarks:

1. SNA inducted 7 individuals into the Surface Navy Hall of Fame last night, including RADM Wayne Meyer (the Father of AEGIS) and VADM Jim Doyle (the guy who programmed to money Meyer needed). As most of you know, Meyer was wrapped up in AEGIS or its forebears for oh--I don't know--twenty years or so. Additionally, Doyle was the DCNO for Surface Warfare for 5 YEARS--from 1975-1980. Together these two changed the Navy, forever. The fleet out there now was Doyle's Fleet with Meyer's help---and I cannot conclude that their longevity in office was anything but helpful to getting big things done.

2. The Hall of Fame induction included a video capturing the exploits of all the inductees. SNA should put it on YouTube---it is wonderful.

3. I put 21 years in the Navy and when I go to SNA, I can't swing a dead cat without running into a dear friend. As I watched the CNO walk about last night, I couldn't help but think about his emotions as he saw old friends from 40 plus years of wearing the Navy uniform. He seemed genuinely thrilled to be there, as if he were drawing energy from the people around him. Good for him.

Now, onto the speech.

There were no newsworthy statements or revelations, but then again, that's not CNO's style. It was well crafted and well delivered, a serious speech about serious things. There were the standards of any CNO speech (praise Sailors, the people in the room, contributions, etc), but what caught my ear was the language of "responsibility" I heard throughout. At one point, the CNO even referred to his "care free" (or was it "free-wheeling"--one of the two) days as a Fleet Commander, in contrast to his tasks as CNO. He used the phrase "responsible acquisition", he spoke strongly of total ownership cost and affordability, and he asserted that our plans must reflect fiscal reality.

Of course, all of this is unremarkable coming from a CNO. What caught my ear though was the way the themes were repeated...as if he were subliminally messaging the audience, perhaps in an unintended way. Others may disagree here--and state that what he said last night was pretty boilerplate stuff. They may be right. I got the feeling though that he was preparing the way for whatever news the QDR may bring for the Navy's fiscal future. He did repeat the 313 ship as a floor statement, something I think he wouldn't do if that weren't likely to remain the case coming out of QDR. The question is how the mix of ships will change, and I think that could be very interesting.

Another item that caught my ear was his determination to focus on "capacity" as he assessed that we had a wide "capability" gap over our competitors--though he did warn about keeping a "weather eye" on the gap in BMD and ASW. This is a subtle shift, but potentially an important one. Does it mean an increased focus on low-end, modestly appointed ships? I read it that way, but then again, I'm on record as wanting more low-end modestly appointed ships, so there's likely a bias there.

ADM Roughead is a serious man, and his speech last night was a serious speech. I'd be interested to read how others viewed it.

Note: a commenter asked about transcripts, and I really do not know--I would direct that question to SNA

Bryan McGrath